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To my father
“To me, you are still nothing more than a little boy who is just
like a hundred thousand other little boys. And I have no need of
you. And you, on your part, have no need of me. To you, I am
nothing more than a fox like a hundred thousand other foxes. But
if you tame me, then we shall need each other. To me, you will be
unique in all the world. To you, I shall be unique in all the world...”
The Little Prince (Chapter XXI)
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of human cognition is that we construe the environ-
ment as including unique individuals that belong to various categories. An
individual dog, for example, could simultaneously be a living being, a mammal
or a poodle, but when it comes to things that are important to us - our dog
Fido, our favorite restaurant, our spouse - we also represent the individuals
themselves, not just the categories they belong to. Cognitive psychologists have
made an extensive study of categories of objects but have had less to say con-
cerning conceptions of individuals, i.e. singular concepts, and how they support
our ability to uniquely identify individual entities in different situations.
The primary goal of this work is to investigate the nature and the functioning
dynamics of singular concepts and explore how these concepts underlie singular
cognition, i.e. the ability to identify a known entity, through perceptual or
epistemic access to its memorial representation, and trace it as the same unique
entity over time and change.
To perform such a process the cognitive system is confronted with a unique-
ness problem. It needs to pick an individual entity out, secure a unique mental
referential link with the entity and maintain that link over time and change.
We argue that singular concepts are the cognitive devices that are special-
ized for this function and we propose a model of singular cognition that has the
notion of singular concept at its core. The main assumption of this model is
that conceptual representations about individuals (i.e. singular concepts) rep-
resent a networks of unique files in memory which mediate the direct access to
individual-specific knowledge and provide a unique mechanism of identification
and reference for unique individuals. According to our model, the access to this
system is not mediated by higher level representations (i.e. general concepts),
neither is internally organized by these representations. On the contrary, it is
subjected to its own functioning dynamics and it is organized through associa-
tive links which connect different individual concepts and causal links which
maintain the conceptual history of an entity, by linking different states of the
same singular concept, across time and change.
We can distinguish four main phases of our investigation about singular
concepts which led to the proposed model of singular cognition.
1) In the first phase we investigated what is the preferential level of ab-
straction at which an individual entity is first identified (i.e. the entry point of
recognition). Since any individual object can be identified at multiple levels of
abstraction (e.g. a dog can be identified as a “dog”, more generally as “animal”
or more specifically as “poodle” or “Fido”), the aim was to test the hypothesis
that the singular concept of an object acts as the access node to the knowledge
that the agent has about the object and this access is direct and not mediated
by higher level concepts. Results from three experiments on visual recognition
provided evidences in favor of this hypothesis, indicating that the entry level of
identification of unique individuals is shifted to the most subordinate level of
abstraction, i.e. the level of unique identity.
2) The second phase of this work explored how our semantic representations
of individual things are accessed and how these representations are inter-linked
with those of other individual things. This issue has been investigated through
a priming experiment which provided evidence in favor of a model in which
singular concepts are organized by means of horizontal associative links instead
of by vertical links with higher level representations.
3) In the third phase of our investigation we looked inside a singular concept
and we explored which attributes people consider more relevant to uniquely
identify entities belonging to different categories and determine the cognitive
importance that individual attributes have in identifying these entities. We
also explored which are the most relevant attributes that people use to identify
entities in a specific task, i.e. the search for information about individual entities
by means of keyword queries on the Web.
4) The last phase of the investigation concerned with the problem of how
people judge the identity of entities over time and change. An experiment
was conducted which explored how people evaluate the identity of entities over
changes in their descriptions. The results of the study have been interpreted in
the light of a causal model of the functioning of singular concepts in keeping
the unique referential link with the entity across change.
Beyond the cognitive issues, this work is also motivated by the recent devel-
opment of technological approaches to the problem of entity identification.
Since many identification problems which are addressed by a cognitive sys-
tem have a counterpart in information systems which manage information about
individual entities (e.g. to represent or extract information about unique indi-
viduals and manage individual-specific knowledge across time and change), the
last goal of our work is to make an investigation of possible contributions that
a cognitive study on the problem of individual identification can provide to
technological applications. In particular we focused on the problem of entity
identification in search systems. A model and an application for a specific tech-
nological problem, i.e. entity type disambiguation in Web-search queries, is
described and its beneficial impact is evaluated.
In summary, the contribution of this work is twofold. On one hand, we
provided new evidence on the nature of high-level cognitive mechanisms involved
in entity representation and identification, suggesting new research issues on
a field scarcely investigated in cognitive psychology. On the other hand, we
provided concrete examples of how a better understanding of these processes at
a cognitive level can improve the development of entity identification approaches
in information systems, suggesting a middle ground where cognitive models and
technological solutions can find the opportunity for integration, in particular in
contexts characterized by interactions between humans and machines.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A fundamental aspect of human cognition is that we conceptualize the reality as
including unique entities - such as specific places, persons, objects - that belong
to various categories. An individual dog, for example, could simultaneously
be a living being, a mammal or a poodle, but when we identify a specific dog
as our dog “Fido” we access the mental representation of the individual itself
not just the categories it belongs to. The processes involved in identifying an
object at these two levels of abstraction (as a member of a general category or
as a unique individual) are indeed quite different, as they are, we assume, their
underlying memory representations. When classifying an object as a member of
a category, we need to ignore the very information that is required to distinguish
individual exemplars of the category and we need to connect the object with
a general conceptual representation which cluster features largely shared by
the members of the category. On the contrary, when we identify an object as a
unique individual we activate unique semantic associations that are distinctive of
that particular object compared to the other category members. We refer to the
cluster of unique semantic associations linked to an entity as a singular concept,
while we name singular cognition the complex of cognitive processes that allow
a cognitive agent to identify a known entity, through perceptual or epistemic
access to its memorial representation, and trace it as the same unique entity
perceived or known at successive moments in time. To perform such a process
the cognitive system is confronted with a uniqueness problem. It needs to pick
an individual entity out, secure a unique mental referential link with the entity
and maintain that link over time and change. We argue that singular concepts
are the cognitive devices that are specialized for this function, providing a unique
referential link between the entity and its memorial representation.
For years, cognitive psychologists have made an extensive study of categories
of objects and their mental representations (i.e. general concepts), but have
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put less effort studying how people represent unique individuals and how these
representations (i.e. singular concepts) support our ability to identify these
entities in different situations. Nonetheless, the identification process is crucial
to daily life. We need to correctly recognize and identify all the individual
entities relevant to our own existence (people, pets, places, objects and so on)
and successfully track those individuals over time and change. When these
abilities are compromised, the consequences may be devastating and a complex
array of neuropsychological deficits have been documented at various stages of
the identification process (a stirring example is described by Oliver Sacks in his
famous book “The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat” [205]).
The identification process has often been treated in a perceptual context (e.g.
face recognition), since perceptual factors play a fundamental role in identifying
objects. For example, I can recognize a person as familiar at a crowded party by
her perceptual appearance (e.g. her face, voice, clothing) and then fully identify
the person by retrieving semantic information about her, including her name.
However, there are contexts in which perceptual information is scarce or in-
sufficient to ensure correct identifications. If I see the same friend after a long
time, the stock of perceptual informations which are part of my representation
of her may be too dated to support the identification process and the full iden-
tification can be obtained only by acquiring extra information, e.g. during the
conversation. In other cases perceptual information can be completely absent.
For example, while reading a news item about a traffic accident, I can suspect
that the person involved in the accident is a classmate whom I lost touch with a
long time ago. In this situation, I have to decide about the identity of this indi-
vidual using only the information reported in the article. In these cases, we can
only rely on conceptual histories and higher level knowledge about individuals
must come into play to allow the identification process.
We argue that this knowledge is stored in specialized mental files, which
we refer to as singular concepts, which bind together our information about
the individuals they are about and individuate our cognitive perspective on
those individuals. However, singular concepts are not only vehicles for storing
information about a particular individual, but they serve as mental identifiers
which create the unique referential link between an object in the world and its
mental representation in the cognitive system.
In this sense, singular concepts represent the core of the identification process
both in perceptual contexts and in contexts in which perceptual information
is scarce or not available at all. Identification depends, indeed, on a variety
of cognitive means for information acquisition, such as perception, reasoning,
communication and so on. The acknowledgment of this variety of means requires
distinguishing two ways to access singular concepts: perceptual or bottom-up and
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epistemic or top-down.
A mental file can be accessed via a bottom-up way by a perceptual stimulus.
In this case the individual is present in a sensory field of the agent’s perceptual
systems and the perceptual input activates the corresponding mental represen-
tation, through a direct match with the perceptual information stored in the
concept. Alternatively, a mental file can be accessed via a top-down way in cases
in which the target individual cannot be perceived, but can be identified on the
basis of indirect information gathered by such sources as memory, reasoning or
communication.
Even though many cognitive models of human knowledge assume the ex-
istence of mental representations of unique individuals 1, the nature of these
representations has been less investigated or has been considered less relevant
to understand the identification process compared to higher level conceptual
representations (as assumed, for example, by sortalist approaches to identity
[268]).
The first aim of the present work is to provide a contribution to fill this gap,
by proposing a general model of singular cognition based on a system of mental
unique representations which ensure the agent’s individuation of unique objects
through different contexts, time and change. In other words the focus is on the
mechanisms and the cognitive devices of singular cognition.
We can distinguish four main phases of our investigation about singular
concepts. We start with the study of how an individual entity first makes
contact with its underlying memorial representation through a bottom-up way
(i.e. from a perceptual stimulus to a singular concept); then, we investigate how
singular concepts are organized and interrelated each other in the conceptual
system; we then pass to explore some aspects of the internal organization of
the knowledge stored in a singular concept and we consider the top-down access
to singular concepts in a specific identification task; we finally investigate how
singular concepts underlie the mechanism of tracing entities through time and
change. More precisely:
1. The first phase of our research aims to investigate what is the preferential
level of abstraction at which an individual entity is first identified (i.e. the
1Unique representations of individuals are assumed in memory studies [3, 195]; neuropsy-
chology studies have suggested specialized neural mechanisms devoted to evoking memo-
ries about unique members of categories [54] and specific impairments for unique entity-
information are reported in literature [92, 90]. The existence of representations of unique
individuals distinct from those of general categories is also expressed in conceptual semantics
in the distinction between “tokens” and “types” [112] and exemplar models of categoriza-
tion [159] make the same distinction, proposing that people represent categories by means
of representations of unique individuals. Finally, the most accepted cognitive models of face
recognition and naming [35, 38] assume the existence of identity nodes in memory which store
semantic knowledge about individuals and are accessed to fully identify known persons.
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entry point). In particular, since any individual object can be identified
at multiple levels of abstraction (e.g. a dog can be identified as a “dog”,
more generally as “animal” or more specifically as “poodle” or “Fido”),
the aim is to test the hypothesis that the singular concept of an object
acts as the access node to the knowledge that the agent has about the
object and this access is direct and not mediated by higher level concepts.
2. The second phase of this work explores how our semantic representations
of individual things are organized and accessed and how these representa-
tions are inter-linked with those of other individual things. In particular
we test two alternative views about the organization of singular concepts
in semantic memory. A categorical view which holds that memory repre-
sentations of unique entities are interconnected by belonging to common
categories and an associative view which holds that relationships between
entities can be represented by networks of associative links but not by
membership of a common category.
3. In the third phase of our investigation we look inside a singular concept
and we explore which attributes people consider more relevant to uniquely
identify entities belonging to different categories and determine the cogni-
tive importance, or weight, that individual attributes have in identifying
these entities. We also explore which are the most relevant attributes
that people use to identify entities in a specific task, i.e. the search for
information about individual entities by means of keyword queries on the
Web. In this phase we explore the hypothesis that information within a
singular concept is organized in terms of identification relevance and that
the notion of relevance is, at least in part, contextual dependent.
4. Finally, the last phase of the research concerns with the problem of how
people judge the identity of entities over time and change. Because indi-
viduals can change some of their properties while persisting as the same
individuals, the singular cognition system needs a function of tracking
a changing entity by performing specialized updating operations, which
maintain the referential link with its singular concept. In this phase of
our research we explore how causal mechanisms come into play to connect
the possible states of a singular concept at successive moments in time.
On the basis of the results of the four phases described above, we finally pro-
pose a cognitive model for singular cognition that has the notion of singular con-
cept at its core. The main assumption of this model is that conceptual represen-
tations about individuals (i.e. singular concepts) represent a networks of unique
files in memory which mediate the direct access to individual-specific knowledge
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and provide a unique mechanism of identification and reference through time.
According to our model, the access to this system is not mediated by higher level
representations (i.e. general concepts), neither is internally organized by these
representations, but it is subjected to own functioning dynamics based on asso-
ciative links which connect different individual concepts and causal links which
connect different states of the same singular concept across time and change.
Beyond the cognitive issues, this work is also motivated by the recent devel-
opment of technological approaches to the problem of entity identification.
Much of information in current decentralized network-based systems - includ-
ing the Web and its evolving extension, the Semantic Web 2 - is about individual
entities and recently we are assisting to the transition from the centrality of doc-
uments to that of entities as atomic objects of information. This transition has
been recently marked in research on knowledge representation and integration
by the passage from approaches more focused on high level representations - i.e.
ontologies with special focus on the T-Box part of the ontology, which defines
concepts and its relations - to the emergence of entity-centric approaches which
focus on the instances which populate ontologies, realizing what has been re-
cently called the “A-Box revenge” [235]. However it is worth to note that this
is just a recent phenomenon and for years research on knowledge representation
and integration was research on general categories and their relations, as well
as nearly all the research on concepts in cognitive psychology was research on
general categories of objects.
Contrary to the traditional trend, today, a big effort is made to allow the
information integration across multiple heterogeneous sources and the idea that
identifying entities is at the core of this effort is increasingly diffuse, representing
also one of the main pillars of the Semantic Web.
Ideally, the information integration could be obtained by uniquely identifying
entities in all the local nodes of a distributed system. However, the solution
proposed by the Semantic Web to extend the use of a URI (Uniform Resource
Identifier) to identify not just web pages, but any resource on the Web [20, 19],
does not ensure that the same entity is consistently assigned the same URI
across different sources.
Several theoretical and technological solutions to the problem of identifi-
cation in the Semantic Web - referred as “identity crisis” by [44] - have been
2The Semantic Web vision was conceived by Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World
Wide Web, as an extension of the current Web, in which information is given well-defined
meaning, better enabling computers and people to work in cooperation [19]. The majority
of today’s World Wide Web’s content is designed for humans to read and understand, not
for machines and computer programs to manipulate meaningfully. Machines have no reliable
way to process the semantics of the Web documents. The Semantic Web will bring structure
to the meaningful content of Web pages through the use of standards, markup languages
and related processing tools with the intent to facilitate information integration, reuse and
exchange, across application and systems.
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recently proposed [101, 26].
A possible solution to the entity identification problem can be found within
the OKKAM project [28, 29]. The goal of OKKAM is to develop an Entity Name
System (ENS) for the (Semantic) Web, a web-scale infrastructure which can
make sure that the same web entity is referred to through the same URI across
any type of content, format, application. The ENS has a repository for storing
entity identifiers along with some small amount of descriptive information for
each entity. When a request for an entity is submitted, the ENS decides if a
URI for this entity is already available in the repository; if it is, then the ENS
will return its URI, otherwise it will issue a new URI which will be stored in
the repository.
The development of an ENS leads inevitably to issues of entity representation
and identification that are common to any systems that represent and manage
information about entities.
The problem to define what counts as an entity is a fundamental issue.
Which are the atomic objects that needs to be referenced and distinguished
from other objects in an information system?
To identify something, it is necessary to distinguish it from other things,
which leads to the question how an entity is supposed to be described in a way
that sufficiently distinguishes it from all the other entities. Which is the most
important information that allows to identify an entity?
Identity decisions, i.e. the decision if two entity descriptions refer to the
same entity, are performed mainly on the information about the entity stored in
the system. However the information about an entity can change across time.
Which is the information more likely to change over time? What is the influence
of entity change on identity?
These questions show that many cognitive issues mentioned above are rele-
vant also from a technological perspective.
There is a strong parallelism between the identification needs in a cognitive
system and those in a entity-centric system. Moreover many of the dynamics
which govern the functioning of singular concept have a counterpart in the func-
tioning of entity-centric systems. In both cases, the system stores, accumulates
and updates information about individual entities creating singular representa-
tion of them. A special kind of referential mechanism between singular repre-
sentations in the system and the corresponding token elements in the world is
required to recognize an entity as a familiar one, to access to its entity specific
information (in a bottom-up or top-down way) and to fully identify the entity
across successive moments in time.
Another important aspect that connects the identification issues of a cogni-
tive agent with those of information systems is that in their interactions with
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these systems people are more and more faced with identifying and searching in-
formation about individual entities. Therefore, the success of these interactions
strongly depends on the ability for the automatic system to correctly interpret
the singular cognition act, i.e. the identification act, of the user and return the
information about the intended target.
Therefore, the second aim of the present work is to provide evidence of how a
cognitive study on the identification problem can contribute to answer analogous
questions in a technological context and inspire possible solutions to some of the
most crucial issues about entity identification in entity-based systems, such as
entity representation or entity resolution 3.
5. The fifth and last phase of the present work aims to map some of the main
cognitive issues about entity identification into corresponding technologi-
cal issues, with the aim to show how the solutions adopted by the cognitive
system can inspire and improve models and algorithms for identification
which can be adopted in information systems. A practical example of this
is reported in Chapter 10 where we describe a model and an application
for entity type disambiguation of keywords in entity search.
1.1 Mission Statement
In this work we argue that a model of how individual entities are analyzed and
represented by the cognitive system for the identification process will have to
provide a system that does more than construct a conceptual representation of
these entities. Such a model, which we might call a model of singular cognition,
will also have to provide a special kind of referential connection between the
elements of the mental representation and certain token elements in the world,
a connection that is unmediated by higher-level conceptual representations, i.e.
general concepts. We argue that this connection is secured by special mental
representations, which we refer to as “singular concepts”, that provide a system
of unique mental identifiers for unique entities.
The main goal of this work is to explore the nature of this system and propose
a model of how people identify individual entities and trace the identity of these
entities through time and change. To this end, we will address the following
objectives:
3Entity Resolution (ER) is an important information integration problem: The same “real-
world entities” are referred to in different ways in multiple data records. For instance, two
records on the same person may provide different name spellings, and addresses may differ.
The goal of ER is to “resolve” entities, by identifying the records that represent the same
entity and reconciling them to obtain one record per entity.
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1. to explore the first point of access to entity-specific information, stored in
singular concepts, during the (visual) recognition of unique entities;
2. to investigate how semantic representations of individual entities are or-
ganized and how these representations are inter-linked with those of other
individual entities;
3. to investigate the internal structure of singular concepts, showing how
semantic features represented within a singular concept may have differ-
ent importance in concept representation and provide evidence of which
features people consider most important to uniquely identify individual
entities in different tasks;
4. to study how causal factors are involved in shaping concepts of individuals
and explore how people make use of causal information to identify objects
across time and change.
5. to explore the parallelism between identification problem in a cognitive
system and the same problem in an information system and provide ev-
idence for possible applications and benefits in developing methods for
automatic entity identity management.
In summary, the contribution of our work is twofold. On one hand, we
aim to examine the nature of high-level cognitive mechanisms involved in en-
tity representation and identification, revealing new research issues on this topic
in cognitive psychology. On the other hand, we aim to explore how a better
understanding of these processes at a cognitive level, can improve the devel-
opment of entity identification mechanisms required by systems that manage
automatically the identity of represented entities.
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Chapter 2
Singular Concepts and
Singular Cognition
Many models of human cognition assume the existence of mental representations
of unique individuals1. However, the nature of these representations and their
functioning dynamics have been poorly investigated in cognitive psychology, in
particular with reference to the identification mechanisms involved in singular
cognition. In this chapter we explain what is a singular concept (and what is not
a singular concept), which are its properties, how it functions and why we need
such a representation mechanism which identify and keeps track of individual
objects in the world across time.
2.1 Singular Concepts: what they are and what
they are not
Our knowledge of the world is mediated by two kinds of activities: 1) percep-
tual activities, providing us with information about the external world; and
2) conceptual activities, allowing us to have internal representations of various
categories of objects.
1For example, many models of semantic memory represent individuals differently than
classes [3, 195] and neuropsychology studies have suggested specialized neural mechanisms
devoted to evoking memories about unique members of categories. [54]. The existence of
representations of unique individuals distinct from those of general categories is also expressed
in conceptual semantics in the distinction between “tokens” and “types” [112] and exemplar
models of categorization [159] make the same distinction, proposing that people represent
categories by means of representations of unique individuals. Finally, the most accepted
cognitive models of face recognition and naming [35, 38] assume the existence of identity
nodes in memory which store semantic knowledge about individuals and are accessed to fully
identify known persons.
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Nearly all research on conceptual activities in cognitive psychology is re-
search on categories of objects, e.g. categories as “dog”, “chair” or “car”. But
when it comes to things that are important to us - people, works of art, build-
ings, places - we understand that much of human knowledge is about “individu-
als” and we have representations of these individuals, not just of the categories
they belong to. This lead us to distinguish between two kinds of conceptual
representations: singular concepts and general concepts.
We use the term singular concept to denote a cognitive representation of
a unique individual, and we contrast singular concepts with general concepts,
which are representations of categories. A representation of The Leaning Tower
of Pisa is a singular concept in these terms, but our representation of (the
category of) buildings or towers is a general one. There are many important
differences between general and singular concepts and these differences explain
some of the most peculiar properties of singular concepts.
• First of all, every (individual) entity may be identified by more than a
single general concept (e.g. my dog can be identified as an “animal”, as a
“dog” or as a “poodle”) and several entities can be identified by the same
general concept, even though some entities can be better exemplars than
others [196], e.g. my dog and the dog of my neighbor are both identified
as “dogs”. On the contrary, a unique singular concept is build in memory
which represents a specific individual and an entity can be fully identified
as that unique entity (e.g. Fido), only by activating the corresponding
singular concept 2. This means that there is a one-to-one relationship
between the individual in the world and its representation in memory. We
refer this property of singular concepts as conceptual uniqueness.
• Many cognitive theories assume that concepts can be considered as orga-
nized structures of semantic features [197, 226, 157] and models have been
proposed to capture the relative importance of different semantic features
to the meaning of a concept [207]. We argue that also singular concepts
can be modeled adopting a feature-based approach. However, an impor-
tant difference between general and singular concepts lies in the kinds of
features which represent the core meaning of a concept, i.e. the most use-
ful features in discriminating the concept from those similar to it. In case
of a general concept the most relevant attributes are those highly shared
by the members of the category, whereas in case of a singular concept
the most relevant attributes are those highly distinctive of that particular
individual. This means that when identifying an object by mens of a gen-
eral concept we focus on properties shared by other members of the same
2In the course of this document we will discuss possible exceptions to this property.
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category, ignoring the very information that is required to distinguish the
object from the other exemplars of the same category. On the contrary,
when identifying an object by means of a singular concept we need to dis-
card the information highly shared by the exemplars of the category and
focus on the distinctive information of that particular object. We name
this property conceptual distinctiveness.
• A third important aspect deals with the following question: why do we
have singular representations for certain particulars and not for others?
or in other words, why do we represent certain entities only as members
of general categories, but we represent other entities as unique members
of singular concepts? This question reminds a similar issue about proper
names that - as noted by Robin Jeshion in her paper on the significance of
proper names [115] - was addressed (among other philosophers) by John
Locke that discussed the issue in his Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing [139]. Locke wondered “why isn’t it the case that all things
have proper names?” The Locke’s answer was that it is “psychologically”
impossible for a human “to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the par-
ticular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree
and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most ca-
pacious understanding” [139, book 4, ch 3, §2 ]. The same constrain can
be applied to singular concepts. Since the cognitive system has limited
resources, it would be cognitively impossible to manage singular concepts
for all the unique entities which a cognitive agent can meet with.
Jeshion noted that the second answer suggested by Locke was that, “even
if it were possible to name every particular, it would be useless for com-
munication have a proper name for each of them” [115], because naming
particulars never communicated about with others could not serve the end
of communication, or to use the words of Locke “it would not serve to the
chief end of language” . This second answer suggests a second reason of
why we have singular representations for certain particulars and not for
others. We represent unique entities by means of singular concepts if this
is useful for a certain function. While the function of proper names is to fix
the reference in communication, functioning as longterm, interpersonally
available linguistic labels of their referents, singular concepts are concep-
tual devices to uniquely identify individuals within the conceptual system
of a human agent. Therefore, we argue that singular concepts are initiated
for those entities we need to mark as “unique” in semantic memory. There
are at least two reasons why we need to mark this uniqueness.
First, we need to single out an individual from all other similar individuals.
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I need to distinguish my dog Fido from all the other golden retriever which
I meet with. However, it is unlikely that I need to single out the dog that
I saw playing in the park last evening from all the other dogs, unless there
is a particular reason (e.g. I was bitten by him).
Second, as argued by Jeshion in the case of proper names [115], we need
to mark the significance of an individual. According to the “relevance
view” proposed by the author “proper names and their associated mental
representations are” non only devices of direct reference but, “addition-
ally, and by their nature, markers of their referents’ significance”. In the
same way, it is likely that we possess singular representations for certain
“special” particulars because we introduce singular representations espe-
cially for those particulars we regard as having intrinsic value, beyond
their value as an instance of a certain category, and we do so because we
wish to signal that “uniqueness”. We note, however, that we can signal
the uniqueness and the relevance of an individual by building a singular
concept of it , without marking the concept with a proper name label.
There are objects that are relevant for us but we do not refer to them by
using proper names. My Iphone, for instance, is not just a member of the
mobile phone category. I have a very distinct representation of it in my
semantic memory that contains, for example, information about the nice
applications that I installed on it, the color of the bumper, the picture
that I’m using as wallpaper and so on. In this and many other cases is
the initiation of a singular concept that marks the relevance of the object
rather than the ”baptism” of the object (and of its concept) with a proper
name.
According to this second meaning of uniqueness, I posses a singular con-
cept of my dog Fido not only because I need to distinguish him from all
the other similar dogs, but also because I want to remark the significance
that this entity has to me. We refer to this property of singular concepts
as conceptual relevance. Even though we noted that there are significant
objects that we do not mark with proper names, there are many evidences
that suggest that (at least for individuals of some kinds, like for example
human beings) our distinguishing of entities according to significance is
largely reflected linguistically in our practices of proper name-giving and
name-use. We will discuss some of these evidences in section 3.4. Many
relevant examples reported in section 3.4 have been suggested and exten-
sively discussed by Jeshion in her paper about the significance of proper
names [115] .
Another important distinction is between singular concepts and object files.
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In the psychology of vision, several authors have hypothesized that the visual
system uses temporary “object files” for tracking and identifying objects. For
example, Kahneman and Treisman [120, 121] suggest that the main result of
processing visually a particular scene is to construct a set of separate (visual)
files, whose function is to store information about objects in the visible scene.
An object file is responsible for the perceived continuity of the seen object. We
will discuss in more details the characteristics of the object file system in section
3.1. Here, we simply contrast the notion of singular concept with that of object
file to highlight the characteristics of the first kind of representation.
The main difference between the two kinds of representation can be un-
derstood quoting Kahneman et al. [121]. “We proposed an account of object
perception as the process of setting up and utilizing temporary “episodic” rep-
resentations of real world objects, which we call object files. Object files are
separate from the representations stored in a long-term recognition network,
which are used in identifying and classifying objects” (p.176).
An object file is therefore a short-term representation that allows the visual
tracking of an individual in a perceptual field. It is a temporary representa-
tion which is addressed by its location at a particular time, not by any feature
or identifying label and within which successive states of an object are linked
and integrated, on the basis of spatio-temporal information. On the contrary, a
singular concept is a long-term representation that allows long-term identifica-
tion and entity tracking across lapses of attention, sleep, and other perceptual
interruptions.
The notion of singular concept is more close to that of mental file proposed
in theories of reference and singular thought [181, 7, 131, 116] in philosophy of
mind and language. A mental file is a representation which allows the possessor
of the file to store information about some thing, associated with some way of
designating that thing. As a singular concept, a mental file is characterized by
a particular relation that links it to some particular object in the world that
the file is about. By virtue of this relation, the possessor of the file can think
or speak directly of the object which is the referent of the file. Therefore, the
notion of singular concept is used to explain the identification process, whereas
that of mental file is used to explain mechanisms of direct reference in language
and singular thought (i.e. thought about a particular individual). A mental
file has a content which represents what properties the file’s possessor believes,
intends or desires the referent of the file to have. In other words an agent’s
mental files on objects capture that agent’s cognitive perspective on the world
at that time.
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2.2 Functional Dynamics of Singular Concepts
Adopting a feature-based approach, singular concepts can be represented as or-
ganized structures of semantic features which store our information about the
individuals they are about. However, singular concepts are not mere long-term
storages for entity-specific information but are indeed specialized structures for
identifying and tracking unique individuals. Singular concepts are the core
structures of singular cognition. We can characterize functionally singular con-
cepts to serve two primary functions.
1. They constitute a cognitive system that allows an agent to identify and
track unique entities across time and change. Adopting a term used by
Jeshion in [116], we call this function Identity Function.
2. They serve as vehicles for bundling together an agent’s fund of information
about a particular entity, providing an economical and efficient means of
sorting, retrieving, and adding information on the particular individual.
We refer to this function as Storage Function3.
We now describe in more details the functioning dynamics underlying these
functions.
1) Identity Function.4 When identifying an entity we access stored in-
formation (both perceptual and semantic) to decide which, if any, previously
encountered entities corresponds to the entity presently encountered. Identifi-
cation is a process across time. At the first encounter with an individual entity
a singular representation, i.e. a singular concept in our framework, about that
individual is initiated and different kinds of information are registered in it.
For example, when I first meet a person I can register in my memorial rep-
resentation structural aspects about her physical appearance (e.g. face, voice,
body shape) and semantic information including biographical knowledge and
her proper name. If I meet that person at a second time, visual, auditory or
verbal inputs are processed, leading to the formation of a temporary description
that is compared with all the representations stored in memory about known
persons. If a match is found a singular concept is activated and the correspond-
ing semantic information is available.
However, because individuals can change some of their properties while per-
sisting as the same individuals, the cognitive system needs mechanisms to ensure
3Jeshion in [116] named this function “Bundling- function”
4Note that the idea that identity judgments should be understood in terms of their effects
on the management of mental files (i.e. by initiating, updating, splitting and merging mental
files) in the mind has been discussed by many philosophers of mind and language. See for
example [131, 116, 181].
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the identification of an individual as the same unique individual perceived or
known at successive moments in time and across change.
We argue that these mechanisms are partly captured by functioning dynam-
ics of singular concepts: initiation, updating, merging and separation.
• Initiation: a new singular concept is created when a new entity is assumed
to come on the scene. For example, the first time that I know a new
person, I store all the information about her in a new singular concept.
Note that singular concepts, differently from object files, are concepts on
individuals that we may or may not have directly perceived. We can have
a singular concept for Napoleon or Pegasus even though we have never
been in perceptual contact with these individuals.
• Updating: a singular concept is continually updated. The updating pro-
cess ensures that the representation maintains its internal coherence and
avoids the dissonance with the other beliefs of the subject. There are two
aspects in the updating function. The first consists in adding new infor-
mation to the representation. For instance, if a friend tells me something
new about a known person, I simply update the corresponding singular
concept adding the new information. The second aspect deals with revis-
ing information already stored about a known entity. If I come to know
that a friend of mine moved to another city, I update the corresponding
representation changing the specific information within the biographical
knowledge about him.
• Merging: singular concepts are merged when the agent comes to identify
two entities previously taken to be distinct. Imagine, for example, that
you never met the sister of a friend. Nonetheless, you have a singular
representation about her based on what you know from him. One day you
met a girl at a party and a new singular concept is initiated about her in
your memory. At a certain point during the conversation you understand
that the person you have just met is in fact the sister of your friend. This
means that now you have two singular representations about the same
individual. In this case the two singular concepts need to be merged to
create a unique representation which combines all the information stored
in two original representations.
• Splitting: conceptual information is distributed in more than a single file
when an individual previously thought to be one is thought to be more
than one. For instance, going back to the previous example, if you think
that your friend has only one sister, every time that he tells you about
his sister you store the information into a unique mental representation.
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But if you discover that in fact he has two sisters, you need to revise
your memorial representations and eventually distribute different pieces
of information into two different concepts.
The identification process implies that a unique referential link is main-
tain between an entity and its mental representation. It is important to note
that there are two ways to activate directly a singular concept. The first is
a bottom-up way. A perceptual stimulus activate several stages of processing
that ultimately lead to activate the singular concept. The second is a top-down
mechanism and concerns all the cases in which the individual cannot be per-
ceived (or perceptual information is insufficient to go through the first way),
but can be located or identified on the basis of information gathered by such
sources as reasoning or communication. We argue that two different referential
links are in play in these cases.
The first is mediated by structural information stored in the concept which
is directly matched with the temporary structural representation of the percep-
tual stimulus. If the match is found the referential connection is established.
Experimental evidence that we will describe in the course of this work shows
that the bottom-up access to singular representations in memory is direct, that
is, the initial point of contact between the perceptual stimulus of a unique dis-
tinguishable object and its memory representation is not mediated by high-level
conceptual structures (i.e. general concepts). This means that having an in-
dividual representation of an object in memory (i.e. individual concept) shifts
the entry point of recognition to the most subordinate level of the knowledge
representation in memory, that is the unique level of identification.
The second is based on the mental counterpart of the main referential mech-
anism in language, i.e. the use of singular terms to refer to individual entities.
Among the information contained in a mental file, there is typically that con-
cerning the proper name of the individual the concept is about. This information
has a different status within the singular concept compared to other informa-
tion, as it is suggested by many studies which have shown that proper names
are processed differently by the cognitive system than other kinds of informa-
tion (see for example [217, 216, 98, 228]. We will discuss this issue in section
3.4). We assume that mental proper names serve as unique labels for singular
concepts and are, typically, the prime means people use to create the referential
link between an entity in the world and its singular representation in memory,
whenever the singular concept can not be accessed directly via the perceptual
way. Mental proper names are top-down modes of accessing the information
stored in a singular concept.
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Finally, there is an indirect way to activate a singular concept, i.e. by
description. There are cases in which I have a singular representation of an
individual, but I can not fix the reference of the representation by means of a
unique label. I can have the singular concept for my sister’s friend even though
I don’t know her name. As a consequence, the singular concept can not be
labeled by means of a singular term. In this cases conceptual information can
be used to fix the reference with a definite description (e.g. the sister of my
friend Paolo) or with a set of attributes which can be used to single out the
singular concept from others (e.g. the blond girl who lives in Trento and works
at the post office). An interesting investigation about the different referential
function of definite descriptions and proper names in initiating and merging
singular representations in memory can be found in [3].
2) Storage Function. Insofar as singular concepts serve as vehicles for
aggregating information that an agent has about a particular individual, they
provide an economical and efficient means of sorting, retrieving, and adding
information on a particular individual. This folder of information enables the
agent to more easily access large units of information about particular objects
and carry through inferences about such objects. We note that a proper storage
function depends strictly by the same dynamics described above (i.e. initiation,
update, merging and splitting) and therefore by a proper referential mechanism.
Only If I identify the singular concept corresponding to the specific target entity
which I’m processing, I can correctly manage the semantic information contained
in it. In the present work our focus is mainly on the identity function of singular
concept that is at the basis of a fundamental cognitive ability named Singular
Cognition.
2.3 The problem of Singular Cognition
Singular cognition deals with two aspects of the functioning of singular concepts:
identification and re-identification.
First, our conceptual system represents singular concepts and these concepts
allow us to identify specific individuals as unique instances of these representa-
tions. Each singular concept corresponds to a specific individual and by means
of a singular concept we can distinguish that specific individual from all others.
If I am at the park with my dog Fido, my singular concept of Fido allows me
to identify it as “my dog Fido” and distinguishes it from all other dogs. In
this sense, singular concepts provide a means to guarantee the individuality or
uniqueness of an entity.
Second, our conceptual system uses singular concepts to re-identify individ-
uals over time and change. For example, if I identify that my dog Fido (the
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unique referent of my singular concept about “Fido”) walked into a cabin, then
a few minutes later, I again identify that Fido (as opposed to another dog) came
out of the cabin. I ask myself: Was that my dog Fido going in and coming out,
or was that two distinct dogs, one went in and the other came out? In this
specific case, re-identification has consequences in whether our visual system
interprets the event as having one or two specific dogs in the scene or whether
I can use the same proper name, Fido, to call the dog which went in and came
out of the cabin. However, in other cases re-identification may deal with long-
lasting perceptual interruptions which may involve great changes in perceptual
and non-perceptual facts about the entity which must be re-identified. Finally,
there are cases in which re-identification may be performed exclusively on the
basis of non-perceptual facts. In all these cases singular concepts provide a
means to guarantee the identity of entities across time and change.
On the basis of this distinction, we define the problem of singular cognition
as follows:
What are the conceptual capacities that are to be taken into consideration if
one wants to explain how a cognitive agent can perform singular cognition, i.e.
the identification and re-identification of an object as the same unique object
at successive moments in time?
We believe that understanding the conceptual mechanisms underlying sin-
gular cognition is of fundamental importance to understand how people interact
effectively with the entities relevant for their own existence. In particular we
can summarize three main aspects of this interaction which are mediated by
singular cognition. Singular cognition of an object o is necessary for:
1. for the acquisition, the rapid access and retrieval of specific knowledge
bearing strictly on o;
2. for maintaing a consistent representation of o across time and change;
3. for performing actions and having reactions that must be directed to that
specific individual o. This includes, for example, an adequate use of an
artifact, an escape reaction in response to stimuli indicative of danger or
threat, an emotional reaction directed to a fiance´, a child or a friend.
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Chapter 3
Uniqueness in Cognitive
Models
Many cognitive models assume the existence of mechanisms which ensure the
identity tracking of unique individuals across time and situations.
There are at least two distinct representational systems underlying this fun-
damental aspect of human cognition. The first is perceptual and has been largely
studied in the context of visual perception and infant cognition, exploring the
principles by which the visual system segments the visual input in discrete ob-
jects and bind individual views of objects into dynamic representations which
persist across time, motion, featural change, and interruptions.
The second system is conceptual and deals with higher level information that
comes into play when an object is fully identified as an instance of a conceptual
representation in memory. This system comes in play, for example, when an
object is identified as a known individual both in presence and in absence of
perceptual information.
In this chapter we review the cognitive models that have addressed the prob-
lem of object identity from these two different perspectives.
3.1 Singular Representations and Reference in
Psychology of Vision and Attention
In the psychology of vision, several authors have hypothesized that the visual
system uses direct mechanisms of individuation and reference which allow a
cognitive agent to trace a perceptual stimulus in the visual field.
This is a fundamental process in visual cognition since our visual world is
filled with objects that constantly change their position or appearance. The
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shape, size, and position of an object on the retina change every time the object
moves or we move our eyes. Yet despite these constant stimulus changes, objects
in motion maintain continuity; likewise, objects are seen as continuous when
viewed across saccades or during temporary occlusions, even though much of
their appearance may change.
The visual system is therefore endowed with mechanisms which guarantee
the maintenance of the perceived continuity of objects as they move, change,
or momentarily disappear, ensuring the maintenance of what we call perceptual
identity. It is worth to contrast perceptual identity with conceptual identity.
In perceptual identity, a stimulus retains its identity and continuity indepen-
dently from the activation of its long-term representation in semantic memory.
I can track an object in the visual field and perceive it as the same persisting
object, even though I’m not able to identify it. Take the case of an observer
who looks at an object moving slowly in the night sky. In the darkness of the
night, the observer looking at the object may be not sure whether the object is
an airplane or a falling star. Nonetheless, he is able to access the “perceptible
sameness” of the object, without grasping the identity of the object. On the con-
trary, conceptual identity depends on a succession of states of activation of units
in semantic memory which leads to recognize and fully identify an individual
as the same individual that has been identified at another time and situation.
If I meet an old friend after a long time, I may be able to identify him as the
same individual I last saw ten years before, in spite of substantial changes in
perceptual appearance. I track my friend on the basis of non-perceptual facts
because I’m able to access the “conceptual sameness” of that individual.
We argue that singular concepts are the critical representations to ensure
conceptual identity.
In this section, we review the mechanisms which have been proposed in
psychology of vision to support perceptual identity and we contrast these mech-
anisms with those involved in conceptual identity through singular concepts.
3.1.1 Object Files
At present, it is unclear how the visual system preserves object continuity despite
stimulus changes. One possible explanation, known as object file theory, has
been proposed by Treisman and her colleagues [120, 121, 248].
According to this theory, when attention is directed to an object in the visual
field, a temporary representation of that object, i.e. an object file, is created.
This file is an episodic, visual representation which store and update information
about the object it represents and it is kept open so long as its object is in view
and may be discarded shortly thereafter.
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Object files are defined as perceptual units into which a scene is parsed
becoming the potential objects of attention. Apart from being vehicles to bind
features on which the attention can be allocated, object files are thought to bind
successive states of an object over time, updating their representations as the
objects move and change. It is argued that this mechanism is at the basis of
the capability of the visual system to restore continuity that has been briefly
broken in the stream of sensory inputs (e.g. during saccadic eye movements or
temporary occlusion).
Object continuity is maintained through a process that consists of three
operations: correspondence, reviewing, and impletion. 1) A correspondence op-
eration determines, for each object in the visual scene whether it is “new” or
whether it is an object recently perceived, now at a different location. This
determination is based on low-frequency spatiotemporal information; features
such as shape, color, or identity are irrelevant to the correspondence problem;
2) A reviewing process retrieves the content of the initial object and compares
it with the characteristics of the object in the current scene. If there is a match,
object continuity holds. If the appearance of the object in the current scene is
inconsistent with the previous object file contents, however, the object file must
either be modified, or discarded and replaced with a new object file. 3) Finally,
impletion operations use current and reviewed information to establish a link
between previous and current object files by creating the appearance of change
or motion in the scene.
An interesting question about object files is what kind of information is
included in an object file.
To answer this question Kahneman et al. [120] introduced an experimental
paradigm known as object-reviewing paradigm.
In the initial object-reviewing experiments [121], observers viewed a “pre-
view” display that contained two or more objects with a different letter placed
in each. The letters then disappeared and the objects moved to new locations.
Once the objects stopped, a single “probe” letter then appeared in one of the
objects, and the observers simply named it aloud. The probe could be one of
the initial preview letters (on “match” trials) or it could be novel to the trial (on
“no-match” trials). Further, on match trials, the probe letter could reappear on
the same object in which it had been previewed (on “congruent” trials) or on a
different object (on “incongruent” trials).
Using this paradigm, Kahneman et al. [121] reported that naming latencies
were longer when the target letter was a repetition of the preview letter from
the opposite object (i.e. incongruent trials) than when it was a repetition of the
preview letter in the same object (i.e. congruent trials) - an effect termed object-
specific preview benefit (OSPB). This result suggested that object identity may
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be included in an object file. In particular, Treisman and her colleagues have
suggested that all information that defines an object is included in its object
file, including identity and meaning. In particular to mediate recognition, the
sensory description in the object file is compared to stored representations of
known objects. If a match is found the identification of the object is entered
in the file, together with information predicting other characteristics, its likely
behavior and the responses it should appropriately evoke, both affective and
cognitive.
Other researchers have used this basic paradigm to argue for the exclusion
of certain object characteristics from object files. For example, Henderson [4]
changed the type font of a single letter between successive displays and found
that the change did not eliminate object-specific effects. This suggests that
information about exact physical form may not be included in an object file.
Again, the results reported by Gordon et el. [89] suggested that information
about the identity of objects is stored in object files, but at least three types of
semantic information (related concepts, semantic features, and category mem-
bership) are not. The same authors found in another study that a concept
can be represented regardless of its medium (e.g. the abstract identity “fish”
persists despite being previewed as a word and probed as a line drawing [88]).
These results seem indicate that object files include object identity and ab-
stract information.
However, in a recent study Mitroff [163] performed a object-reviewing exper-
iment with novel face images as stimuli and found that object files can store not
only abstracted information about object types, but also specific visual features
of individual object tokens.
From these premises we note some important differences between the object
file system and that of singular concepts. First of all, object files are separate
from the representations stored in long term memory which are used to classi-
fying and identifying objects, i.e. general and singular concepts respectively. In
particular, in contrast to singular concepts which serve as storage mechanism
of long-term identification networks, object files are temporary representations
which are addressed by their location at a particular time, not by any feature
or identifying label and within which successive states of an object are linked
and integrated.
Unlike long-term object identification, where surface features may be used
for bottom-up identification (e.g. recognizing a friend across a crowded audito-
rium), object files are mid-level visual representations (mid-level because they
fall between low level sensory processing and high level placement into concep-
tual representations) which operate in online visual processing tracking objects
on the basis of spatio-temporal information, i.e. how and where objects move
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rather than how they look like.
The identity of a changing object is carried by the assignment of informa-
tion about its successive states to the same file, rather then by its name or by
properties. This assignment leads to update and review object file content, but
the singular content is not used for object tracking.
Therefore, object files can be considered the placeholders for that of updating
system (or updating state with singular content).
Differently from singular concepts, object files can not be accessed by means
of top down processes of identification and they are responsible for the perceived
continuity of the seen object without need to access to semantic information
about it.
In conclusion, object files are cognitive representations which have been pro-
posed as core mechanism of singular perception - i.e. the incremental perception
and tracking of an object as the same unique, or distinct and numerically identi-
cal object - whereas singular concepts are here suggested to be the fundamental
mechanism of singular cognition - i.e., the identification of an object as the
same unique object identified at successive moments in time, even in absence of
perceptual information.
3.1.2 Visual Indexes
Attempting to answer the question of how the world is connected to our visual
representations, Pylyshyn has proposed a theory of vision that assumes the
existence of a special kind of direct connection between elements of a visual
representation and certain token elements in the visual field [187].
This connection is unmediated by an encoding of properties of the individual
tokens involved and implies a sort of direct link between a perceptual system
and an object in a scene. Like natural language demonstrative (i.e. deictic
words like this or that), this direct connection allows entities to be referred to
without represent them “under a description” (i.e., without representing them
as members of some categories).
Such a preconceptual connection is ensured by a mechanism of visual indexes
or visual demonstratives (or “FINSTs”, from “FINgers of INSTantiation”) that
picks out individual objects from the rest of the visual field and allows to main-
tain and track the identity of these objects qua individuals despite changes in
the individual’s properties. As we noted above, FINSTs are more similar to
demonstrative than to proper names in natural language. This is because they
ensure a direct reference to a particular individual but this reference relation
ceases to exist when the referent is no longer in view. This way of reference is
also “preconceptual” since it allows to refer to things in visual scenes regardless
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to their category membership and pick out them directly by a mechanism that
works like a demonstrative. To put the point in other words, if visual indexes
provide a mechanism for reference to distal items, this is not a kind of refer-
ence by description, but reference constituted by some sort of causal connection
between the object in the world and its visual representation in the cognitive
system.
This mechanism of reference provides a means by which the cognitive system
can pick out a small number of individuals in a visual scene, keep track of them
and further examine them in order to encode their properties, to move the focal
attention to them or to carry out a motor command towards them.
Pylyshyn [187] suggested that conceptual or descriptive representations are
insufficient as the sole form of visual representation. According to this view, If
we could refer to the elements of a visual scene only in terms of their category
membership, our concepts would always be related to other concepts and would
never be grounded in experience. Moreover there are two general problems
raised by the description view of visual representations. The first is that there
are an unlimited number of entities in the world that can belong to any particular
category or satisfy a particular description. As a consequence, reference by
category or description may be inadequate to refer to a unique individual among
many similar ones in the visual field. Secondly, the visual system needs to be
able to individuate a particular object in the visual scene and track it as a
particular enduring individual in spite of its property changes. A visual tracking
by description would be extremely expensive because the description would has
to be continuously updated with the changes of the object (such as changes in
visible surfaces or spatio-temporal location).
Some empirical reasons have been proposed to motivate the existence of
primitive indexing mechanisms as a possible solution to the previously men-
tioned problems.
First of all the mapping from the world to our visual representation is not
built up in one step but incrementally (for example scanning attention and/or
one’s gaze). This implies that all the information about a particular token
acquired across different periods of time should be associated to the same indi-
vidual object. A descriptive approach to this problem would need a description
that is unique to the individual in question, say “the object x that has the
property P”, where P uniquely picks out that particular object. In order to
add new information about the object, you need to add a new predicate Q (say
“the object x has the property Q). This way of adding information also requires
an identity assertion that specifies that the two properties refer to the same
object (P(x) ∧ Q(y) and x ≡ y). This way of representing and updating the
information about an individual object presents a main problem. In order to
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add information about an object x in the visual field, first you need to recall the
description under which x was last encoded and then add a new predicate to
the original description. In other words, every time you gain new information
about a certain object x (say a property Q), you need to go back to the previous
representation of it and detect that the object that you noted as having a new
property Q also had a previous property P which uniquely identifies it. After
having established the identity, you need to update the representation and de-
scribe the object as the referent of a new description that uses the conjunction
of the two property (P and Q). This backward process from an individual to its
previous representation seems implausible and antieconomical.
Another solution to the problem of updating a representation upon noticing
a new property Q, invokes a direct mechanism of reference. This mechanism
does not need to locate a representation of an individual with certain properties,
but rather needs the direct link to the very individual on which the new property
Q has been detected, regardless of the properties you have already encoded at
that point of time. The author suggests that this mechanism is mediated by
some functional equivalent of demonstrative reference. Adding a new property
Q to a representation of an individual object x requires adding a new predicate
Q(x) where x is the object directly picked out by the demonstrative indexing
mechanism.
A second reason is that there are many properties that are extracted and en-
coded like relational properties (e.g., Inside(X,C) ) which apply over a number
of particular individuals. In order to apply these properties we need to spec-
ify which objects are involved in the relation independently of what properties
these individuals have. The visual system must adopt a mechanism that uses
something different from descriptive information in order to track individual ob-
jects and their relations in the visual field. Like proper names or demonstratives
in natural language, this mechanism uses visual indexes that uniquely pick out
particular individuals. These indexes may be used as labels or names that refer
directly and a-conceptually to individuals. This means that we have a way to
individuate and track individual objects in a scene even when they change their
properties or location.
Finally many evidences (see [212] for a review) support the assumption that
a property is detected and encoded by the visual system, not just as a property
existing in the visual field, but as the property of a specific perceived object.
This object-based encoding must be guaranteed by a direct mechanism of refer-
ence which allows that properties are always detected as belonging to an object.
We briefly summarize the main characteristics of the FINSTs system. The
FINST indexing mechanism is the way of reference that the early visual sys-
tem uses to pick out and track individuals in a scene without recurring to
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top-down conceptual descriptions. This mechanism is preattentive, preconcep-
tual and bottom-up. The individuals picked out by this mechanism are named
primitive visual objects. The basic idea of the FINST indexing mechanism is to
provide a mechanism to link these primitive visual objects (by means of FINST
indexes) to certain conceptual structures (which we may think of, in our frame-
work, as singular concepts in Long Therm Memory). This connection is purely
causal and stimulus-driven without cognitive or conceptual intervention. An
individual object “grabs” the indexing early vision mechanism and thus initi-
ates a FINST. The number of FINSTs that can be activated at a single time is
limited (by means of this mechanism we can track only four or five individual
objects.) By virtue of this causal connection, the conceptual system can refer to
any of a small number of primitive visible object. It can, for example, move fo-
cal attention to them, evaluate visual predicates and finally predicate something
about them. It is interesting to note that claiming that the indexing process is
preconceptual is not to claim that the assignment and maintenance of indexes
does not involve the properties of objects. Clearly indexes get assigned because
objects in question posses certain properties rather than other properties. What
is claimed is that the encoding of these properties is not necessary to the cogni-
tive system to assign and track an index. Without preconceptual reference we
would not be able to decide that a particular description D was satisfied by a
particular object D and consequently we could not make judgments about nor
to decide to act upon a particular individual.
It is interesting to contrast visual index theory with the object file framework
and with our notion of singular concept. The FINSTs theory is very close to the
object file theory of Kahneman at al. [121] described in 3.1.1, even though the
latter was more focused on the memory content of the information associated
with the object in memory. This focus is also confirmed by a lot of research on
what object-related information is encoded in an object file [262, 89, 163].
Kahneman et al. suggested the relation between object files and visual
indexes, when they write “We might think of [a visual index] as the initial spatio-
temporal label that is entered in the object file and that is used to address it
. . . [A] FINST might be the initial phase of a simple object file before any features
have been attached to it” (p. 216).
Because of this difference in focus, research on visual indexes has more con-
centrated with the nature of the reference mechanism that allows cognition to
refer directly and track objects, whereas object file theory has more focused on
the question of which features of the object are encoded in memory.
Both systems concern temporary representation of objects and have been
proposed to address the problem of perceptual (i.e. visual) identity. While visual
index theory emphasizes the mechanism that connects representations with the
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objects they are about, object file theory is more focused on the question of
which features of the object are encoded in memory. Object files store temporary
“episodic” representations of objects in a recent visual field that is updated
through alterations in the perceptual situation. FINSTs are the vehicles by
which objects files represent the objects that they store information about.
What this means is that, while object files collect information about objects,
this information is not used to determine which individual it is associated with.
It is the FINSTs system that creates the bridge between the object file and the
individual that the file is about.
Differently from object files and singular concepts, visual indexes are deictic
non conceptual mechanisms of direct reference in vision. While they provide
the connection between a concept and an object in the world, the conceptual
representation of the object is stored temporarily in object files or permanently
in singular concepts. This means that FINSTs and object files are mechanisms
that allow to keep the visual identity of objects, whereas singular concepts
are conceptual mechanisms of reference used to track the conceptual identity
of objects across lapses of attentions, sleep and different kinds of perceptual
interruption which can not be dealt by the cognitive system with temporary
mechanisms of reference and representation.
Prima facie, there is a striking similarity between the psychological theories
about visual indexes and object files on one hand and our notion of singular
concept on the other hand. Both accounts 1) are object-centered approaches
of mental reference and 2) share some primitive functioning notions about the
organization of the representation of individuals (e.g. the need of a direct mecha-
nism of reference or updating functions). Nonetheless, the roots of the tradition
in psychology of vision differs from our approach in at least one important re-
spect: in psychology of vision, the theoretical constructs of visual indexes and
object files appear as a rather non-conceptualist solution to the problem of trac-
ing the perceptual identity of objects across time and change because it refers
to a temporary visual representation which can track a persevering object in the
visual field without the use of sophisticated conceptual or descriptive contents.
On the contrary, singular concepts provide a conceptual solution to the same
problem and are at the core of a storage mechanism of long-term identification
networks which involve more complex conceptual representations of individual
entities.
3.1.3 Object Indexes and Object Concepts
From a different perspective, developmental studies have faced the problem of
how infants establish representations of individuated objects and track them
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through time, space and occlusion.
Recently, many have suggested that the studies of object representations in
infancy involve similar problems (and plausibly the same psychological mecha-
nisms) to those reported in the mid-level object attention studies in adults (see
for example, [135, 41]). In a paper published in 1998, Leslie [135] reports a
series of consideration in favor of this hypothesis and presents a model of object
representation that underlines the main similarities within both the literatures.
The key notion of this model is that of “sticky” object index, a mechanism of
selective attention that points directly at a physical object in a location. Just
like a FINST in the Pylyshyn’s model, an object index does not represent any of
the properties of the object which it points to. The indexing mechanism forms
the basis for the infant’s object concept because it is involved in object individ-
uation, identification and enumeration of physical objects. An object index has
a certain number of properties that closely recall some characteristics of both of
models described above (that of FINSTs and that of object files). First of all,
an object index is a mental token that functions like an abstract pointer to an
object in the world.
Second, an index does not inherently represent any of the properties of the
object indexed. However, this information can be bound with the index and
can be used in the identification process.
Third, object indexing is a mechanism of selective attention and presents
resource limits. This means that only a limited number of indexes can be
associated to specific objects in a scene (not more than four).
Forth, indexes are assigned to objects primarily by location but they are not
linked to the location itself but to the object in that specific location. Moreover,
property information eventually bounded with the index can be used for the
index assignment when location information is unavailable or ambiguous.
Finally, there are same basic principles that control the allocation mecha-
nism.
A distinct object can be assigned only with a single index and, when assigned,
the index sticks to its target through space. This mechanism provide immediate
access to the object’s location even though the object is in motion or it moves
behind an occluder. In the last case the index points to an approximate location
behind the occluder.
Distinct indexes are assigned to objects that occupy different locations in
space at the same time.
Finally, indexes can be reused and reassigned to different objects when they
are disconnected from their previous targets. The index reassignment is neces-
sary because only a small number of objects can be indexed simultaneously.
In order to understand the functioning of the index system, it’s important
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to note the difference between two distinct processes, object individuation and
object identification. Individuation establishes the notion of “single object”
and “more that a single object”, whereas identification established the notion
of “self-same one”.
The theory assumes that object individuation is primarily determined on
the basis of the locations objects occupy and not on the basis of the features
they have. However, featural information is assumed to be integrated at a later
stage to the early object representation. Featural information is also necessary
in those situations in which spatiotemporal information is absent or ambigu-
ous. For example, if a cup and a ball take turns appearing from an occluder
and disappearing behind it, we judge that there are two objects in the scene
rather than one whose features change. This judgment is based on featural dif-
ferences because the two objects are never seen simultaneously occupy different
locations. Featural information influences the indexing process in two distinct
ways: individuation-by-features and identification-by-features. In the first case,
the system simply registers whether or not salient new features have appeared
(feature detection). The second type of processing encodes specific featural in-
formation that is bound to the early representation after an index is assigned
(feature identification).
The first type of output suffices to count how many objects are present in
a scene, but the latter information is required in order to identify what objects
are in play.
The results of many studies using the violation of expectancy looking time
paradigm have been interpreted in the light of indexing model, showing that the
mature indexing system can assign indexes either by location or by features.
However, a body of findings provide evidence that the object individuation
process undergoes many changes and that a complete individuation-by-features
is not available by the age of 12 months [269].
3.2 Singular Representations in Models of Face
Recognition and Naming
In section 3.1 we have discussed models of vision and attention which propose
direct mechanisms of individuation and reference to explain how a perceiver can
perform the perceptual individuation or identification of an object as the same
unique object perceived at successive moments in time (i.e. singular perception).
All the models that we have reviewed above share a non-conceptual approach to
the problem of singular perception since they are based on the idea that sensory-
motor capacities or perceptual contents, make it possible for a perceiver to latch
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on to, or to track a target x as being the same target without the help of complex
conceptual or descriptive capacities.
Such perceptual capacities must be able to perform anchoring of the per-
ceiver onto the object x and provide perceptual reference to x, regardless of the
fact that the object is fully identified as a unique individual (e.g. the object
x is my dog Fido) or as a member of a category (e.g. the object x is a dog).
In other words, instead of tracking x over time and space on the basis of the
understanding that x is a known individual which has a unique representation
in memory or that x is an exemplar of a learned category, non-conceptual ap-
proaches anchor the perceiver on to x without the mediation of an elaborate
understanding of the “conceptual identity” of x.
Moreover, these models deal with the problem to explain how a perceiver
trace the identity of an object when the perceiver is in “perceptual acquaintance”
with the object or the perceptual acquaintance is only temporary interrupted.
However, when we have to recognize and track individual objects over long-
term interruptions or changes in perceptual properties or even in absence of
perceptual inputs, high level information about identity (i.e. conceptual repre-
sentations) must come into play.
In particular, unique high level representations about objects are involved ev-
ery time a unique individual is recognized as a known individual and individual-
specific information is retrieved about it.
In the literature on object recognition, almost exclusive attention has been
given to a special kind of unique individual entities, i.e. person, and very few
studies have investigated the recognition of other kinds of unique entities1.
Many models of face recognition and naming assume the existence of unique
representations of individuals in memory and the way in which conceptual and
name codes of familiar faces are accessed from perceptual input is a matter of
considerable current debate in cognitive research. In this section we review the
major cognitive models that have addressed this issue and have inspired research
questions and experimental paradigms useful for the present research.
A first comprehensive model of face recognition was proposed by Bruce and
Young [35], which assumes that access to face names is the last step in a serially
arranged sequence of processing stages. The model proposes three main repre-
sentational stages: 1) a recognition stage, which involves a set of structural and
view-independent long-term representations (face recognition units or FRUs);
2) a semantic stage, which permits the activation of permanent, person-specific
knowledge about the recognized person; and 3) a name retrieval stage which
allows the retrieval of the proper name of the person.
According to this model, perception of a familiar face activates structural
1Some exceptions are described in Chapter 4.
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and view-independent long-term representations (FRUs). Each known face was
assumed to be represented by a FRU, the activation of which permits a familiar-
ity decision (i.e. the decision that a face is “known” ). These FRUs are linked
to amodal person identity nodes (PINs) which contain semantic-biographical in-
formation concerning known persons, such as occupation, hobbies, date of birth,
etc. In a final step, name nodes are accessed from their corresponding PINs.
Bruce and Young claimed that processing occurs in the fixed (and immutable)
order from FRUs to PINs and then from PINs to retrieval of name codes, and
it was further assumed that processing must be completed at one stage before
it starts at the next. As a consequence, the model assumes that naming is
necessarily semantically mediated and names are harder to retrieve than other
person-specific information because names are stored in a separate and final
component, which may be accessed from faces only via semantic information.
However, the Bruce and Young’s model does not have a route for the produc-
tion as opposed to the retrieval of names or other personal information about
people. There are many possible output systems which could be recruited fol-
lowing the initial retrieval of person-specific information or the corresponding
proper name. For instance, one might be shown a picture of a face and be
required to pronounce the person’s name, to write it or to press a bottom in a
laboratory experiment. Moreover the model is also incomplete in the sense that
it shows no route by which a input names can access to personal information.
In order to account for these processes, Valentine et al. [250, 251] proposed
a functional model of face, name and word recognition which is an extension
of the original model by Bruce and Young. The author proposed a further
stage of word recognition units (WRUs). There is a WRU for each known
word and this unit becomes active as a result of input from any recognizable
instantiation of the word. Those words that are names activate a new set of
units named name recognition units (NRUs). These units are thought to be
analogous to FRUs, i.e. there is a NRU for each familiar person. The activation
flows from NRUs directly to PINs. However, unlike FRUs, these units have
direct access to the lexical output codes. The connection between NRUs and
PINs serves to link the conceptual system with lexical representations. Access
from a face representation to a person’s name can only be achieved by this single
link from the PIN to the NRU that represents the name. Like in the Bruce and
Young model, in the model of Valentine et al. PINs are units which store
semantic information about people and separate semantic stores are assumed
for information about people and words.
An alternative architecture can be found in the interactive activation and
competition (IAC) model developed Burton e Bruce [38, 37] which is based on
the architecture described by McClelland and Rumelhart [152].
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This model comprises three sets of units of processing: Face Recognition
Units (FRUs), Person Identity Nodes (PINs) and Semantic Information Units
(SIUs). The units are organized into pools such that the units within a pool are
connected to each other with inhibitory links. The links between units belonging
to different pools are excitatory. All the links are bidirectional and have equal
strength in each directions. Furthermore, all the excitatory links have equal
strength and the same is for the inhibitory links.
For each face there is a single face unit which becomes active. FRUs are
connected to corresponding PINs, that are multimodal units receiving inputs
also from other systems (e.g., a PIN is activated by read names, voice and so
on). PINs are cross domain gateways to semantic information stored in SIUs
and signal familiarity. When a certain threshold is crossed, the face is recognized
as familiar and the PIN leads the activation to the corresponding SIUs. In turn,
the activation of a SIU above its threshold corresponds to the retrieval of the
corresponding personal information encoded into it.
We note that the Burton and Bruce’s model differs from the Bruce and
Young’s model in some important respects.
First of all, as in the Bruce and Young’s model, PINs are activated from
their corresponding FRUs, but differently from the Bruce and Young’s model,
these PINs do not contain identity-specific semantic information but they permit
access to it. PINs merely serve as modality-free interfaces between FRUs on the
one hand, and both semantic-biographical information and names on the other
hand.
Secondly, units in the SIUs pool are supposed to specifically code person-
specific knowledge about people, as well as the names of these persons. There-
fore, in the Bruce and Young’s model, name retrieval takes place in a separate
processing stage that follows, and is contingent upon, the retrieval of semantic
information about the person. In contrast, Burton and Bruce proposed that
names and semantic information can be accessed in parallel. Hence, the as-
sumption of conceptual mediation prevalent in the serial model of face naming
proposed by Bruce and Young is abandoned.
Therefore, the two models make different predictions about whether face
name retrieval is subject to semantic context effects. The serial account as-
sumes that face naming mandatorily proceeds from face recognition to name
retrieval via semantic representations and therefore semantically related primes
should induce priming effects. The parallel account, on the other hand, does not
necessarily predict semantic effects in face naming, as names can be accessed
independently from semantic codes.
However, the activation mechanism at the core of the model proposed by
Burton and Bruce predicts more complex interactions between semantic and
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identity units due to the back propagation of activation in the network.
The model assumes that when a particular PIN is activated, activation from
the PIN flows to the SIUs that are connected to it. Some activation flows
back from these SIUs to PINs that share semantic features with the original
person, taking activation in any such PIN above its resting level. For example,
suppose input is given to the FRU of Barack Obama. Activation flows to Barack
Obama’s PIN, which in turn activates the SIUs with which he is associated (e.g.,
President, Michelle Obama, USA etc.). As George Bush’s PIN is also connected
to many of the same SIUs, activation spreads back to George Bush’s PIN taking
it above its resting level. The level of this “above resting activation” depends
on how many semantic features are shared. If at this point input is given to
George Bush’s FRU, activation will flow to his PIN, which will reach threshold
faster than had it started at resting level, and this is the basis of the facilitatory
effect.
Note that this architecture implicitly assumes a form of categorical organi-
zation between the identity nodes of the network. Since each SIU is connected
to the PINs of persons who share the same attribute (e.g. the SIUs representing
occupation information are connected to all persons with the same occupation),
when a familiar face is presented, activation can spread back to the representa-
tions (PINs) of other persons also linked to the same SIUs, e.g., persons with
the same occupation. In this way the shared category functions as an organizing
category of person-specific nodes, and the IAC model predicts that categorical
priming should be observed between two persons sharing a common category
(e.g. occupation). This assumption of the model has been largely investigated
in priming experiments and has motivated many researches which explored how
semantic knowledge for people is stored in long-term memory (see for example
[9, 9, 236]). We will discuss in more details these studies in chapter 7, because
they have been the starting point for methods and research questions which have
inspired the part of our work concerning how singular concepts are organized
and accessed and how these representations are inter-linked with those of other
individual things.
The Burton and Bruce’s model provides also a different explanation, com-
pared to the Bruce and Young’s model, about why names are difficult to retrieve
compared to other semantic information. Quoting the authors, “while we know
many teachers, many Americans and many politicians, we typically know only
one Margaret Thatcher”. Therefore, units in the pool of SIUs that represent
a person’s full name are connected to only one PIN, but units representing se-
mantic information are linked to many PINs. If a unit of FRUs pool crosses the
threshold, the activation passes to the corresponding PIN and in turn to the
SIUs connected to the specif person. Because of the nature of connections (that
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are bidirectional), SIUs that are unique in the network are activated slowly than
SIUs that are connected to many PINs.
For example, if a picture of Barack Obama is seen, the SIU that codes that
he is a politician is activated and the activation is back-propagated to all the
PINs associated with other politicians. This activation passes again from these
PINs to connected SIUs. In this way SIUs that are shared by many PINs receive
more activation that unique SIUs. As a consequence, any “unique” semantic
information that is known about a person (like for example the proper name)
should be more difficult to retrieve.
Bre´dart et al. [36] have proposed an alternative architecture for the interac-
tive activation model in which descriptive properties are represented in separate
pools of units for each semantic domain of information and in which names are
represented by a separate pool of lexical output units. In particular there are
two main problems with the original model that the new version tries to resolve.
Firs of all, the Burton and Bruce model predicts that the more facts you know
about a familiar person, the slower you should be to retrieve any of those facts
including the name (fan effect). This is because all identity-specific semantic
information is represented by SIUs within the same pool of units and inhibitory
links are assumed to connect these units. If many SIUs are activated by the
same PIN, the amount of inhibition between the units within the same pool
increases. The empirical evidence used by Burton and Bruce to give support to
the validity of their model is controversial. In particular, the authors argue that
their prediction is supported by the reverse frequency effect in retrieval failures
for names - that is the fact that retrieval failures are reported much more often
for names that are rated as familiar than for names that are rated as not very
familiar. However the reverse frequency effect is not always reported. Bre´dart
et al. [36] have conducted a study to evaluate directly the relationship between
the number of properties known about people and the retrieval of those people
names. The results of this study show that naming the face of a person about
whom we know many pieces of information is faster than naming a person about
whom we know few pieces of information, although the two sets of items were
equated for face familiarity. The results are in the opposite direction of what
predicted by Burton et al.’s model.
The second problem with the Burton and Bruce’s model, is that the storage
of names and semantic information within the same pool of units is inconsistent
with models of speech production. In particular it’s not clear the status of the
SIUs representing names (prelinguistic units or lexical?) and why this kind of
information should be store alongside semantic information.
On the basis of these considerations, the authors proposed two main modi-
fications to the original model.
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First, storage of names and descriptive properties are separated into different
pools of units. Names are represented by lexical units in the output lexicon.
Second, personal information is clustered into semantic sub-domains.
Like in the original model, units within a pool are connected each other with
inhibitory links and units may be connected across pools by excitatory links.
All connections are bidirectional.
A first pool of units (PINs) contains token markers, one for each familiar in-
dividual. These units are connected to semantic information units (SIUs) repre-
senting personal information about known persons. Each PIN is also connected
to one Lexical Output Unit (LOU) representing lexical access in production of
their names.
With a series of simulations, the authors provide an interesting set of evi-
dences. First of all, the network is able to exhibit properties consistent with
mental chronometry as effectively as Burton and Bruce’s model. In particular,
the fact that semantic information is accessed more rapidly than lexical infor-
mation is confirmed by the pattern of mean activations of lexical and semantic
units. It’s never the case that a name unit reached the threshold activation be-
fore any of the SIUs associated with the same PIN. Moreover names rose slowly
the maximum level of activation that SIUs except for SIUs representing unique
properties.
A second simulation compared the effects of an impairment of lexical access
(attenuating the PIN-LOU connection) on the retrieval of semantic information
to the effects of the impairment of semantic access on the name retrieval (atten-
uating the PIN-SIU links). The results show that the firs kind of manipulation
do not prevent SIUs from reaching the threshold of activation, while the second
alteration does prevent LOU from reaching the threshold.
Finally, the model confirms the prediction that the more properties are
known about an individual the easier his or her name is retrieved.
The comparison of different models of person recognition and naming opens
interesting questions about the structure of the semantic memory, the access
and the retrieval of personal information of individuals. All the models agree
that several stages are involved in the process of recognizing and accessing infor-
mation about people. First of all, a visual, auditory or verbal input is processed,
leading to the formation of a structural description that is compared with all
the structural representations contained in modality specific units (respectively
Face Recognition Units, Voice Recognition Units or Name Recognition Units).
Secondly, modality specific units converge into Person Identity Units (PINs)
allowing recognition of a particular person and activation of the corresponding
semantic information. The third stage is the retrieval of biographical infor-
mation associated to the specific individual and finally the process allows the
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production of the person’s name. These models differ, however, in two impor-
tant aspects concerning the locus in which familiarity feelings are generated and
in which person-specific information is stored. Furthermore, controversies exist
about the format in which biographical knowledge is represented.
Both in the Burton et al.’s and in the Bre´dart at al.’s models, a supra-modal
level of PINs is responsible of the generation of familiarity feelings. At this level
information from different modalities is combined in personal identity nodes
that do not store semantic information, but provide a modality-free gateway to
a single semantic system, where information about people is stored in an amodal
format. From this respect, these models differ from the face identification model
originally proposed by Bruce and Young which locates the locus of familiarity
feelings at the level of recognition units where the structural description of a
seen face is compared to the familiar faces stored in the FRUs. Moreover, the
Bruce and Young’s model assumes that PINs store semantic information.
Apart from the differences between the face recognition models, what is rel-
evant for the purposes of the present research is that all the models assume the
existence of identity nodes in semantic memory which provide a mechanism of
unique reference establishing a relation one-to-one between an individual in the
world and its memorial representation in the cognitive system. Even though
some models [35, 250] assume that identity nodes directly store person-specific
information, while other models [38, 37, 36] represent this information in sepa-
rate semantic nodes, the common idea is that the cognitive system use different
structures to store general knowledge from those used to store individual-specific
knowledge. This view is in line with our notion of singular concept, i.e. a cog-
nitive representation of a unique individual which promotes recognition and
identity judgments.
Another common aspect of these models is the special status of proper names
among other person-specific information. This is in part due to the fact that
these models have been influenced by a considerable body of evidence which
support the view that the retrieval of proper names is in some way different
from the retrieval of other personal information.
First of all, experiments have shown that people are slower to name familiar
faces than they are to categorize the same faces by occupation. For example,
when subjects are shown a face, person’s name is retrieved more slowly than
other personal information such as occupation or nationality [273, 46].
In tasks that require subjects to learn face-occupation-name association they
are generally showed more difficulties in learning people’s names than in learning
semantic information about them [45], even when the words to learn are the
same like in name-occupation homophones [158], (i.e, learning that somebody’s
name is “Backer” is more difficult than learning that somebody is “a backer”).
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This means that the name is more difficult to recall and this effect can not be
attributed to differences in the phonological form or frequency to occurrence.
Retrieval of some personal information is possible without retrieval of a name
but the converse has never been demonstrated. Diarists involved in studies of
everyday difficulties in person recognition commonly reported incidents during
which they are unable to retrieve a person’s name while being able to remember
a lot of personal facts about him [213]. They don’t, however, remember a
person’s name without remembering his or her occupation [272].
The vulnerability of the retrieval of proper names is also seen in the tip-
of-tongue phenomenon (TOT) in which a person is unable to produce a word
although he is certain that the word is known. Many studies have shown that
this phenomenon for proper names can be induced in the laboratory, showing
pictures or presenting verbal descriptions of famous people [102]. The TOT state
represents an impairment of phonological information in a name, not semantic
information associated with it. This is also confirmed by the fact that cueing
with the name’s initials aids the resolution, while presenting other cues like
pictures did not.
Further evidence for a distinction between retrieval of names and retrieval of
biographical information can be found in neuropsychological literature. Several
studies of anomic patients [69, 143] describe people who are unable to name
familiar people while being able to access to relevant semantic information about
them. No cases of patients showing the converse pattern have been reported in
literature.
Many models of face recognition and naming explain these evidences assum-
ing that names are stored separately from other kinds of personal information
[35, 250, 36]. For instance hierarchical models such as the Bruce and Young
model [35] posit a store for names that is functionally separate from the store
for other personal information and which can only be accessed after that all
personal information is retrieved. Although this suggestion is consistent with
empirical evidences, it seems to be problematic. It is possible recognize Tom
Cruise and recall his name, but be temporarily unable to remember that he
was married with Nicole Kidman. IAC models like that of Burton at al. [37]
do not separate the representation of proper names from that of other personal
information, being stored in the same semantic units (SIUs), but they assume
that proper names are hard to retrieve because they are unique and therefore
they can not be pre-activated by the activation of other PINs. However, more
recent models, like that of Bredart et al. [36] propose that storage of names
and descriptive properties are separated into different pools of units but they
are accessed in parallel instead of serially.
Our notion of singular concept is more similar to that of PIN in the model
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of Bruce and Young [35] in that it assumes that a singular concept is an identity
node which store individual-specific knowledge about an entity. Within a singu-
lar concept, as within a PIN there is all the semantic information we know about
the represented entity. Note that in the IAC models the complete representation
of an individual is given by the conjunction of relevant SIUs connected with the
unique PIN which corresponds to the entity. This means that the knowledge is
distributed in a network of nodes which are connected to many PINs.
However, our notion of singular concept shares some characteristics with
the notion of semantic node (SIU) of the IAC model of [37] in that it does
not separate the representation of the proper name from that of other personal
information. This means that the mental representation of the proper name
is part of the singular concept as it is all the information we know about the
entity the concept is about. However, the mental proper name has a special
status among other information in the singular concept, because it functions as
a mental label that can be used as the mental counterpart of a singular term in
language to uniquely refer to a mental representation in memory. The mental
name is a sort of unique identifier for a mental representation as the proper
name is a rigid designator for reference in language.
There is a third aspect about the organization of the semantic information
of unique individuals in face recognition models which opens an interesting
research question for the present study. These models posit that all the semantic
information about a person is equally important in the semantic representation
of that individual. In the hierarchical models this is confirmed by the fact that
all the information stored in the PIN must be accessed before passing to the
next stage of the recognition process and no claim is made about which piece
of information is activated before another within the PIN. In the IAC models
this assumption is manifested by the general architecture of the model. All
the excitatory links as well as all the inhibitory links, have the same weight.
This means that when a PIN is activated, the activation pass to all the SIUs
connected to it with the same activation power. As a consequence, all the
information about an entity is equally available for retrieval, unless some SIUs
are pre-activated from other PINs.
We believe that this assumption of equality of importance between the se-
mantic attributes of an individual is implausible since it is evident that some
attributes about an entity can be accessed more rapidly than others even though
they are part of the singular representation of that entity. Therefore we argue
that a model of singular concept should account the differences between at-
tributes in terms of relevance for the representation and its access. To this
purpose, one of the goals of this work is to suggest a measure of relevance for
attributes within singular concepts.
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3.3 Cognitive Theories of Object Identity
We have already pointed out that nearly all research on concepts in cognitive
psychology is research on categories of objects and less effort has been made
studying how people represent unique individuals and how these representations
(i.e. singular concepts) support our ability to identify these entities and trace
their identity across time.
The study of singular concepts have been for long time neglected in favor
of the study of general concepts and even when the researcher’s attention has
been called to the importance of individual concepts, the latter have been con-
sidered or as auxiliary to the representation of general concepts or less relevant
to understand the identification mechanisms compared to higher level concep-
tual representations.
Exemplar models of categorization [159, 129, 172], for instance, support this
difference of status by proposing that people represent categories by means
of stored exemplar information. According to this view, for example, people
represent the category of dogs as a set of individual dogs that they have stored
in memory. However these models do not consider exemplar representations as
representations whose properties are worth exploring in their own right.
The subordinate role of singular representations compared to general con-
cepts is also assumed by a doctrine, developed in philosophy and more recently
imported in psychological research, about the problem of object identity. This
doctrine, known as sortalism, argues that the concept of an individual depends
so tightly on the concepts of its categories that the individual’s persistence,
identity and distinctness derive from these concepts.
Contrary to this view, in the last years we have assisted to the development
of other theories of object identity which are not based on strong assumptions
about the relation between singular and general concepts. We refer to these
theories as non-sortalist approaches to object identity.
In this section we look at these two kinds of approaches of object identity
(i.e. sortalist vs. non-sortalist approaches) and we discuss these approaches in
the light of the singular cognition problem.
3.3.1 Sortalist Approaches to the Problem of Singular Cog-
nition
Since Frege [71] first observed that one cannot count without specifying what
to count, various philosophers and psychologists of language have argued that
certain concepts dubbed “sortals”, such as “dog”, “table”, “person” provide
principles of individuation and numerical identity. These concepts tell us what
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to count as one instance of something and whether something is the same one
as what we have seen before [258, 107, 142].
Sortals are lexicalized as count nouns in natural languages that make the
count/mass distinction. A sortal term, such as table, allows us to single out
individual tables so that we can count them. On the contrary, a predicate
like wooden denotes a property that does not by itself aid in singling out and
enumerating objects. We cannot count the wooden stuff that composes a table.
Should the wooden table be counted as one or should the top and the four legs be
counted separately so that we have five wooden stuffs? In contrast, a request to
“count the wooden tables in this room’ will receive a definite answer: a wooden
table (with its legs and top) should be counted as one table. Hence the count
noun “table” gives us the principles for what to count as one table, whereas the
adjective “wooden” does not provide principles of counting. In general, other
predicates besides count nouns, e.g. verbs or adjectives, do not serve the logical
function of providing principles of individuation. We cannot count “sleeping”
or “green” unless we mean, e.g. count the naps you took or the green trees.
Sortals also provide principles of numerical identity. We cannot ask the
question “is this the same X” without using a sortal to specify what X is.
When a person dies, even though we can trace a spatiotemporally connected
path from the person to its body, we nevertheless decide that the person has gone
out of existence. Your child and your sister’s child are two different children,
whereas a certain baby and a certain grown teenager may be the same person.
This is because an individual can undergo a variety of changes in its prop-
erties, but some changes are non compatible with its identity. The distinction
between possible and impossible changes for an individual determines, at least
in part, the identity of that individual. An individual x0 cannot be the same
individual as x1, if the change which could explain that x0 has been converted
into x1 is not compatible with the x0’s type. Which changes are compatible
and which are not varies across types of objects. I can totally disassembly a
table and then reassembly it after a while and still say that it is the same table.
In contrast, total disassembly and reassembly is incompatible with a person.
Therefore, which changes are possible and which are not depends from what ul-
timately an object is. Following Wiggins [258], a sortal is exactly what provides
an answer to the Aristotelian “what is it?” The expected answer will mention
the kind to which the individual belongs, enabling one to make judgments about
its numerical identity over time.
Again, adjectives and other grammatical categories do not provide such prin-
ciples of identity. For instance, the question whether something is “the same
wooden stuff does not have a definite answer unless we mean “the same wooden
table’. In this case the count noun such “table” provide the principles of identity.
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Another aspect about sortals is that principles of individuation and iden-
tity provided by sortals may override our basic criteria of identity based on
spatiotemporal continuity. To borrow an example from Hirsch [107]: A car con-
signed to a crusher follows a spatiotemporally continuous path in the crushing
process and it gradually becomes a pile of metal and plastic, but nevertheless
at some point, we decide that the car has gone out of existence. This is because
the sortal car provides the criteria for what counts as a car.
Wiggins [258] have proposed a further distinction between substance and
stage (or phase) sortals. In a nutshell, a count noun is a substance sortal if
instances of the sortal it denotes cease to exist when they cease to be members
of the sortal, e.g. person, dog, tree, car. In other words, substance sortals satisfy
the condition that once something is no longer an X, it is also “no longer”. For
example, when a person dies, he ceases to be a member of the sortal person and
he goes out of existence. Hence “person” is a substance sortal. Substance sortals
contrast with phase sortals such as baby or caterpillar, which do not have this
property - a baby does not cease to exist when she grows up even though she
or he is no longer a member of the sortal baby. Similarly, a caterpillar does not
cease to exist when it becomes a butterfly although it is no longer a member of
the sortal chrysalis. For Wiggins [258], only substance sortals stand for genuine
kinds in a metaphysical sense.
More extreme sortalists argue that there are no individuals at all, apart
from the sortal concepts that single out them and establish their beginning and
endings [61]. This assumptions led some authors to formulate a sort of “logic
of sortals” whose main tenet is that there are no “bare particulars”. The idea
is that we cannot enumerate or trace identity without the support of a sortal.
“Bare particulars” are the alleged individuals that have no properties of their
own whatsoever but still serve as entities on which to hang properties.
Suppose someone is pointing at some part of the visual scene and uttering
the word “that”. The demonstrative “that” may refer to a bare particular.
It does not pick out an individual for which we can trace identity over time.
We may be able to figure out that the person intends to pick out part of the
visual scene with a table present, but we would not know whether the person
is pointing to the table, a colour patch of the table, the millions of molecules of
the table, or the table plus the dish that is sitting on it. The main tenet of the
logic of sortals denies that we have conceptual access to bare particulars.
Sortalists claim that objects are always top-down product of their categories
and suggest that we can not represent, identify and track individuals without the
support of sortal concepts which provide principles of persistence and identity.
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Sortalist approaches in psychological theories
The doctrine of sortalism have been recently imported in psychological studies
in order to explore whether adult’s or children’s intuitions about individual
identity match those of sortalism. Do people think that an individual’s identity
depends on the sortal category to which it belongs? As pointed by Rips in
[23] this psychological version of the doctrine of sortalism (or psychosortalism,
e.g. “the doctrine that people think that identity and differences of individuals
crucially depend on sortals”) deals with people’s beliefs about individuation and
identity and therefore it is far from the metaphysical questions that inspire the
philosophical sortalism (e.g. What is an individual object?).
In this section we focus on psychological studies which provide evidences in
favor of the psychosortalism.
A first consistent attempt to show how sortals play a role in explaining
identity over time comes from studies on object individuation in developmental
psychology.
Object individuation is the process by which we establish the number of
distinct objects in an event. When an object is seen at time t1 and an object
is seen at time t2, the question arises as to whether the same object is seen
on two different occasions or whether two distinct objects are present. Three
main sources of information have been proposed to be involved in this process:
1) spatiotemporal information, 2) property (featural) information, 3) and sortal
information [265, 107].
As pointed by Fei Xu [265], spatiotemporal criteria include the following
assumptions: 1) one and the same object cannot be at two places at the same
time ; 2) no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time; 3) objects
travel on spatiotemporally continuous paths. No object can travel from point
x1 to point x2 without traversing a continuous path in between; in presence
of spatiotemporal discontinuity people judge that there must be two objects
involved. For example, the wooden table that is in front of you now is not likely
to be the same object that was seen in a faraway place 10 minutes ago, because
no object can traverse a spatiotemporally connected path between these two
locations in such a short amount of time. These generalizations are true for
all objects, regardless of their kind. Property information include the following
assumptions: 1) if we see an object belonging to a certain kind (e.g. a dog) at
a time t1 and an object belonging to a different kind (e.g. a table) at a time t2,
we infer there are two numerically distinct entities; (2) upon seeing a member
of a kind at a time t1 (e.g. a red car) and a member of the same kind with a
different property (e.g. a blue car) at a time t2, we likely infer that there are
two numerically distinct entities. For example, the blue car that you see now is
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not likely to be the same object as the red car that you saw 10 minutes ago. Of
course if you see the blue car 2 years later, the interpretation that the blue car
is the same as the red car is more plausible.
The property criteria are kind-relative. Certain property changes signal a
change in identity only within certain kinds of objects. For example, if you see a
small screen on the table now and a big screen on the same table later, you infer
that there are two numerically distinct screens. But if you see a small plant in
the garden now and a larger one there a few months later, it is not necessarily
the case that there are two distinct plants.
Sortal information includes generalizations such as 1) objects do not change
kind membership; 2) if an object seen at time t1 falls under one sortal concept
and an object seen at time t2 falls under another sortal concept, then they must
be two objects. For example, the blue car that you see now cannot be the same
object as the blue table you saw 10 minutes ago. Furthermore, property infor-
mation is sortal-specific such that property differences are weighted differently
depending on the kind of object under consideration. For example, if a small
green plant is replaced by a large leafy one in a month, it might well be the
same individual that has grown over time. By contrast, if a small green car is
replaced by a large green car, it is very unlikely that they are one and the same
car.
A lot of psychological investigations have focused on what criteria are em-
ployed by infants for individuating objects and deciding whether something is
the same one as seen before.
In the last decade, a methodology, named violation-of-expectancy looking-
time paradigm, has been developed to study the cognitive capacities of pre-
verbal infants [229]. In this method, infants are shown the same event re-
peatedly and their looking times recorded. With each repetition their looking
times decline, that is, infants “habituate”. When infants reach a pre-set habit-
uation criterion, they are shown two displays alternately, one consistent with
adults’ understanding of the event and the other inconsistent. If the infants
have the same understanding of the habituation event as adults, they should
look longer at the inconsistent display as opposed to the consistent one. In a
seminal study, Spelke et al. [230] showed that 4-month-old infants take evidence
of spatiotemporal discontinuity as evidence for numerically distinct objects. In
this experiment, two screens were lowered onto the stage with some space in
between them. The infant saw that a rod appeared from behind one screen,
say the left one, moved to the left end of the stage, then returned behind the
left screen. No object appeared between the two screens. After short pause, a
physically identical rod appeared from behind the right screen, moved to the
right end of the stage, then returned behind the right screen. This event was
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repeated until the infant reached a habituation criterion, which was defined as
the average looking time of the last three habituation trials being half of the
first three trials or less. The screens were then removed to reveal one of two
outcomes: the expected outcome of two identical rods or the unexpected out-
come of just a single rod. The infants looked longer at the one-rod outcome,
suggesting that they, like adults, had expected two rods and were surprised to
see just one. When the rod did appear in the space between the two screens,
on the other hand, the infants looked about equally at the one-rod and two-rod
outcomes, as if undecided as to how many rods were behind the screens.
Baillargeon et al. [8] presented evidence that 5-month-old infants understand
that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time and that one
object cannot be at two places at the same time. In one of the experiments,
infants were habituated to a tall rabbit going behind a screen and appearing
on the other side. Then the middle section of the top half of the screen was
removed so that the tall rabbit should appear in this “window”. If the rabbit
did not appear in the window, the infants looked longer than if the rabbit
did appear in the window. But if the infants were shown two identical tall
rabbits simultaneously, one on each side of the screen, they did not look longer
when no rabbit appeared in the window. Infants could only succeed if they
interpreted the two identical-looking rabbits as two distinct rabbits using the
location information. In other words, if shown two objects simultaneously, the
infants set up representations of two numerically distinct objects that allowed
them to resolve an apparent violation of spatiotemporal continuity.
The results of these studies are compatible with two different interpretations
of how sortal concepts can underlie the identity judgments, one assuming that
infants represent specific sortal concepts such as rabbit or ball, and the other
assuming that the sortal concept underlying the behaviour is physical object.
Xu and Carey [269] devised further experiments to address this question.
The aim of these experiments was to produce evidence in favor of the Object-
first Hypothesis (OFH). According to this hypothesis there are two hierarchical
levels of sortals in the adult conceptual system. A most general sortal named
object for which spatiotemporal properties provide the criteria of individuation
and identity and more specific sortals rely on additional types of properties
to provide these criteria. The OFH claims that infants may have the sortal
object before they have other sortals more specific than object. Starting from
the results of Spelke et al. [230] about the ability of four-months infants of
using spatiotemporal information to trace the object identity through time, the
authors conducted 5 studies using the habituation paradigm to support this
hypothesis.
The first experiment replicated the results of Spelke et al. [230], showing
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that 10-month-old infants use spatiotemporal information to establish how many
individuals are involved in an event and to track identity of those individuals
over time. In this experiment the split screen procedure was used to contrast
two conditions: a discontinuous condition where no object ever appeared in the
space between the screen and a continuous condition where an object traced a
path continuously back and forth behind the screens, appearing in the middle. In
both conditions babies looked longer at what for adults would be the unexpected
outcome (respectively one object and two objects).
The remaining experiments addressed directly the OFH using a variant of
the Spelke’s procedure. They show babies events in which one object emerges
from one side of a screen (e.g. a ball) alternating with a different object (e.g. a
bottle) emerging from the other side of the same screen. Adults infer that there
must be at least two objects behind the screen, referring to specific sortal mem-
bership or property information. Then the experimenter removes the screen,
revealing either one object (unexpected) or two (expected). The issue was to
test whether babies would make the same inference of adults, looking longer at
the unexpected outcome.
If the infant is able to use the property/kind (or sortal) difference between the
ball and the bottle to infer two distinct objects, she should look longer at the one
object outcome. Surprisingly, these 10-month-old infants failed to look longer
at the unexpected one-object outcome suggesting that they do not represent
sortals ball or bottle. In a variant of the experiment which varied the sequences
of habituation the authors showed that the results cannot be explained with the
infants’ incapacity to code properties. Xu and Carey concluded that even though
the infants had encoded the properties of the objects, they did not use these
differences to infer that there were two distinct object. More likely they have
represent the event as an object (with ball properties) and as an object (with
bottle properties). As the only sortal infants represent is physical object, then
they can only use spatiotemporal criteria to individuate objects but because the
spatiotemporal information is ambiguous (one screen) the infants were agnostic
as to how many objects were behind the screen. Further experiments in Xu and
Carey [269] showed that 12-month-old infants succeed at these tasks. This is at
least suggestive that the older infants may have sortal concepts such as ball and
bottle. As the two exemplars belong to two different sortals/kinds, they must
be two distinct objects. The experimental evidence reviewed above suggests
that physical object may be the first sortal concept infants represent and that
it is not until 10 to 12 months of age that they represent more specific sortals
such as ball or bottle.
Van De Walle [255] et al. extended these findings by using a manual search
task. Infants saw 1 or 2 objects placed inside an opaque box, into which they
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could reach but not see. Across conditions, the information specifying the two
objects differed. On one-object trials, a single object was shown to infants and
returned to the box, which was presented for reaching. Infants invariably re-
trieved the object, which was then taken away from them, after which reaching
was coded. Because the object has been retrieved, reaching should be brief and
cursory. On two-object trials, infants was shown two objects, either simulta-
neously in the spatiotemporal condition or successively in the property/kind
condition. Before the box was presented for reaching, one object was surrepti-
tiously removed. Again, infants invariably retrieved the object still in the box,
which was then taken away from them, following which reaching is coded. Now,
infants who have represented two objects should reach often and persistently
because they should expect to find the second, missing object.
The results of two experiments show that twelve-month-old infants indi-
viduate objects in the current task when provided with either property/kind
information alone or property/ kind information paired with spatiotemporal in-
formation. They reach both more frequently and for a longer duration when
a second object should be in the box than when the box should be empty.
Ten-month-old infants, in contrast, individuated objects in this task only when
provided with unambiguous spatiotemporal information that specifies two ob-
jects.
Despite disparate information-processing demands, this pattern converges
with looking time data, suggesting a developmental change orthogonal to that
of executive function.
In more recent studies has been shown that several factors allow young in-
fants to anticipate two object correctly. If 10-month-old infants are able to
inspect simultaneously both the objects before start the trial, then they look
longer at the one-object scene. This evidence has been explained with reference
to the OFH by arguing that younger infants have high-level sortal concepts,
equivalent to “physical object” which provides the sortal information that in-
fants use in the pre-view condition. As Xu stated [265] “ for both adults and
young infants, there is nonetheless a sortal physical object, which is more general
than person, car, or tree. A physical object is defined as any three-dimensional,
bounded entity that moves on a spatiotemporally continuous path” (p 369).
Blok at al. [24] offer different criticisms to this hypothesis. First, sortal theories
in philosophy typically hold that terms like thing, object, physical object, space
occupier, entity, and so on, are not sortals, despite their count noun syntax, be-
cause they do not provide identity conditions (see [259] for a discussion on this
issue). First of all, Fei Xu’s definition of “physical object”, namely “bounded,
coherent, three dimensional physical object that moves as a whole” definitely
excludes all sorts of things that we certainly need to be able to pick out (and to
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recognize again and again). Her definition excludes rooms, walls, floors, ceilings,
corridors, trees, roads, ponds, hills and so on. Secondly, the concept of “physi-
cal object” does not allow us to single out individual entities and count them.
Going back to the previous example, we cannot count the physical objects that
constitute a table; the number could again be one (the table), five (the legs
and top), six (the legs, top, and the table), and so on. Moreover, strong sortal
theories argue that only a single sortal captures all the identity conditions for
a particular object. The idea that both physical objects and basic-level terms
like table simultaneously function as sortals is in conflict with the traditional
sortal view.
Therefore, these criticisms cast a first doubt on the validity of the sortalist
approach to explain the empirical evidences reported above.
Moreover, it was demonstrated that younger infants can use verbal cues to
individuate objects [266]. Nine-month-old infants, for instance, were presented
with the is-it-one-or-two task. When each object emerged from behind the
screen, the experimenter labeled it: “Look, a duck!” or “Look, a ball!” With just
a few repetitions of these labels, 9-month-old infants behaved like 12-month-olds
in the test trials: they looked longer at the unexpected outcome of one object
than the expected outcome of two objects. Infants also succeeded when two
unfamiliar objects were presented and non-sense words were used. By contrast,
they failed when both objects were labeled “a toy” or when two distinct tones,
sounds or emotional expressions were provided. However, it is noted that non-
sense words can not provide criteria of identity because they are meaningless.
Therefore, as pointed by Block et al. [24], the results in [266] could be explained
without referring to the notion of sortal, but simply assuming that contrastive
labels encourage infants to expect the presence of two objects instead of one.
Another study tested whether labeling alone could guide the process of es-
tablishing representations of distinct objects. Using a manual search method,
12-month-old infants were shown to be able to apply the presence of labels to
determine how many objects were in a box whose content was invisible to them
[267]: when infants heard the content of the box labeled with two different
words, they expected to find two objects inside; when they heard just one word
repeated, they expected to find only one object inside the box.
These studies converge with the results of the object individuation studies:
infants expect count nouns to map onto kinds of objects at the beginning of word
learning, and this expectation leads them to use labeling as a source of evidence
in identifying kinds in their environment. The labeling event “Look, a rabbit!”
informs the infant that she should set up a mental symbol that represents a
sortal concept; the sortal concept RABBIT maps onto the kind rabbit in the
world. If an object seen at a different time is labeled with a different count
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noun, “Look, a dog!”, a mental symbol is then created to represent the sortal
concept DOG. These sortal concepts provide the basic criteria for individuation
and identity: an object that falls under the sortal RABBIT cannot be the same
object as one that falls under the sortal DOG. In this sense, the acquisition of
basic-level sortal concepts depends on acquiring basic-level count nouns.
Sortalists developmental psychologists, such as Carey and Xu, used these
evidences to support the hypothesis that sortal concepts, such as “ball” and
“rabbit” allow older infants and adults to perform correctly in a is-it-one-or-two
task.
According to this view, the representational system underlying object indi-
viduation (and adopted in the is-it-one-or-two-task) is fully conceptual, drawing
on kind information for decisions about individuation and numerical identity.
This system is completely different from that described in 3.1, that is a mid-
level vision system that establishes object file representations, and that indexes
attended objects and tracks them through time. Object file representations do
not depend upon categorizing individuals into antecedently represented object
kinds. To a large extent, the mechanisms that index and track objects through
time work the same way whether the objects are instances of familiar kinds or
not and are thus mid-level in not requiring placement into conceptual categories.
The idea that the object representations of young infants are identical to
those that are served up by mid-level object-based attention has been recently
suggested by many authors [135, 211] and have challenged the interpretation
of the empirical results discussed above as evidence in favor of the sortalist
view. We have already described in 3.1.1 the object index theory. Here, we
briefly review how some of recent studies on object individuation have been
reinterpreted from the point of view of indexing theory.
In their seminal study on object persistence which we have describe above,
Spelke et al. [230] found that young infants’ individuation judgments were
influenced by spatiotemporal continuity. These findings have been interpreted
by Leslie et al. [135] as a form of indexing by location. Take Spelke’s first
condition: as the first object appears, it is assigned an index. The index sticks
to the object as it moves along, disappearing and reappearing from behind each
of the screens in turn. A single object attracts a single index. The test phase, in
which the single object is seen again, concurs with indexed expectations and has
little novelty. The two-object test requires the infant to assign a new index (by
location) to the second object and consequently attracts additional attention.
In the discontinuous condition, the first appearance of the object attracts an
index that, again, sticks as the object disappears behind the screen. But in
this condition the object does not reappear. Instead, another object appears
from behind the second screen. Because the first index still points behind the
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first screen and has not traversed the gap, a new index must be assigned to
the second object. Now the infant has two indexes active, which translates into
an expectation for two objects. When a single object is shown in the test, the
infant has two indexes active with only one of them pointing at something. The
infant looks for the “vanished” object.
Another example is the study of Xu and Carey [269]. In this study infants
were shown with pairs of objects by removing and replacing them from behind
a screen. The objects were placed in the infants’ view either two at a time (spa-
tial condition) or alternating, one at a time (temporal condition). The objects
always differed by kind (e.g. a shoe and a cup). Following familiarization, the
screen was removed revealing either only one of the objects previously shown, or
both objects. In the spatial condition, 10-month-old infants looked longer when
the screen revealed a single object. However, in the temporal condition, the
infants looked equally at the revelation of one and two objects. They appeared
unable to infer that a shoe and a cup must be distinct objects, unless they saw
both objects together at the same time. When shown the cup and shoe at differ-
ent times, they did not infer the presence of two distinct objects. Slightly older
infants, at 12 months, successfully inferred two objects under both conditions
Apparently, Xu and Carey’s younger infants individuated only by location. In-
dexing theory, drawing on independently motivated notions, provides a ready
explanation. Because objects are indexed by location, seeing two objects in dif-
ferent locations at the same time forces the assignment of two indexes: therefore
two individual objects are inferred. However, the index does not automatically
carry featural information. When only one object at a time is in view, only one
index is assigned. The featural differences across successive appearances might
be registered and remembered in the infant’s feature map, but they do not force
the assignment of distinct indexes. Under these conditions at 10 months, in-
dexing appears to be driven by the “where” and not by the “what” system.
By 12 months, however, the featural differences across time apparently do force
assignment of a second index. One intriguing hypothesis is that the change be-
tween 10 and 12 months in these tasks reflects increased integration of ventral
(“what”) and dorsal (“where”) neural systems.
This interpretation of the results challenges the sortalist view of object in-
dividuation and suggests that the heart of any object representation might be
inherently abstract, a kind of mental pointing at a “this” or at a “that”. This
idea of a deictic system at the basis of object representation is in line with our
notion of singular concept in that it creates the first route for a direct connection
between an object in the world and its representation in the cognitive system.
Other evidences against the sortalist view have been provided by studies that
have explicitly investigated the role of sortal concepts in identifying objects. We
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review these studies in the next section.
3.3.2 Non-sortalist Approaches to the Problem of Singu-
lar Cognition
If the main tenet of the sortalism is that sortal concepts, such as “car” or
“table” give people the means to identify objects, one way to provide evidence
in support to or against the sortalist view is to examine the role of sortal terms
in identifying objects.
As pointed by Rips in [23], a first attempt in this respect has been made by
Liittschwager [137] which used a transformation method to examine children’s
and adults’ willingness to attribute the same name to people after a trans-
formation. Participants (4-year-old children) were presented with illustrated
stories about people who were described as magically transformed to different
states. The transformations ranged, across trials, from minimal changes of tem-
porary properties (a clean child to a dirty child), to more extreme trans-category
changes (a child to a rabbit). For each type of transformation, participants had
to decide whether the transformed object could still be called by the name of the
original person (e.g., Do you think that now this is Ali?). According to sortal-
based theories, objects cannot maintain their identity across changes in sortal
categories; so participants should use the same proper name only if the trans-
formation is within the basic-level category person. The results of the study
showed that adults as well as children were less willing to attribute the original
name to the final product of the transformation the greater the transformation
distance between them. The interesting result of the study was that there was
no clear breakpoint on this continuum - in particular no elbow was found where
the transformation crossed the sortal category boundary. These findings pro-
vided a first evidence in favor of the hypothesis that identity judgments can be
maintained across changes up to the sortal category.
Using the same transformation method, Sergey Blok, George Newman, and
Rips [23] reported other findings in contrast with the sortalist view. Partic-
ipants read stories about an accountant (e.g., Jim) who was the victim of a
serious traffic accident. As a result, Jim’s brain was transplanted in a new
body: either a robot body or a human body. In both cases the Jim’s original
body was destroyed. Participants had to decide whether the result of the oper-
ation was still Jim and also whether he was still a person. To investigate other
factors which may contribute to judgments of identity continuity the authors
introduced a further manipulation. Some participants were told about a brain
transplant, while others were told that memories from the original brain were
copied onto a computer, placed in control of a robot or humanoid body. The
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most important prediction of the study was the following: if people use sortals
to guide identity judgments, they should be no interaction between whether
Jim’s brain is transplanted into a human or robot body and whether the ques-
tion of continuity is about being a person (category judgment) or about being
Jim (identity judgment).
Contrary to this prediction, the results indicated a dissociation between
identity and category judgments. In determining whether the creature post-
operation was still Jim, participants paid more attention to whether Jim’s mem-
ories were preserved and paid less attention to whether the recipient of these
memories was a robot or a human body. Therefore, in some conditions partici-
pants were more likely to agree that the creature was still Jim than it was still
a person and vice versa in other conditions they were more likely to agree that
he was still a person than it was still Jim. This double dissociation presents
difficulties with the sortalist view, since this theory predicts that Jim’s existence
should cease when he stops being a person. On the contrary the results indi-
cated that Jim continues to exists, though out of hist sort, that is out of person
category.
In a second transformation study the authors tested whether natural kinds
and individual artifacts can persist across changes in sortal categories. Par-
ticipants were presented with a picture and a short description of an object
(e.g. a particular cat). They also were shown with a drawing of a sci-fi device
which could be a “transporter” (i.e. a device to transport the object particle-
by-particle to a new place and reassembly it) or a “copier” (i.e. a device that
made a new copy of the object, while the original was destroyed). Finally, par-
ticipants saw a picture of the outcome of the transformation that could be the
same picture as before (e.g. the picture of the same cat), a picture of a related
object (e.g. a picture of a dog) or a picture of an unrelated object (e.g. a picture
of a boat). The task was to judge whether the outcome of the transformation
was still the same individual and whether it was still a member of the same
sortal (e.g. a cat).
As in the previous experiment, the results produced a dissociation between
the identity question and the category question. When the outcome was the
same as the original, participants judged the outcome to be a member of the
same category but were less convinced that it was the very same individual. On
the contrary for transformation involving related objects the pattern of results
was reversed. They were more likely to agree that the outcome was the same
individual than that it was a member of the same category. No differences were
found for transformations with unrelated objects.
Another non-sortalist approach to explain judgments of the persistence of
individual objects has been recently proposed by Rips et al. [192]. In a se-
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ries of evocative studies, the authors examined the role of causality in identity
judgments and have proposed a new model of object identity named Causal
Continuer Theory. The model derives from a philosophical theory, i.e. the
Closest Continuer Theory, proposed by Robert Nozick [174] as a theory of per-
sonal identity. We have already noted that the problem of object (or personal)
identity deals with the question of how people decide that an individual object,
let’s say x0, existing at one time is identical to one of a set of candidate objects,
x1, x2, ..., xn, existing at a later time. The Nozick’s theory suggests that the
identical object to the original x0, i.e. the continuer, is the one that is, in some
ways, the closest to it. In the Rips et al.’s model this closeness is explained in
terms of causal dynamics and therefore the model has been referred as Causal
Continuer Theory. The intuition is that “the continuer of the original object
must be a causal outgrowth of that original” (p. 7). Causal continuity captures
the intuition that people think of causes as central to object persistence and
suggests that what makes two entities identical with each other is not based on
superficial similarity or sortal membership but rather on a deep causal connect-
edness.
While the first element of the model deals with causality, the second element
deals with closeness. As we noted above, the model assumes that in determining
a continuer, people do not select something that is arbitrary far from the origi-
nal. If there are two or more objects at a later time that are close enough to the
original, the theory specifies that only the closest of these objects is identical
to the original. However, if none of these potential continuers is significantly
closer to the original than the others, the model predicts that indecision can be
generated due to the competition between the candidates. Another aspect re-
lated to the closeness is that in determining a continuer, people can not to select
something that is arbitrary far from the original. If the candidates are causally
too far from the original there may be no object that qualifies as identical to
the original.
In the causal continuer framework, the authors proposed a two-step decision
process on identity judgments. 1) The first step deals with considering as po-
tential candidates only those objects that are close enough to the original; 2)
the second step consists of selecting, within the range of candidates, the closest
object as the one identical to the original.
Note that the determination of the range of candidates is context dependent.
This means that an item in one situation may not be the closest in another if
the second situation contains an even closer object.
In a series of experiments Rips et al. [192] evaluated the psychological plau-
sibility of the model and they developed a quantitative version of the model
that provided accurate predictions about identity judgments in different tasks.
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In the experiment most relevant for the present discussion about sortalist
versus non sortalist approaches, the authors tested the hypothesis that causal
factors rather than sortal category membership dominate judgments of object
identity when these factors are contrasted. In this experiment, participants were
asked to make an identity choice between potential continuers. The causal dis-
tance between the continuers and the original object was systematically varied
across the trials. Participants were presented with stories about a machine that
could copy and transfer objects from place to place on a particle-by-particle
basis. The machine copied the particle of the original object and retransmitted
them to a new location where the particle were reassembled while the original
particles were destroyed. The duplicating process was interpreted in the exper-
iment as the guaranty of the causal connection between the original and the
continuers, whereas spatio-temporal and material connections were eliminated
by the fact that the the particles were reassembled in another place and the
original particles were distroyed.
The causal distance between the original and the continuers was varied by
changing the proportions of particles in the copy that the original object causally
produced. In order to contrast the predictions of the causal continuer theory
with those of the sortal theory, the source of the particles which completed the
outcome of the transformation (when less than 100% of the original particles
stemmed from the original) was varied. On half of the trials the residual particles
were from another member of the original’s category, wherehas on the rest of
the trials the residual particles came from a member of a different basic-level
category. The task was to decide 1) whether the copy was the same object
as the original; 2) whether the copy was in the same category as the original.
Moreover in one condition (one-copy condition) a single copy was generated
from the original, whereas in another condition (two-copy condition) two copies
were derived from the original. Therefore, in the second condition participants
ware asked to chose whether only one copy of the two copies was the same object
as the original (or in the same category as the original); whether both copies
were the same as the original (or in the same category as the original); or finally
whether neither of the copies was the original (or in the same category as the
original).
Confirming the results reported in [23], the authors found a dissociation be-
tween category judgments and identity judgments. The larger the percentage
of particles from the original, the more likely participants responded that the
copy was the same as the original. However, no effect was found of whether the
residual particles were from a member of the same category or of a member of a
different category compared to the original. The opposite pattern was found for
the category judgments. When more and more particles came from the opposite
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category, more likely participants judged improbable that the outcome of the
transformation was a member of the same category as the original. The disso-
ciation indicated that factors affecting category membership do not necessarily
affect decisions about individual persistence. This results are in contrast with
the assumptions of the sortal theory which predicts that factors that cast doubt
on whether the copy is a member of the sortal category should also cast doubt
on whether the copy cab be considered the same individual as the original,
contrary to the results.
Moreover, the data from the two-copy condition supported the prediction of
the Causal Continuer Model, showing that as the percentage of original particles
in the two copies became more dissimilar, participants shifted toward judging
that only the dominant copy (i.e. the copy with the largest number of particles
stemmed from the original) was identical to the original. On the contrary,
when both copies had the same number of particles from the original, neither
copy was dominant and participants were more likely to judge that both copies
were identical to the original or neither copy was identical to the original if the
number of particles stemmed from the original was scarce. Again no difference
resulting from whether the residual particles came from a member of the same
category as the original or from a member of the contrast category, confirming
the results of the one-copy condition and reinforcing the challenge toward the
sortalist view.
Even though other authors [190, 190] tried to defend the sortalist approach,
the empirical results from Rips et al.’s studies reinforce the doubts about sor-
tal theories since they were obtained from experiments which were thought as
systematic attempts to pit the causal theory against alternative theories and in
primis against the sortal theory.
Moreover, the model in Rips et al. [192] aimed to capture adults’ judgments
about object identity over the long term, investigating what people take to be
the ultimate basis for object identity even in situations in which perceptual
information was not involved. On the contrary, sortal theory in psychology
was originally applied to research on infants and children by Macnamara [146]
and Xu and Carey [269] to investigate object individuation across temporary
perceptual interruptions. Although the results of developmental studies may be
relevant to adult judgments, there is no empirical evidence that directly links
these two programs of research, and the lessons from the infant research are
ambiguous, as we have noted above.
Beyond the debate between sortalists and non-sortalists, these results are
also highly relevant to the present work because they suggest that singular rep-
resentations of individuals (i.e. singular concepts) can free themselves from the
bounds of basic level categories, becoming the very tokens on which people base
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their identity judgments. In other words, these findings show that people do
not believe that knowledge of individuals depends so tightly on knowledge of
categories that their identity can not be preserved across the category boundary.
On the contrary, it appears that people may have representations of individu-
als apart from their representations as members of a category. We argue that
these representations, which we refer to as singular concepts, possess their own
individuality in the conceptual system and are indeed the core of object iden-
tity. Our aim is to show that many psychological theories have overstated the
dependence of individual and general concepts and many aspects of singular
cognition can be explained without assuming that general concepts provide the
ultimate principles to organize the knowledge about individuals, the access to
this knowledge and the use of it in identity judgments.
3.4 Proper Names as Index of Individual Iden-
tity
When we have described the nature of singular concepts in Chapter 2, we have
claimed that singular concepts may contain a special kind of information, cor-
responding to the proper name of the entity represented. We argued that these
“mental proper names” serve as a sort of mental labels which can be used to
create a direct referential link between the singular concept in memory and the
corresponding individual in the world, even when the object is not directly per-
ceived. Insofar as they serve as longstanding labels on singular concepts, which
can be used for accessing, adding, updating, and merging of information on an
individual, even without the need of a perceptual contact with that individual,
mental names cannot be pure demonstratives or indexicals, which are contex-
tually based determiners of their objects. In this sense they differ from visual
indexes described in section 3.1.2, but they serve as the cognitive counterpart
to the proper names that are used in language to refer to unique individuals.
Indeed they are the mental encoding of the proper names used in language.
Many evidences confirm that proper names are processed differently within
the cognitive system than other kind of information.
In this section we review the studies which support our assumption that
proper names have a different status within the mental representations about
individuals.
A first evidence comes from neuropsychological findings that show that
proper names follow functionally distinct processing pathways compared to com-
mon names.2 Neurological damage can result in a condition whereby only proper
2The common names/proper names distinction is interesting from our perspective because
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names are disturbed, while common names are unaffected. The opposite con-
dition whereby proper names are spared but there are severe problems with
common names has also been observed, even though the latter condition has
been reported less frequently then the first condition (see [216] for a review about
neuropsychological dissociations between common and proper names). Taken
together, these two conditions, mirroring each other (thus constituting, what is
known in neuropsychology as a “double dissociation”), constitute evidence of a
separation of mechanisms processing proper and common names in the brain.
An interesting interpretation of these evidences have been recently proposed
by Semenza [216] within a theoretical, information-processing model of proper
name production and understanding which is based on the notion that differ-
ent ways of possessing reference, which distinguish proper names from common
names, are reflected in different mechanisms governing semantic memory, dis-
tinguishing “individual semantics” from more general semantics. In particular,
the properties of semantic operations necessary for naming with proper names
may have, in comparison with those used for common names, different qualities.
As Semenza, Zettin and Borgo [217] have observed, a name designating a cate-
gory applies to a set of attributes overlapping or interacting with each other via
high-probability connections. The set of attributes labeled by a proper name,
instead, combine together incidentally, being related to each other only by virtue
of belonging to entities that are unique. This fact would explain why the link
proper names have with their reference is more likely damaged than the link
that common names have with the objects they label.
Another evidence which confirms that a proper name has a different status
within a singular representation, derives from studies showing that proper names
are more difficult to retrieve than is biographical information about people.
We have already discussed these studies in 3.2 showing how they influenced a
number of theoretical accounts of person recognition and naming.
Other studies have investigated the cognitive relevance of proper names in
the context of developmental psychology. These studies have been reported
by Jeshion in [115] as evidences supporting her view about the significance of
proper names. We review here some of these studies that show the special status
of proper names in the cogntive reference system.
Several studies of word learning in childhood have explored the question of
how children learn proper names.
By the time they are two years old, children appear to know which ex-
pressions in their language are proper names, and they also genuinely seem to
reflects the distinction, at a conceptual level, between singular concepts and general concepts.
Proper names essentially refer to individuals (or individual groups), while common names
refer to categories. In the same way, singular concepts represent individuals, whereas general
concepts represent categories.
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represent these expressions as designating individual objects. Children’s ability
to use syntactic and semantic clues to comprehend new names was investigated
by Katz, Baker and Macnamara [125] and and Macnamara [145].
In these studies, the authors showed one group of 2-year-olds a target doll
and labeled it with a novel word modeled syntactically as a proper name (e.g.,
“This is ZAV”). These children restricted the word to the target object and were
unwilling to extend it to another similar-looking doll. This finding suggests they
interpreted “ZAV” as a proper name designating the individual target doll. In
contrast, another group of 2-year-olds heard the same target doll labeled with
the same word modeled syntactically as a count noun (e.g., “This is a ZAV”).
Children in this group readily extended the word to both the target and another
similar-looking doll, suggesting that they interpreted the word as a count noun
picking out an object category.
But how do children acquire the ability to use syntactic information to iden-
tify proper names in speech? In her paper on significance of proper names
Jeshion [115] [p. 383] noted that “knowledge of syntax helps guide children in
identifying novel words as proper names as opposed to common nouns” , but
“while common nouns taking determiners provides a basis for distinguishing
them from proper names, syntax is insufficient for proper name identification”.
The author pointed out that other possible candidates, such as pronouns, adjec-
tives and mass nouns, could be considered to identify the novel words modeled
syntactically as proper names (e.g. “this is Zav”). And still remains open the
question of how a child is able to acquire syntactic knowledge. According to
Jeshion, this would imply assuming that the child ”must be able to already
possess some knowledge of the linguistic category of some words”.
One proposal is that children use semantic information (i.e. knowledge about
the properties of real-world entities) to learn these words’ syntactic markings.
According to Macnamara, for example, children rely on the assumption that
proper names are the words that people use to pick out objects belonging to
kinds of things whose members are seen as enduringly significant in their own
right.
One such assumption is that only some kinds of individuals are regarded
as candidates for a proper name. There are empirical evidences that support
this hypothesis. Gelman and Tylor [83], for example, showed that children in
their experiments exhibited a strong tendency to choose an animal-like toy as
the referent of a proper noun but they were reluctant to assign proper names
to artifacts-blocks, shoes, toy cars and planes. Similarly, Hall [99] showed that
3- and 4-year olds made proper name interpretations when they learned novel
words for typical pets, like birds or dogs, as they did the majority of those
who learned novel words for nonstandard pets described as possessed by the
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experimenter.
Another evidence supporting the hypothesis that children, like adults, rep-
resent proper names as referring to unique individuals (i.e. Unique Individuals
hypothesis) has been provided by a study of Sorrentino [228].
Using a very simple experimental procedure, children and adults were shown
an object (a toy animal or a non-animal artifact) with a salient property (an
object marker like a colorful bib). The object was introduced with a novel
word (“This is daxy”). The object was then moved, the object marker was
removed and a second object identical to the first was introduced at the location
before occupied by the first object. The object marker was placed on the new
object. At this point the experimenter asked “Which one is daxy?”. In the
animal condition both children and adults selected the toy animal originally
referred to with the new word (despite a change in the animal’s appearance
and location). Note that this new word was interpreted by adults like a proper
name in a evaluation session that followed the main task. The results show an
interesting bias named “animal bias”: participants in the artifact condition did
not interpret the word as a proper name.
This study provides evidence in support of the central role that proper names
plays in reference. Proper names are paradigmatic referring expressions not
only from a philosophical point of view but also from a psychological point
of view. The results support that proper names contrast referentially with
other referential expression like count nouns, mass nouns or adjectives. Proper
names are represented as referring to unique individuals, or rigid designators,
namely they refer to unique individuals and are used to trace the identity of
their referents through changes in appearance and location. Another interesting
point is about the animal bias : children like adults readily learn proper names
for people, many animals and their surrogates (e.g. dolls) but not for non-
animal individuals such as wooden blocks. In this study adults interpreted the
new word introduced in an ambiguous sentence frame as a proper name when
the referent was an animal but not when the referent was a simple artifact.
This result is interesting because it shows that there are type of entities that are
conceived more prototypical namable entities. In this respect artifacts represent
a special type of entities, an aspect which we have investigated in our work.
People may assign proper names to complex artifacts such as boats or cars (e.g.
Titanic) but generally they do not assign proper names to simple artifacts (like
bottles or knives). It would be of interest to investigate the properties of objects
that lead people to consider them like candidates for proper names. If proper
names are means to trace personal identity, we can suppose that people assign
proper names to objects that are cognitively not interchangeable with other
objects. Being good candidates for proper names could depend more from a
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differentiation need than from category membership.
Some interesting insights about this issue have been provided by Hall et al.
[98]. In two studies the authors explored 5-year-olds and adults beliefs about
entities that receive reference by proper names. This research was motivated by
two main goals: 1) to develop a set of norms about the structure and coherence of
children’s and adults’ concept of proper namable entity, 2) to develop a possible
account of how children learn proper names. To this purpose, authors adopted
two different tasks. A listing task in which children and adults stated what
things in the world can or cannot receive a proper name and an explanation task
in which participants explained why things receive proper names. The results
show that children tended to list animate living things and their surrogates as
meriting a proper name and tended to not include human artifacts or other
things as being deserving. In contrast the lists reported by adults included all
the previous type of things. Children and adults showed similar belief about non
namable things, tending to report artifacts and other things as being unworthy
of a proper name. Both groups of subjects provided similar explanation for why
things can receive proper name. The main explanation is that things receive
proper names in order to be identified as individuals in their own right or to be
distinguished from other things. The only alternative explanation is the need
to interact with something socially or to mark affection for it.
The results of this study are interesting at least for two reasons. First, they
show that the difference between children’s and adults’ beliefs about entities
that receive proper names does not depend from a different explanation of why
certain things are deserving of reference by proper names but it seems more
related to a different experience and knowledge of things that receive proper
names. This result is interesting because it provides evidence of a common
referential mechanism for children and adults that goes through a gradual spe-
cialization in the course of the development to include more types of namable
things. The second important result concerns the non-namable things. Both
children’s and adults’ lists of non-namable objects were heavily filled with arti-
facts and lesser degree with other things. This result confirms the peculiarity of
artifacts (and their difference respect to living things) also in reference. More-
over the fact that some artifacts were considered as deserving of proper names
by some participants and as not deserving of proper names by others show that
there can be difference in terms of how people construed the items. We claim
that a possible difference could be derived by a not clear differentiation between
proper names and brand names. In the present work we will investigate another
kind of label for artifacts, i.e. the model name, that often includes or is strongly
associated to, the brand name (e.g. Fiat 500). As we will discuss later, our
assumption is that model names can function as proper names to label a special
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kind of individual concepts, that is singular concepts of products. This aspect
has been fully investigated in the experiments reported in Chapters 6 and 7.
The thrust of this section was twofold. First, we aimed to describe empirical
evidences supporting the assumption that proper names have a different status
in entity-specific information processing. Second, we wanted to provide evidence
in favor of the idea that there is a connection between names and significance.
This connection recalls the principle of significance discussed in Chapter 2 for the
initiation of singular concepts. This suggests that individuals that are deserving
of reference by proper names are more likely to be the individuals for which we
have singular concepts in memory, because both mechanisms, i.e. conferring
proper names and initiating singular concepts, have the same aim to signal the
individuality of individuals.
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Chapter 4
Neural Basis of Singular
Concepts
The way in which we interact with the world is determined by our network of
accumulated knowledge concerning the people, objects, places, animals and all
the other entities that comprise it. This knowledge is stored in a sort of mental
repository typically called semantic memory. Within of semantic memory we
have distinguished between knowledge about general categories (general con-
cepts) and knowledge about individual entities (singular concepts). The focus
of our work is on the access, the functioning and the organization of this con-
ceptual database in its part concerning the representation of individual entities.
In the chapter 3 we have discussed cognitive models which assume that the
cognitive system uses singular representations of individuals and mechanisms for
direct reference to objects in order to support processes concerning the track-
ing (perceptual or conceptual) of unique entities and their identification. We
have also contrast these models with other approaches (sortal theories) which
suggest that singular representations are in subordinate position compared to
high level representations (sortal concepts) to guarantee object individuation
and persistence across time.
In this chapter we discuss the studies which provide evidence for the exis-
tence of brain areas involved in representation and processing of singular repre-
sentations and we review the literature that have investigated different aspects
concerning with the neural basis of singular concepts and singular cognition.
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4.1 Neuropsychological Evidences
Neuropsychological studies of brain damaged individuals with disrupted seman-
tic memory, and more recently, functional imaging investigations in healthy
control subjects, have been critical in shaping current theories regarding the cog-
nitive and neural architecture of semantic memory. Many studies have demon-
strated that different parts of brain may be selectively involved in processing of
different categories. Subjects with deficits affecting one category of knowledge,
with relative preservation of another, have been of particular interest in this
respect [106, 256, 117]. In particular, different systems appear to mediate the
access to knowledge about tool and man-made objects as opposed to natural
categories of objects [40, 126]. Such findings are accepted by some researchers
as reflecting categorical organization of semantic memory, with separate repre-
sentation of distinct domains of knowledge [40].
Apart from representing categorical information, the human brain continu-
ally deals with a vast amount of specific knowledge about individual entities.
However, the characterization of entity-specific semantic knowledge as a disso-
ciable domain from general knowledge concerning general categories has been
less investigated.
The majority of studies that has addressed this issue have investigated the
neural basis for processing knowledge about individual entities within a specific
category (e.g. faces), focusing on a specific process such as visual recognition,
access to (specific) semantic knowledge or naming.
However, very few studies have compared entities from different categories
which can likewise be accessed at the exemplar level, matching the level of
categorization at which the stimulus is processed (e.g. comparing a famous
building like the Eiffel Tower with a famous person like Marilin Monroe).
In this section we aim to show how when this match is ensured, the evidence
for a category specialization appears less strong, showing that many areas acti-
vated for processing individual entities of a category are also activated for that
of entities of another category.
One of the most studied category of unique entities is that of familiar people.
This is not surprising if you consider that the ability to recognize and distinguish
a person from another is a fundamental skill necessary for the everyday social
interactions.
The common issue underlying these studies is to explore whether specific
neurocognitive systems are involved in person-specific knowledge processing.
This issue is closely associated with theories of modular specialization in the
brain. In particular, the postulated existence of a brain area that is specialized
for face processing would provide a clear example of domain specificity, one of
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the defining features of cognitive modules [70].
Two sources of evidence are available regarding the functional anatomy of
the different stages of person identification: the association of deficits with the
lesion sites and functional imagining.
Neuropshycological studies described patients with impairments at various
stages of the person identification process, including 1) a presemantic stage
when recognition of famous faces is impaired only in the visual domain (i.e.
prosopoagnosia); 2) the semantic stage when loss of biographical information
about known people occurs regardless of stimulus modality (crossmodal agnosia
for familiar people ); and 3) the post semantic lexical retrieval stage, when name
retrieval is impaired but semantic information is retrieved correctly (i.e. proper
name anomia).
The issue whether these deficits reflect the existence of face or person-specific
cognitive modules has been debated since the earliest reports of prosopoagnosia.
Some studies provided evidence for the selectivity of the disorder for faces as
opposed to other types of objects. De Renzi [188, 189], for example, described a
severely prosopoagnosic patient who easily performed a variety of subtle visual
recognition tasks with objects such as wallets, neckties and photographs of cats.
The patient studied by McNeil at al. [154] presented a very severe prosopoag-
nosia with a stable and longstanding impairment for recognizing very familiar
people. Nevertheless, he was able to learned to identify another group of visually
and easily confusable stimuli, the faces of sheep.
The idea that prosopoagnosia is an impairment of a specialized form of
visual recognition that is necessary for face recognition but it is not necessary
for common object recognition, is suggested also by a study by Farah et al.
[64]. In two experiments the authors found that when a prosopoagnosic patient
was asked to discriminate both faces and visually similar exemplars of non-
face object categories, the patient performed disproportionately poorly with
faces compared to normal subjects. The results were used to disconfirm the
hypothesis that the dissociation between face and non-face recognition in cases
of prosopoagnosia is due to a grater difficulty of face recognition, requiring an
higher level of discrimination within category, compared to object recognition.
Although they cannot recognize people from their faces, prosopagnosic pa-
tients are frequently able to identify people from their voices or clothing. They
can also retrieve semantic information about these people in response to their
name [56].
However, other studies have investigated the selective impairment for person-
specific semantics. Hanley et al. [103], for example, described a patient who,
following herpes simplex encephalitis, had difficulty in identifying people from
their face, their name, and their voice and was unable to gain access to mental
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representations of precise person semantic information.
A selective deficit for person-specific knowledge with relative preservation
of general semantic knowledge has been reported by Thompson et al. [245].
In their study, the authors described two patients which presented contrasting
patterns of semantic memory deficits (i.e. impaired person-specific semantics,
with relative preservation of knowledge about objects and animals and vice
versa) and lateralized temporal lobe atrophy (right vs.left).
Finally, cases were described which presented a specific impairment in re-
trieving proper names of familiar persons, even though the access to person
specific knowledge about them were preserved.
Lucchelli and De Renzi [143] reported the details about a patient that, fol-
lowing a left thalamic infarct, showed a marked impairment in retrieving person
proper names in response to faces and to verbal descriptions, despite being able
to provide precise information about the persons he could not name and to point
to their photograph when the name was provided by the examiner.
A very similar deficit is also reported by Fukatsu [72] which described a
patient with a selective deficit in retrieving proper names after left temporal
lobectomy. He showed proper name anomia in conversation, in response to
photographs, and in verbal descriptions, despite being able to provide semantic
information about the people he was unable to name.
These studies seem to confirm the existence of dedicated cognitive modules
for faces. According to this view, faces are very unique stimuli and are thus
served by specific dedicated systems. Face-specific deficit at different stages
of the identification process are also in line with the most accepted cognitive
models of person recognition which distinguish between different stages involved
in the process of recognizing and accessing information about people (see for
example [35, 250, 38])1.
However, although a number of cases have emerged in whom knowledge
concerning familiar or famous people has been severely disrupted with relative
preservation of other domains of semantic memory [62, 103], in other cases the
deficit extended to impaired recognition and naming of specific objects that, like
faces, have many visual similar neighbors, e.g. breed of dogs, types of flowers
or cars, individual animals, familiar building and landmarks [62, 54, 53].
Particular relevant for our work are the impairments of unique familiar stim-
uli (e.g. landmarks) referred as “semantically unique items” by Gorno-Tempini
[90], who described them as items “which carry unique semantic associations
that are not shared by other perceptually similar category members” (p.2087).
Unique semantic stimuli such as landmarks and building have been often re-
ported as impaired not only in prosopoagnosia, but also in patients with person-
1A more detailed description of these models is reported in Section 3.2
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specific deficits in semantics and lexical levels. Likewise, patients with deficits in
memory for specific persons have been noted to have parallel defects in memory
for these other kinds of specific entities.
Gentileschi et al. [84], for example, reported the case of a woman with
no focal brain lesions, suffered from a progressive impairment in recognizing
familiar people along with an impairment in recognizing of famous buildings
and songs.
In a systematic review on selective disorders in recognition of familiar people,
Gainotti [74] compared the recognition of unique entities (famous monuments,
cities, countries and other geographical entities) with recognition of familiar
people in individual and group studies of patients with right and left temporal
lobe lesions. The analysis showed that the recognition of unique entities, in
particular monuments, was impaired in almost all the subjects with right tem-
poral lobe lesions. On the contrary, in patients with left temporal lobe lesions
identification of unique entities was spared. However, an impairment in finding
entity proper names was observed when the anterior parts of the left temporal
lobe was selectively damaged.
In a similar vein, some patients with anomia for proper names of famous
person have been noted to have parallel defects in naming geographical items.
For example Otsuka [176] has recently described a patient with proper name
anomia following subcortical hemorrhage in the left superior temporal gyrus.
Despite the preserved ability to retrieve common names, the patient could not
retrieve the names of people, countries, or racehorses, which he could recognize
quite well and whose semantic knowledge could be accessed.
Also the anomic patient studied by Semenza [217] presented a significant
impairment for geographical items, in addition to the deficit in producing proper
names of famous persons.
The impairment in accessing knowledge about unique entities belonging to
different categories has been also reported in amnesic patients.
In a case study of an amnesic patient with a medial thalamic lesion, Miller et
al. [162] found that their patient was unable to access information about unique
entities across a range of domains (e.g. famous people, events, famous buildings,
movie titles), while his memory for more general knowledge was intact.
A modality specific semantic knowledge loss for unique items is also reported
by Kartsounis [124] who described a patient who had great difficulty in identi-
fying in the visual modality historically known people, such as Queen Elizabeth
I and Napoleon, and well known world and London landmarks, such as the
Parthenon and Buckingham Palace.
Such co-occurring deficits seem not consistent with the existence of person-
specific modules and are more consistent with the hypothesis that co-occurring
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deficits for unique entities of different categories can arise from the damage of
a system for stored knowledge of unique identity.
When an individual entity is identified at the unique level of identity (rec-
ognized as familiar or named with its proper name), the identification process
requires that the entity is distinguished from other perceptually similar category
members and it needs to be linked to unique semantic and lexical knowledge.
According to this view, the process of identifying unique faces could be not
consistently different from that of identifying unique entities of other classes.
In this perspective, all the unique entities which have unique conceptual and
lexical associations are akin to the category of known persons and might share
neuroanatomical or functional underpinnings.
This view is in line with the explanation proposed by Gentileschi et al. [84]
to explain the deficits of their patient. The authors argued that the patient’s
difficulty in identifying familiar people was the consequence of progressive loss of
stored exemplars of familiar persons and also of some other “unique items” (fa-
mous songs and monuments) in an independent subsystem of semantics named
“exemplar semantics”.
The idea that recall and retrieval of unique items from different categories
depend on a common mechanism (i.e. that is not specific for person-specific
knowledge) has been proposed by Damasio [54]. He suggested that evoking
unique entities depends on trigger the disparate neuronal patterns that cor-
respond to the separate inscriptions that are associated with a unique item.
Further he proposed that the rostral regions of the temporal lobes may acts as
“converging zones” binding together the distributed representations of concepts
and that this mechanism may mainly concerns “unique entities”. When trans-
lated with our terminology, the idea of Damasio is that the anterior temporal
lobes serve to trigger and synchronize feedback projections to the multiple corti-
cal regions that hold the separate inscriptions that compose a singular concept.
In contrast, recall of non-unique entity such as identifying an item as member
of a category would occur as a result of biding within and among the more
posterior, single modality cortices.
4.2 Neuroimaging Evidences
The localization of neural circuits specialized for the identification of famous or
familiar entities from different categories is an area which has recently received
attention in the neuroimaging literature.
Also in this research area, many studies focused on a specific category of
familiar entities and the most studied category is again the person (face) cate-
gory.
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It is worth to note that the comparison between familiar and unfamiliar
entities is particularly interesting from our point of view, because it provides the
opportunity to examine the neural systems activated when pre-existing semantic
and biographical information is available for retrieval, that is when a singular
concept is available in memory.
The distinction between familiar and unfamiliar stimuli is particularly im-
portant in reviewing the face processing literature, since many studies of face-
specificity have focused on the perceptual level of processing (irrespective whether
faces are familiar or not) [123, 186, 218, 104]. These studies have used unfamil-
iar faces that can not be linked to specific semantic knowledge to study initial
category-specific processing (face vs. other object categories) in the extrastriate
cortex, while minimizing semantic processing [123, 186].
It was found that viewing and matching unfamiliar faces relative to other
categories of objects consistently activate a region of the lateral fusiform gyrus
bilaterally, but more consistently on the right, that has been labeled as “fusiform
face area” (FFA).
However, the face specificity of this area has been challenged by other studies
that found that the response in the FFA is not exclusive to faces. FFA also
responds to animal faces [147] and is activated when visually similar objects are
categorized at the subordinate level, e.g. when distinguishing different types
of birds or cars, especially when the subject is an expert [79] and also when
expertise with novel objects (greebles) is acquired [81].
Beyond asking what stimuli an area prefers, other studies focused on asking
what type of computations are performed and to what behaviors such compu-
tations contribute. In particular in the case of face processing, the issue is to
understand whether the FFA is specialized for face detection (i.e. detecting
exemplars from face category so that specialized routines can be engaged) or it
is involved in processing faces at the individual level.
One of the first studies that addressed this issue was conducted by Gauthier
et al. [82]. Exploiting the mechanism of habituation, the authors measured
the activity of three different areas (two selective for faces and one selective for
letters) during a task in which participants attended to the location of stimuli
(faces or letters). They found that activity in the face-selective areas habituated
to the repeated presentation of one exemplar more than to the presentation of
different exemplars of the same category, supporting the hypothesis that these
areas are involved in processing stimuli at the individual level. Indeed, if these
areas were involved only in face detection, no differences in activity should have
been registered.
Other studies explored the effect of familiarity on the processing of human
faces. Numerous neuroimaging experiments on familiar face recognition ex-
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plored the activations in the face-responsive regions of the ventral extrastriate
cortex, producing often inconsistent results [167, 60, 91, 203].
Nakamura et al. [167], for example, found that the right inferior tempo-
ral/fusiform gyrus responds selectively to faces but not to non-face stimuli and
it is involved in the first stages of face perception; on the contrary the right tem-
poral pole is activated during the discrimination of familiar faces from unfamiliar
faces. It is worth to note that in this study the activation of the right temporal
pole was not face-specific, suggesting that this region may be associated with
the recognition of familiar entities regardless of the entity category.
Based on the distinction between familiar and unfamiliar entities, Leveroni
et al. [136] conducted an event-related fMRI study in which they compared
brain activations associated to newly learned faces, unfamiliar faces, and famous
faces. They found that the recognition of famous faces produced significantly
larger MR signal intensity changes over widespread areas of the prefrontal, lat-
eral temporal and mesial temporal regions (hippocampal and parahippocampal
regions), compared to recognition of recently encoded faces or unfamiliar faces
seen for the first time. These brain areas have been interpreted as a common
neural network for long-term retrieval of famous face.
However, Gorno-Tempini et al. [91] found a very different pattern of acti-
vations. They observed that the areas specialized for the perceptual analysis of
faces were right lingual and bilateral fusiform gyri, while the areas specialized
for famous faces spread from the left anterior temporal to the left temporopari-
etal regions. Interestingly, the same areas activated during the processing of
famous faces were activated also during the processing of proper-names.
On the contrary, Dubois et al. [60] found that the main difference between
familiar and unfamiliar faces involved the early visual areas (with a decreased
activity for familiar faces) and a region outside the ventral extrastriate cortex,
i.e. the amygdala (which was more activated for unfamiliar faces).
Beyond the differences of localization reported in different studies, what it is
relevant for the purposes of our investigation is that certain areas in the brain
are specialized for processing faces at the unique level of identity. Related to
this evidence is the issue whether these areas are specialized to identify unique
exemplars from face category or they are involved in processing unique entities
from different categories. To answer this question, other studies compared the
patterns of activation for familiar entities from different categories (e.g. face
and landmark) in different tasks.
Converging evidences from functional neuroimaging studies showed that
tasks requiring processing of famous entities from different categories (e.g. per-
sons or landmarks) activate similar neural regions [90, 167].
In particular anterior temporal regions consistently have shown stronger re-
70
sponses to a variety of familiar stimuli, including faces, names and landscapes.
Gorno-Tempini and Price [90] investigated in a PET study the effect of
fame on activation elicited by famous an non-famous faces and buildings during
a same-different matching task. They found that the task elicited constant
category-specific activations in the fusiform and parahippocampal/lingual areas
which was not modulated by fame. On the contrary the activation in the left
anterior middle temporal gyrus showed an effect of fame that was common for
faces and buildings.
The results suggested that the left anterior temporal cortex is involved in
shared analysis of unique semantic attributes which mediate the identification
at the unique level of identity.
Unique and non-unique entities were also compared in studies which explored
specialized brain areas involved in retrieving of names for unique items.
In a PET study Grabowski et al. [92] investigated the role of the left tem-
poral pole in naming unique entities (famous faces and landmarks). The author
tested the hypothesis that cortices in the left temporal pole are engaged when
lexical retrieval was performed at unique level. To this purpose they used two
categories of unique entities, face and landmark, and studied the activations in
the left temporal pole during a naming entity task. The PET results showed a
significant activation of the left temporal polar region for both unique naming
tasks (person and landmarks naming) when compared to the baseline tasks us-
ing unfamiliar entities. Interestingly, the authors found that retrieval of proper
names of persons and landmarks engages the left temporal pole to a comparable
degree, supporting the hypothesis that the same brain region is linked to the
level of specificity of word retrieval (i.e. the retrieval of a proper name referring
to an individual entity) rather than the conceptual class to which the stimulus
belongs.
It is interesting reading the results of the Grabowski’s study in the light
of previous evidence from both lesion and functional imaging which implicated
relatively segregated sectors of inferotemporal (IT) and temporal polar (TP)
cortex in the process of word retrieval for entities belonging to different concep-
tual categories.
Tranel et al. [247], for example, tested a large sample of subjects with focal,
unilateral brain lesions using a procedure which required the visual recogni-
tion of entities from three categories: unique persons, non-unique animal and
non-unique tools. Results showed that defective recognition of persons was as-
sociated with maximal lesion overlap in right temporal polar region; defective
recognition of animals was associated with maximal lesion overlap in in right-
mesial occipital/ventral temporal region and also in left mesial occipital region
and defective recognition of tools was associated with maximal lesion overlap in
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the occipital-temporal-parietal junction of the left hemisphere.
In our perspective, the relevant finding of the Tranel’s study was that the
unique-level recognition and naming of face stimuli were associated with the
activation of a segregated sector in left TP and a sector of the left middle
temporal gyrus but not in left ventral and posterior IT, which were engaged in
recognition and naming of non-unique stimuli from animal and tool categories.
Since in the Tranel’s study faces were used as unique-level stimuli and be-
cause faces are special entities for a variety of reasons [54], it is possible that
the activation of anterior temporal regions reflects the specialization of these
regions for face processing and not necessarily for unique level processing.
In this vein, the results of the Grabowski’s study provide a very important
evidence supporting the hypothesis that the effect found when naming persons
is linked to the level of specificity of the retrieval, rather than to the special
properties of face stimuli.
The hypothesis that the categories of famous landmarks and famous persons
share neuroanatomical underpinnings is further supported by a recent lesion
study on subjects with focal lesion to left TP, right TP or outside TP [246].
Using a landmark recognition and naming task, the author found that land-
mark naming was significantly inferior in the left group. In a second experiment
it was also found that participants with left TP lesions had impaired naming
of famous faces, supporting the notion that left TP contain systems that are
important for retrieving proper names for unique entities.
Lateralized processes in identification of specific exemplars compared to iden-
tification at the level of basic category have been investigated by Laeng et al.
[130]. Using a picture-name verification task and presenting the stimuli tachis-
toscopically in one of the two later visual hemifields, Laeng et al. found that
left hemisphere (LH) is specialized for classifying objects at the basic level,
whereas the right hemisphere (RH) is specialized for classifying objects at the
most specific level of abstraction, i.e. the level of unique identity.
The results of the Laeng’s study are consistent with those of a study by
Marsolek [148] in the context of visual form perception and identification which
shows that the left hemisphere (LH) preferentially encodes general and abstract
representations and prototypes, whereas the right hemisphere (RH) preferen-
tially encodes exemplars.
Another study which directly compared the processing of familiar (at the
exemplar level) and unfamiliar faces and building was conducted by Engst et
al. [63] by recording event-related potentials in a priming repetition task. The
study focused on two levels of the unique entity recognition process: the access
to stored structural representations and to identity-specific semantic knowledge.
The distinction between these two separate levels of processing is at the core of
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the most highly accepted models of face recognition [35] and object recognition
and have been related to different ERPs components.
In their study, Engst et al. focused on the early repetition effect (ERE/N250r)
which has been proposed to indicate the access to stored structural knowl-
edge and the late repetition effect (LRE/N400), a possible indicator of semantic
knowledge access. The results showed that an ERE/N250r component was pre-
set for both familiar faces and familiar building. Moreover, the scalp topography
were indistinguishable between faces and building. On the contrary, the late
repetition effect (LRE/N400) displayed a very distinct category-specific scalp
topography. This results is relevant because showed that semantic knowledge
about persons and similarly unique non-face objects have separate representa-
tions in the brain.
In summary, converging evidence from neuropsychological and neuroimag-
ing studies suggest that unique entities from different categories share common
mechanisms of processing. In particular, these mechanisms seem involve the
later stages of processing, i.e. the access to long-term memory representations
that mediate entity identification and proper name retrieval. These results are
in line with our hypothesis that entities from different categories involve dif-
ferential pre-semantic processing prior to access a common system of stored
knowledge of unique identity, i.e. the system of singular concepts.
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Chapter 5
The Problem of Identity in
Information Systems
The problem of identifying and tracing the identity of individuals is not exclu-
sive of cognitive agents. An equivalent issue can be found in computer-based
information systems used for managing and integrating information about en-
tities.
According to our model of singular cognition, each act of the identification
process - whether perceptual or conceptual - is mediated by a system of sin-
gular mental representations about unique individual entities. These cognitive
structures, which function as tools for unique reference, allow us to manage dif-
ferent mental activities concerning individual entities. They provide the means
for storing information about unique individuals, identifying and re-identifying
them across time, integrating information about them from different sources
and mediating the cognitive interoperability with other cognitive agents by en-
suring the referential agreement between them in communication or other kinds
of interaction.
In the same way, computer-based information systems which manage infor-
mation about real-world entities need mechanisms to guarantee the effectiveness
of equivalent processes (i.e. storage, retrieval, identification, integration and
tracking) from a technological point of view. Consider, for example, the simple
case of a database which store information about the employees of an organi-
zation. Each record of the database should store information about a unique
individual and provide a mechanism to correctly and unambiguously access to
that information. Ideally, redundancy in the records should be avoided, i.e. the
database should not contain multiple references to the same entity. When a
request about a specific individual is submitted, the system needs to identify
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the corresponding record and return the correct information to the user (i.e. the
information about the person intended by the user’s query). The identification
mechanism is also in play when the information within a record needs to be
updated (i.e. by adding new information or by changing stored information) or
a record must be deleted from the database.
From these considerations, it should be straightforward that the perfor-
mance of these information systems and their interoperability with other sys-
tems strongly depends on their ability to uniquely identify (and re-identify) the
entities represented within the system and outside the boundaries of it.
As the cognitive system uses mental representations that “stand for” actual
objects in the real world, an information system - which can not have a physical
access to objects of the real world - needs of some kind of mechanism which
uniquely represent the real-world entities which are coded in the system.
The commonly practiced solution in this case is to provide a placeholder (i.e.
an identifier) for each represented entity. Of course, since many different sys-
tems may represent information about the same real-world entities and identify
them with different identifiers, a big effort is made recently to find solutions for
achieving the information integration across multiple heterogeneous sources.
Not only information systems deal with very similar representation and iden-
tification problems to those of cognitive systems, but also the research on knowl-
edge representation and integration in information systems was influenced by a
bias toward high level categories similarly to what we observed for studies on
human knowledge representation. Indeed, the largest part of the research effort
has been made on the problem of 1) studying and designing high level concep-
tual representations (i.e. general categories and their organization in ontologies)
or 2) designing methods for aligning and integrating heterogeneous representa-
tions (e.g. schema level integration, ontology alignment and integration). Only
few studies focused on the ground of the ontological representations, that is on
the entities which populate ontologies and the relations between them.
However, the idea that uniquely identifying entities is at the core of the
problem of information integration across multiple heterogeneous systems is
nowadays increasingly diffuse, representing also one of the main pillars of the
Semantic Web.
In this section we focus on these new entity-centric approaches, reserving
particular attention to the problem of identification in the Semantic Web.
5.1 Entity-level Information Integration
Describing the functioning dynamics of singular concepts, we noted that singular
concepts can be merged when the cognitive agent comes to identify two entities
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previously taken to be distinct. A very similar process in information systems
is involved in entity-level (or data-level) information integration.
While schema-level integration deals with combining the general schemas
(i.e. the format, structure, and organization of the data in a system) of two or
more representation systems into a coherent and global view, entity-level infor-
mation integration focuses on integrating information at the entity-level (i.e. the
singular representations of individual entities). Entity level integration concerns
with deciding whether two entity descriptions refer to the same individual (or
entity) and with merging the two entity descriptions (deciding what to include
in the joint entity description).
The problem has been largely investigated by the database community. In
this context entity-level integration is the process of determining the correspon-
dence between singular instances from more than one database.
This problem is known by the name of entity resolution, record linkage,
object identification, de-duplication, merge/purge, data association, identity
uncertainty, field matching problem, reference reconciliation, and others.
Entity-level integration is difficult in database integration because similar
data entities in different databases may not have the same key (or identifier).
For example, an employee may be uniquely identified by name in one database,
and by social insurance number in another. Determining which employee in-
stances in the two databases are the same is a complicated task if they do not
share the same key. Entity identification has been defined as the process of
determining the correspondence between object instances from more than one
database [138]. Combining data instances involves entity identification (deter-
mining which instances are the same), and resolving attribute value conflicts
(two different attribute values for the same attribute).
As many names have been assigned to the same problem, as several different
approaches have been proposed in literature to address it. Here we give just an
overview of the variety of approaches in this research field.
The entity resolution problem was first identified by Newcombe et al. [169],
and given a statistical formulation by Fellegi and Sunter [65]. Most current
approaches are variants of the Fellegi-Sunter model, in which entity resolution
is viewed as a classification problem: given a vector of similarity scores between
the attributes of two entities, classify it as “Match” or “Non-match” [16].
For example, Ganesh et al. [77] proposed the use of distances between at-
tribute values as a measure of similarity between the records they represent.
A generalization of the the Fellegi-Sunter model can be found in [224] which
proposed a method based on the Markov logic.
Recently, a multiple classifier system approach has been proposed by [275].
The method applies several classification techniques drawn from statistical pat-
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tern recognition, machine learning, and artificial neural networks to determine
whether two records from different data sources represent the same real-world
entity. The results of a first evaluation of the method showed a significant
improvement compared to previous methods.
Other approaches treated the problem of entity resolution as a name-matching
task and used the notion of string distance (i.e. a metric for measuring the
amount of difference between two sequences of characters) to resolve the match-
ing problem [164, 47].
An innovative method for data integration appeared in [215] . In this work,
the authors attached context information to simple data values. For example,
context information on a stock price including currency value and scaling factor.
This context information was stored using defined names and values, so that
comparisons between data values under different contexts was possible. A set
of conversion functions were defined to convert from one context to another.
Other studies which addressed the problem of integrating information at the
entity-level deal with identity uncertainty, object identification and co-reference
resolution in natural language processing.
Identity uncertainty arises whenever entities in the data are not labeled
with unique identifiers or when those identifiers may not be perceived perfectly.
Identity uncertainty has been studied for example in citation matching, i.e.
the problem of deciding which citations correspond to the same publication.
Many approached have been proposed to address this issue, many of which used
machine learning techniques [179, 132].
Another problem concerning entity-level integration is dubbed object identi-
fication. The problem, in this case, is that data objects can exist in inconsistent
text formats across several sources (e.g. the same restaurant can be referred
differently in two different web sites). The first methods of object identifica-
tion have required manual construction of object identification rules or mapping
rules for determining the mappings between objects. More recent approaches
used machine learning methods to derive automatically these rules in specific
domains [244].
Finally, co-reference resolution is typically done with unstructured texts and
deals with the problem to find the nouns, pronouns and phrases that refer to
the same entity in a text. Co-reference resolution has often be performed by
learning pairwise distance metrics between mentions [227] or using conditional
probabilistic models [151].
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5.2 Identity and Reference on the Semantic Web
The idea that the integration of information across heterogeneous resources can
be addressed by means of mechanisms of identification of unique entities is one
of the main pillars of the Semantic Web. The key feature of the Semantic Web
is not its use of knowledge representation technologies like ontologies, but the
introduction of these technologies to operate over Web resources1 as defined by
URIs. Information about resources is represented by means of a language, re-
source Description Framework (RDF), which is based upon the idea of making
statements about resources in the form of subject-predicate-object expressions
named RDF triples or RDF statements. Each resource in a RDF triple is iden-
tified by means of a URI.
The general idea is that if people use standard names for resources (URIs),
then the integration of information from different distributed sources will hap-
pen smoothly and efficiently simply by using URI identity as a means for merg-
ing representations about the same entities. However, the solution proposed by
the Semantic Web to extend the use of a URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) to
identify not just web pages, but any resource on the Web [20, 19] have lead to
many problems of reference, identity, and meaning [100], generating what has
been dubbed the Identity Crisis of the Semantic Web [44].
According to the Semantic Web vision, in contrast to past practice that gen-
erally used URIs for web-pages, URIs could be given to resources traditionally
thought of as not “on the Web” such as abstract concepts, people, monuments
and so on. It seems, with this ever-expanding notion of a resource, that very
different kinds of things are being described by a notion of a resource, including
web-accessible resources, like a webpage, and resources that are not, like the
Colosseum.
The guiding example is that instead of just visiting Tim Berners-Lee’s web
page to retrieve a representation of Tim Berners-Lee via http, you could use the
Semantic Web to make statements about Tim himself, such as where he was
born or the color of his eyes.
However, this solution to talk about anything with URIs leads to identifica-
tion problems.
The first problem concerns the following question: What does a URI iden-
tify? For web pages or documents it’s pretty easy to tell what a URI identifies.
The URI identifies the information that one gets when one accesses the URI
1Tim Berners-Lee, who originally expressed the vision of the Semantic Web, defined a
resource as “anything that has identity. Familiar examples include an electronic document,
an image, a service (e.g., “to day’s weather report for Los Angeles”), and a collection of other
resources. Not all resources are network retrievable; e.g., human beings, corporations, and
bound books in a library can also be considered resources”.
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with whatever operations are allowed by the scheme of the URI. Therefore, un-
like names in natural language, URIs often imply the potential possession of
whatever representations the URI gives one access to. But when a URI is used
to identify something that is “not on the Web”, what a URI identifies or means
is a question of use. A URI has no identity in of itself, but only in the context
of its use. If the meaning of a URI is its use, then this use can easily change
between applications, and nothing about the meaning (use) of a URI should be
assumed to be invariant across applications.
The second identification problem, or co-reference problem2, deals with the
fact that there is no way in the Semantic Web Vision to force people to use
the same URI for identifying the same entity across different entity. Moreover,
a single URI may be used to identify more than one resource. This leads to
a proliferation of URIs which hinders significantly the integration of Semantic
Web knowledge on the data level. Therefore if a reliable method for supporting
the reuse of URIs for entities across application is not ensured, the risk is to
produce, as noted by Bouquet et al. [28], “an archipelago of semantic islands
where conceptual knowledge may (or may not) be integrated (it depends on
how we choose the names of classes and properties, and on the availability of
crossontology mappings), but ground knowledge is completely disconnected”.
Different solutions have been proposed in the Semantic Web to address the
identification problems described above, with the common aim to allow infor-
mation integration across systems and applications. A notable approach is the
effort of the Linking Open Data Initiative3, which has the goal to “connect
related data that was not previously linked”. The main approach pursued by
the initiative is to establish owl:sameAs statements (meaning “this resource is
the same as that resource”) between resources in RDF in order to resolve the
co-reference problem of the Semantic Web. More precisely, the semantics of
owl:sameAs dictates that all the URIs linked with this predicate have the same
identity, implying that the subject and object must be the same resource. The
problem is that in many cases one can only be sure that two URIs are equivalent
within the confines of a specific application, whereas owl:sameAs asserts that
two references are always the same. Therefore the major disadvantage with
this approach is that the two URIs become indistinguishable by means of the
owl:sameAs link, even though they may refer to different entities according to
the context in which they are used. Moreover, the owl:sameAs approach in fact
not address the problem of multiple identifiers for the same entity, in turn it
supports their proliferation.
2Co-reference deals with ensuring that two different entities do not share the same name
or identifier, and conversely identifying when two identifiers refer to the same entity. In the
context of the Semantic Web we are therefore concerned with URIs.
3http://esw.w3.org/SweoIG/TaskForces/CommunityProjects/LinkingOpenData
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A centralized solution for the problem of proliferation of identifiers has been
proposed by [85]. The authors implemented a Coreference Resolution Service
(CRS) to facilitate rigorous management of URI co-reference data, and enable
interoperation between multiple Linked Open Data sources. The system is based
on the idea of maintaining sets of equivalent URIs. Equivalent URIs are con-
ceptually stored in a “bundle” - a set of identifiers referring to resources which
are considered to be the same in a given context. A URI can exist in at most
one bundle within a CRS instance. One URI in each bundle is nominated to
be a canonical identifier, or canon, for that bundle, representing a “preferred”
URI for the set of duplicates. An application that wishes to use data from mul-
tiple sources as if they were a single resource can process results by looking up
URIs in a CRS and replacing them with their canons on the fly, reducing the
multiplicity of identifiers to a single definitive URI.
5.3 An Entity-Centric System for tracing the
identity of entities on the Semantic Web
A different solution to the entity identification problem has been recently pro-
posed within the OKKAM project [28, 29]. We pay particular attention to this
solution because it shows the strong parallelism between the identification needs
in a cognitive system and those concerning an entity-centric system. Moreover,
the analysis of the functioning dynamics of an entity-centric system reveals that
many aspects which govern the functioning of singular concepts have a counter-
part in the functioning of entity-centric systems. This parallelism leads us to
investigate possible contributions which a cognitive study on the identification
problem may provide to answer analogous questions in a technological context
and inspire possible solutions to some of the most crucial issues about entity
identification in entity-based systems.
The goal of OKKAM is to develop an Entity Name System (ENS) for the
(Semantic) Web, a web-scale infrastructure which can make sure that the same
entity is referred to through the same URI across any type of content, format,
application.
The key idea behind the proposal of an ENS is that the Semantic Web can
become an open and scalable space for publishing knowledge only if there will
be a reliable support for the reuse of URIs. The ENS has a repository for storing
entity identifiers along with some small amount of descriptive information for
each entity. When a request for an entity is submitted, the ENS decides if a
URI for this entity is already available in the repository; if it is, then the ENS
will return its URI, otherwise it will issue a new URI which will be stored in the
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repository. In this sense the ENS is different from the Coreference Resolution
Service described above [85]. Instead of creating a RDF repository in which
the same real-world entity is denoted by two or more different URIs, and then
trying to reconcile these URIs, the aim of the ENS is enabling any application
which produces RDF content to reuse a globally unique URI for that resource.
Instead of using one of the many possible names for an entity, the ENS provides
a unique name (i.e. global identifier) for that entity. This leads to the possibility
to relate and integrate - without additional efforts - all the contents referring to
the specific entity through its unique global identifier.
The development of an ENS leads inevitably to issues of entity representation
and identification (some of these issues are discussed in [235, 29]) .
The first issue deals with the representation and identification of an entity
in the ENS. Since the system has to decide which (if any) URI in the repository
corresponds to a given request, the question is how an entity is supposed to be
described in a way that sufficiently distinguishes it from all other entities.
A possible solution is to define the type of an entity with a possibly asso-
ciated schema for its representation (description). An entity repository with
a strong notion of typing is expected to increase efficiency and effectiveness of
entity identifier retrieval, because entities can be managed in virtually or phys-
ically separate repositories according to their types, and type-specific matching
approaches can be implemented. This raises the challenge of finding the right
granularity and the right set of types for organizing the repositories. The solu-
tion adopted in the ENS is the use of high level entity types, such as “person”,
“organization”, “event” to provide an upper level organization of the entity
profiles in the system.
A second, although related topic, is the use of schemata for the representation
of the entities. Since the ENS is not a repository of information about entities,
the idea is not to collect as much information as possible about each entity, but
simply to provide a schema which should include the attributes that are most
adequate for the identification of the respective entity. The envisioned solution
in this case is the use of a core schema of attributes dynamically adapted, based
on data learned from the usage of the entity repository. This core schema should
guide storage of new entities and matching for candidates retrieval. However,
for the usability in different situations the user is allowed to use the attributes
he has at hand for querying the entity repository. Therefore, the system is
supposed to cope with the translation of incoming queries into core schema
requests (schema-mapping).
The representation issues described above provides a first point of contact
between cognitive and technological issues. In particular the question of which
attributes should be included in a core schema to provide an effective descrip-
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tion to uniquely identify entities in the system is not trivial. We suggest that
the study of how people organize information within individual concepts could
provide interesting insight to answer this question. In the same vein, studying
how people search for information about individual entities (for example using
a search engine like Google) is another way to explore the same issue from a
different perspective. The searching task can be seen as a way to pick up few
relevant attributes from the singular concept of an entity and use them to iden-
tify the entity in that particular context. A system which is designed to consider
the real ways of identification of its users is expected to increase efficiency and
effectiveness in retrieval, as well as to incorporate important features in terms
of usability.
Another issue related to the development of an ENS concerns the repository
maintenance. The same mechanisms which we have described about the func-
tioning of singular concepts have a technological counterpart in the maintenance
of the repository of an entity-centric system. Following the classification which
we have prosed in 2.2 we can identify four main processes.
• Initiation: The creation of a new entity in the system starts with an
entity request. Given a request of an entity, the system decide if a URI
for this entity is already available in the entity repository (using some
method(s) for entity matching); if it is, then the ENS will return its URI
(or at least a ranked list of candidates), otherwise it will issue a new URI
which will be stored in the ENS repository with the information that was
provided as part of the respective request. This process leads to create a
new representation, i.e. entity profile, in the ENS.
• Updating: The information about an entity can be managed by updating
and extending the information contained in the initial entity profile of the
entity. For the update and extension of the information managed for the
individual entities, different processes are involved: a) new information
that is provided when further requests for the same entity are encoun-
tered is added to the initial profile; b) the usefulness of the stored entity
information is analyzed and eventually the information is filtered, c) the
age of the information is considered and old information can be deleted
d) (only in rare cases) manual change of entity information via adequate
user interfaces can be allowed.
• Merging: As a consequence of the fact that new profiles of entities are
continuously added to the system and entity representation change incre-
mentally as a consequence of the updating process, the system is supposed
to revisit its identity decisions, i.e. it has to check if given the current sta-
tus of information in the repository, entity matching would still support
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the same entity identity decisions. As a result of such a process it might be
detected that two entity representations (with separate identifiers) actu-
ally refer to the same real world entity, requiring corrective actions which
produce a unified representation from the two initially separated profiles.
This process is named entity merging.
• Splitting: The opposite case happens when the revision process detects
evidences for the fact that two real world entities have been by mistake
or lack of sufficient information been marked as identical. In this case the
initial profile must be split into two different profiles and the information
contained in it must be correctly divided up in the two profiles, be means
of a process named entity splitting.
The repository maintenance offers the most clear example of the correspon-
dences between the managing of singular representation in memory and that
of singular profiles in an entity-centric repository, such as the ENS. In partic-
ular, the maintenance process implies the notion of tracing the identity across
time and change. As we have noted, this is a fundamental aspect in singular
cognition. Again, we argue that a study of this human ability from a cognitive
perspective can reveal useful aspects that can be implemented in a technological
model for entity management. Moreover, given that the system interfaces with
human users (as well as with machines), a better understanding of the identifi-
cation processes in play when people interact with the system should contribute
to suggest technological solutions based on the strategies and needs of its users.
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Part II
Novel Contributions
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Chapter 6
The Entry Point in the
Identification of Individuals
Humans have an extraordinary ability to identify objects in a very efficient way.
Any individual object can be identified at multiple levels of abstraction. So,
for example, whereas a dog can be identified as a “dog” (basic level), the same
dog can be identified more generally as “animal” (superordinate level) or more
specifically as “poodle” or “Fido” (subordinate or unique level, respectively).
The first phase of our research aims to investigate whether there is a preferential
level of abstraction at which an individual is first identified. Do we first identify
our dog as “Fido” or as a“dog”? Is there a direct access to the identity node
of Fido (i.e. the singular concept of Fido) during the identification process, or
is the access mediated by higher level conceptual representations (i.e. general
concepts)? These questions deal with the bottom-up access to singular concepts
of individuals, that is the way through which the perceptual stimulus makes
contact with its singular concept.
The aim of this study was to investigate whether people identify individual
artifacts from three different categories (i.e. artwork, building and product)
more frequently and as quickly (or more quickly) at the unique level (e.g. Mona
Lisa) as at the basic level (e.g. painting), and whether they have direct (i.e.
unmediated by higher level representations) access to the visual representations
of these individuals at the level of unique identity.
To this purpose, we conducted three experiments. In a first experiment, it
was tested whether individual artifacts as opposed to non-individual artifacts
were most frequently named with unique level category names, compared to
basic or superordinate category names. The second experiment, investigated
whether individual artifacts were recognized faster than non-individual artifacts
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at the unique level of abstraction. Finally, in a identity-priming experiment
we studied whether unique-level primes facilitated the matching responses of
individual artifacts but not of non-individual artifacts.
6.1 Introduction
In their seminal studies, Rosch et al. investigated “the principles by which
humans divide up the world”[198, p.382]. The authors found that, although all
objects can be categorized at different levels of abstraction, there is one level,
called the basic level, that has a special status in categorization (a phenomenon
known as basic level advantage). This means that of all the various categories
to which a given item belongs (e.g. “poodle” “dog”, “mammal”, “animal”,
“pet”), some appear to be more readily accessible to the human mind than
others. Rosch et al. have described four operational definitions that summarize
their structural view 1 of the basic level. 1. Basic-level categories are the most
inclusive categories for which clusters of co-occurring attributes are listed. 2.
Members of a basic-level category share similar overall shape. 3. The basic level
is the most inclusive level at which highly similar sequences of motor movements
are used to interact with objects in the class; 4. the basic level is the most general
level at which an averaged shape of an object may be correctly identified as
that object. According to this structural view, the advantage for the basic level
arises because the basic level is the level at which objects show the largest gain
in structural similarity.
To test the relation between basic level advantage and object identification,
Rosch and colleagues [160, 198] used several object-identification tasks. Among
other things, the authors found that in an object naming task, where partic-
ipants were asked to name an object with the first word that comes in mind,
people prefer to use basic-level terms to identify objects (e.g. “dog”) over more
general or specific terms (e.g.“animal” or “poodle”). In a category verification
task, where people were asked to verify whether an object is a member of a
category, it was found that they were faster to verify objects at an intermediate
level of specificity (such as “dog”) than at more general (i.e. “animal”) and
1Rosch and colleagues [199] originally suggested that basic level categories are special
because they capture significant regularities or patterns in the features associated with these
categories. According to Rosch [197] “a working assumption of the research on basic objects is
that in the perceived world, information-rich bundles of perceptual and functional attributes
occur that form natural discontinuities, and that basic cuts in categorization are made at
these discontinuities” (p.31). We refer to this type of explanation of the basic level advantage
as a structural theory, since it implies that certain categories are “basic” because of their
structural properties, namely, the statistical associations between features and categories. It
is important to note that, although Rosch’s research emphasizes structure in the world, she
did not view this structure as existing independently of the human perceiver. Rosch was
careful to explain that it is the interaction between the human perceiver and the world that
specifies the basic level.
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more specific (i.e. “greyhound”) levels. Finally, in an identity matching task,
where participants were asked to judge if two stimuli simultaneously presented
were physically identical, the matching responses were faster when participants
were primed with a basic-level name rather than a superordinate name. Crit-
ically, subordinate-level names provided no additional priming over basic-level
names. From these evidences, it has been argued that the basic level represent
the entry point in object recognition, that is the level at which the object is first
recognized.
In one influential account of basic-level effects, Jolicoeur, Gluck, and Kosslyn
[119] explained the superiority of the basic level with reference to spreading-
activation models derived from the Collins and Quillian’s model of memory
[50, 49].
In spreading-activation theories, concepts (i.e. mental representations of
categories) are stored in memory within a hierarchical structure. Concepts are
assumed to be represented as nodes in the hierarchy, which are interconnected
by class-inclusion propositions called ISA links. For instance, the knowledge
that a poodle is a kind of dog is represented by connecting the node for poodle
to the node for dog with a ISA link; knowledge that dogs are animals is stored
by linking the dog node to the animal node, and so on. Other facts are stored as
predicates attached to the various nodes. For instance, to store the information
that a dog “barks”, the predicate “barks” is attached to the dog node; and to
store the information that all animals “need nutrients to survive”, the predicate
“need nutrients to survive” is attached to the animal node. The fundamental
retrieval mechanism is spreading of activation. To make inferences about the
properties of a given concept such as poodle, the model first retrieves all of
the predicates stored directly with the corresponding node; but activation then
spreads upward along the ISA links so that the predicates attached to more in-
clusive concepts also get attributed to the probe concept. For poodle, activation
first spreads to the dog node, supporting the inference that the poodle barks,
and then up to the animal node, supporting the inference that the poodle needs
nutrients tu survive.
Jolicoeur et al. [119] proposed that certain nodes within a Quillian like
processing hierarchy serve as “entry points” for probing the semantic network.
An entry point corresponds to the level where the perceptual stimulus first
makes contact with its underlying memorial representation. Visual stimuli are
first classified into one of these entry-level categories by means of a perceptual
processing mechanism so that any information stored directly with the corre-
sponding entry-level node becomes available earliest in processing. Additional
information about the stimulus becomes available later, as activation spreads
upward from the entry point toward more inclusive concepts or downward to-
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ward more specific concepts. Basic-level effects are observed for typical category
members because the basic-level category nodes serve as the entry-point for such
items. For instance, a visual stimulus such as beagle first activates the dog node,
providing rapid access to the name “dog” and other typical dog properties (e.g.
has four legs and can bark). Retrieval of properties that the beagle shares with
all animals takes longer as it requires a search of the semantic network upward
from the entry point. Retrieval of properties idiosyncratic to the beagle takes
longer either because nodes below the entry point must be searched or because
more specific classification relies on finer visual details [48].
Research on human object identification demonstrated that the entry point
could be modulated by at least two factors: typicality of an exemplar for its
corresponding basic level and domain-specific expertise.
Concerning the former, Jolicoeur et al. [119] suggested that atypical category
members fail to show a basic level advantage because their entry-points are
specific rather than basic. An atypical member is structurally dissimilar to the
other members of the same basic level category and therefore it is more easily
categorized at subordinate levels than at the basic. For example, the entry level
for a picture of a penguin would be the node corresponding to penguin rather
than the bird node that serves as the entry point for more typical birds.
About the second point, expertise in a particular field is likely to shift entry
level of many objects towards the subordinate level. The influence of expe-
rience on the entry point has been firstly emphasized by Rosch et al. [198].
For example, they reported an anecdote about one of their participants who
was an expert airplane mechanic and seemed to recognize airplanes at a more
subordinate level of abstraction relative to the rest of the participants tested.
Johnson and Mervis [118] studied the interaction of knowledge and basic-
level categorization in individuals with varying levels of knowledge about song-
birds. Results from a series of experiments showed that experience increased
accessibility to categorical knowledge at subordinate levels, causing these levels
to function as basic (that means an increases in the speed and efficiency with
which subbasic-level information was accessed from semantic memory). How-
ever they found no evidence that the original basic level actually changed as
a function of knowledge. It was never the case that experts responded signif-
icantly less quickly for trials involving category names at the basic level than
for category names at subordinate level. Thus, the efficiency advantage of the
previous basic level is not lost as knowledge about subbasic categories increases.
Consistent with this view, Tanaka and Taylor [240] found that experts are
as fast to categorize objects from their domain of expertise at the subordinate
level of abstraction as they are to recognize the same object at the basic level.
A dog expert, for example, is able to recognize a picture of a greyhound as a
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“greyhound” as quickly as he recognizes it as a “dog”.
In the domain of face perception, Tanaka [241] suggested a shift in human
perception towards subordinate classification of familiar faces. The general idea
is that even though few people are experts in recognition of objects from a par-
ticular category, all adults can be considered expert in human face recognition
[239]. Therefore, if face recognition follows the pattern of other kinds of expert
object recognition, people should show a downward shift in recognition as a re-
sult of experience. However, although both face expertise and object expertise
promote increased access to levels of representation subordinate to the basic
level, the subordinate level corresponds to different levels of abstractions. In
the case of object expertise, the identification typically occurs at the species
(“mastiff”) and subspecies (“neapolitan mastiff”) level of abstraction. In the
case of face expertise, the level of abstraction corresponds to the most extreme
subordinate level, that is the level of unique identity where the category la-
bel is a proper name referring to a single individual in the world (e.g., Barack
Obama). Therefore, the face expertise hypothesis predicts that the entry point
of face recognition is at the level of unique identity. Thus, a face will more
likely be identified as “Barack Obama” rather than as a “person”. Converging
evidence from four experiments supports the hypothesis that the entry point of
face recognition is different from the entry point of non-face objects. For exam-
ple, whereas common object were likely to be identified with basic-level names,
familiar faces were more likely to be identified with unique identity names (i.e.,
proper names). In a category verification task, faces were verified as quickly at
the subordinate level of unique identity as at the basic level. Finally, results
from an identity-priming task shown that subordinate level proper names labels
produced greater priming effect than the basic-level labels.
Similar downward shifts in recognition were found by Gauthier and Tarr [80]
after participants were trained in identification of artificial objects (“Greebles”)
specifically constrained to be similar to faces along several dimensions (e.g.,
similar features organized in similar configurations).
Further evidence that the entry point of object recognition can be different
from the basic level, comes from a recent study by Belke et al. [17]. In this
study the authors provides empirical evidence that art is distinguished from
other real world objects in human cognition, in that art allows for a special
representation in memory and identification based on artists’ specific stylistic
appearances. Converging evidence from three experiments suggests that iden-
tification of visual art is at the subordinate level of the producing artist (e.g.,
participants matched a familiar painting with its artist’s name as fast as they
matched it with the artistic genre).
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6.2 Objectives and Rationale of the Study
The studies described above provide evidence that “for many objects (and per-
haps many situations) we use identification routines at levels other than the
basic level” ([119], p. 272). Dog experts, for example, identify dogs at species
and subspecies levels of abstraction as quickly as at the basic level.
A special case is represented by human faces. In his study on face recog-
nition, Tanaka [241] provided evidence that the entry point of familiar faces is
shifted to the most specific level of abstraction (i.e., people first recognize faces
at the level of unique identity), supporting the assumption (previously untested)
of many models of face recognition that the first recognition occurs at the level
of individual faces. Compared to other objects classes, faces seem to represent a
special class of objects because they require the most extreme level of specificity
in recognition in which an individual face is the only object of the category.
But is the level of unique identity the preferential access point to memorial
representation exclusive for faces?
This question can be linked to the broader debate whether faces are processed
by cognitive systems specialized for (and specific to) this particular class of
stimuli or by more general cognitive systems, which are used for all objects (see
[153] for a review of this literature).
This issue is particularly interesting as human faces seem to occupy a spe-
cial status among other visual objects. The extraordinary skills of humans
in recognize familiar faces may indicate the existence of specialized processing
mechanisms unrelated to those involved in visual object processing.
Neuropsychological lesion studies on patients with acquired impairments of
face recognition (a deficit known as prosopoagnosia) have been often interpreted
as evidence of the existence of specific processing mechanisms that are separate
from those applied to other objects. The impressive double dissociation found
in different studies (prosopoagnosia without object agnosia [188] and objects
agnosia without prosopoagnosia [204]) would seem to indicate the existence of
some face-specific processing systems. However, reported dissociations have
been also interpreted in a different way.
The alternative explanation assumes that faces are not necessarily processed
by specialized processing systems [242]. Faces would require more precise per-
ceptual discriminations to distinguish between them because of their high inter-
stimulus structural similarity compared to other objects. Therefore, a partial
deficit to a common perceptual processing system would reveal itself more strik-
ingly for those stimuli that require a greater degree of differentiation, namely
faces. However, many studies have demonstrated that inversion is more detri-
mental to recognition of faces than objects [270] (a phenomenon known as inver-
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sion effect) and that upright faces are recognized more holistically than objects
[238], which led to the suggestion that faces are recognized using specialized
visual mechanisms.
The debate over the extent to which face-processing engages specific modules
has recently extended into the functional neuroimaging literature. The site of
primary interest is the Fusifom Face Area (FFA) that has been found to be
preferentially activated by face stimuli compared to other object classes [123].
Since the location of this area is consistent with the lesion site in prosopoagnosic
patients and it reflects two classical markers of face processing (olistic processing
[210] and inversion effect [274]), it has been suggested that FFA is a locus of
face-specific processing. Contrary to this position, a series of studies have shown
that the putative role of FFA as “face area” may be the result of our extensive
experience with faces. For example, the two markers of face processing (holistic
processing and inversion effect) have been obtained with non-face objects for
expert subjects (e.g. dog experts). Brain imaging studies have shown that
expertise recruits the FFA, increasing the response of this area to object of
expertise compared with control objects.
From these evidences, it stands out that several questions about the mech-
anisms of face and object processing remain unresolved.
Up to now most of the research on this issue has focused on whether the
cognitive and neural processes that are used for identifying faces are the same
as or different from those that are used to recognize other kinds of objects. The
common approach used in these studies contrast faces and objects in formally
similar tasks and compare the effects of the same experimental manipulation.
As an example of this approach, let’s consider a typical experiment of semantic
priming. In this kind of experiment object naming and face naming are com-
pared. In object naming, pictures of objects (e.g., an apple, a chair, a rabbit and
so on) are preceded by semantically related pictures, whereas in face naming,
familiar faces to be named are preceded by a face prime which is semantically
related to the target. The facilitation effects in the two conditions are studied
to make inferences about the organization of the underlying semantic represen-
tation of the two classes of stimuli. This example shows a common aspect of
the current research on face and object recognition: the non-face stimuli used
in these studies are accessed at the basic or (in same cases) at subordinate level
of abstraction, whereas face stimuli are accessed at the unique level of identity.
In other words, recognizing that an object is an apple involves the activation of
a general concept (i.e., a cognitive representation of a category) whereas recog-
nizing that an individual is Barack Obama involves the activation of a singular
concept (i.e., a cognitive representation of a singular individual).
It remains unclear whether the differences between face and object processing
relate to different entry levels or to different recognition and categorization
processes performed on the stimuli.
Therefore, the first aim of the present study is to investigate whether the
entry point in the identification of unique non-face objects is at the level of
unique identity as that of face objects [241].
Up to now research in the domain of object recognition has been concerned
with object classes such as furniture, every-day-objects and even artificial ob-
jects, but very little is known about the representation and initial identification
of unique entities belonging to these classes. For instance, what might be the
first access to semantic memory when a person identifies the “Eiffel Tower”? If
the entry point follows the Rosch et al.’s [198] structural definition, we should
expect that the entry point in this case is at the level of “monument” or “tower”
or even more general “work of art” corresponding to the basic level of the stim-
ulus. According to the structural hypothesis, people may access to the unique
level of identity only after the basic level is activated. Therefore, if the access to
the subordinate level of identity is mediated through the basic-level, the struc-
tural account predicts that the basic-level categorization should be faster than
the subordinate-level categorization. On the contrary, if the stimulus is recog-
nized at the level of unique identity, as “Eiffel Tower”, recognition times should
be as fast as or faster at this level than at the basic level.
Our hypothesis is that a person first recognizes an individual entity at the
level of unique identity when she possesses an individual concept on that indi-
vidual entity in semantic memory. We assume that the initial identification of
an individual entity whose information is structured in memory as an individual
concept yields cognitive processing that differs from that involved in the identi-
fication of objects which are not individuated in memory by means of individual
concepts. Rephrasing the words of Rosch et al.[196], individual concepts follows
the natural correlations and divisions of features distinguishing unique familiar
entities and provide the entry points of recognition of these entities. Initializing
the individual concept of an entity makes that entity unique and identifiable
(i.e., atypical in a sense) from the other members of the same basic level cate-
gory. Then this entity can be categorized faster at the most subordinate level
of categorization, namely the unique level of identity.
We assume that having the singular concept of an object entails the direct
recognition of the object through that concept. Therefore, the singular concept
of an object acts as the access node to the knowledge that the agent has about
the object. As a result, any information stored at the level of the singular
concept becomes available earliest in processing.
We should note that our hypothesis finds support in several functional mod-
els of face recognition available in literature. These models suggest that the first
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recognition of a known face occurs at the level of the individual face before to
access more inclusive categorical knowledge.
In the Bruce and Young model [35], for example, the perception of a fa-
miliar face activates structural and view-independent long-term representations
(face recognition units, FRUs). These FRUs are connected to amodal person
identity nodes (PINs) which contain semantic-biographical information, such as
occupation, hobbies, date of birth, etc.
The direct (i.e., non mediated by basic level knowledge) access to personal
information stored in memory is also assumed by the interactive activation mod-
els of face recognition proposed by Burton, Bruce and Johnston [38] and by
Bredart, Valentine, Calder and Gassi [36]. According to this models, PINs are
activated from their corresponding FRUs, but they serve as modality-free gate-
way to stored personal information, coded at the semantic information units
(SIUs).
We argue that the direct access to semantic information about unique indi-
viduals during the recognition process is not a cognitive process specialized for
human faces, but is a general mechanism that humans use in the recognition
process of unique identifiable entities.
Our strategy to test the hypothesis is to employ another category of unique
entities, artifact, and predict that, if the entry point is set on the basis of the
level of the uniqueness of the items within the category, the unique-level catego-
rization of unique items should be faster than their upper-level categorizations.
6.3 Methodology
In this study, we explore whether the entry point in the identification of non-
face entities can be shifted to subordinate levels of abstraction and whether
this entry point is at the level of unique identity for those objects that can
be recognized as unique and distinguishable from other objects (i.e, objects
that have a singular concept in memory). To this purpose, we investigate in
three experiments the initial identification of non-face objects belonging to three
kinds of artifact types: artwork, building and product. Using tasks such as
free naming, category verification and visual identity matching, paradigms were
applied that had been predominantly used in the domain of object and face
identification [198, 241, 17]. Performance on unique distinguishable entities from
artwork and building classes (e.g. Mona Lisa, Eiffel Tower) is tested against
unfamiliar objects from other artifactual categories which the entry point is
expected to be at the basic level (as suggested by previous studies on object
identification).
Entities from the third artifact class are used to investigate whether there is
95
a particular entry point in the identification of products that is different from
other (artifact or non-artifact) objects.
Products represent a very special class of artifact from an ontological point
of view. In a recent work on this subject, Vignolo [252] suggests that there are
two ways to speak of products. One is the sense in which a product is referred
as a model that can have many particular objects as its instances, the other is
the sense in which a product is a specific instance of the product model. To
clarify the distinction, consider the following example proposed in [252]. The
car driven by Sean Connery in Goldfinger is an instance of the Aston Martin
DB5. The Aston Martin DB5 of which the car driven by Sean Connery is an
instance, is a model which might have many exemplars.
We hypothesize that this distinction may be reflected in semantic memory
in two kinds of conceptual representations and presumably allows for a different
type of processing. We note that in our hypothesis both types of representations
are singular concepts. Claiming that the specific car driven by Sean Connery in
Goldfinger has a corresponding singular memorial representation seem unprob-
lematic. That particular car is processed at a conceptual level so specific that
the car is in its class with no other members. However, the fact that the Aston
Martin DB5 model corresponds to a singular concept in memory is less immedi-
ate. In this case many objects can fall under the same model class, nonetheless
we argue that they are represented as a singular concept in memory and not as
general concept.
To clarify this point, let’s us consider the difference between a general cat-
egory and a model category. We suggest that the difference lies in the graded
structure of categories. Instead of being equivalent, the members of a category
vary in how good an example (or in how typical) they are of their category
[193, 200]. In the category of birds, a sparrow is generally considered a very
typical exemplar of the category, a pigeon is moderately typical, whereas a
penguin is atypical. Contrary to general categories, model categories do not
present a graded structure. All objects falling under the category are equally
good exemplars of the category. For instance, in the “iPod” model category, my
iPod is not more typical than any other iPod belonging to the category. Then,
many equivalent instances, which belong to the same model category, point to a
unique model representation in memory. Therefore, the only difference between
a singular concept and a model concept lies in the kind of relationship between
instances and the conceptual representation. In the first case, there is a one
to one relationship (a unique entity is represented by a singular concept), in
the second case, there is a many to one relationship (many entities of the same
model are represented by a singular model concept).
We propose that products are distinguishable frommany other object classes,
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since they can be first recognized at two subbasic levels of abstraction, that
correspond to two kinds of singular concepts, one at the individual level (i.e.,
unique identity level), the other at the model level. In this sense, products
provide a further test for investigating a downward shift in the entry point as a
result of the level of specificity of the mental representation first linked to the
item. In this study we focus on the model-level representation.
According to our hypothesis about the representation of identifiable arti-
facts (works of art, buildings and products), it is assumed that the entry point
of these entities can be shifted to a subbasic level (i.e., the level of singular con-
cept) and shows up at this level with highest frequency proportion in naming
(experiment 1), with fastest category verification speed (experiment 2), with
the largest amount of priming in visual identity matching task (experiment 3).
Alternatively, according to the structural hypothesis proposed by Rosch et al.
[198], artifacts should be identified first at a more general level (such as, for ex-
ample, “building”, “artwork”, “product”,“bridge”, “portrait”, “audio player”,
“car” and so on) and are more frequently named as such, are verified faster and
yield higher priming gains on such basic level categories than at subordinate
level categories.
For methodological reasons, the three experiments required participants be-
ing able to identify the critical stimuli (i.e., the stimuli used in the experimental
conditions and contrasted with the control conditions) at the level of unique
identity. For example, a person who has never encountered the statue of David
by Michelangelo and who is not familiar with his name would neither be able to
classify it as such in a naming task, nor to verify the David’s name in a category
verification task, nor to respond to it in a priming task. Therefore, a procedure
to omit from the analysis the items that can not be named at the unique level
of identity is used in each experiment.
6.4 Experiment 1: Entity Naming
Every object belongs to more than a single category, but people must select only
one when they are asked to name an object. In previous research, it has been
shown that participants used basic-level names when asked to spontaneously
name pictures of common objects [198, 119]. This result provides support to
the notion that objects are first identified at the basic level of abstraction.
A free naming task was carried out in experiment 1 to test the hypothesis
that people use subbasic level names (i.e., proper names or model names) when
they are asked to freely name pictures of entities of which they have singular
concepts in semantic memory.
Participants were shown with pictures of familiar entities (i.e., famous enti-
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ties that can be commonly identified at the unique level of identity) from three
different categories (artwork, building and product) and non familiar entities
from three contrast categories (home furnishing, utensil and musical instru-
ment). Unfamiliar stimuli contained sufficient detail to be identified at the sub-
ordinate level (e.g., “rocking chair”, “ upright piano”). The task was to name
each object as fast as possible with the first noun that came instantaneously to
mind.
Our hypothesis predicts that participants should use subordinate-level names
(proper names or model names) when identifying pictures of familiar artifacts
and basic-level names when identifying non familiar objects.
6.4.1 Method
Participants
18 people (11 male, 7 female) participated to the experiment. Mean age was
35.3 years (SD=2.45) ranging from 23 to 38 years. Each participant was tested
individually and was not paid for participation.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 48 pictures, half of which were from three artifac-
tual category (artwork, building and product categories) and half from three
contrasting categories (home furnishing, utensil and musical instrument). As
famous artworks, some of the most well-known paintings and sculptures in art
history were selected (e.g., Mona Lisa, Sunflowers, The Pieta`). Famous build-
ings were selected from those used in [90] (e.g., Eiffel Tower, Twin Towers,
Leaning Tower of Pisa). Finally, for the product category, we used some of
the most popular models of vehicles and electronic devices in Italy (e.g., Fiat
500, Iphone). The complete lists of the familiar and unfamiliar stimuli used in
experiment 1 are reported respectively in table 6.1 and table 6.2.
Artwork Buildings Products
Mona Lisa Eiffel Tower Fiat 500
The Last Supper Leaning Tower of Pisa Mini Cooper
Sunflowers Golden Gate Bridge Beetle
The Scream Rialto Bridge Fiat Panda
The Pieta` Twin Towers iPod Nano
Discobolous Empire State Building Walkman
David St. Peter’s Basilica Black Barry
The Statue of Liberty Milan Cathedral iPhone
Table 6.1: List of familiar artifacts used in Experiment 1
Pictures were standardized with Adobe Photoshop to 336 (450 × 600 pixels)
square centimeters with the original width-to-height ratio maintained.
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Home furnishing Utensil Musical Instrument
rocking chair wooden spoon electric guitar
folding chair tea spoon acoustic guitar
desk lamp bread knife trombone
floor lamp flick knife clarinet
tea table fry pan bongo drum
dining table saucepan bass drum
four poster bed nail scissors grand piano
cot garden scissors upright piano
Table 6.2: List of unfamiliar artifacts used in Experiment 1
Procedure
The experiment consisted of four practice and 48 experimental trials presented
on a computer with a 15” monitor (resolution 1024×768). Participants were
instructed that they would see a series of pictures of objects and their task was
to name each of the stimuli as fast as possible with the first noun that comes to
mind.
At the beginning of each trial a short instruction appeared on the screen
reminding participants to “say the word that names the object as quickly as
possible”. After a 2000 ms interval, the written instruction was replaced with
a 800 ms blank screen, which was followed by a 2000 ms picture-stimulus (ei-
ther a familiar or a non familiar item), which in turn was followed by another
blank screen. After 1500 ms, the participants were asked to start next trial by
pressing any key on the keyboard. The stimulus order was randomized with the
restriction that pictures depicting famous objects from the same category are
not presented on consecutive trials. The experimenter sat behind the participant
and noted down the verbal responses for each experimental trial.
The experiment was implemented in Matlab using the Psychtoolbox-3. View-
ing distance to the screen was approximately 70 cm.
To exclude the possibility that basic-level categories were used due to a lack
of familiarity with subordinate level categories, at the end of the naming trials,
participants were asked to identify each stimulus on a very specific (subordinate)
level. For example, participants were asked to indicate the title of a painting or
the model of a car. Pictures that could not be named at the subordinate level
were omitted from the analysis for the corresponding participant. In this and
the following experiments participants were tested individually.
6.4.2 Results
Before analyzing the data, all incorrect responses were eliminated according
to the following two criteria. First, verbal classifications were excluded from
analysis if a person could not name an object correctly at the subordinate level
in the post-experimental task. In the case of familiar individual entities, this
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task required labeling of the specific entity with its proper name or model name
(unique level), or with any description showing that the entity was identified
at subordinate level. For instance if the Last Supper could not be named as
“The Last Supper” or as “a Leonardo’s painting”, the corresponding trial was
omitted.
Second, if an object was named wrongly in the experiment, the response was
considered as incorrect. For example, if the Golden Gate Bridge was labeled
as “The Brooklyn Bridge”, the corresponding trial was eliminated. Given these
exclusion criteria, participants responded to 94% of familiar unique objects and
97% of non familiar objects. Thus, participants were very familiar with the sub-
ordinate level terms of the objects. Finally, all correct responses were classified
into four levels of abstraction (i.e., unique level, subordinate, basic and super-
ordinate levels). For the familiar entities, naming responses such as “artwork”,
“building” or “product” were classified as superordinate responses; “painting”,
“bridge”, “car” etc. as basic level responses; descriptions such as “a Van Gogh’s
painting” or “a famous bridge in San Francisco” as subordinate level responses,
and finally proper names (i.e. titles, building names or model names) as unique
level responses.
The dependent variable of interest was percentages of frequencies. Inde-
pendent variables were categories (artwork, building, product, home furnishing,
utensil and musical instrument), familiarity (i.e. familiar-object or non-familiar-
object) and level of categorization (i.e., unique, subordinate, basic, or superor-
dinate).
In table 6.3 we reported the percentages of frequencies for each category
and for each level of abstraction. No verbal responses were given at the su-
perordinate level for familiar entities and less than 1% of verbal classifications
at superordinate level for unfamiliar entities. As expected, no verbal responses
were obtained at the unique level for unfamiliar entities. Therefore, we col-
lapsed the unique and subordinated-level responses into a general subordinate
level of categorization. This procedure was used to compare familiar and un-
familiar entities at a level of abstraction that is subordinate to the basic level.
Furthermore, given the lack of superordinate level responses, verbal responses
were analyzed considering only two levels of abstraction (i.e. subordinate and
basic levels) in subsequent analysis (aggregated data are shown in table 6.4).
To test for differences between the three categories of familiar entities, per-
centages of frequencies were submitted to two-way ANOVA with Category (art-
work, building and product) and Level of Categorization (subordinate and ba-
sic) as within-participant factors. The main effect of object category was not
significant, F(2,34)=2.09, p=0.14, whereas the effect of level of categorization
was significant, F(1,17)=67.64, p<0.001. Category × Level of Categorization
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Category Levels
Familiar Entities Unique Subordinate Basic Superordinate
Artwork 0.85 0.03 0.12 0
Building 0.83 0.03 0.14 0
Product 0.66 0.15 0.21 0
Unfamiliar Entities
Home Furnishing 0 0.47 0.52 0.01
Utensil 0 0.48 0.52 0
Musical Instrument 0 0.31 0.68 0.01
Table 6.3: Percentage Frequencies by Object category and Level of abstraction
Category Levels
Familiar Entities Subordinate Basic
Artwork 0.88 0.12
Building 0.86 0.14
Product 0.80 0.20
Unfamiliar Entities
Home Furnishing 0.48 0.52
Utensil 0.47 0.53
Musical Instrument 0.32 0.68
Table 6.4: Percentage Frequencies by Object category and Level of abstraction:
aggregated responses
interaction was also not significant F(2,34)=1.42, p=0.25.
The same analysis was conducted to test differences among the three cate-
gories of unfamiliar entities (i.e. home furnishing, utensil and musical instru-
ment). As expected, neither the main effect of object category F(2,34)=0.48
,p=0.48, nor the Category × Level of Categorization interaction was signifi-
cant, F(2,34)=3.06, p=0.07. The effect of level of categorization was also not
significant, F(1,17)=2.23, p=0.15.
Given the lack of the main effect for category and interaction, the three cat-
egories of familiar entities were collapsed to obtain individual frequency scores
for the domain of familiar objects. The same procedure was used for the three
categories of unfamiliar entities, by collapsing the subordinate and basic-level
responses across the categories.
Responses were collapsed and analyzed across participants. Figure 6.1 shows
the percentages of subordinate and basic level responses for familiar and non-
familiar objects. Participants named familiar entities in 90% of the trials at the
subordinate-level and 16% at the basic-level. Unfamiliar entities were identified
with subordinate-level terms on 43% of the trials and with basic-level terms on
58% of the trials.
A 2 × 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance was performed with Fa-
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Figure 6.1: Percentage of basic level and subordinate level labels used in the
naming task.
miliarity (familiar entities, non-familiar entities) and Level of Categorization
(Subordinate and Basic levels). The analysis shows that the effect of Category
was not significant F (1, 17) < 1 , p=0.93. On the contrary, the Level of Cate-
gorization was significant F (1, 17) = 12.03, p < 0.01, as well as the Category ×
Level of Categorization interaction, F(1,17)=76.11, p < 0.001. The interaction
(see Figure 6.2) indicated that familiar entities were more frequently named
with subordinate-level terms than were unfamiliar entities, whereas unfamiliar
entities were more frequently named at the basic level than familiar entities.
In a more detailed analysis, we also investigated the nature of concepts par-
ticipants applied in naming of familiar entities. From table 6.3 we can note that
familiar entities were predominantly identified at the unique level of abstrac-
tion. This kind of identification comprised using the title of an artwork, the
name of a building or the model name of a product. However, we found that
in some cases additional information were added by participants to identify the
target entity. In particular, the artist’s name were used in addition to the title
of an artwork (e.g. Sunflower by Van Gogh), the name of the city in addition
to the name of a building (e.g. St. Peter’s Basilica Rome) and the brand in
addition to the model name of a product (e.g. Fiat Panda). In the case of art-
work, the represented object is also used in some descriptions. To perform the
comparison between these two kinds of identification, we distinguished between
narrow unique level identification (i.e. identification by proper names) and broad
unique level identification (i.e. identification by proper names with additional
information). This analysis was carried out independently of category. In total,
participants used 88% of narrow identifications and 12% of broad identifications
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Figure 6.2: Category × Level of Categorization interaction.
(p < 0.001). From this analysis it appears that using proper names were the
predominant familiar entity identification.
Furthermore, restricting the analysis to the artwork category, we investigated
the specific kind of art-related classification which were proposed by Belke et
al. [17]. Among the art-related classifications, comprising the artist’s name,
the artistic style and the title of the artwork, the author found that art objects
were most frequently named with the artist’s name. In contrast with this result,
we found that the title was most frequently mentioned (0.86%), followed by the
artist’s name (0.14%). The artistic genre was never used by participants to
identify artwork. In this respect, we didn’t confirm the assumption that art-
objects allow for a special kind of identification based on individual artists’ styles
that may serve as an entry point in recognition. On the contrary, we found that
the participants’ naming behavior was not different for artworks compared to
the other individual objects tested in the experiment.
To summarize, the results of the experiment 1 showed that entity naming of
familiar objects differed from unfamiliar objects. Consistent with our hypoth-
esis, unfamiliar objects were identified at a more general level of abstraction
(basic level), while familiar objects were named at a more specific level (sub-
ordinate level). Results are in accordance with the assumption that familiar
entities allow for a preferential level of identification which corresponds to the
most specific level of unique identity. This result is analogous to the previ-
ous findings in the domain of face recognition [241] and art recognition [17] in
which people preferred subordinate-level names over basic-level names to iden-
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tify respectively faces and art objects. However, in contrast with the results
by Belke [17], we found that art objects as other kinds of familiar entities are
preferentially identified by the artwork’ title instead of by the artist’s name. As
suggested by Tanaka [241] for face naming, it is possible that present results do
not reflect an increased accessibility of the unique identity representation but
instead naming preferences of people or social convention which encourage the
use of proper names to refer to familiar entities. According to this interpreta-
tion, it is still possible that people identify familiar entities at the basic level, but
choose to name them with the commonly used proper names. For this reason,
the results of the experiment 1 show only a preference for this level of identifi-
cation but are not sufficient to make inferences about the preferential access to
semantic memory. In experiment 2, the accessibility to memory representations
was directly tested analyzing reaction times in a category verification task.
6.5 Experiment 2: Category-Verification Task
In experiment 2, we used a category verification task similar to that adopted by
Tanaka [241] in the domain of face recognition and by Belke [17] in art recogni-
tion. Participants were shown with a superordinate, basic or subordinate level
category name and a brief time later were shown with a picture. Their task was
to indicate whether the picture was an exemplar of that category. The results
were compared between familiar and unfamiliar objects, selected from the cat-
egories used in experiment 1 (i.e., artwork, building and product) for familiar
entities, (home furnishing, utensil and musical instrument) for unfamiliar ob-
jects. The choice of stimuli items and selection of verbal categories was oriented
on the findings of experiment 1.
In the experiment, participants were asked to verify exemplars from these
categories at superordinate (e.g., “artwork”, “building”, “furnishing”), basic
(e.g., “painting”, “tower”, “chair”) and subordinate levels (e.g., “Mona Lisa”,
“Eiffel Tower”, “rocking chair”) of categorizations.
In previous research [198, 119], it has been shown that participants were
faster to categorize exemplars at the basic level (e.g., verifying that an entity is
a “dog”) than categorizing exemplars at the superordinate level (e.g., verifying
that an entity is an “animal”) and at the subordinate level (e.g., verifying that an
entity is a “poodle”). Therefore, according to the basic-first hypothesis, artifacts
should be categorized first at the basic level (regardless of the fact that they are
familiar or unfamiliar). That is, basic level verifications should be faster than
superordinate verifications and than subordinate verifications (unique identity
name or model name verifications). For instance, people should be faster to
verify that a picture is a “painting” than to verify that it is an “artwork”or
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“Mona Lisa”.
On the contrary, we expect that subordinate-level representations will be
more accessible than the basic-level representations for familiar objects. That is,
participants should be as fast or faster to verify the unique identity of a familiar
object (e.g., “Mona Lisa”) than to verify that the object is an “artwork” or a
“painting”. We expect the same pattern of results for products, like familiar
car models. That is, people should be as fast or faster to verify that a car is a
“Fiat 500” than to verify that is a “vehicle” or a “car”.
6.5.1 Method
Participants
Twenty participants took part in the experiment. Mean age was 31.15 (SD=6.35),
ranging from 23 to 45 years. Participants were tested individually and they were
not paid for participation.
Stimuli
Pictures were chosen from the categories used in experiment 1 (artwork, build-
ing, product, home furnishing, utensil and musical instrument). The choice of
stimuli items and the selection of verbal categories were oriented on the find-
ings of experiment 1. For each category we selected 4 items. Additionally, four
pictures other than those used for experimental trials were selected as practice
trials.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were presented with
instructions explaining the category verification task on a monitor screen. They
were also provided with the complete list of the subordinate-level terms for all
of the 24 target exemplars presented in a random order one after the other.
Subsequently, to signal the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross appeared for
1000 ms on the monitor. Next, a blank screen appeared for 1000 ms, followed
by a category word which remains for 2500 ms. Finally, after 500 ms blank
interval, the category name was replaced with a picture. The participants’ task
was to verify whether the picture matched the category name, by pressing as
quickly as possible the corresponding TRUE or FALSE buttons. The picture
remained on the screen until the answer was given. The two response keys were
counterbalanced for hand across participants. Trial order was fully randomized.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the design of a sample trial in the category-verification
task used in the experiment.
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Figure 6.3: Trial presentation sequence in the category verification task. On
each trial, a word was viewed (at superordinate, basic or subordinate level),
followed by a picture, and the subjects were asked to indicate whether the
picture matched the word.
The experiment consisted of 144 experimental trials, resulting from 24 items
with two response types (TRUE and FALSE) and three levels of categorizations.
That is, each item was shown six times. In the superordinate level and true
condition, the category-word could be “artwork” , “building”, “product”, “fur-
nishing”, “utensil”, “musical instruments”. In the basic level and true condition
it could be “painting”, “tower”, “phone” and so on. Finally in the subordinate
level and true condition the category word was the proper name of the artifact,
the model name of the product or the specific type of furnishing, utensil or
musical instrument. In the false conditions, category words were taken from
a different exemplar of the same higher-order level category. For example, the
“Eiffel Tower” letter string and the “Leaning Tower of Pisa” picture stimulus
were paired, falling both under the same inclusive category “tower”. In the basic
level condition, a false word label that shared the same superordinate category
was provided (e.g., the letter string “painting” was presented with a “statue”
picture stimulus, with both referring to the superordinate category “artwork”).
False trials were designed with the restriction that each word-picture combina-
tion at the subordinate level would appeared only once during the experiment
and each word within a level of categorization would appeared with the same
frequency in order to prevent response bias. The experiment was implemented
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in Matlab using the Psychtoolbox-3. The complete list of the category words
used in the three categorization levels for true and false conditions is reported
in Appendix A.1.
6.5.2 Results
Percentages of correct TRUE and correct FALSE responses by object category
and level of categorization are reported in Table 6.5.
Category Superordinate Basic Subordinate
CT (%) CF (%) CT (%) CF (%) CT (%) CF (%)
Artwork 89 89 100 90 92 96
Building 85 86 92 93 93 92
Product 86 76 67 98 68 91
Home Furnishing 0.81 0.81 0.93 100 96 79
Utensil 0.81 0.81 0.93 100 0.81 0.81
Musical Instrument 100 100 0.90 100 0.84 0.67
Table 6.5: Percentage of correct TRUE (CT) and correct FALSE (CF) responses
by category.
Aggregating the data by category, we found that participants, presented
with familiar entities, correctly responded “true” on 83%, 86% and 84% of the
trials for superordinate-level, basic-level and subordinate-level categorizations,
respectively. For false trials, participants correctly responded on 98%, 94% and
93% of the trials for superordiante, basic and subordinate level categorizations,
respectively. Responses to the unfamiliar entities, showed that participants
correctly responded “true” to 88%, 92% and 94% of the trials for identifications
at the superordinate level, basic level and subordinate level, respectively. For
false trials, participants correctly responded “false” to 98%, 94% and 93% of the
trials for identifications at the superordinate level, basic level and subordinate
level, respectively.
An analysis of variance was performed on reaction times of correct true and
separately of correct false responses. Before performing the analysis, trials with
outlying RTs (i.e., below 300 ms or above 3000 ms) were excluded from the data
set.
To test for differences between the three familiar categories mean RTs were
submitted to two-way ANOVA with Category (artwork, building and product)
and Category Level (superordinate, basic and subordinate) as within-participant
factors. This analysis showed that the main effect of level of categorization was
significant, F (2, 38) = 8.93, p < 0.001. Neither the main effect of category
F (2, 38) = 1.36, p = 0.27, nor the interaction between category and category
level were significant F (4, 76) = 0.20, p = 0.93 (see figure 6.4).
The same analysis was performed to test for differences among the unfamil-
iar categories. Mean RTs were subjected to a 3 (Category: home furnishing,
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Figure 6.4: Mean Reaction Times for the three categories of familiar entities,
at the superordinate, basic and subordinate levels in the true condition.
utensil and musical instrument) × 3 (Category Level: superordinate, basic and
subordinate) within-participants ANOVA. As in the previous analysis we found
that neither the main effect of category F (2, 38) = 1.03, p = 0.36, nor the in-
teraction between category and category level were significant F (4, 76) = 1.73,
p = 0.15. On the contrary, the main effect of level of categorization was sig-
nificant, F (2, 38) = 11.20, p < 0.001. The mean reaction times for the three
categories of unfamiliar entities, at the superordinate, basic and subordinate
levels are shown in figure 6.5.
Consequently, categories of familiar entities and categories of unfamiliar en-
tities were collapsed to obtain individual mean RTs to familiar and unfamiliar
entity types, respectively. Table 6.6 shows the separate reaction times for true
responses as a function of category (Familiar vs. Unfamiliar) and category level
(Superordinate, Basic and Subordinate).
Category Level
Category Superordinate Basic Subordinate
Familiar 1200 1072 949
Unfamiliar 1236 979 1096
Table 6.6: Mean Reaction Times for the TRUE responses as a function of
Category (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and Category Level (superordinate, basic
and subordinate.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed for reaction times of correct
true responses with Familiarity (familiar or unfamiliar) and Category Level
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Figure 6.5: Mean Reaction Times for the three categories of unfamiliar entities,
at the superordinate, basic and subordinate levels in the true condition.
(superordinate, basic and subordinate) as within participant factors. The main
effect of Familiarity was not significant F (1, 19) = 0.93, p = 0.35, indicating that
overall participants were not faster to categorize familiar entities than they were
to categorize unfamiliar entities. On the contrary, the main effect of category
level was significant, F (2, 38) = 13.61, p < 0.001. Critically, the Familiarity ×
Category Level interaction was also significant, F (2, 38) = 5.69, p < 0.01. As
shown in figure 6.6, participants were faster to categorize unfamiliar entities at
the basic level than at subordinate level, F (1, 19) = 4.10, p < 0.05. For instance,
they were faster to verify that a bread knife is a “knife” than they are to verify
that it is a “bread knife”. On the contrary, for familiar entities, participants
were faster to categorize entities at the subordinate level (i.e. unique level)
than at the basic level, F (1, 19) = 7.72, p < 0.05. For example, participants
were faster to verify that the David is “The David” than to verify that it is “a
statue”. The results seem to confirm the assumption of a general basic-level
advantage [198] for unfamiliar entities. However, contrary to this assumption,
we found a different pattern of results for entities that can be identified at the
unique level of identity (i.e. familiar entities). At the subordinate level (i.e.
the unique level of identity) familiar entities were categorized faster than at the
basic level, showing that the basic-level advantage disappears for entities that
can be identified at the most specific level of identity.
Direct comparisons between TRUE judgments showed that subordinate-
level judgments in the familiar category were significantly faster than subor-
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dinate judgments in the unfamiliar category, t(19)=3.74, p<0.01. The related
comparison between reaction times for the familiar-basic and unfamiliar-basic
categorizations showed the opposite pattern. Unfamiliar-basic judgments were
significantly faster than familiar-basic judgments, t(19) = 2.36, p<0.05.
In summary, these results demonstrated that familiar entities were identified
differently from unfamiliar entities. People are faster to categorize familiar
entities at subordinate level than they are to verify them at the basic level. On
the contrary, verification times for unfamiliar entities were faster at the basic
level than at the subordinate level.
The main contribution of this study is to support the assumption that the
shift of the entry point in recognition towards the subordinate level is not pe-
culiar of some special categories of entities but is a more general phenomenon
concerning all the entities that have a unique representation in memory.
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Figure 6.6: Mean Reaction Times for categorizing familiar and unfamiliar enti-
ties at superordinate, basic and subordinate levels in the TRUE condition.
An ANOVA was also performed for correct false reaction times with fa-
miliarity (familiar or unfamiliar) and category level (superordinate, basic and
subordinate) as within-participant factors. Table 6.7 shows the separate reac-
tion times for false responses as a function of category (Familiar vs. Unfamiliar)
and category level (Superordinate, Basic and Subordinate).
The results of this analysis were globally in accordance with those obtained
for correct true response times. In figure 6.7 we report mean reaction times
for the correct falsification responses depending on familiarity and level of cat-
egorization. The main effect of familiarity was not significant, F (1, 19) = 1.40,
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Category Level
Category Superordinate Basic Subordinate
Familiar 1108 1104 1052
Unfamiliar 1118 1010 1182
Table 6.7: Mean Reaction Times for the FALSE responses as a function of
Category (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and Category Level (superordinate, basic
and subordinate.
p = 0.24. This means that people were not faster to verify familiar entities than
unfamiliar entities. Instead, the main effect of level of categorization was signifi-
cant, F (2, 38) = 12.97, p < 0.001, indicating slower responses for a more specific
level of categorization. Critically, the Familiarity × Category Level interaction
was also significant, F (2, 38) = 6.59, p < 0.001. The interaction indicates that
participants were faster to correctly reject unfamiliar entities at the basic level
than at the subordinate level, F (1, 19) = 4.10, p < 0.05, whereas they were
equally faster to correctly reject familiar entities at basic level than at subor-
dinate level, F (1, 19) = 0.161, p = 0.69. The last result represents a difference
compared to the previous analysis on the correct true reaction times. While
participants were faster to verify a familiar entity at the subordinate level than
at the basic level, they were equally fast to correctly reject a familiar entity
at the subordinate-level as at the basic-level. This result could be explained
arguing that the mismatch between the singular concept activated by the word
category and that activated by the picture takes more time to be recognized.
However, the result does not contrast our hypothesis since it shows that it is not
the case that correctly rejecting a familiar entity at the basic-level is faster than
rejecting a familiar entity an the subordinate level, as predicted by the basic-
level advantage hypothesis. On the contrary the lack of a basic level advantage
for the true rejecting trials of familiar entities indicated that representations of
familiar entities are highly accessible at a specific level of abstraction which is
related to the proper name of the entities.
As in the TRUE condition, we found that direct comparisons between FALSE
judgments showed that basic-level judgments in the unfamiliar category were
significantly faster than basic-level judgments in the familiar category, t(19)=4.07,
p<0.001. These results open the question whether a mechanism of inhibition
may come into play to favor the access to singular representations compared to
higher level representations. To answer this question future experiments should
compare familiar and unfamiliar entities from the same categories to reduce as
much as possible processing differences due to the category.
In conclusion, the results of the experiment 2 provided evidence in favor of
our hypothesis that people are faster (or at least equally fast) to verify entities
at the unique level than at higher levels of abstractions.
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In terms of mental representations, this suggests that people have direct
access to singular concepts and that this access is un-mediated by higher level
conceptual representations, when they identify entities which are represented in
memory by means of singular concepts.
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Figure 6.7: Mean Reaction Times for categorizing familiar and unfamiliar enti-
ties at superordinate, basic and subordinate levels in the FALSE condition.
6.6 Experiment 3: Identity Matching Task
Previous studies on the entry point issue, have shown that categorizations sub-
ordinate to the basic level require additional perceptual processing [119], as the
identification at this level is based on more detailed perceptual discriminations
during the initial processing. In experiment 3 such perceptual representations
of individual artifact are directly examined using an identity matching task.
Our prediction is that having a singular concept of an entity can favor the rapid
perceptual analysis of information from that entity, because perceptual infor-
mation may be part of the singular concept of the object. Participants are
presented with a word prime (basic-level prime or subordinate-level prime) or
a neutral prime (consisting of the letter string “blank”) followed by two simul-
taneously shown pictures. The participant’s task is to decide whether the two
pictures are visually identical or different. Facilitation is measured by the differ-
ence in reaction times between primed and neutral trials for the same matching
picture stimuli. The identity-priming paradigm assumes that the word prime
activates the participant’s visual representation, which in turn is used to en-
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hance the perceptual matching response [184, 198]. The stronger the priming
is, the shorter the reaction times will be. The degree of facilitation depends on
the match between mental representations, as elicited by the word stimulus and
its correspondence with the physical picture stimulus.
This task has been first used by Rosch et al. [198] to examine the category
level at which people represents objects. They found that relative to the neu-
tral condition, basic-level words (e.g. “dog”) produced more facilitation than
superordinate level words (e.g. “animal”). More important for the aim of the
present study, it was shown that subordinate-level words (e.g. “poodle”) did
not produce more facilitation, even though they convey more information about
the visual appearance of objects. From this evidence, the authors argued that
people represent most objects at the basic level of detail.
Instead, we hypothesize that a proper name or a model name should acti-
vate a unique identity representation in memory that would facilitate the visual
comparison task for pictures representing the referent of these names. On the
contrary, if participants represents unique artifacts, like general objects, at the
basic level, no differences in facilitation should be found between subordinate-
level primes and basic-level primes.
6.6.1 Method
Participants
Fourteen participants (8 female) took part in the experiment. Mean age was
28.5 years (SD=5.17) ranging from 23 to 38 years. None of the participants
participated in Experiments 1 or 2. Each participant was tested individually in
a quiet room.
Stimuli
Target stimuli consisted of four pictures selected from each of the four categories
(artwork, building, product, home furnishing, utensil and musical instrument)
used in the previous experiments, resulting in 24 picture stimuli. For different
responses, each target picture was paired with a different picture which shared
the same basic level of the target (e.g. two different paintings). The complete
list of the paired stimuli used in the experiment is reported in Appendix A.2
Procedure
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were shown writ-
ten instructions that explained the procedure for the identity matching task.
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The participants’task consisted of judging (as fast an as accurately as possi-
ble) whether two simultaneously presented stimuli were physically identical or
different. Before starting the experiment, participants performed eight practice
trials followed by 144 experimental trials. At the beginning of each trial, a ready
signal consisting of a fixation cross appeared for 1000 ms in the center of the
screen. After that the cross was replaced by a word prime or the neutral word
“blank” for 2500 ms. Word primes were either basic-level words (i.e., “artwork”,
“building”, “product” for familiar entities and “furnishing”, “utensil”, “musi-
cal instrument” for unfamiliar entities) or subordinate-level words (e.g., “Mona
Lisa”, “Eiffel Tower”, “Iphone” and so on). Subsequently, a 300 ms blank screen
interval was shown and then followed by the simultaneous appearance of two
pictures. The two pictures remained on screen until participants pressed the key
marked SAME (indicating that the two pictures were physically identical) or
the key marked DIFFERENT (indicating that the two pictures were physically
different). The trial presentation sequence is presented in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Trial presentation sequence in the identity matching task. On each
trial, a word was viewed, followed by the simultaneous appearance of two pic-
tures, and the subjects were asked to indicate whether the pictures were physi-
cally identical.
The two pictures presented in the “same” conditions were either two fa-
miliar objects from artwork, building or product categories, or two unfamiliar
objects from furnishing, utensil or musical instrument categories. In the “differ-
ent” conditions, the two pictures shared the same basic level (e.g., two different
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paintings) with the restrictions that each combination appeared only once and
all stimuli appeared with equal frequency. Thus, the three types of word primes,
24 target items, and two response types yielded a total of 144 experimental trials
(see the Appendix A.2 for the complete list of experimental stimuli used in the
experiment). Participants were instructed to answer by pressing one of two but-
tons corresponding to “same” and “different” answers. The two response keys
were counterbalanced for hand across participants. Trial order was fully ran-
domized. The experiment was implemented in Matlab using the Psychtoolbox-3
and run on a Dell Latitude D630 with a 15” monitor.
6.6.2 Results
Before performing the analysis, reaction times were adjusted by setting bound-
aries to eliminate outliers. The lower boundary was set to 200 ms and the upper
boundary was set to 2000 ms, which corresponds to approximately 2.5 standard
deviations from the mean (MRT = 881 ms, SD = 392).
Table 6.8 shows the mean reaction times depending on prime level and object
category.
Priming
Category Neutral Basic level Subordinate level
Artwork 966 (44) 916 (52) 847 (49)
Building 970 (38) 936 (42) 860 (59)
Product 917 (49) 913 (54) 844 (50)
Home Furnishing 982 (76) 842 (40) 915 (58)
Utensil 996 (49) 866 (48) 927 (53)
Musical Instrument 946 (49) 899 (60) 932 (54)
Table 6.8: Mean RTs in milliseconds (and standard errors of the mean) by
Object Category and Prime Type
In the following analysis, we used “same responses” to measure priming
effects. To obtain priming scores, differences in reaction times were calculated
between responses for correct same responses when pictures were preceded by
a neutral word as compared with when they were preceded by either a basic-
level word or a subordinate-level word. Mean priming scores for familiar and
non-familiar objects were analyzed and compared.
To this purpose, we calculated a mean basic-level and subordinate priming
score by averaging priming scores for the three categories of familiar objects and
for the three categories of unfamiliar objects at the two levels of abstraction:
basic and subordinate. Then, for each participant a mean priming score was
calculated for each of the six target categories at the two levels of abstraction.
To test for differences between the three familiar classes of objects, we sub-
115
mitted priming scores to a two-way ANOVA with category (artwork, building
and product) and priming condition (basic and subordinate level) as within-
subjects factors. Neither the main effects of category, F(2,26)=0.19, p=0.82,
nor their interaction, F(2,26)=0.39, p=0.67, was significant. Given of lack of
difference between familiar categories, we collapsed the three categories of famil-
iar entities (artwork, building and product) to obtain individual mean priming
scores for a general category of familiar entities.
The same analysis was performed on the three contrast categories (home
furnishing, utensil and musical instrument). As in the previous analysis, nei-
ther the effects of category, F(2,26)=1.81, p=0.18, nor the interaction between
category and level of abstraction was significant, F(2,26)=0.001, p=0.99. Conse-
quently, non-familiar object categories were collapsed to obtain individual mean
priming scores for a general category of unfamiliar entities. This was done by
averaging priming scores for basic and subordinate level responses across the
three categories.
In Figure 6.9 we show the amount of total facilitation produced by the basic-
level and subordinate-level primes depending on the object category (familiar
vs. unfamiliar).
To test for differences in priming effects between familiar and unfamiliar
objects, an ANOVA was performed with object domain (familiar or unfamil-
iar) and category level (basic or subordinate) as within participant factors.
The analysis revealed a significant domain × level of categorization interaction,
F (1, 13) = 7.05, p < 0.05. No other effects were significant. The interaction
showed that additional priming effects were found at the subordinate level for
familiar entities, but not for unfamiliar entities. The opposite pattern was found
at the basic level, where additional priming was revealed for unfamiliar entities
but not for familiar entities. However, a direct comparison between basic and
subordinate-level primes revealed that the difference was significant only for fa-
miliar entities, p < 0.05. For unfamiliar entities the difference did not reach the
0.05 level of significance (p = 0.33).
Thus, people recognized familiar entities faster at the unique level of identity
and were able to access elaborated visual representations when primed with a
matching entity proper name. According to the logic of the identity-matching
paradigm, these findings suggest that for familiar entities, participants are able
to activate unique-level visual representations, that are used to bear the iden-
tity matching task. We argue that such perceptual representations are part
of the singular concepts of individual entities. Therefore the results suggest
people have quick access to singular concepts during initial visual processing of
individuals.
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Figure 6.9: The results of Experiment 3 showing the amount of facilitation for
basic and subordinate level primes for familiar and non-familiar objects.
6.7 General Discussion
The purpose of the study was to provide empirical evidence for the direct access
to semantic memory of unique entities through individual concepts. Converging
empirical evidence from three experiments, which have previously proved sensi-
tive to address the object identification issue, suggested that the initial point of
contact between the perceptual stimulus of a unique distinguishable object and
its memory representation is not mediated by high level conceptual structures
(i.e. general concepts).
Our study suggests that having an individual representation of an object
in memory (i.e. individual concept) shifts the entry point of recognition to the
most subordinate level of categorization, that is the unique level of identification.
The recognition mechanism of unique familiar entities is different from that of
entities that can not be identified at the unique level of identity (i.e. unfamiliar
entities). In principle, a familiar individual could be first recognized as whatever
other unfamiliar individual, namely as a member of a category (more likely as a
member of a basic level category). Our experiments shown that this is not the
case.
In a naming task (experiment 1), whereas common entities where likely to
be identified with basic level category labels, it was found that familiar unique
entities were more likely to be named with unique identity names. In a category
verification task (experiment 2), we found that unique familiar entities were ver-
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ified more quickly (or rejected as quickly as) at the subordinate level of unique
identity than they were at the basic level. Finally, in experiment 3 the preferen-
tial access to a fine-grained visual representation for unique individual entities
was demonstrated in an identity matching task. In this experiment, subordinate
level primes (i.e. proper names) produced stronger RT facilitation compared to
basic-level primes in matching pictures of familiar individual entities, but not
in matching pairs of pictures of unfamiliar entities.
Considered together, these results suggest that whereas the entry point in
recognition for most unfamiliar objects is a the basic level of categorization
(i.e. the first contact with a memorial representation is at the level of a general
concept), the entry point of unique familiar entities is at the subordinate level
of unique identity (i.e. the first contact with a memorial representation is at
the level of a singular concept).
The results of our study mirror previous findings in recognition of familiar
faces [241] and visual art identification [17], in that a preferential accessibility
to more specific representations in memory has been previously demonstrated
for famous face and art recognition. However, in these studies the underlying
idea is that there is something “special” in the target entities that lead people
to develop specialized mechanisms of identification. Belke [17], for instance,
explicitly argue that “art has a special status amongst external-world objects
since it allows for a memorial representation based on stylistic features that are
linked in semantic memory to the creating artist” (p.199). The special status
of faces was instead conceived by Tanaka [241] in terms of expertise. Faces are
different from other objects of expertise in that object expertise is a specialized
activity that is achieved by relatively few individuals and only through explicit
training. On the contrary, face expertise is a general ability that virtually all
people possess (excluding people affected by rare disorders like prosopoagnosia)
and is acquired without training. According to the face expertise hypothesis,
the high level of specialization in face recognition explains the shift of the entry
point for faces at the most subordinate level of abstraction.
Expertise is also an important aspect of the study of Belke [17], in the sense
that participants were people with a fairly good level of expertise in visual
art. We believe that this methodological choice limits the generalizability of
the results to people with limited art experience. The study leaves open the
possibility that the organization of mental representations of visual art at the
level of producing artist is a special feature of art experts. Even tough we agree
with the authors that art can be generally regarded as an expertise domain,
because exposure to art, unlike encounters with every-day objects, is a rather
limited event, we believe that it is still possible to investigate the identifica-
tion mechanisms of art objects in people without relevant art-specific categories
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acquired by training. To this purpose, in our study we used very famous art
stimuli which are assumed to be part of common knowledge. The results of
our experiments indicate that the specific level of unique identity is the level
at which the recognition of famous art entities first occurs also in non experts.
Contrary to the Belke’s results, our experiments do not support the existence
of a specialized mechanism for art identification at the level of the producing
artist. In experiment 1, for example, the artist’s name is used only in about
15% of the trials about artworks and always along with the title of the artwork
(e.g. The Last Supper of Leonardo Da Vinci).
This evidence indicates that at least for very familiar art objects the entry
point of identification is not dissimilar from that used for other classes of familiar
entities. Consequently, the formation of style-based memorial representations
could be a specialization which is acquired with the experience to deal with art
entities whose memorial representations are not shaped by recurrent encounters
and for which a singular concept has not yet been initialized.
We argue that the shift of the entry point toward the unique level of identity
is not a peculiarity of a “special” category of objects, but is the general mecha-
nism through which an entity recognizable at the level of unique identity is first
recognized. In favor of this hypothesis, we did not find a significant difference
between the three categories of familiar entities (artwork, building and product)
used in our experiments.
This result is particularly interesting for a second reason. Converging evi-
dence from the three experiments here described indicates that the identification
of well identifiable products (e.g. the Beetle or the iPhone) is different from that
of other generic objects (e.g. an unknown car or phone). The identification pro-
cess of known products mirrors that of other familiar entities, in the sense that
the first recognition occurs at the subordinate level of abstraction represented by
the model name of the product. This means that, for instance, the iPhone is fist
recognized as “iPhone” rather than as a “phone”. We argue that in this case the
recognition is mediated by a memorial representation which has the same char-
acteristics of a singular concept with the only difference that in this case many
equivalent individual entities can be recognized by the same individual concept
and referred with the same proper name. We remark that the model-based
conceptual representation can not be considered as a general concept in that all
the members of the category are equivalent: they are equally good exemplars
of the category, they share the same relevant features and ultimately they have
the same core meaning of the concept. Moreover, our study provides evidence
that the model name is processed differently than the brand name in activating
the corresponding conceptual representation. Previous studies [160, 119, 241]
that used brand names to test the entry point of identification for products like
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cars did not find a shift to the subordinate level of abstraction represented by
brand names. On the contrary, we found that model names promote this shift.
It is interesting to note that in their study on the neuropsychological status of
brand names Gontijo et al. [86] found that brand names form a special lexical
category that seem to occupy a somewhat intermediary lexical status between
common nouns, nonwords and proper names. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate the neuropsychological and lexical status of model names to test whether
they behave more similar to proper names than common nouns or brand names.
The similarity between model names and proper names would be an evidence
of their similar function in activating unique representations in memory.
In conclusion, our study provides some valuable insights to the current de-
bate about the sequence of processing steps involved in visual object recog-
nition. Traditional models of object recognition posit an intermediate stage
between low-level visual processing and high-level object recognition at which
the object is first segmented from the rest of the image before it is recognized
[121, 58, 168]. However, other evidence suggests that object recognition may in-
fluence, and perhaps even precede, segmentation [182, 93]. Thus, the hypothesis
which suggests that segmentation occurs prior to recognition, is currently sub-
ject to vigorous debate. Other evidence suggest that objects are perceptually
categorized (e.g. bird) before they are identified at a finer grain (e.g. sparrow).
Consistent with this second hypothesis, some behavioral evidence suggests that
familiar objects are named faster at the basic level than the superordinate or
subordinate level [198]. However, this is apparently not true for visually atyp-
ical members of a category [119]. Further, it has been suggested that visual
expertise may lead experts to recognize stimuli from their expert category as
fast at the subordinate level as the basic level [241]. Thus, the generality of the
second hypothesis is also subject to debate.
The present study provides evidence in the same direction. The findings of
three experiments challenge the hypothesis of a basic-level entry point of recog-
nition of unique entities, where perceptual categorization precedes unique level
identification and provide support for a direct (i.e. unmediated by general cat-
egories) access to unique information stored in individual concepts. Moreover,
the results provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the shift of the entry
point to the level of unique identity is not peculiar of “special” kinds of ob-
jects (like faces), but it is the general mechanism to access to individual-specific
memorial representations.
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Chapter 7
Associative and Semantic
Priming in Recognition of
Individuals
In chapter 6 we described three experiments which investigated the access point
to singular concepts about individuals and we reported findings supporting the
hypothesis of a direct - non mediated by higher level representations - bottom-up
access to these concepts. In this chapter we explore another aspect of how our
semantic representations of individuals are accessed and organized in memory.
A priming experiment was conducted to investigate the relations between sin-
gular concepts, contrasting associative and semantic priming effects in a entity
recognition task.
7.1 Introduction
Fast and reliable access to entity-specific information is of central importance
in everyday life. Humans need to correctly store and retrieve knowledge about
unique entities such as people, places, objects and other individual things rel-
evant to their own existence. Our ability to recognize, identify and name all
the entities which populate our environment and our life depends on this fun-
damental aspect of human cognition.
Although efforts to access this kind of information are subject to occasional
incidents (see, for example, [272] for a description of errors in recognizing peo-
ple), humans appear to be remarkably capable at storing and retrieving entity-
related knowledge. For instance, when shown a picture of Barack Obama, people
will know that he is a familiar person; they will able to access biographical in-
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formation, such as he is the 44th President of the United States, is married with
Michelle Obama, represents the Democratic Party; and they probably will also
able to access to his name.
The way in which this information is structured in semantic memory and ac-
cessed from the perceptual input is a matter of considerable debate in cognitive
research.
Many studies in literature focused on the problem to understand the orga-
nization of (and the access to) semantic memory for familiar people and several
theoretical explanations have been proposed to explain person recognition and
naming [35, 38, 36, 234].
However, little attempt has been made to compare the processes involved
in person recognition and naming with those used for other kinds of entities.
The only few studies (see for example [9, 55]) that have addressed this issue
compared face and object processing at two different levels of abstraction. For
instance, a common task used in these studies is the face naming task. In this
task, participants are asked to name a known person by producing her proper
name. To perform such a task, it is necessary to access to the specific memory
representation of that unique person and retrieve part of it (in this case the
proper name). On the contrary, in the corresponding task used for objects,
namely the object naming task, a generic exemplar of an object category (e.g.,
a bottle) is shown and people are asked to name the object with the name of
the category (that is a common name). When a person recognize an exemplar
of the category “bottle” as “a bottle”, she does not access to the individual
information of that specific bottle, but she assigns that exemplar to the bottle
category and then she retrieves the name of the category. The findings of the
experiments described in chapter 6 provided evidence in favor of a different
access mechanism in these two cases.
As yet, very few studies [63, 90] have compared the organization of person-
specific knowledge with that of other entities at the unique level of identity.
The primary rationale of the present research is to provide a contribution
in this direction, comparing person and non-person entities that can likewise
be accessed at the exemplar level in terms of recognition. More precisely, our
aim is to investigate how our semantic representations of individual things are
organized and accessed and how these representations are inter-linked with those
of other individual things. To this purpose, we probe the semantic system using
a priming experiment.
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7.2 Categorical and associative relatedness be-
tween entities and priming effects
The analysis of priming effects has provided a feasible way of investigating the
structure of semantic memory.
In this section, first, we will clarify the distinction between two different
ways in which individual entities can be related in memory, namely by means
of semantic and associative relationships. Then, we will explain how these rela-
tionships lead to different implications concerning priming effects (semantic and
associative priming). Finally, we will review the literature on entity recognition
and naming in the light of this distinction. Since our interest is on individual
entities, we will reserve particular attention to the literature that addressed
the problem of recognition and naming at the unique level of identity and in
particular to the literature on face recognition and naming.
How semantic knowledge for individual entities is stored in long term mem-
ory is an open issue. One possible view - categorical view - is that semantic
knowledge of individual entities has a categorical structure, as has been demon-
strated to exist for generic objects [9, 110]. The idea is that memory representa-
tions of unique entities are interconnected by belonging to common categories.
This view holds that the category “politician”, for example, exists as a node in
a network and that all the exemplars of the category (e.g., Barack Obama, Bill
Clinton, Nicolas Sarcozy) are connected to the corresponding node. The con-
nection with the superordinate category creates an indirect link between these
entities. An important implication of this view is that entities would be assumed
to inherit the properties of the category to which they belong.
An alternative view - associative view - holds that the semantic knowledge
for unique identifiable entities is different and that this knowledge is not struc-
tured according to categories. In this view, relationship between entities can be
represented by networks of associative links but not by membership of a common
category. According to this view, Barack Obama and Michelle Obama would
be linked in memory because they are inter-connected by a directly associative
factor (i.e. a partnership relationship). Moreover, it is assumed that knowledge
of entities which are identifiable at the level of unique identity is individual and
attributes cannot be automatically inferred from category membership. In the
course of this section, we will discuss in more details the nature of categori-
cal and associative connections between entities and we finally provide a clear
definition of our use of these terms.
The two views described above imply different predictions about the priming
effects that can be observed in experiments of entity recognition and naming.
In particular, a clear distinction should be made between priming based on
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semantic (or categorical)1 and associative relationships. Since in many studies
no clear distinction has been made between these two forms of priming, we first
clarify the distinction between semantic and associative priming.
Priming is a memory effect in which the exposure to a stimulus (prime)
influences the response to a subsequent stimulus (target). The particular re-
lationship between the prime and the target defines the nature of the priming
effect. In particular, one can distinguish an associative relation among prime
and target from a purely semantic relation.
In psycholinguistics the distinction between semantic and associative priming
has been acknowledged and has generated numerous debates. In this context,
semantic relatedness reflects the similarity in meaning or the overlap in featural
descriptions of two words (e.g. “turkey-goose”). On the other hand, associative
relatedness reflects the probability that one word will call to mind a second word
(e.g. “cat-dog”). Associative relations are assumed to reflect word use rather
than word meaning. Whether semantic priming can be observed in absence of
associative priming and vice versa is a matter of considerable debate in word
recognition literature.
Some authors argue that a purely semantic relationship between prime and
target can provide very little priming effect or no effect at all [144, 219] and
associative relationships are the main cause of what is generally referred as
semantic priming. Shelton and Martin [219] claim that “words that are very
similar in meaning or sharing many features will not show automatic semantic
priming if they are not also associated” (p. 1204). Hutchison [111], neverthe-
less, challenged this conclusion arguing that it is possible to obtain a “pure
semantic” priming effect when great care is taken to select semantically related
but unassociated stimuli. Indeed, “pure semantic” priming effects have been
demonstrated by McRae and Boisvert [156] and by Perea and Rosa [180].
On the other hand, other studies have demonstrated “pure associative” prim-
ing in absence of semantic relationship between prime and target [108, 260] and
a dissociation between the two forms of priming has been also demonstrated
within the same study [66].
A similar debate about whether priming effects are in fact due to associative
or categorical relationships between items in memory has produced a similar di-
vision in face recognition literature, but the issue has not been fully investigated.
Moreover, the two forms of primings are often confounded in this literature and
there is an ambiguity about the locus of the effect. This is due to the fact
that in many studies the stimulus pairs are simultaneously related by categori-
1These two terms are often used interchangeably in priming literature. Therefore in the
first part of this section we will not distinguish between them. A more clear discrimination
between terms will be provided at the end of the section.
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cal and associative relationships and the term “semantic priming” is often used
to include both kinds of relationships. For instance, McNeill and Burton [155]
define semantic priming as “the fact that processing of an item is faster if it is
preceded by a closely associated item”(p.1142) and explicitly state “throughout
the body of this study we do not distinguish between semantic and associative
relations”.
Carson and Burton [42] discriminated between “semantic”, “categorial” and
“associative” relationships. According to them, two people are related “associa-
tively” if they are “routinely observed together” (e.g. Bill and Hillary Clinton);
they are “categorically” related if they “share a particular personal information”
(e.g. Stan Laurel and Buster Keaton because they are two comedians); finally,
they are “semantically” related if one or both of the previous relationships hold.
According to this classification, semantic priming does not distinguish between
categorial and associative relations. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
definition of categorial relatedness is quite ambiguous. Bill and Hillary Clinton,
for example, share “particular personal information” (e.g. they are married but
they are also politicians). It is not straightforward from the previous definition,
if “being married” is the cause of the associative link (i.e. they are routinely
observed together because they are married) or is part of the semantic relation-
ship. It is also unclear why the authors define “semantic” a relationship based
on co-occurence.
In addition, the idea that a certain amount of semantic information must
be shared between two associate faces in order to produce a priming effect is
implicit in several models of face recognition.
For instance, in the Burton, Bruce and Johnston’s model of person recogni-
tion [38] a form of semantic mediation is implicit.
We will briefly describe this model because it is probably the most influential
model that offers an account for priming effects in person recognition and it is
the model that has inspired the majority of studies on this issue. We refer
to section 3.2 for more details and the comparison with other models of face
recognition and naming.
This model comprises three sets of units of processing: Face Recognition
Units (FRUs), Person Identity Nodes (PINs) and Semantic Information Units
(SIUs). The units are organized into pool such that the units within a pool are
connected to each other with inhibitory links. The links between units belonging
to different pools are excitatory.
For each face there is a single face recognition unit which becomes active
by matching the perceptual input from a familiar face. If a match is made
then activation spreads from the FRU to the corresponding person identity
node (PIN). A PIN is a multimodal unit that receives inputs also from other
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systems (e.g., a PIN is activated by read names, voice and so on). It represents
the access point to semantic information stored in SIUs and signals familiarity.
When a certain threshold is crossed, the face is recognized as familiar and the
PIN leads the activation to the corresponding SIUs. In turn, the activation
of a SIU above its threshold corresponds to the retrieval of the corresponding
personal information encoded into it (e.g. occupation). Each SIU is connected
to the PINs of other persons who share the same attribute. For example, the
SIUs representing a certain occupation are connected to the PINs of known
persons with that occupation. Since the links between a PIN and relevant SIUs
are bi-directional and excitatory, when a familiar face is presented, activation
can spread to the representations of other persons linked to the same SIUs.
In this model, categorical information organizes the connections between PINs
and the only way in which two or more PINs could be associated is by semantic
mediation. The IAC model does not include any mechanism to allow direct
associative relationships between PINs and cannot explain purely associative
priming effects without recurring to categorical information.
The model predicts that priming should be observed between two person
sharing a common category. That is, the presentation of the face of a known
politician (e.g. Barck Obama) should influence the speed of responses to a
subsequently presented target person sharing the same occupational category
with the prime (e.g. Nicolas Sarcozy). Highly associated pairs, it is suggested,
do not differ qualitatively from purely categorically related pairs but simply
possesses more conjoint SIUs. However, evidence from priming experiments are
mixed.
Probably the first study that used faces as stimuli in a priming experiment
was conducted by Bruce [34]. In this study, some of the prime-target pairs were
defined as “good predictors” of one another (i.e. close associated items); other
pairs, still related but not associated, were considered “bad predictors” (i.e.
semantically related items). The results shown a very similar facilitatory effect
in the two conditions, providing the first evidence of semantic priming in face
recognition. However, Bruce’s results were based on extremely small samples of
stimuli (5 related and 5 unrelated pairs in a sequence of 60 faces).
Other evidence supporting the view that semantic memory for famous per-
sons has a categorical structure come from a study by Brennen and Bruce [31].
The authors reported significant categorical priming with face stimuli when
they used a double familiarity decision task, but only an associative effect when
subjects were asked to perform a single familiarity decision.
Carson and Burton [42] also presented results in favor of the IAC model.
In four experiments the authors shown that it was possible to boost semantic
priming effects when multiple primes were presented before the target. Since se-
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mantic priming effect was found having similar characteristics to the associative
effect, the authors suggest that semantic priming behaves like a weak version of
associative priming and it should not be considered as a different mechanism.
This idea seems supported by a recent study by Vitkovitch et al. [253]. Using
a competitor priming paradigm (that investigates the effect of the presentation
of a prime three trials before a target on error rate and response latencies) it
was found a similar facilitatory effect both when the prime-target pairs were
closely associated and when they were non associated category members.
However, the idea that associative and semantic priming can be explained by
the same underlying mechanism, is challenged by a recent study conducted by
Wiese and Schweinberger [257]. These authors used reaction times and event-
related potentials (ERPs) to study the organization principles of person-specific
semantic knowledge by explicitly comparing effects of categorical and associa-
tive priming. Reaction times shown significant priming effects in both condi-
tions but the amplitude and the scalp distribution of the ERPs to the target
were significantly different (i.e. more positive over the central and parietal ar-
eas in associated condition, more posterior for categorical priming), suggesting
that associative and categorical priming are based on at least partially different
mechanisms.
In addition, other studies that tried to isolate categorical effects from asso-
ciative effects within the same experiment, failed to observe categorical priming
of person recognition. Young, Flude, Hellawell and Ellis [271] tried to determine
whether mere membership in a certain category (i.e. occupational category) is
enough to produce priming or whether, instead, an associative relationship be-
tween prime and target is an essential factor. They found that inclusion within
the same category is not enough to produce priming, whereas associative relat-
edness is a strong predictor of it.
Barry, Johnston and Scalan [9] reported significant associative priming ef-
fects in face familiarity decision and face naming, but not categorical priming
with occupation as shared category (two British comedians who have performed
as sketch duo primed each other, but unrelated comedians did not). Based on
this pattern of results, the authors proposed an alternative model in which mem-
ory representations of famous persons are structured in biographical idiosyncrat-
ically organized gnostic (BIOG) units that contain personal information, such as
“British comedian”, “politician”, “came to fame in the 1960s” and so on. These
units become associated through common episodic events, that is the experience
of co-occurrence of people. For instance, when the BIOG unit of Oliver Hardy
is activated, activity flows on to the connected unit of Stan Lauren not because
both are comic actors but because both appeared together in the same movies.
To investigate the nature of associative relationships in face processing,
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Vladeanu et al. [254] explored the effects of co-occurence and semantic re-
latedness in face priming, using a learning paradigm with artificial, computer
generated faces. The results showed that an associative priming effect can be
obtained solely by the co-occurence of computer generated faces, which have no
semantic background that could explain their association. On the other hand, a
priming effect is shown when prime-target pairs are semantically associated but
never co-occurred. However the effect in this second case is weaker than that
produced by co-occurence. The author concluded that semantic and associative
priming are two different phenomena but in many studies they are intrinsically
interlinked and both factors may have contributed to the priming effects.
Echoing this conclusion, we believe that one of the main reasons of this
overlapping is that in face priming studies associated stimuli share also a lot
of categorical information. Consider, for example, one of the associated prime-
target pair used by [9]: John Lennon and Paul McCarty. They are both persons,
singers, male, British as well closely associated members of the Beatles. It
could be argued that they are indeed categorically related but also share a
significant degree of co-occurrence. If we find a priming effect using this pair,
it is difficult to separate the contribution of categorical relatedness from that
of associative relatedness. It is likely that both forms of primings contribute to
the overall effect reported. Indeed, those studies that shown both categorical
and associative priming effects within the same study, often reported a weaker
effect when prime and target were categorically related than when they were
closely associated (see for example [42]).
This could be one of the reason because the definition of associative priming
is more fuzzy in person recognition than in word recognition literature.
Moreover, in contrast to object priming studies, where associated prime-
target pairs may belong to very different basic level categories (e.g. carrot-
donkey, squirrel-nut, cheese-mouse), in all the face priming studies cited here,
items from the same basic level category (e.g. Eros Ramazzotti and Michelle
Hunziker are both person) or subordinate category (e.g. Angelina Jolie and Brad
Pitt are both actors) were used as stimuli. In other words, the only associative
connections that have been studied to investigate the organization of person-
specific information are associative links between entities belonging to the same
category.
This is in line with a general view that considers people as “special enti-
ties” whose semantic knowledge differs in structure from that of other objects.
This idea is supported, for example, by the results reported in [9]. The authors
found qualitative differences in semantic and associative priming of faces and ob-
jects. Objects were primed reliably by both associates and semantically related
non-associates. In contrast, for faces there was a substantial priming effects
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for associated but not for semantically related items. The authors suggested
that semantic representations of objects are inter-connected by abstracted su-
perordinate categories but that representations of people are interconnected by
networks of inter-personal relatedness rather than by categories. Since the as-
sociative links, as proposed by Barry et al. [9], are “social” in nature, it seems
obvious that they may interconnect only “social” entities (i.e. persons).
We argue that associative relationships may be established between entities
belonging to different categories. A building, for example, may be strongly
associated to the city where it is placed (e.g Colosseum-Rome ), an artwork to
its author (e.g. The Pieta`-Michelangelo) or a product to its brand (500-Fiat).
In this study we will investigate these kinds of associative relationships. The
advantage to extend the definition of associative connections across the category
boundaries is that the semantic relatedness between the associated entities is
kept to a minimum.
This considerations lead us to clarify our use of categorical and associative
relationships between entities.
We define these relationships as follows:
1. Two entities are said to be “categorically” related if they share the same
basic level or subordinate level category. For example, Rome and London
are categorically related because they are both cities (or capitals), as are
The Golden Gate Bridge and The Rialto Bridge because they are bridges
or Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarcozy because they are politicians (or
Presidents). For the purpose of this paper, we do not consider semantic
relationships at the superordinate level of abstraction (e.g. the relation
between me and my neighbour’s dog because we are living things).
2. Two entities are said to be “associatively” related if the first entity call to
mind the second entity and/or vice versa. We share with other authors the
view that the primary mechanism for associative relatedness is that the
two entities are routinely experienced together in the contexts in which
they appear (i.e. both real and informational contexts). For example, The
Buckingham Palace and London are associatively related in our definition
if the entity London is produced in response to the entity Buckingham
Palace and/or vice versa. The association could be created, for example,
by the fact that people experience many episodic events that involve both
entities (e.g. every time they go to London they visit The Buckingham
Palace). Otherwise, the association could be also induced by the fact that
London is cited very often when information about Buckingham Palace is
provided or vice versa, or by the fact that pictures of London represent
The Buckingham Palace and so on.
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Even tough we acknowledge that a purely associative relation can be in-
duced by repeated co-occurrence of two entities otherwise unrelated and
become automatically registered in memory (as shown in [254]), we argue
that associative connections are in fact more likely to be determined by
co-occurrence of entities related by meaningful relations. In other words,
an entity co-occurs with another entity for a certain reason (e.g. Michelle
Obama may be associated to Barack Obama because she is married to
him and this link favor the co-occurence of the two entities). A similar
view has been proposed in word priming literature (see for example [165]).
Moss et al. proposed that some words that have been traditionally thought
to be related by co-occurrence in fact have a functional relationship. For
example wallet and purse do co-occur often, but they do so because the
function of the purse is to contain the wallet. Our view is not functional in
the sense proposed by Moss [165] (we do not claim that an entity is asso-
ciated to another because the function of the first is to perform an action
on the second or vice versa), but it is functional in the sense that there
is a (binary) property which connects two entities and these two entities
may co-occur and become associatively related because of this property.
According to this view, entities do not co-occur by chance in real life but
they co-occur because there is a particular relation that connects them.
Co-occurrence in turn strengthens the initial connection. We note, how-
ever, that not all the binary properties which connect entities necessarily
create associative relations. You can know that Barack Obama was born
in Hawaii and in this case there is a binary connection between these two
entities in your memory representation, but it could be that Hawaii never
call to your mind Barack Obama or vice versa.
This observation raises the idea that binary relations must be reinforced
to produce the associative connection. Co-occurence has a straightforward
effect to reinforce the binary connections between entities and to trans-
form an initial connection between them into an associative link. The more
two entities co-occur, the stronger will be the association between them.
So, the more Michelle Obama and Barack Obama are observed together
in everyday experience (e.g. they appear together in official ceremonies,
their are both cited in the same news articles or television programs, their
pictures are shown on the same magazines), the stronger will be the asso-
ciative connection between them. It is not the simple fact of being married
that creates the associative connection between these two entities, but it
is likely that since they are married they frequently co-occur in common
episodic events. If this happens the association between them will be
created.
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We note also that the properties which may promote the creation of as-
sociative connections between individual entities are different from those that
connect entities to their categories (i.e. ISA-properties). The first are connec-
tions that create a direct link between two entities (from that derives the name
“binary” that indicates an entity-to-entity relation). The second are connections
between one entity and the categories which it belongs to. ISA-properties are
the connections that mediate categorical relationships between entities (that are
indirect relationships), whereas binary properties are the connections underlying
associative relationships.
Since binary properties convey semantic information, we prefer to use the
term “categorical” instead to “semantic” to refer to relationships between enti-
ties that are mediated by categories.
The major purpose of the present study is to contrast categorical and asso-
ciative priming for individual entities from different categories (person, artwork,
building and product) in a recognition task. To investigate the recognition pro-
cesses we used a familiarity decision task. In this task people are asked to make
a decision about the familiarity of a target entity. The target entity is preceded
by a stimulus (a written word or a picture) that can be differently related (as-
sociatively or semantically) to the target or unrelated to it. Priming effects are
measured in terms of reaction time and accuracy.
7.3 Objectives and Rationale of the Study
The final goal of this study was to provide a contribution to clarify the orga-
nizing principles of entity-specific semantic knowledge. We can summarize the
rationale of the study as follows:
1. Many studies have investigated priming of face recognition and face nam-
ing, but only few have compared faces with other kinds of entities. The
attempt to compare faces and objects, for example, was motivated by the
idea that faces are “special entities” and they are likely to be processed dif-
ferently than other objects. However in these studies the non-faces objects
were not accessed at exemplar level but at basic level or subordinate level.
More precisely, we investigated whether there are qualitative differences in
semantic and associative priming of individual entities. To this purpose,
we compared the priming effects for entities of the person category with
those for entities of other three categories: artwork, building and product.
Priming effects were investigated using a familiarity decision task.
2. Entities can be related to each other either by being close associates or
members of the same semantic category. Additionally, an entity can be
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related to another entity of the same category (e.g. a person can be
related to another person) or to an entity which belongs to a different
category (e.g. a person can be related to an organization). To the best of
our knowledge, all the studies that have investigated associative priming
effects at the unique level of identity (i.e. face priming studies) have used
stimuli belonging to the same basic or subordinate level category. As
we have discussed above, this approach makes difficult to discriminate
effects due to categorical relatedness (or common semantic features) from
effects due to associative relatedness. For this reason, in this study we
investigated priming effects in associated pairs whose members belong to
different categories (e.g. Rome-Colosseum). Since previous studies have
demonstrated the importance of associative relationships between persons,
only for this category we decided to compare the effects of associative
priming within and across the person category. In this way, we explored
how memory representations of individual entities are inter-linked with
those of other individual entities of the same or different category and
explore whether these connections are qualitative different.
3. In their study on the nature of associative priming, Vladeanu, Lewis and
Ellis [254] reported a strong associative priming effect based on simple
visual co-occurrences of computer generated faces in the absence of any
semantic-specific knowledge. This study examined only within-domain re-
lationships among faces, implicitly assuming that co-occurrences between
people are more frequent within modality (e.g. the face of Angelina Jolie
is more often seen with the face than with the written name of Brad Pitt).
We hypothesize that other kinds of co-occurrence can contribute to the
creation of associative links. In particular, for entities belonging to dif-
ferent categories, across domain co-occurrence (e.g., the picture of Mona
Lisa and the name of Leonardo da Vinci) is likely to be as much frequent
as within co-occurrence, or even more frequent especially in informational
contexts. Therefore, in this experiment we chose a cross-modal design
to control for potential explanations of the observed effects by simple vi-
sual co-occurrences or direct connections within a given pool of processing
units (i.e. face recognition units).
To investigate the points described above we examined associative and cat-
egorical priming in a entity recognition task.
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7.4 An Entity Recognition Experiment
The goal of this experiment was to explore how singular representations of indi-
vidual entities (i.e. singular concepts) are organized in memory. In particular,
we investigated how these representations are interlinked with those of other
individual entities belonging to the same or different basic level category and
whether exist qualitative differences in associative and semantic relationships of
individual entities which belong to different categories.
To address this issues we examined associative and semantic priming effects
in an entity familiarity decision task, comparing person recognition with object
recognition when both processes involve individual exemplars of the category.
Individual objects were famous exemplars selected from three categories: art-
work, building and product. Exemplars of the person category were famous
people belonging to four occupational categories: politicians, singers, sport per-
sons and actors.
7.4.1 Pilot Study: stimulus selection
For our experiment a) highly associated prime-target stimulus pairs, b) non-
associated pairs belonging to the same category and c) unrelated pairs were
required. To identify the prime-target pairs for use in the following experiment,
we conducted a pilot study. The aim of this study was to identify an initial set
of associated pairs from which we generated the complete list of experimental
stimuli for the four conditions. To create this set, we compiled a list of famous
entity names (12 entities for each category) to be used in a free association task.
In this task, each name on the list had to be rated on a 4-point scale according to
its familiarity to the participant (1=unfamiliar, 2=rather unfamiliar, 3= rather
familiar, 4= familiar). These fame ratings were collected to ensure that the
entities selected were really familiar to participants. In addition participants
were asked to write down as many entities as possible that came spontaneously
to mind when they encounter a particular name. These spontaneously generated
names were assumed to be associated to that particular name on the list. This
means that we took an entity B to be associatively related to an entity A, if B was
produced in response to A by the majority of participants. Fifteen participants
took part in this pilot experiment (8 females, 7 male). For each entity on the
list we calculated a) mean fame ratings b) the frequency of occurrence of each
name associated to a specific entity name. The most highly associated pairs
were identified and combined into prime-target pairs for use in the following
experiment.
For each of the second member of these pairs of associates, an entity who
was not associated but who was from the same basic level category as the first
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was selected2. That is, we took an entity B to be categorically related to an
entity A if both entities belong to the same basic level category (e.g. politician,
painting, tower, car and so on) and B was not produced in response to A by
any rater in the free association task.
Then, an unrelated but famous entity was chosen for each entity target.
The free association task produced some interesting patterns of results. First
of all, for each entity on the list the prime-target pair with the highest degree of
association was composed by entities belonging to different basic level categories.
For artworks, the most common association is with the author (75%) or with
the place where they can be seen (25%). Buildings are more often associated
with the place in which they are located, and more precisely with the city (92%).
Finally, the most common association for a product is with its brand (100%).
The most heterogeneous pattern of results was found for entities of the per-
son category. Persons are strongly associated to organizations (42%), artifacts
(42%), places (12%).
Even though only in one case we found that the most frequent associated
pair was composed by two persons, it should be noted that for seven person
entities in the list we found that an associated person was mentioned by more
than 50% of participants. This seems to confirm that associative relationships
within the category are relavant for person entities. This result opens the ques-
tion whether there are differences between associative connections within cat-
egory and associative connections across category. In particular, the question
is whether representations of people (i.e. singular concepts) are preferentially
structured along social relationships, as hypothesized by Barry et al. [9] or these
associative links are as strong as other associative connections with other types
of entities. To address this issue, we added a subset of twelve associated pairs
whose both members belonged to the person category.
These associates were selected with the same procedure described above,
with the only difference that in this case a group of 15 judges were specifically
asked to write down as many other names of famous persons as possible that
came spontaneously to mind when they encountered the target person name.
For each target member of these pairs of associates, a person who was not
associated but who was from the same category as the target was selected by
the authors. For the unrelated condition, a famous person of an unrelated
category was chosen for each target.
The use of unrelated stimuli from the same category of the target gave us
also the opportunity to verify whether there are differences between unrelated
pairs whose members belong to the same high level category (i.e. person) but
with different occupational role (e.g. an actor and a politician), and unrelated
2For the category person, pairs with the same occupational category were selected.
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pairs whose members belong to different categories (e.g. person and artifact).
7.4.2 Method
Participants
Eighteen participants took part in the experiment (11 female). Mean age was
30.61 years (SD=4.59) ranging from 23 to 40 years. Each participant was tested
individually in a quiet room.
Stimuli
For each category of the selected target entities (person, artwork, building and
product), the experimental stimuli consisted of 12 pairs of closely associated
famous entities, arranged into three sets (set A,B,C) of 4 pairs. In these sets
the prime entities belonged to a different category than target entities. For the
person category 12 pairs of closely associated famous entities from the same
category (i.e. associated persons) were also used. In this way, we introduced
a further condition, in which associated, categorical and unrelated primes were
selected from the same category (i.e. Person). To distinguish between the two
conditions in the person category, we named Person Across the condition in
which target and associated primes were from different categories and Person
Within the condition in which target and primes were from the same category.
Since in this study we used a cross-modality design, prime stimuli consisted of
written names of entities, whereas targets were pictures (450×600 pixels in size)
depicting the entities paired with the primes. Pictures were edited with Adobe
Photoshop to remove background information (where present) and convert them
to gray scale.
Each participant saw the entities in one set in their close-associate pairs, the
entities in a second set rearranged to form pairs whose members were from the
same category but no close associated, and in the remaining set rearranged to
form unrelated pairs. The allocation of the sets to the experimental conditions
was counterbalanced across participants. In addition, 60 unfamiliar entities
(24 persons, 12 artifacts, 12 buildings and 12 products) were selected to serve
as targets and combined with the same 60 primes to generate the familiarity
decision demand. In this way, unfamiliar targets were also preceded by famous
names and prime familiarity would have no predictive value for target familiarity.
As a consequence of the adopted design, each prime was presented twice in the
course of the experiment. We note that potential effects of prime repetition
would have occurred in all experimental conditions in a comparable way and
therefore cannot explain the differences between conditions. Appendix B.1 lists
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the names of the entities, divided by categories, used in the experiment.
Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room. The experiment adopted the
prime-target design typically used in semantic priming studies. In each trial,
the prime (i.e. an entity name) was presented for 1000 ms followed by a fixation
cross (200 ms) and the corresponding target picture. The target remained on
the screen until the subjects made a manual yes/no response by pressing the “A”
key or the “L” key. The two response keys were counterbalanced for hand across
the participants. The experimental trials were preceded by eight practice trials.
None of the items used in the practice trials were adopted in the experimental
trials. Each trial was initiated by the response on the previous trial after an
inter-trial interval of 1000 ms. In Figures 7.1 and 7.2, we report the design of
two sample trials with associative and categorical primings respectively.
Figure 7.1: Trial presentation sequence in the entity recognition task (associative
priming). On each trial, a word was viewed, followed by a picture, and the
subjects were asked to indicate whether the entity depicted on the picture is a
familiar entity or not.
Participants were instructed to respond only to the target picture. The task
was to decide as fast as possible whether the entity depicted on the picture was
a familiar entity or not. They were told that although they were not to respond
to the name which preceded the picture, they were to pay attention to it as
“in some trials it may help you to make your familiarity decision”. Response
latency was taken as the delay between presentation of the stimulus target and
initiation of a response as measured by the Matlab program. The presentation
of the prime-target pairs was randomized by the computer separately for each
subject. Each subject saw 120 experimental trials: 60 positive and 60 negative.
136
Figure 7.2: Trial presentation sequence in the entity recognition task (categorical
priming). On each trial, a word was viewed, followed by a picture, and the
subjects were asked to indicate whether the entity depicted on the picture is a
familiar entity or not.
7.4.3 Results
The analysis was based on reaction times (RTs) of correct positive responses.
Before the actual analysis, RTs from trials on which errors occurred were ex-
cluded from the analysis. Moreover, latencies over 2.5 s, which is equivalent
to approximately 3 standard deviations from the mean (MRT = 1116 ms,
SDRT = 386 ms) were discarded, as were outliers exceeding the participant
mean by 2.5 standard deviations, for any particular condition.
Mean RTs for correct responses and accuracies are reported in Table 7.1.
Primes
Category Measure Associates Same-category Unrelated
Person Across RT (SE) 937 (25) 1017 (21) 1082 (32)
Person Within RT (SE) 919 (21) 1022 (33) 1045 (36)
Artwork RT (SE) 954 (35) 1055 (42) 1052 (30)
Building RT (SE) 998 (42) 1090 (46) 1098 (40)
Product RT (SE) 961 (23) 1107 (44) 1148 (44)
Person Across AC 0.95 0.98 0.90
Person Within AC 1 0.88 0.94
Artwork AC 1 0.91 0.94
Building AC 0.90 0.97 0.92
Product AC 0.97 0.95 0.85
Table 7.1: Mean Reaction Times (RT) in milliseconds (and Standard Errors
(SE)) and Accuracies (AC) for Conditions of the Entity Recognition Experiment
For each category we performed a one-way repeated-measures analysis of
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variance (ANOVA) calculated for mean RTs with prime type as a within-
subjects factor (factor levels: associated, same-category, unrelated).
The analysis for the category Person Across resulted in a significant main
effect, F(2, 34)= 11.39, p < 0.001 (see Figure 7.3 for a graphical representation
of mean response times for priming condition).
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Figure 7.3: Mean response times for the category Person Across by prime con-
dition.
Post hoc Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD) tests revealed signifi-
cant faster RTs for the associated condition (937 ms) than for the same-category
(1017 ms), (q = 4.02 , p < 0.05) and unrelated conditions (1082 ms), (q = 6.70 ,
p < 0.001). However, RTs in the same-category condition were not significantly
different from those in the unrelated condition,(q = 2.68 , p = 0.15).
The same analysis for the Person Within category resulted in a significant
main effect F(2, 34)= 9.03, p < 0.001 (see Figure 7.4). The post hoc Tukey
test revealed a significant difference between associated and same-category con-
ditions, indicating faster responses for the associated condition (919 ms) than
for the same-category condition (1022 ms) (q = 5.13 , p < 0.01). No signifi-
cant difference was found between the same-category (1022 ms) and unrelated
conditions (1045 ms) (q = 0.16 , p = 0.99).
A significant main effect (see figure 7.5) was also found for the category Art-
work, F (2, 34) = 3.93, p < 0.05. The post hoc analysis showed faster responses
for the associated condition (954 ms) than for the same-category condition (1055
ms), (q = 3.44 , p < 0.05). The comparison between the same-category (1055
ms) and the unrelated conditions ( 1052 ms) did no show significant difference
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Figure 7.4: Mean response times for the Person Within category by prime con-
dition.
(q = 1.09 , p = 0.72).
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Figure 7.5: Mean response times for the Artwork category by prime condition.
As shown in Figure 7.6, the main effect was not significant for the Building
category, F = 1.53, p = 0.22, even though it shows a very similar trend than
the other categories.
On the contrary, we found a significant main effect for the Product category
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Figure 7.6: Mean response times for the Building category by prime condition.
F (2, 34) = 5.63, p < 0.01. In Figure 7.7 the mean response times by prime
condition for the Product category are shown. The post hoc analysis revealed
the same pattern of results found for the other categories (with the exception of
the Building category). In particular, we found a significant difference between
associative and same-category conditions with responses that were faster in the
associative condition (961 ms) than in the same-category condition (1107 ms),
(q = 3.45 , p < 0.05), but no significant difference between same-category (1107
ms) and unrelated (1148 ms) conditions, (q = 1.09 , p = 0.72).
In order to test whether there are differences in semantic and associative
priming for faces and objects, we collapsed person and object classes to form
two general domains (i.e. Person and Object, respectively).
The comparison between the two general domains (face vs. object) was
motivated as follows. First of all, we did not find a significant difference in
the pattern of results obtained for the Across Person and the Within Person
conditions (see Figure 7.8). Therefore the two person categories were collapsed
to create a general Person category.
Second, we tested for differences between the three non-face categories (art-
work, building and product). Mean reaction times were submitted to two-way
ANOVA with category (artwork, building and product) and priming condition
(associate, same category or unrelated) as within-participant factors. The main
effect of priming condition was significant, F (2, 34) = 8.84, p < 0.001). Nei-
ther the main effect of category, F (2, 34) = 1.45, p = 0.24), nor the interaction
was significant, F (4, 68) = 0.69, p = 0.60). The interaction plot for the three
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Figure 7.7: Mean response time for the Product category by prime condition.
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Figure 7.8: Mean response times for the Person Across and Person Within
categories by prime condition.
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categories and the three priming conditions is shown in Figure 7.9.
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Figure 7.9: Mean response times for the three object categories by prime con-
dition.
Due to the lack of the main effect for category and interaction, the three
object categories were collapsed to obtain one individual mean RTs for the
object-domain.
As a consequence of the aggregation procedure, we were able to compare
semantic and categorical primings for faces and objects, by a two-way (2×3)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the mean reaction times, with the variables of
stimulus category (face vs. object) and priming condition (associate vs. same
category vs. unrelated). The analysis was conducted by subjects with both
variable (stimulus category and priming condition) as within subjects factors.
The main effect of stimulus category was significant, F (1, 17) = 7.81, p < 0.05.
A a post hoc one-tailed t-test showed that responses to faces were significantly
faster (1004 ms) than those to objects (1060 ms), (p < 0.05). The main effect
of priming condition was also significant, F (2, 34) = 22.92, p < 0.001. Post
hoc Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD) tests revealed that: a) for faces
the associate condition was significantly faster from both the same-category
(q = 5.58 , p < 0.01) and the unrelated condition (q = 7.24 , p < 0.001),
but the same-category condition did not differ significantly from the unrelated
condition (q = 1.76 , p = 0.47); b) for objects the same pattern of results
was found, that is the associate condition was significantly different from the
same-category, (q = 4.37 , p < 0.01) and the unrelated condition ,(q = 4.93 ,
p < 0.01), but the same-category condition did not differ significantly from the
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unrelated condition, (q = 0.60 , p = 0.90).
As shown in Figure 7.10, the stimulus category × priming condition was not
significant, F = 0.07, p = 0.93.
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Figure 7.10: Mean reaction times for face recognition and object recognition at
the three levels of priming condition
These results demonstrated that priming effects for faces were non signifi-
cantly different (i.e. faster) from priming effects for objects. In particular, we
found that for both categories, the associate condition was significantly different
from the other two priming conditions, which did not differ significantly from
each other.
7.5 Discussion
The entity recognition experiment produced a very clear and homogeneous pat-
tern of results. For all the categories of entities used in the experiment, with
the exception of the Building category, we found that entity familiarity deci-
sion times were reliably primed by the prior presentation of associates. On the
contrary, non-associates from the same semantic category did not produce fa-
cilitation effects on familiarity decisions. This means that the time to recognize
a familiar person, an artwork or a product was significantly and robustly facili-
tated by the prior presentation of the name of an associate entity, but was not
reliably facilitated by the name of an entity from the same category but not
associated.
Interestingly, the comparison between face and object categories did not
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reveal a significant difference between the two domains in the amount of fa-
cilitation in the three conditions of priming. The only difference between the
two domains was that the responses to faces were significantly faster that those
to objects in all the priming conditions, confirming the astonishing ability of
humans to recognize person identity from faces.
These results can be compared with those of Barry et al. [9]. The authors
conducted two experiments which examined whether there exist differences in
semantic and associative priming for faces and objects. Differently from our
experiment, object stimuli used in their experiments represented generic objects
(e.g. a table, a chair, a lion) which could not be recognized at the unique
level of identity, but only at the basic level (e.g. as members of a general
category). The authors found that faces were substantially primed by associates
but not by non-associates of the same category. In contrast, they found that
objects were primed reliably by both associates and categorically related non
associates. The results were interpreted as evidence for a different organization
of the semantic knowledge of objects and people. We argue that to draw the
conclusion that different processes underlie the organization and the access to
semantic representation of faces and objects, a comparison between faces and
objects at the same level of identity (i.e. as semantically unique entities) is
required. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that performed this
comparison in a priming experiment. Our results confirmed those of Barry et al.
for faces, showing that face familiarity decisions were significantly facilitated by
the prior presentation of associates from both the same and different category,
but not by non-associated stimuli from the same category. However, contrary to
Barry’s et al. results, we found that object familiarity decisions presented the
same priming effects than faces when the stimuli were recognized at the unique
level of identity. These findings challenge the conclusion by Barry’s et al. about
a different organization of semantic representations of objects and faces and
suggest a common mechanism to organize knowledge about individuals from
different categories, as we will discuss in the next section.
Another important result is about the Person category. In our study we
tested for differences between two different kinds of associative priming: prim-
ing across category (i.e. prime and target belonging to different categories) and
priming within category (i.e. prime and target belonging to the same category).
From our analysis we found that associated primes from different categories
were as good as associated primes from the same category to produce priming
facilitation. This result is important because previous studies which investi-
gated associative priming effects for faces used associated primes from the same
category (i.e. person), making difficult to isolate the associative effects from the
categorical effects. In our study, we found that the associative effects in the two
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conditions (within and across) were not distinguishable, producing evidence in
favor of a pure associative facilitation. Therefore, it is clear that priming of en-
tity familiarity decisions is associative but not reliably categorical and, at least
for the Person category, both associated entities within the category and asso-
ciated entities from different categories may facilitate the familiarity decision.
We note that in the Burton et al. model [38] of face recognition familiarity
decision are proposed to be made by activating PINs which are proposed to
be entry-level, threshold based recognition units that operate as amodal “gate-
ways” to person information. According to this view, PINs would be activated
by the recognition of names and voices as well as by FRUs. In this model a
word prime would activate its PIN and corresponding SIUs. As there are pro-
posed excitatory, bi-directional connections between PINs and SIUs, priming
is interpreted in the terms of feedback activation from SIUs to increase the
activation of PINs which are connected to the same SIUs. As we found prim-
ing effects from close associates but none from non-associated members of the
same occupational category, then it would appear that only activation from the
SIUs of associates fedbacks to the PINs. Therefore, these results raise some
questions about the nature of the elements of stored biographical knowledge
and in particular whether it is correct to propose that these are represented
by general categorical units (SIUs) such as “politician” or “actor” as proposed
by the Burton et al. model. Moreover, the model can not explain the priming
effects from associates belonging to different categories since SIUs are assumed
to code only person-specific knowledge. On the contrary, our results are more
compatible with a model in which singular representations of individuals from
different categories can be connected directly through associative links, so that
the activation of one of this singular concept spreads to all the associated sin-
gular concepts without the mediation of categorical units which are assumed to
organize the knowledge of singular conceptual representations.
In our experiment we did not find a reliable priming facilitation for the
Building category. Even though responses are globally faster for the condition
with associated primes than for the condition with same-category primes, the
difference did not reach the significance level, given the higher variability in
responses for this category. In order to investigate possible differences between
the stimuli used in the experiment and reveal possible sources of variability, we
performed a post hoc analysis by items (paired t-test), comparing the associative
and same-category conditions. We found a significant difference (p < 0.05) in
mean between the associative condition and the same-category condition for 7
of the 12 trials corresponding to the following associated pairs: Washington-
White House, Bin Laden-Twin Towers, London-Big Ben, Berlin-Brandeburg
Door, New York-Empire State Building, Paris-Louvre (see Table B.1 for the
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corresponding same-category and unrelated pairs). The analysis suggested that
associative priming effects can be observed for buildings, but that in some pairs
used in the experiment the associative link may be not sufficiently strong to
produce a priming effect. We noted that the strength of associate priming
depends (among other things) on the frequency of co-occurrence. Specifically,
the magnitude of priming would depend on the predictive value of the prime for
the target. The predictive value is low when the frequency of co-occurrence is
low but also when the co-occurrence is not specific (a prime co-occurs frequently
with other targets). In our experiment the associative link between a building
and its location or a person related to the building is less specific than other
associative links such as the relation between an artwork and its author or a
product with its brand. A place can be associated to many other things as
well as buildings and this can explain the weaker association for some of the
associated pairs tested in the experiment.
7.6 Implications for a Model of Entity Repre-
sentation
The results of this experiment can be used to develop a model of the functional
organization of semantic knowledge about individual entities which has at its
core the notion of singular concept. More precisely, the model aims to explain
how our semantic representations of individual entities, i.e. singular concepts,
are inter-linked with those of other individual entities.
As described in section 7.2, there are two different ways in which individual
entities can be related in memory. One is based on vertical relationships which
connect individual instances to categories, the other is mediated by the horizon-
tal relationships between individual instances within or across categories. We
name “categorical” the relationships of the first type, “associative” the relation-
ships of the second type (see Figure 7.11).
In the first case, abstracted superordinate categories are used to create a
connection between individual items which belong to the same category. Two
instances of the same category are connected to the representation of the cat-
egory which they belong to and the category creates an indirect link between
the two instances.
This means that once an instance of a category is presented and recognized,
activation spreads to the other instances of the same category. If semantic
representations of individual entities are inter-linked by categorical structures,
we should register priming effects when prime and target entities has no other
connection than the category membership.
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Figure 7.11: Associative and Categorical links between singular concepts
The second way by which semantic representations of individual entities
can be structured and connected in memory is by means of direct associative
links. These links are not mediated by shared category memberships but reflect
meaningful co-occurrence relationships between singular representations of en-
tities which non necessarily belong to the same category. Category membership
can be part of the information shared by associated singular concepts but is not
the semantic connection that interlinks them.
If associative links structure the representations of individual entities in
memory, this means that once an entity is presented and recognized, activa-
tion spreads from the singular concept of the entity to its associated singular
concepts. In terms of priming, we should obtain a priming effect when prime and
target entities are associatively related even when they do not share category
membership.
The priming effects obtained in the present experiment are more consistent
with this second organization mechanism. Once an individual which can be
recognized at the level of unique identity, such as a famous person, artwork,
building or product, is presented and recognized, activation spreads to other
individuals associatively connected to it, which produces the associative priming
effects. The results of the experiment show clearly that there was no reliable
categorical priming of individuals, in the sense that there was no significant
benefit from primes corresponding to the proper names of members of the same
category (e.g. another person from the same occupational category or another
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painting) but not associated. Since we found that associative links between
prime and target from different categories produced facilitation effects and for
the category person we found similar priming effects when associated pairs were
from the same or from different categories, it appears that activation within
the semantic system spreads to the representations of associates by connecting
paths other than those provided by general concepts.
These findings can be interpreted within a model that proposes that seman-
tic representations of individuals (i.e. singular concepts) are inter-connected
by networks of horizontal associative links rather than by vertical categorical
relations. The singular concept of “Mona Lisa” is connected to the singular
concept of “Leonardo da Vinci” by an associative link. Note that this link is
associative not because the two entities are simply connected by the binary
property “is created by” or the inverse property “is the creator of”. We argue
that the information that connects the artwork with its author is part of the
semantic information stored within the singular concept, as it is the information
about the category membership. What it makes the binary property an asso-
ciative link which organizes the connections between individual entities is the
co-occurrence of the two entities in different contexts. Of course in this case the
co-occurrence is due to the meaningful relationship between the artwork and
its author, but the simple relationship is not enough to create an associative
link. The associative link is created by experiential and episodic factors which
reinforce the binary link. In this way, the activation of the Leonardo’s singular
concept spreads to the singular concept of Mona Lisa, through the preferen-
tial route represented by the associative connection, producing a facilitation in
recognizing the entity and retrieving information about that entity. On the
contrary, the singular concept of “Mona Lisa” and that of “The Sunflowers”
share the same category membership (i.e. both are paintings) but this shared
membership does not inter-connect the two representations.
We do not deny that people use higher level categories to organize their
knowledge about individuals. We can use category membership to connect
“Mona Lisa” and “The Sunflowers” if we are required to list famous paint-
ings, but this is not the main mechanism that structures our knowledge about
individuals in memory. We propose that representations of known individuals
are connected to each other individually by links representing specific associa-
tive relatedness. Contrary to the Barry et al.’s [9] model for face processing, we
argue that horizontal links can be establish non only within the person cate-
gory as a consequence of “social” and “interpersonal” relationships (e.g. who is
married to whom or who works with whom), but also between individuals from
different categories which are connected by binary relationships reinforced by
co-occurrence.
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To conclude, we propose that singular concepts are organized within a net-
work of horizontal associative links rather than being connected by vertical links
with shared higher-level conceptual representations and this organization mech-
anism is not peculiar of singular concepts about people but it is the common
way to connect singular concepts of individuals from different categories.
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Chapter 8
Identification Relevance in
Entity Representation
When we have introduced the notion of singular concept we have claimed that
singular concepts can be represented as organized structures of semantic features
(or attributes) which store our knowledge about the individuals they are about.
But how is this information organized within a concept?
Many of the most influential theories of concepts and categorization used
semantic features as their representational currency. For example, classical,
prototype and exemplar theories of categorization all are based on featural rep-
resentation [199, 159, 226], as are network models of semantic memory [49],
connectionist models of semantics [183], vector models of memory [166] and
similarity [249].
Many of these models do not assume that features may have graded relevance
within a representation, but rather they assume the presence or absence of a
feature (see for example [249]).
On the contrary, our assumption is that semantic features are of different
importance in concept representation. Since the main function of a singular
concept is the identity function - i.e. the function of providing the access to
stored information that can be used to decide if an encountered entity corre-
sponds to an entity previously encountered and stored in memory - it is quite
natural to assume that the most important features in a singular concept are
those which absolve better this function. This means that there are attributes
that are more relevant than others to identify the unique individuals they rep-
resent. Intuitively, for example, the “name” of a person is more relevant to
identify a person than her “occupation”, as well as her “eyes color” is more
relevant than her “hair color”. One reason which can explain these differences
151
is that, for example, a person may change her occupation or hair color, but she
unlikely may change her name or eye color.
We can consider the identification relevance of a feature as a measure of the
contribution of the feature to the “identification core” of a singular concept. The
“identification core” of a singular concept is thought to include those semantic
features that enable to identify the referent of the concept (and to discriminate
it from other similar referents).
Our notion of identification relevance is a variation of the notion of semantic
relevance introduced by Sartori and Lombardi [207] to capture the importance
of a given semantic feature in the distinction of one (general) concept from other
similar ones. For example, the concept elephant may be more easily identified
from the feature “has a trunk” than from the feature “has four legs”.
In this chapter we describe two studies which aimed to investigate the iden-
tification relevance of singular concepts belonging to five general types (i.e.
person, organization, event, artifact and location).
The first study used a revised feature listing task paradigm to collect feature
norms for singular concepts of entities from the five types reported above.
The second study used a more specific task, i.e. entity searching task, to
explore which kinds of attributes people use to identify entities when they search
information about them.
8.1 Semantic Feature Norms Production for In-
dividual Entities
Many cognitive theories assume that semantic features are the building blocks
of semantic representation (see for example [199, 159, 226, 49, 183, 166, 249]).
Moreover, the attribute-value pair representation is the most often used knowl-
edge representation scheme in information systems.
Given the importance of semantic features in shaping theories and repre-
senting knowledge, researchers have recently recognized the value of collecting
empirically based semantic feature norms to construct conceptual representa-
tions that can be used for testing hypotheses, constructing experimental stimuli,
and generating representations for implemented models [157].
These features norms have been used, for example, to derive measure of rele-
vance for general concepts. Sartori and Lombardi [207] suggested that subjects’
verbal descriptions may be used to derive the relevant features of a concept.
Going back to the previous example, the idea is that “has a trunk” is a se-
mantic feature of high relevance for the concept elephant because most subjects
use it to define elephant, whereas very few use the same feature to define other
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concepts. “Has 4 legs”, on the other hand, is a semantic feature with lower
relevance for the same concept because few subjects use it in the definition of
elephant while using it in defining many other concepts.
In the same vein, we assume that people have conscious intuitions about the
most important features for identifying individual entities and therefore they
may be asked to derive, by description, relevant features for singular concepts.
The major goal of this study is to construct empirically derived entity rep-
resentations in order to capture the features people consider most important
to uniquely describe and identify individual entities, belonging to a few set of
entity types. To this purpose we conducted a first study using a feature-listing
task paradigm.
We argue that these data provide valid information about the cognitive rep-
resentation of individual entities, not because they yield a literal record of se-
mantic representations of entities, but rather because such representations are
used systematically by participants when they have to generate entity descrip-
tions. The basic premise of the method used is that participant’s conscious
intuitions about the features relevant in singular concept representation actu-
ally map onto some underlying mental representation of the cognitive processing
of singular concepts.
A participant’s list of attributes is assumed to represent a sort of tempo-
rary abstraction that contains the main attributes relevant for the identification
(see for example [12] for a discussion about the dynamic realizations of con-
cepts depending on context). These “online” representations are built in many
entity-centric tasks (e.g., searching for information about entities). Therefore,
the study has a second “technological” motivation. We argue that the basic
information collected thorough this study can be relevant for the development
of systems that manage information about entities (i.e., databases, ontologies,
knowledge bases), as well for the development of entity-based methods for spe-
cific applications such as those required by an Entity Name System (see 5.3).
This second motivation explains certain methodological choices which we fol-
lowed in the study, such as the selection of the general categories of entities to
be investigated which represented the first step of the research.
8.1.1 Method
Experimental Task
In a typical feature-listing task, participants are presented with a set of category
names and are asked to produce the attributes they think are important for each
category. Since we were interested to collect norms for singular concepts, we
needed to adapt the classical paradigm to our purposes. We considered two
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different approaches that could be followed in our study.
The first is to define a small set of individuals from different categories, such
as famous people, monuments or towns, and ask participants to produce the
attributes they believe are important to identify those specific individuals. For
example, we can present a picture or a written word of “Rome” (or both) and ask
participants to list the features they think relevant for identifying it. A similar
approach has been used by Gainotti et al. [75] in an experiment which aimed
to evaluate whether subjective evaluations given by normal subjects confirm
the different weight that various sources of knowledge have in representation
of different biological and artifact categories and of unique entities. However
in the experiment, the authors were interested to evaluate the influence of a
limited and predefined set of sources of knowledge, such as perceptual knowl-
edge (e.g. visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and taste perceptions), motor and
language-mediated encyclopedic information, but they did not investigate spe-
cific features. A limit of this approach to collect feature norms is that providing
a small set of individuals for each category of entities under investigation may in-
troduce a bias in generating features that can be tailored for the specific entities
presented.
An alternative approach consists in inducing subjects to produce lists of
attributes they think not generically important for a general category (e.g. per-
son) but relevant to identify uniquely members of the category. According to
this approach, people may be asked, for example to list the attributes they be-
lieve relevant to identify a specific individual which belongs to a given category
(e.g. a specific person) without providing any specific exemplar. The advantage
of this approach is that the descriptions produced by participants are not in-
fluenced by the selection of a predefined set of unique individuals and therefore
should be more useful to identify a small set of features which are generally
considered relevant for identifying the majority of the unique individuals of the
category. In this study we adopted the latter approach.
It is worth to remark another important difference between a typical feature
listing task and the task that we used in this study. In our version of the task we
described a feature (or attribute) according to an attribute-value system. Each
feature in an attribute-value system may possess a range of values. For example
the attribute “color” may have different values, such as “red”, “blue”, “green”
and so on. The features collected in a feature listing task are not attribute-value
features but they simply are features which are present or absent. To make clear
the distinction, people may use the feature “is used to cat” to describe a knife
in a feature listing task. “Is used to cut” is a feature which contains its value
and something may have this property (if is used to cut) or may have not the
property (if it is not used to cut). On the contrary, the attribute “use” or
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“function” is an attribute-value feature because it may have different values
such as “is used to cut”, “is used to clean”, “is used to dry” and so on.
The typical feature listing task would require to present participants with a
specific individual (e.g. Barack Obama) and ask them to produce features that
are possessed by that specific individual (e.g. “is the USA President”).
Since different individuals may have different values for the same attribute
and the typical paradigm would produce a different feature for each value (e.g.
“lives in Italy”, “lives in Germany” and so on), we decided to force participants
to list directly attribute types (e.g. Country). This approach was more conve-
nient for the final analysis because we wanted to analyze patterns of attribute
types and not specific attributes values for specific individuals.
Selection of Top Level Categories of Entities: an empirical motivation
Defined the experimental task, the following step was to select an appropriate
set of high-level categories for the experiment. Since one of the motivations of
the study was to provide useful insights for the development of technological
applications which manage knowledge about individual entities, we selected a
small set of categories looking at the representation needs of a real application,
i.e. the ENS described in 5.3.
The definition of “entity” in the Ens is purposely given in a very broad fash-
ion, and covers all kinds of individual things from “anything that an information
system talks about” to “an individual in an ontology” or “the interpretation of a
variable in a first-order theory”. The reason for this very un-precise approach is
the simple fact that – even though the creators of the idea have a sort of wishful
thinking regarding the types of objects that should be covered – in reality it
will be impossible to predict what finally enters into the system once it opens
to the public.
The consequence is that in order to describe such entities in the Ens, it was
decided to not impose or enforce a certain schema to be used for the description
of different types of entities, as well as strong typing of entities is not pursued
or enforced.
However, such genericity obviously has its downsides: the Ens can never
know what type of entity it is dealing with, and how the entity is described, due
to an absence of a formal model. This becomes very relevant when searching
for an entity, a process called entity matching. The envisioned use of the Ens is
that an agent (human or artificial) has a certain entity in mind and provides a
description of this entity, which is then used for finding and re-using the entity
identifier, similar to the use of a traditional search engine to find the desired
target of an HTML hyperlink. However, the absence of information about the
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type of the entity and its corresponding descriptions make difficult the use of
specialized algorithms for entity marching.
To resolve this conflict between generality and precision, a possible solution
would be to foster the convergence of entity descriptions on a small set of default
types, and attributes for these types, by providing suggestions : when a new
entity is to be created in the Ens, an agent has the possibility to select a
default type and description, and “fill in the blanks”, or otherwise to provide
any other kind of description. With this approach a useful clustering of entities
could be achieved in the Ens, allowing the application of specialized matching
algorithms.
Which is an appropriate collection of top-level categories which we can sug-
gest to users for a “weak” or “light-weight” classification for the entities they
create? This question provided the framework to define the categories of our
study.
We identified four main requirements for this collection:
Usefulness. The set of top-level categories needs to be useful for a “normal”
user, in that the concepts cannot be too abstract or too specific.
Disjointness. The categories need to be selected in a way that makes it easy
to decide whether an entity belongs in one or the other, optimally through
disjointness of the categories.
Conciseness. The number of categories should stay within easily manageable
bounds, optimally below the “magic” number of 7 items [161], so that
a user can decide at a single glance without further investigation which
category should be chosen.
Coverage. The set of categories should be made in a way that all the entities
that we envision to enter into the “population” of the Ens can be assigned
to one of the categories.
In order to achieve these goals, we adopted a top-down approach: we ana-
lyzed the main top-level ontologies available in literature (Wordnet [78], Dolce
[175, 149], Sumo [170] and Cyc [150]), to integrate important ontological distinc-
tions from those ontologies. Even though the lack of correspondence between
ontologies in their top-level division is well known representing one of the main
obstacle to the integration of different ontologies, some important similarities
can be identified (for a discussion in the context of ontology design see for ex-
ample [173]). Starting from these similarities we tried to defined a set of few
categories in accordance with our requirements.
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At the end of our analysis we identified the following six top-level categories1:
• Person
• Organization
• Event
• Artifact
• Location
• Other
We point out that the last category (Other) is a miscellaneous category that
contains all entities that are not classifiable in one of the other categories and
formally can be thought of as the complement of the union of the first five
categories. Of course we did not include this category in our study.
Another aspect that should to be mentioned is the level of abstraction of
our categories. Our choice was guided by two constraints. The first is related
to the cognitive reliability of the categories. It is well-known that categories are
organized into a hierarchy from the most general to the most specific, but the
level that is cognitively most basic is in the middle of the hierarchy [198]. Many
studies (see for example [160]) have shown that there is a preferential level of
abstraction (named “basic level”) for object identification and description. At
this level the categories are more differentiated and more attributes are reported
to describe the members of the categories. This aspect is particularly relevant
for our research since the experimental paradigm that we adopted asked people
to identify different types of entities in terms of their relevant attributes. For
this reason we needed to find a balance between too general or too specific
categories.
The second constraint is more connected to the assumed use of the final
system. Even though we do not know in advance the kinds of entities that will
be entered in the system we can hypothesize that certain types of entities are
more likely to populate the system than others.
These constraints explain for example the choice about the first category,
Person. Although a more general category, such as Being, would allow us a
better ontological coverage, including for example animals, it is not very proba-
ble that this latter type of entities would populate the system in large numbers.
Moreover the level of abstraction of the Being category is quite far from the
basic level making more difficult the task of listing attributes.
1We use small caps notation for the list because we want to denote the category itself, and
not a natural-language label for the category. We could have chosen to use single characters
as for variables, but decided to use this kind of notation of easier readability.
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We also note that our categories have a good overlap with the main classes
of names studied in the context of Named Entity Recognition (NER). Person,
Organization, Location and Temporal Expressions are the most studied entity
named types in the context of the NER task (see for example [94]) and recently
there is a trend to include other entity types such as Product, Brand and Object
[21] that correspond quite well to our Artifact category.
As evident from the list, we limited our analysis to a subclass of entities
that we can describe as “physical” entities (things that have a position in space
and/or time), missing out “abstract” entities (things that do not have spatial
nor temporal qualities, and that are not qualities themselves). The distinction
between physical and abstract entities is one of the most ubiquitous top-level
division. It is at the base of the SUMO ontology (physical entity vs. abstract
entity), the DOLCE ontology (endurant, perdurant particular vs. quality and
abstract particular) and the CYC ontology (Intangible thing vs. Individual
thing). The notion of abstraction is also present in WordNet, but has a different
ontological coverage, not referring to state, psychological feature, action and
phenomenon.
Following the distinction proposed by the CYC Ontology, we can distinguish
between temporal entities and spatial entities, which justifies two of our top
categories: Event and Location. An Event is a thing that occupies a point
(or period) in time, whereas a Location is a thing that occupies a space. Both
can have spatial and temporal parts, but the ontological nature is determined
only by the essential parts that are temporal for events and spatial for locations.
Another important ontological assumption that we followed to build our
list of top-level categories is related to the behavior of the entity in time. This
distinction is connected to the difference between what philosophers usually call
“continuants” and “occurrents”, or using the terminology adopted in the Dolce
framework between “endurants” and “perdurants”. The main idea is that there
are entities (endurants) that are wholly present (all their parts are present) at
any time at which they exist and other entities (perdurants) that extend in time
and are only partially present for any time at which they exist because some
of their temporal parts may be not present. This motivated us to distinguish
between entities that are in time like for example Person or Artifact and
entities that happen in time like Event, keeping another distinction that we can
find both in the Sumo ontology (object vs process) and in the Dolce ontology
(perdurant vs endurant).
A further ontological distinction we made within our basic categories is re-
lated to “agentivity”. This property refers to the attribution of intentions,
desires and believes and the ability to act on those intentions, desires and be-
lieves. On the basis of this assumption we can distinguish physical entities that
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are agentive such as Person (or groups of several agents operating together
like Organization), and entities that are not-agentive such as Artifact.
Another difference that is taken into account is that between “Individual”
entities and “Collection”. This ontological constrain is evident both in Sumo
and CYC, and is used to explain the notion of collective entities such as Or-
ganization, whose members can be added and subtracted without thereby
changing the identity of the collective.
Similarly, WordNet distinguishes Entity (defined as something having con-
crete existence, living or non-living) and Group (which is any number of entities
considered as a unit).
After making explicit the representation of the so-called ontological com-
mitments (abstract vs physical, temporal vs spatial, endurant vs perdurant,
agentive vs non-agentive, individual vs collective), we can provide definitions of
each of our top-level categories (for a graphical representation see figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Top-level categories and Ontological Commitments
• Person: a physical entity, endowed with temporal parts that can change
as a unit (endurant) and able to express desires, intentions and believes
(agent).
• Organization : a physical collective entity, whose members are intelligent
agents. In terms of behavior in time, an organization changes in time as a
whole object so we can define it an endurant. As a collection of agents that
operate together, an organization can be considered an agentive entity,
characterized from desires, intentions and believes.
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• Event : a physical individual entity that happens in time, perdurant.
• Artifact : a physical entity intentionally created by an agent (or a group of
agents working together) to serve some purpose or perform some function.
An artifact is a non-agentive endurant.
• Location: a physical individual entity that has a spatial extent, endurant.
• Other : any entity that cannot be categorized in any of the above cate-
gories.
Tasks
Since our top level categories were at a high level of abstraction, we decided to
introduce also a certain number of subcategories for each of them in addition
to the top level category (named “neutral category”), reported in the section
8.1.1. This approach allowed us to investigate potential differences inside to the
top level categories in terms of attributes reported, identifying (in addition of
attributes common to all different subcategories) also possible specific attributes
for specific subcategories.
Note that a similar approach has been recently proposed in Named Entity
Recognition. In this context an increasing effort has been devoted to develop
methods for automatically classifying entities into more fine-grained categoriza-
tions (see for example [68, 67]), exploiting differences in textual context rather
than in attribute types.
In order to identify a small set of highly typical subcategories for each top
level category, we performed a pretest asking eight people to list the most repre-
sentative subcategories for each top level category. The categories were chosen
on the basis of the frequency distribution of the answers, selecting the five most
frequent subcategories for each category. We note that the idea was to define
a subset of representative subcategories but our approach can be extended to
other subcategories suggested by specific contexts.
For each top level category we developed 6 different scenarios one for each
subcategory including the neutral category. We remark that for each top level
category one scenario corresponded to the neutral category itself. This condition
provided a way to compare the attributes common to all the subcategories of
the same top level category with those reported for the top level category itself.
By means of these scenarios we asked participants to imagine a specific entity
from a given category (e.g. person) or subcategory (e.g. politician) and produce
a list of all attributes relevant for uniquely identify that entity with the aim to
obtain a unique profile of the entity. There was no restriction in the number
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of attributes that could be reported. In table 8.1 we report the five lists of
subcategories used in the experiment.
Scenario Person Organization Event Artifact Location
1 politician company conference product tourist location
2 manager association meeting artwork city
3 professor university exhibition building shop
4 sports person government show book hotel
5 actor agency sport event article of clothing restaurant
6 person organization event object location
Table 8.1: Categories and Subcategories used in the experiment.
Implementation
Each participant was randomly assigned to a combination of 5 scenarios, i.e.
one scenario for each top level category. This was required to eliminate possi-
ble interference between different scenarios within the same top level category.
To guarantee a balanced distribution of subjects to the different scenarios, we
adopted a cyclic algorithm2. Through the first cycle the algorithm selected
randomly one scenario from each of the 5 lists and assigned the combination
of scenarios to the first subject. In the second cycle the algorithm selected
the scenarios immediately subsequent (in order) to those assigned in the previ-
ous step. When all items of one list were assigned, the algorithm began again
from the completed list. The order of the scenarios were randomized between
participants.
The experiment was conducted in two different versions: English (eng),
Italian (it) and was provided through the WWW. The subjects were invited
(through email 3) to participate in our online study. Once at this site, partic-
ipants had to select the preferred language and were randomly assigned to an
experimental condition, as described before; they then proceeded with 5 steps
throughout the experiment: presentation, introduction, example, task and per-
sonal details.
Before starting the real task, participants were asked to read carefully the
instructions which explained key terms used in the scenarios (for example the
difference between “attributes” and “values” and the notion of “profile”). After
that, a concrete example of the task was displayed. The domain of this exam-
ple was deliberately chosen to be unrelated, to avoid that attributes reported
as examples could interfere with the subsequent answers produced by subjects.
2The use of this procedure was necessary, because we could not counterbalance perfectly
the assignment of participants to the different conditions given the online modality of the
experiment.
3To spread the participation request we submitted our post to mailing lists such as DB-
World or SIG-IRList
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For the real task, the five scenarios were presented in succession (the order was
randomized between subjects). Finally, a personal detail page was presented.
The aim was collecting information about provenance, age, gender, internet ex-
perience and semantic web experience of participants to use for further analysis.
This part of the experiment was optional and could be skipped.
As incentive to participation we arranged a lottery to assign a prize4 among
the participants who completed the task. Subjects were free to decide whether
to participate in the lottery or not. In case of participation, they were asked to
submit their email address, but the anonymity of the experiment was guaranteed
by making sure that this information was not aggregated with the experimental
data5.
Subjects
We collected data from 353 participants (159 for the English version, 194 for the
Italian version), 181 of these were male, 102 female, 70 did not report gender
information.
The average age of participants was 31.06 years (SD=10.3),6. In table 8.2
we report the distribution of the number of subjects that specified their na-
tive country (262 out of 358), whereas in figure 8.2 we show the distribution in
terms of Internet and Semantic Web experience, reported by 280 participants.
From these self-evaluations it stands out that all subjects stated to have some
knowledge in internet use and the majority of them reported “good” (117) or
“expert”(134) knowledge. Differently, one-third of participants (102) reported
none (54) or little knowledge (48) in the area of Semantic Web. Only 31 sub-
jects defined themselves as experts in this area but a good part of participants
reported “good” (85) or “average” (65) experience.
Country N Country N
Italy 141 United Kingdom 5
Brazil 19 Netherlands 3
USA 14 Canada 3
Germany 14 Spain 3
India 11 Jordan 2
Pakistan 9 Malaysia 2
China 8 Mexico 2
Greece 6 Australia 2
Ireland 5 Switzerland 2
Others 21 Ntot 262
Table 8.2: Geographical provenance of participants.
4We gave away a medium-priced MP3 player.
5Every participant was represented in our database by a numerical id, with the intent of
tracing the combination of scenarios, the corresponding answers and the anonymous personal
details. The email address was stored disconnected from these records.
6considering only 285 subjects that actually provided age information
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Figure 8.2: Self-evaluation of the participants regarding Internet and Semantic
Web Experience
8.1.2 Results
Normalization
As mentioned in the general description of the experiment, the peculiarity and
the linguistic nature of the task made predictable a certain degree of variability
in our data. To deal with this variability we normalized the data in three
different steps: structural, morphological and semantic.
The first normalization step (structural) was performed mainly to report
all answers in the form of lists of attributes. Indeed, although the instructions
specified to insert one attribute per line in the specific form, some subjects
disregarded this recommendation, using other break symbols (such as “,” “;”
“and” etc.) to separate the entries. Consequently, we had to implement a semi-
automatic procedure to convert all the entries of our database in a standard
form, splitting attributes so that the line number corresponded to the order of
listing. This information will be extremely important for the future analysis on
ranking. Moreover, in this first step, we checked the data to remove all typing
errors.
The second normalization step (morphological) was finalized to report the
attributes in a unique morphological form. For this purpose we removed articles,
normalized the use of prepositions and the singular-plural inflections, we fixed
the order for composed attributes (attributes which consists of two or more
words).
Finally, the last normalization step (semantic), was conducted to aggregate
attributes characterized by semantic overlaps (such as synonym expressions).
In table 8.3 we report some examples of this preliminary phase. The number in
brackets in the third column corresponds to the normalization step.
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Attributes Normalized form Type of Normalization
name, address name splitting (1)
address
surename surname typing error (1)
the name name article erasing (2)
date of birth birth date order (2)
near cities neighbouring cities semantic overlap (3)
zip code post code semantic overlap (3)
Table 8.3: Normalization examples. 1=structural normalization; 2= morpho-
logical normalization; 3=semantic normalization
Measures and Results
For each category and subcategory, each feature was recorded with its produc-
tion frequency, which is the number of participants who listed that feature for
that concept. As we have seen discussing the semantic normalization proce-
dure, a major issue in analyzing the features was to ensure that synonymous
features were recorded identically, both within and among concepts. For exam-
ple “occupation” and “profession” were considered synonyms. It was equally
critical to ensure that features that differed in meaning were given distinct la-
bels. To avoid potential ambiguity, responses were interpreted conservatively7
and because of possible differences in meaning due to the language we started
to analyze separately the data from the two linguistic versions of the experi-
ment (Italian and English). The complete lists of features for the categories
and the subcategories investigated in the study are reported in Appendix C.1.
We describe the organization of the results for the category Person as example.
In table 8.1.2 we present the features listed by the participants for the cate-
gory Person, for the Italian and English versions of the experiment, respectively.
For each attribute we reported the absolute (F) and relative (f) frequencies 8.
Given the variety of the features reported by the participants (i.e. we obtained
a long tail of unique features) we used a cutoff to include features, that is we
considered only the features listed by at least 15% of the participants in each
condition.
Since we found a good mapping between the attributes in the two language
conditions we also performed an analysis on the aggregated data. In table 8.1.2
we report the results of the analysis on the aggregated data for the category
Person. The results for the other categories are presented in Appendix C.1
7This means that we did not merge the features unless the overlapping was clear. For
example, we decided to maintain separate the attribute “restaurant type” from the attribute
“type of cuisine” even though it is plausible that a common way to classify restaurants is based
on the type of cuisine. However, since other forms of classification underlying the general term
“type” can not be excluded, we preferred to be as conservative as possible in the third phase
of the normalization process.
8The relative frequency is the absolute frequency divided by N that is the number of
subjects
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Category Attributes (it) F f Attributes (eng) F f
Politician age 17 0.56 party 24 0.76
name 14 0.46 name 19 0.63
political view 14 0.46 age 13 0.43
party 13 0.43 country 10 0.33
surname 11 0.43 gender 10 0.26
type 11 0.36 role 8 0.26
role 10 0.36 nationality 6 0.20
education 9 0.30 surname 6 0.20
experiences 7 0.23
curriculum 5 0.16
N=30 N=30
Manager name 13 0.46 name 0.71 16
surname 11 0.39 age 0.28 7
company 8 0.28 department 0.23 5
age 7 0.25 experience 0.20 5
role 7 0.21
type 6 0.21
education 6 0.21
N=28 N=21
Professor name 13 0.52 name 0.87 21
specialization 16 0.64 university 0.41 10
age 9 0.36 department 0.33 8
surname 8 0.32 education 0.29 7
educational institution 6 0.24 publication 0.29 7
publications 5 0.20 age 0.20 5
type 5 0.20 email 0.20 5
research area 0.20 5
surname 0.20 5
N=25 N=24
Sportsperson type of sport 20 0.66 name 0.63 19
age 14 0.46 type of sport 0.5 18
name 14 0.46 age 0.33 10
surname 9 0.23 gender 0.26 9
type 7 0.23 birth-date 0.23 7
birth date 6 0.20 nationality 0.16 5
level 6 0.20 team 0.16 5
N=30 N=26
Actor/actress age 16 0.51 name 0.88 16
type 16 0.51 birth date 0.38 7
name 15 0.48 movies 0.38 7
experiences 14 0.45 gender 0.33 6
nationality 11 0.35 country 0.27 5
surname 10 0.32 age 0.22 4
movies 10 0.32
birth date 7 0.22
N=31 N=18
Person name 20 0.74 name 0.73 19
neutral category surname 17 0.62 gender 0.46 14
birth-date 10 0.37 birth date 0.42 11
age 10 0.37 age 0.38 10
birth-place 8 0.37 education 0.23 6
tax code 8 0.29 height 0.23 6
occupation 7 0.29 nationality 0.23 6
height 7 0.25 occupation 0.23 6
place of residence 7 0.25 surname 0.23 6
type 7 0.25 birth-place 0.19 5
character 6 0.22 email 0.19 5
weight 6 0.22 marital status 0.15 4
eye color 5 0.18
nationality 5 0.18
N=27 N=26
Table 8.4: Features and production frequencies for the category Person
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Category Attributes (all) F f
Politician party 37 0.61
name 33 0.55
age 30 0.50
role 23 0.38
experiences - career 19 0.31
political view 17 0.28
surname 17 0.28
education 13 0.21
country 11 0.18
type 11 0.18
gender 10 0.16
N=60
Manager name 29 0.59
age 14 0.28
role 12 0.24
company 11 0.22
experiences 10 0.20
education 9 0.18
competence 9 0.18
N=49
Professor name 34 0.69
specialization 20 0.40
age 14 0.28
surname 13 0.26
publications 12 0.24
university/ies 11 0.22
department 10 0.20
N=49
Sportsperson type of sport - specialty 38 0.63
name 33 0.55
age 24 0.40
birth date 13 0.21
gender 9 0.15
surname 9 0.15
N=60
Actor/actress name 31 0.63
age 20 0.40
type 18 0.36
movies 17 0.34
birth date 14 0.28
experiences 14 0.28
nationality 13 0.26
education 8 0.16
N=49
Person name 39 0.73
neutral category surname 23 0.43
birth date 21 0.39
age 20 0.37
birth place 15 0.28
gender 14 0.26
occupation 14 0.26
height 13 0.24
nationality 11 0.20
eyes color 8 0.15
N=53
Table 8.5: Features and production frequencies for category Person: aggregated
data (i.e. English and Italian).
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To summarize the results it appears that a person is more likely identified
by means of features about personal data (e.g. name, surname, birth date,
birth place, age), followed by features about occupation and education (e.g
affiliation, specialization, competence, education, experiences) and finally by
means of physical attributes (e.g. height, weight, eyes color). Dispositional
attributes are less frequently reported by the participants.
An organization is most likely identified by means of its name, followed by
features about the location (e.g. address, country), the kind of activity and
objectives of the organization (e.g. business type, sector) and finally by aspects
concerning its dimensions and internal structure (e.g. number of members or
employees, turnover, faculties).
About events participants reported attributes concerning the location of the
event and its temporal coordinates (e.g. date, time, duration), the topic and
the tile of it and finally they listed attributes about people involved in the event
(e.g. participants, organizers, protagonists).
The features reported for the artifact category were more diversified. From
the lists it comes out the predominance of perceptual features, such as color,
material, shape and attributes about the dimensions of the artifact (e.g. size and
weight). Others features for this category concerns the creator of the artifact
(e.g. author, manufacturer, architect, artist). Finally artifact are identified by
means of function or use.
A location is more likely identified by its geographical position or in relation
to other locations. For example a city is identified by the country, an hotel, a
restaurant or a shop by the city or the address. Other features can be used to
specify qualitative aspects of the location (e.g. attractions, services, range of
prices, number of stars) or quantitative aspects (dimensions, population, number
of rooms).
Measuring the Identification Relevance of Features
When we have introduced the motivations of this study we claimed that one
goal was to provide useful results and measures for the development of systems
which manage information about entities. Therefore, a second analysis of the
data was performed with the aim to show a possible application of the results
to a concrete representational issue in the context of the Entity Name System
(ENS) described in 5.3.
As we have already mentioned, the ENS faces two problems: first, the system
cannot assume to know what kind of entity it is dealing with (e.g. the entity of
the user’s request), and second, it cannot rely on homogeneous descriptions of
entities (i.e. even if the type of the entity is knew, it can not be assumed that
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two entities of the same type are described using the same schema).
To resolve these problems a possible solution could be to foster the conver-
gence of entity descriptions on a small set of default types, and attributes for
these types, by providing suggestions: when a new entity is to be created in the
ENS, an agent has the possibility to select a default type and description, and
“fill in the blanks”, or otherwise to provide any other kind of description. With
this approach the system can achieve useful clustering of entities, which put the
system in a better position for entity matching, because at least in some cases it
can understand better what kind of entity is described, and how it is described,
which allows for a far better development and selection of specialized matching
algorithms.
We argue that the data collected in our study can be used to establish the
mentioned suggestions for entity types and their descriptions. Instead of simply
accepting (or inventing out of mind) a certain schema, we propose to use a
bottom-up approach of schema creation which exploit the results collected from
a large sample of participants.
The data analysis was conducted having in mind two different issues: the
first deals with the intent to provide a small set of default entity types suggesting
a possible description through attributes, the second pertains the possibility of
exploiting the information enclosed in the description provided by users to im-
prove the efficacy of the entity matching algorithms. To such issues correspond
two different questions: firstly, which is the information most frequently spec-
ified by subjects when they provide descriptions of entity types investigated?
Secondly, which is the information more relevant to identify specific types of
entities (distinguishing one type from others)?
To this purpose we adopted two measures: a measure of attribute dominance
and a measure of attribute relevance. These measures can be considered a
variation of those proposed by Sartori e Lombardi [207, 208, 209] in their model
of Semantic Relevance for general concepts.
Dominance The problem of suggesting descriptions for types of entity at a
high level of abstraction (corresponding to our top level categories) can be faced
in two different ways.
The first consists of using directly the attributes reported for the scenarios
of the neutral categories.
The second consists of identifying a set of general attributes used by subjects
across the subcategories of the same top level category, aggregating the data of
these subcategories (e.g. politician, manager, professor and so on for Person).
The advantage of the second approach is twofold. First of all the analysis can
be performed on a larger and diversified sample of observations. Secondly, the
attributes shared by the subcategories represent an overlap that emerges from
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the data (bottom-up) and is not the result of a high level abstraction operated
by participants with the intent to provide a description of a generic entity clas-
sifiable into one of the top level entity types. In this sense, the descriptions
of the subcategories are more close to the real descriptions that we expect in
the final use of the ENS and can be useful to reveal some more details about
the attributes that people need to describe real entities. However, if the se-
lected subcategories are representative of the corresponding top level category,
we should expect a substantial overlap between the results of the two kinds of
analysis mentioned above9. The results of our study confirms this prediction as
indicated by the asterisks in table 8.6 that mark the attributes that appear in
the first 5 positions in both the analyses. In this section we present the measures
that we adopted to perform the second kind of analysis.
When aggregating the data from the subcategories of each top level category,
we require a measure to evaluate the importance of an attribute f for the top-
level category c.
To this purpose we introduced a new measure that results from the combi-
nation of two components.
The first component is the dominance measure, that is a measure that quan-
tifies the importance of an attribute for a specific category. We can formalize
the function of Dominance (φ: C × F → N) in the following way:
dominance = φ(c, f) = |{s ∈ S : f ∈ F cs }| (8.1)
where S is the sample of subjects and F cs is the set of attributes listed by the
subject s given the category c. In other words, the dominance φ of the attribute
f for the category c corresponds to the number of subjects that reported the
attribute f for the category c. The dominance presents high scores when the
attribute is frequently mentioned by subjects in identifying a member of the
category.
Note that the dominance measure does not guarantee that attributes with
high values of dominance are also attributes shared between the subcategories.
If an attribute is reported by all participants for a specific subcategory (e.g.,
“political party” for politician) and only for this subcategory, it is possible that
this attribute appears among the first dominant attributes for the correspond-
ing top level category (e.g., Person), when the data are aggregated across the
subcategories. For this reason the dominance measure is more suitable for the
first kind of analysis that we have suggested before which is based on the data
9Note that the comparison of the two kinds of analysis provides an indirect method to test
the representativeness of the selected subcategories. A lack of overlap would indicate that the
subcategories are not representative of the category.
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collected from the neutral categories that present a higher level of abstraction10.
Therefore, to derive a set of default attributes that are both frequently re-
ported by subjects for a specific top level category, and also highly shared across
the subcategories within the same top level category, we introduced a second
component to our measure, local sharedness, that quantifies the level of sharing
of an attribute f across a collection of subcategories:
sharednessloc = ψl(f) =
|Sc[f ]|
|Sc|
(8.2)
where |Sc[f ]| is the collection of the subcategories belonging to the category c
that have in common the attribute f , and |Sc| is the collection of the subcate-
gories of the category c.
Combining the two components listed above we obtained a new measure of
dominance (Ψ) that we name local dominance:
dominanceloc = Ψ(c, f) = φ(c, f) ∗ ψl(f) (8.3)
Applying this measure to our data, we obtained the list of default attributes
for our top-level categories. The first five attributes of our analysis for the two
version of the experiment (English and Italian) are reported in Table 8.6. We
note that the attribute more common across the categories is “name” which
is the first attribute in two categories (Person and Organization) both in the
Italian and in the English version and in the category Location but only in
the English version. Moreover in the English version, “name” is present among
the first 5 attributes in all the categories. Personal attributes (name, surname,
age, gender, birth-date) are most frequently reported to describe people. In
addition to “name”, organizations are identified in terms of spatial location
(address, country) and type. Spatial (location) and time attributes (date, time)
appear more relevant to describe events, whereas morphological and perceptual
aspects (color, dimension, size, material) turn out to be more salient for the
category Artifact. The most frequent attributes to describe locations are spatial
(location, geographical coordinates, address, country).
Relevance The two measures of dominance described above do not provide
information about the discriminatory power of an attribute f respect to a spe-
cific category c. If a user adopts a highly dominant attribute to describe an
entity, we can not use this information to detect the presumptive category. The
reason is that the dominance provide only a local evaluation of the importance
of an attribute for the category without considering if the attribute is relevant
10We used the dominance measure to analyze the results of the neutral categories and to
perform the comparison with the results of the second kind of analysis.
170
English Italian
Category Attributes Ψ(c, f) Attributes Ψ(c, f)
Person name* 110 name* 89
age* 49 age* 73
gender* 44 surname* 64
birth-date* 29 type 56
surname 24 birth-date* 34
N= 145 N=171
Organizationname* 77 name* 87
location * 37 type * 54
country 34 objective/s* 44
address 31 location* 37.5
type * 23 head office 15.83
N= 137 N=168
Event location* 116 location* 126
date* 69 date* 74
time* 64 type* 68
name* 49 time 57
participants* 40 participants* 33.42
N= 146 N=161
Artifact color/s* 46 color/s* 74
name* 33 type 60
size* 29.16 dimension/s* 36
type 28 material* 35
price 20.83 price 28.33
N= 140 N=168
Location name* 86 location* 78
country* 50 name* 73
location 48 tipo (type) 57
address 39.1 geographical position* 29.1
geographical position* 35.83 address 18.66
N= 145 N=169
Table 8.6: Local Dominance for selected top-level categories. We marked with
an * the attributes that appear in the first 5 positions of dominance also in the
analysis which considered only the neutral categories.
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also for others categories. Detecting those attribute which are dominant for a
specific category but at the same time distinctive for it, is exactly the second
aim of our research.
To identify attributes that correspond to this requirement, we propose a
measure, named relevance (k), that is the combination of two components: a
local component (dominance) and a global component (distinctiveness). In the
previous section we have formalized the first component. Now we pass to con-
sider the second component.
The distinctiveness is a measure that quantify how much an attribute f is
specific for a category c. When an attribute is used only in identifying one
or few categories, its distinctiveness is high, whereas when it is used for many
categories (or all) the distinctiveness score is low. The distinctiveness can be
calculated as a function ψd(f) : F → [0, 1] expressed as follows:
distinctiveness = ψd(f) = 1− ψs(f) (8.4)
where ψs(f) is a function of sharedness ψs(f) : F → [0, 1]
sharedness = ψs(f) =
|C[f ]|
|C|
(8.5)
where |C[f ]| is the collection of the categories that have in common the
attribute f and |C| is the collection of all categories. If an attribute f is listed
for all categories ψd(f) is 0 and ψs(f) is 1.
The distinctiveness is a global measure because is transversal to all categories
and in this sense it is category-independent and frequency-independent. This
means that if we consider two different attributes f1 and f2, one used by all
subject only in the category c1 and the other used by only one subject only
in the category c2, their distinctiveness is identical (ψd(f1) = ψd(f2) = 1/|C|)
regardless of the category and the number of subjects.
We can combine the two measures (dominance and distinctiveness) in a single
measure, the relevance k(c, f), with the following formula:
k(c, f) = φ(c, f) ∗ ψ(f) (8.6)
where ψ(f) is a logarithmic transformation of the distinctiveness ψd(f)
ψ(f) = ln
|C|
|C(f)|
(8.7)
We point out that the idea to combine dominance and distinctiveness into a
single measure of relevance has been adopted in other contexts. In information
retrieval for example a similar measure (tf-idf) has been used to evaluate how
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important a word is to a document in a corpus [206]. In cognitive science a model
of semantic relevance has been recently proposed to compute the importance
of a semantic feature in concept identification and has been used to explain
semantic memory deficits (see for example [207, 209, 140]).
In our context we use this measure as an estimation of the contribution
of an attribute f to identify an individual of a specific category c. We note
that differently from distinctiveness, the relevance measure can be considered a
concept-dependent measure. In other words, if the attribute is used by all (or the
majority of) subjects to identify the category (high dominance) and is used only
for that specific category (high distinctiveness), the relevance of the attribute for
the category is consequently high. This means that the presence of that attribute
is highly indicative (that is identifies with high probability) of the category
considered. For example, the attribute “editor” is one of the most frequent
attributes for the category book in both versions (it results in high values of
dominance) and it is reported exclusively in the descriptions of that category
(high values of distinctiveness). Combining dominance and distinctiveness, we
obtain high values of relevance for this attribute when considered respect to the
category book. Attributes with high values of relevance are highly informative
for entity identification and entity matching. Continuing our example, consider
the query q1:<The Lord of the Rings and Allen & Unwin>. If we are able
to recognize that “Allen & Unwin” is the name of a publisher, we ca use this
information for the entity identification and matching, because the presence of
the attribute “publisher” suggests that the query refers most probably to the
book rather than the movie that have the same title “The Lord of the Rings”
(namely the same value for the attribute “title”).
In tables C.11, C.12, C.13, C.14 and C.15 we report the measures of rele-
vance, considering the first 5 attributes for each subcategories. In general we
can notice that in every subcategory stand out some highly specific attributes
that combine high-middle value of dominance coupled with high level of distinc-
tiveness. Just to make some example, “party” for the subcategory politician,
“faculties” for university, “sport specialty” for sport event, “editor” for book or
“number of stars” for hotel. In addition to these specific attributes, every sub-
category presents two or three of those attributes that we identified at the top
of the lists of dominance. These attributes are less distinctive for the particular
subcategory (that is they are widely shared by the subcategories inside their top
level category but are not extensively shared by other subcategories resulting
in intermediate values of distinctiveness) but compensate with very high values
of dominance. For example, “surname” and “age” are attributes of this kind
for the category Person. A case apart is represented by the attribute “name”.
As pointed above this attribute is the most shared between the subcategories
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(ψit = 0.93, ψeng = 1). However if we consider carefully the nature of this at-
tribute we can note that the presumptive meaning of it could be very different
in different contexts. For the category Person, “name” can mean “first name”
or a combination of “first name” and “surname”11. For the category Company,
“name” can be synonym of “brand” and legal constraints regulate the organiza-
tion name assignment at least in local contexts. Normally, for products “name”
is associated to a class of objects (i.e. iPhone 3G) with the same features and
not to a single object (my iPhone). In the light of these differences, we decided
to consider the attribute “name” distinct for the five top level categories. Using
this expedient, we found that the attribute “name” appear nearly in all subcat-
egories among the 5 most relevant attributes. In support of our methodological
choice of aggregating data across the subcategories to obtain a list of general
attributes as suggestions for entity description, we found that the most relevant
attributes for the neutral categories correspond well enough to those found by
means of the dominance measures obtained from aggregated data sets. The rea-
son that why we adopted the aggregation strategy is primarily due to the size
of the sample (the neutral category samples have about one sixth of subjects in
comparison to the aggregated samples).
Applications
As briefly sketched in the introduction of this study, the driving factors for this
research were strongly related to its applicative potential. We present here two
application areas concerning the functioning of the ENS: entity representation,
and entity matching.
1) Entity Representation We can directly apply our findings to the way
entities are represented in the Entity Name System in order to foster a cer-
tain convergence between how users describe entities, and how they search for
entities.
Some of the client applications that are using the Ens today have been
updated to give the user a selection of our top-level types, to manually classify
an entity to be created. Subsequently, we provide the properties found to be
most important for this entity type as a proposed “default schema” to the user,
that can be manually filled with values.
As a second step, the knowledge we gained from investigating the co-occurence
of attributes enables us to work on a way to remove the manual classification
step in favor of automatic classification. This is a more complex scenario that
11We suppose that the tendency of considering “name” as the combination of “first name”
and “surname” is more likely for English speakers. Indeed in the Italian version of the ex-
periment 63 participants (out of 89 that reported the attribute “name”) listed “name” and
“surname” as two different attributes, whereas in the English version only 24 subjects (out of
110) listed the two attributes combined.
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requires knowledge-based methods, which are mentioned among the Ens use
cases. Imagine the description “Costa Forza Italia”: for a human (with some
background knowledge), it is relatively easy to understand that we are describ-
ing a person called “Costa” who is member of the political party “Forza Italia”,
and not – what would be another imaginable interpretation – a stretch of coast
in Italy that is named “Forza”. The following steps facilitate such an automatic
classification process:
1. Through the use of Named Entity Recognition (NER) functionality, which
will be able to detect that “Forza Italia” is a political party; thus, we can
tokenize the description into two parts: t1 = Costa, which is still unknown
at this point, and t2 = Forza Italia, which we have just classified.
2. Relying on our findings, we can assume that “political party” is an at-
tribute only relevant for politicians.
3. With the use of a background ontology (or a simpler structure that for-
malizes the results presented here), we can know that politicians are of
type Person.
4. Based on our findings, we know that the most relevant attribute of Per-
son is “name”, so we can argue that the token t1 is probably the name of
the entity.
As a result, we can (a) provide a schema proposal to describe the entity,
and (b) pre-populate the schema with the values already provided. We expect
this to have significant positive influence on the “cleanliness” of data, and on
the convergence between entity representation and entity matching, as we will
explain in the following.
2) Entity Matching The second application area that we are directly in-
terested in is entity matching, i.e. the attempt to return the single one entity
that a user was (most probably) looking for when searching the Ens.
There are two ways how the research findings presented here can be applied
to this problem: in a straight-forward manner, to take into serious account
which descriptive attributes are more relevant for distinguishing entities, and a
“backward” manner, by making inferences about the desired type of entity from
a given search term.
The first case can be exploited by giving higher weights to the more rele-
vant attribute types when ranking search results. To give a brief sketch, for
example, as we have illustrated above, the “name” attribute usually has a high
relevance; so for a search term x and two entities E1 = {name = x} and
E1 = {place of birth = x}, it can be argued that E1 is the better match,
because the search term appears in the more relevant feature.
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A second way to make use of our findings is related to the issue of developing
an advanced matching algorithm for a problem, by guessing the type of entity
that is to be matched, based on co-occurance of descriptive attributes. We are
attempting to mimic human behaviour of “understanding” what is the intention
behind a bag of search words, by applying the following steps:
1. First, we can perform automatic classification based on co-occurence of
attributes, similarly as explained before. The only difference is that now
we are classifying a query string, to infer what kind of entity a user is
searching for.
2. With the help of a thesaurus-based approach, we can approximate the
“name” field in an entity description in different natural languages or
representations (“nombre”, “nome”, “http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name”,
. . . ).
3. Finally, we can give assign an appropriately higher weight to this field
when matching entities, as described before.
In the light of the result that “name” seems to be by far the most relevant
attribute to describe entities, we do expect matching requests for entities to also
reflect this phenomenon. We thus plan to directly apply the findings presented
here to work on algorithms that work on co-occurence of attributes similar to the
example described above. Such algorithms will concentrate on (a) classifying
what type of entity a matching request is most probably aiming at, and (b)
relating search tokens to the most probable attributes of this entity type (i.e.
which of the tokens most probably is the name of an entity, and which on is just
“description”). To the best of our knowledge, this represents a novel approach,
and we expect this to help us achieve higher-precision results without the a-
priori knowledge (or enforcement) of any specific representational schema for
entities. The insights presented here inspired a second study more focused on
the search strategies used by people in formulating queries about individual
entities.
8.2 An Entity Search Experiment
In the study described in 8.1 we adopted a feature listing task paradigm to
investigate how people describe in terms of features individual entities from
different categories and we proposed measures of relevance to quantify the im-
portance that different features have for identifying these entities. The basic
premise of the method was that participant’s conscious intuitions about the
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most important features to identify individual entities actually reflect the un-
derlying organization of the corresponding mental representations (i.e. singular
concepts) in terms of feature relevance.
However, we note that the relevance of an attribute for identifying a given
entity depends also on the specific context in which the identification process is
performed. Our assumption is that, given a specific context, a person builds a
sort of temporary representation of the entity which contains the most relevant
attributes for the identification in that specific context. This view echoes the
notion of flexibility and contextual-dependency in human (general) concepts pro-
posed by Barsalou [10, 11]. In brief, the idea of the author is that there are two
important types of properties associated with concepts, context-independent
properties and context-dependent properties. Context-independent properties
are activated on all occasions in which the concept is activated, whereas context-
dependent properties are activated only by relevant contexts. In the same vein,
we argue that some attributes are generally relevant to identify an entity (e.g.
the title or the author of a book), while other attributes become relevant only
in certain contexts (e.g. ISBN). If I talk about the last book of Umberto Eco
with a friend of mine, it is implausible that I use the ISBN to identify the book
during the conversation. However the ISBN can be used by a bookstore clerk
to check for the edition of the book.
In this study we investigate how people identify individual entities in a very
specific context: searching for information about individual entities by means
of keyword queries.
Searching for information about individual entities such as persons, loca-
tions, events, is a major activity in Internet search. It was estimated, for
instance, that searching for persons accounts for more than 5 percent of the
current Web searches [95]. In a manual analysis on 1000 queries randomly se-
lected from the search log of a commercial web search engine, Guo et al. [97]
reported that named entities appear very frequently in queries and about 70%
of the queries contain named entities.
General purpose search engines, like Google or Yahoo, are the most com-
monly used access point to entity-centric information. In this context, keyword
queries are the primary means of retrieving information about a specific entity.
In this sense, queries for specific entities represent a variation of the expressed
information need that has been studied in many Information Retrieval (IR)
contexts [243, 233]. A query for a specific entity can be considered like a way to
translate a human information need into a small number of attributes that the
user considers relevant to identify the entity. Therefore, the analysis of real user
queries should provide valuable insights into which kinds of attributes humans
actually consider relevant to identify different types of entities during the search
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process.
Several studies have looked at search engine log files to find out different
aspects of the search process. These studies have revealed that the typical Web
users only use a couple of query terms per query [109, 114], have short search
sessions [223], typically check one result page and rarely use advanced query
operators [13].
Besides general statistical analysis, a variety of other research topics have
drown interest (see Jansen and Pooch [113] and Spink and Jansen [231] for a
review of the state of research in this field). Among the variety of research
topics, we mention the reformulation process of queries over a period of time
[191], query frequency distribution and caching [134, 264], search strategies and
successful performance in Web searching [6].
Studies on what users search for are also reported in literature. On the one
hand there are studies that focused mainly on term frequency distribution, co-
occurrence of search terms and term clustering [202, 114, 263]. On the other
hand, other studies have faced the problem to group queries into a small set of
topics in order to produce a representation of users’search interests [232, 185]
or to monitor the changes in popularity of topical interests [13]. However, from
our review of the literature on query analysis it appears that little effort is made
to investigate the semantic structure of textual queries.
Queries have been typically examined like list of terms (bag of words) with-
out considering the semantic content of the keywords within the query. Our
study aims to provide a contribution to this issue by investigating which at-
tributes are considered more relevant by people to identify specific types of
entities in a query formulation task and how these attributes are organized
within the query.
As a first step towards a better understanding of this aspect of the query
formulation process, we performed an experimental study. The goal of the study
was to investigate the process that leads users to organize and represent their
information needs using simple queries, limiting the analysis to queries that look
for specific type of entities (Person, Organization, Event, Artifact and Location).
The motivation for this study was twofold.
First, from a cognitive point of view, the search task provided a real con-
text where people were naturally forced to build on-line contextual-dependent
representations of entities in which very few attributes (expressed by two or
three keywords in a query) were used to uniquely identify these entities in the
interaction with a search system. Exploring how people organize their informa-
tion needs about unique entities in a search task provided a different way to
investigate the identification relevance of attributes within a more realistic and
constrained context, compared to that represented by the feature listing task.
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Therefore, the results of this experiment could extend those obtained in the
previous research about the internal structure of singular concepts. Moreover,
the contextual need of selecting only few attributes to formulate a search query,
would force people to use strategies tuned on the specific exigences of the task,
individuating the attributes which are most relevant for the specific context of
entity search. This aspect is strongly connected to the second motivation of our
study which is related to applicative implications of the results.
From this perspective, understanding which attributes are considered more
relevant by people to identify specific types of entities in a query formulation
task could provide valuable insights for the development of information search
systems. Therefore, the second motivation of the study, was to provide evidence
for the beneficial impact that a cognitive study on the identification strategies
used by people in entity search may have in improving the performance of
computer-based search systems.
In particular, we aimed to show how our results could contribute to address
one of the most critical problem in information retrieval that is the problem to
capture the meaning of a query most likely intended by the user. Our assump-
tion is that an important first step of performing such a task is to understand
what type of entity the user is looking for. We call this process Entity Type
Disambiguation. To address this problem we propose a Bayesian Model based
on the assumption that an entity type can be inferred from the attributes a user
specifies in a search query. Our aim was to apply the model to the queries col-
lected in the experiment to test the performance of the model on the entity type
disambiguation of real-world queries. Finally, to show the beneficial impact of
the entity type disambiguation approach on a search system we aimed to test
the effect of the disambiguation on the performance of a real system.
In summary, the study explores four main issues:
1. to investigate which attributes are considered more relevant by people to
identify specific types of entities in a query formulation task;
2. to test the main assumption of a probabilistic (Bayesian) model for Entity
Type Disambiguation that the entity type of the target of a query can be
inferred by the specific pattern of attributes specified within the query;
3. to identify significant patterns of attributes that reproduce recurrent strate-
gies in organizing the information in entity searching and show how these
patterns can be integrated in the Entity Type Disambiguation model, im-
proving the performance of it;
4. to provide evidence for the beneficial impact of Entity Type Disambigua-
tion on the performance of a real search system.
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8.2.1 Method
Participants
301 participants took part in the experiment (165 male, 101 female, the others
did not provide personal information). The average age of participants was
31.4 years (SD=9). Personal information (gender, age, country, Web and search
engine experience) was collected through a questionnaire presented at the end
of the experiment.12 The participant’s provenance is shown in Figure 8.3. In
Web usage the participants’ own evaluation revealed high experience with an
average of 10.1 years of Web experience (SD=3.64) and an average of 5.87
(SD=3.7) hours of use per day. All subjects mentioned using Internet more
than once per week with 233 participants (85%) using Internet daily, 32 (12%)
almost daily and 5 twice per week (2%). In search engine usage the frequency of
use was lower with 175 participants using search engine daily (65%), 71 almost
daily (26%), 20 (8%) twice per week and 2 (1%) only once per week.
Figure 8.3: Geographical provenance of participants of the entity search exper-
iment.
12Note that the questionnaire was optional, therefore the personal information statistics
were calculated on the subset of participants which completed the questionnaire.
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Procedure
To answer our research questions we conducted a Web-based experiment with
a significant amount of users (N=301). The advantage of the on-line modality
is twofold. First, the target of our research is a user population that has expe-
rience with Web-based information retrieval systems and the Internet provides
a “natural” environment to reach this target. Second, the Internet experiment
allowed us to access a more diverse pool of participants (demographically and
culturally), as can be noted in Figure 8.3, which is more representative of the
real user population. For this reason, the experiment was performed in two
versions, English (133 participants) and Italian (168 participants). Altogether
these advantages contributed to improve the ecological validity of our research.
However, the main drawback of the open environment of the Internet was the
loss of some experimental control, such as providing supplementary clarifications
about the task during the experimental session. To make sure that the instruc-
tions were clear enough and the interface was appropriate, the experiment was
pilot-tested with two participants.
The experiment consisted of ten query formulation tasks. Participants were
presented with an entity type (e.g., person) and they were asked to imagine any
individual entity of their choosing belonging to this type (e.g., Barack Obama)13.
Once the individual entity was chosen, participants were asked to formulate a
query with the intent to find the homepage or an official Web site dedicated
to the entity considered. In our example a plausible query may be <Barack
Obama president USA>.
Every participant was asked to perform ten such tasks, submitting their
queries through a dummy search engine interface (see Figure 8.4). Five tasks
presented entity types at a very high level of abstraction. We call these types
high-level entity types (person, organization, event, artifact and location). All
the participants were tested on all the high-level classes. The other five tasks
corresponded to more specific entity types (low-level entity types), selected from
a predefined set of possible subtypes for each high-level type. Every participant
performed only one low-level task for each high-level entity type. The task order
was randomized between subjects. In the table 8.7 we report the complete list
of high-level and corresponding low-level types. We note that high-level and
low-level entity types were the same used in the experiment described in 8.1.
Using this experimental procedure, we collected a set of queries, for each of
the entity types and subtypes, creating a suitable dataset for investigating our
research questions. In particular, the selected experimental procedure which
13We remark that participants were provided only with information about the entity type,
but they were free to choose any specific entity they came to their mind to perform the query
formulation task.
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Figure 8.4: Search interface used in the experiment to collect the partici-
pants’queries. In figure is shown the trial about a person search.
Person Organization Event Artifact Location
politician company conference product tourist location
manager association meeting artwork city
professor university exhibition building shop
sports person government show book hotel
actor agency sports event article of clothing restaurant
Table 8.7: Entity types and subtypes used in the entity search experiment.
allowed us to know in advance the intended entity type of each query collected
by the participants, helped to create the annotated training set for the Bayesian
Model which we used in the query analysis.
8.2.2 A Naive Bayes Model of Attribute Relevance
In order to address the first two issues of our study, we analyzed the data
collected in the experiment within a Bayesian framework. Therefore, we perform
the formulation of our problem, through a parallel introduction into the basic
theory of the Naive Bayesian Model (NBM) used for the analysis.
We can represent a query Q as a set of unknown terms T = (t1, t2, ..., tn),
each of which can be a single word or a combination of words. We assume that
each term t specifies the value of an attribute a. Assume that A = (a1, a2, ..., an)
is a set of attribute types. We map every term t into one appropriate type in
A. After this mapping is established, Q can be represented by a vector a (an
assignment of attribute types a1, a2, ...as to the terms in T ). Finally, suppose
that E = (e1, e2, ..., em) is a small number of entity types.
The goal of our method is to define a Naive Bayesian model that can assign
the most likely entity type e∗ to a given query Q described by its attribute
vector.
This is done by computing the probability P (E = ek|A = a) for each possible
entity type ek and finally assigning Q to the type that achieves the highest
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Query Syntactic Preproc. Semantic Preproc.
Q1 =ISCW 2010 Shangai t1=ISWC t1 ⇒ event name
t2=2010 t2 ⇒ date:year
t3=Shangai t3 ⇒ location (city)
Q2= McCain Republican t1=McCain t1 ⇒ surname
t2=Republican t2 ⇒ political party
Table 8.8: Two-step Preprocessing
posterior probability. Using the Bayes’rule we have:
p(E = ek|A = a) =
p(ek) ∗ p(a|ek)∑m
i=1 p(ei) ∗ p(a|ei)
(8.8)
The critical quantity in Equation 8.8 is p(a|ek). Since the NBM assumes that
the conditional probabilities of attributes are statistically independent (that
means that the value of a particular attribute is unrelated to the value of any
other attribute), we can decompose the likelihood to a product of terms:
p(a|ek) =
s∏
j=1
p(aj |ek) (8.9)
Because we are interested only in the most probable entity type, the NBM
can be described by the function disambiguate (f : a → (E)) that takes as
argument a vector a of attributes and returns the most likely entity type e∗.
This function is defined as follows:
disambigaute(a) = arg max
ek∈E
p(ek) ∗ p(a|ek)∑m
i=1 p(ei) ∗ p(a|ei)
(8.10)
8.2.3 Results
Preprocessing
Before applying the Bayesian Model to our data we performed two steps of
preprocessing (see table 8.8 for examples). The first step, i.e. syntactic pre-
processing, involved extracting the terms from the queries. A term can be a
single word or a combination of words (i.e., a collocation). In this phase we also
cleaned the dataset from unusual queries such as blank queries (empty), strings
with only punctuation marks or senseless queries. Once the terms have been
extracted from the queries, they were mapped into the attribute type set A.
This mapping corresponded to the second step of preprocessing: semantic pre-
processing. In Table 8.8 we report two examples of the two-step preprocessing.
The first step was conducted in a semiautomatic way (i.e., the deletion of
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empty queries and a rough tokenization by segmenting the text at each space
were performed automatically but the assignment of words to terms was per-
formed manually), whereas the semantic preprocessing was performed entirely
manually.
Queries
In our experiment we collected an amount of 4017 queries. The average query
length was 2.04 terms (mode=2 and median=2), which is in line with the results
reported in literature (see for example [113]). Over 35% contained only one
term and less than 3% of the queries contained five or more terms. Almost
none of the queries utilized Boolean operators (over 99%). In only ten queries
the operator AND was used, whereas the use of other operators was inexistent.
The analysis of the word frequency distribution showed a very limited usage of
articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. The only word without content that
appeared in the first 30 most frequently used words was the preposition “of”.
Bayesian Relevance of Attribute Types
The first goal of our research is to identify which kinds of attributes humans
consider relevant to identify different types of entities during the search process.
In order to address this problem, we used the Bayesian model described above
to determine the relevance of an attribute as for a given entity type ek. The
relevance of an attribute for an entity type measures the importance of the
attribute in the search of the type of the entity. In the NBM framework this
corresponds to compute the posterior probability p(ek|as):
p(E = ek|A = as) =
p(ek) ∗ p(as|ek)∑m
i=1 p(ei) ∗ p(as|ei)
(8.11)
Assuming all entity types are equally probable (equal priors), the term p(e) is
constant across the categories and can be ignored. Moreover, since the size of the
training set is small, the relative frequency estimates of probabilities p(as|ek),
will not be reasonable: if the attribute type never appears for a specific entity
type in the data set, its relative frequency estimate will be zero. This means
that the denominator in 8.11 will be nullified. Instead, we applied the Laplace
law of succession [87] to estimate p(as|ek)
14. The estimate of the probability
p(as|ek) is given as:
p(as|ek) =
Nks + 1
Nk + 2
(8.12)
14The Laplace law of succession has been used only to calculate the Bayesian relevance of
attribute types but it was not adopted in the application of the model to the Entity Type
Disambiguation problem.
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where Nks is the number of queries of type ek in which the attribute as occurs
and Nk is the total number of queries of type ek.
We note that the rationale underlying the Bayesian measure of relevance is
similar to that expressed by the measure of identification relevance proposed in
8.1. The relevance of an attribute for a given entity type is not only dependent
on how frequently the attribute is used to identify entities of that type in the
search process, but it is also dependent on how frequently the attribute is used
to identify entities from other types. In other words, if the attribute is used to
identify only entities of a given type, the presence of that attribute is highly
indicative of the fact that the query is about an entity of that type. On the
contrary, the relevance of the attribute is as lower as higher is the use of the
attribute in queries about other entity types.
To make a concrete example, “city name” is the most frequently used at-
tribute when a user looks for a city, but the same attribute is also used in queries
about other entity types, such as queries about restaurants, shops, buildings,
people and so on (see the tables reported in Appendix C.2). Therefore, the
presence of this attribute is for sure relevant for the entity type City, but its
relevance is mitigated (as expressed by the denominator in Equation 8.11) by
the fact that the attribute is used in queries of other types.
In Table 8.9 we report the results of applying the Bayesian Model described
in Equation 8.11 for the five high-level entity types addressed in our experiments.
To clarify the semantic distinctions between the attribute types used in our
classification, some examples are shown in Table 8.10. For each entity type we
list the attributes with the highest probability values of relevance (p(e|a) >=
0.15. In Table 8.11 we report the same analysis for the low-level entity types of
Person. The results for the other low-level entity types are reported in Appendix
C.2.2.
From an overall analysis of the results it turns out that for the majority of
high-level entity types “name” is the most relevant attribute used by people to
identify the target of their request. This result confirms the centrality of proper
names within the referential expressions (see for example [127]), but also the
significance of mental names within singular concepts. However not all entities
can be identified by means of a name. For example, pieces of clothing, sometimes
meetings, or governments are entity types identified preferentially by means of
other attributes. A particular case is represented by the entity type “product”.
Our analysis shows that the majority of products are identified by the “model
name” and not by the proper name of a specific entity. This result is interesting
if it is considered in the light of the results of the experiments described in
chapter 6 and 7 which showed that products are identified by model names
as other entities are identified by proper names. This result reveals another
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Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Person first name 0.85
surname 0.84
occupation 0.89
middle name 0.69
pseudonym 0.33
area of interest/activity 0.21
nationality 0.20
organization name 0.05
Organization organization type 0.88
organization name 0.73
area of interest/activity 0.54
location name 0.07
Event event name 0.96
event type 0.95
date:month 0.83
date:year 0.81
date:day 0.75
location name 0.20
topic 0.17
Artifact artifact type 0.98
features 0.90
model name 0.89
artifact name 0.86
historical period/epoch 0.56
nationality 0.50
organization name/brand 0.13
Location location type 0.84
location name 0.65
Table 8.9: Bayesian Relevance: top-level entity types
Query Terms Attribute Types
Person:
T1=Johann, Sebastian, Bach A1=first name, middle name,
surname
T2=Madonna, singer A2=pseudonym, occupation
T3=Tim, Berners-Lee, semantic
web
A3= first name, surname, area
of interest/activity
Organization:
T1=Greenpeace, environment A1=organization name, activ-
ity
T2=Emergency, onlus A2=organization name, orga-
nization type
Event:
T1=ISWC, international confer-
ence, 2008
A1=event name, event type,
date:year
Artifact:
T1=Audi A4 A1= model name
T2=Mona Lisa, oil, portrait A2= artifact name, features,
artifact type
T3=Discobolus, Ancient Greek A3= artifact name, historical
period
Location:
T1=Louvre, museum, Paris A1= location name, location
type, location name
Table 8.10: Attribute Types: examples
important aspect of the identification process: only a subset of entities are
prototypically namable entities (e.g. person). Since users need also to identify
non-namable things in their queries, the problem of Entity Type Disambiguation
can not be entirely solved by the detection of the named entity in a query and
the classification of it into predefined classes (an example of this approach can be
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Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Politician party 0.77
location: country 0.56
role 0.37
related event 0.30
nationality 0.28
title 0.24
surname 0.21
first name 0.20
Manager occupation 0.55
affiliation 0.33
role 0.29
location: country 0.16
location: city 0.19
surname 0.16
first name 0.15
Professor location: city 0.57
title 0.40
affiliation 0.40
occupation 0.27
area of interest/activity 0.21
surname 0.21
first name 0.20
Sportsperson area of interest/activity 0.62
related event 0.51
location: country 0.20
surname 0.21
first name 0.20
nationality 0.15
Actor movies/series 0.79
role 0.30
nationality 0.29
first name 0.24
surname 0.21
Table 8.11: Bayesian Relevance: Person
found in [97]). Given a query like “guitar Jimi Hendrix 1967”, the named entities
are “Jimi Hendrix” and “1967”15 , but the target entity of the query is an artifact
(a guitar, precisely the first guitar burned by the guitarist on stage in 1967).
The example shows that the simple classification of the named entities can be
uneffective to detect the type of the target entity of the query and supports the
idea that the disambiguation can be improved by including information from
different kinds of attribute, such as “organization type” for organizations (e.g.
non profit), temporal attributes for events (e.g. date), qualitative attributes
(e.g. “color” or “material”) for artifacts. However, as we will discuss later,
the difficulty of automatically disambiguating these kinds of attributes may
challenge the possibility to adopt them in real applications. Another interesting
aspect is the use of the attribute “location” (e.g. city, country, province) to
identify entities from different types, such as persons, organizations and events,
and of course location. However, queries about locations (e.g. city, restaurant,
hotel) very often present more than one attribute concerning a location. Usually
the first attribute specifies the name of the target of the query, while the second
15we restrict the word “named” to those entities for which one or many rigid designators,
as defined by Kripke [128], stands for the referent.
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specifies the location of the target. For example, in a query like “Venice Italy”
the first location, i.e. Venice, is the target, while Italy is the spacial context
where the target is placed.
Entity Type Disambiguation
The second goal of our study was to test the hypothesis that the entity type
of a query can be inferred from the pattern of attributes a user specifies in the
query. To address this issue, we proposed a Naive Bayes Model (NBM) for
entity type disambiguation. The model is described in Section 8.2.2. In order
to test our hypothesis, we applied the NBM to our experimental data within the
Weka framework [261]. We conducted the analysis using the subset of queries
of high-level entity types (N=1350 queries) as learning set. The results of the
stratified cross validation16 performed on the learning set is reported in Table
8.12 that shows the confusion matrix on the learning set.
Classified as → Person Organization Event Artifact Location
Person 259 1 5 5 0
Organization 0 268 0 1 1
Event 6 3 261 0 0
Artifact 6 2 0 262 0
Location 1 2 1 3 263
Table 8.12: Confusion matrix: learning set. Each row of the matrix represents
the instances in a predicted class, while each column represents the predictions
made by the model.
1313 of the 1350 queries were correctly classified (97.25%), corresponding
to a mean absolute error of 0.023 and root mean squared error of 0.0981. In
Table 8.13 we report the results in terms of precision, recall, F-measure and
ROC area17.
In order to test the generalization performance of the NBM, we used two
different test sets. The first test set (TSa) was created by randomly selecting 125
queries (25 for each of the five entity types) out of the set of experimental queries
16Cross-validation is a technique for assessing how well the model which has been learned
from some training data is going to perform on future as-yet-unseen data. The first step of
cross-validation involves partitioning a sample of data into complementary subsets, performing
the analysis on one subset (called the training set), and validating the analysis on the other
subset (called the validation set or testing set). To reduce variability, multiple rounds of cross-
validation are performed using different partitions, and the validation results are averaged over
the rounds.
17Precision is defined as the number of queries correctly assigned to the entity type divided
by the total number of queries assigned to that type; recall is defined as the number of queries
correctly assigned to the entity type divided by the total number of queries which should
have been assigned to it; F-measure is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) area is the area under the ROC curve that is a statistical
technique using linear regression to describe the accuracy of the model by plotting predicted
true positive rates (y-axis) at given false positive rates (x-axis). The larger the area under
the curve the more accurate the model.
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Class Precision Recall F-Measure ROC Area
Person 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.99
Organization 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99
Event 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99
Artifact 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99
Location 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
Table 8.13: Learning set evaluation. TP=true positive; FP=false positive
about the low-level entity types18. The second test set (TSb) was created by
extracting 125 queries for specific entities from a collection of queries provided
by [1] to evaluate entity search and entity linkage methods. The aim of using
this second test set was to evaluate whether the performance of the NBM on
queries obtained from real applications (e.g., Wikipedia’s search system) was as
good as that obtained for experimental queries. The results of this comparison
are presented in 8.14.
Class Precision Recall F-measure ROC Area
TSa TSb TSa TSb TSa TSb TSa TSb
Person 1 0.81 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.98 0.98
Organization 0.95 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.91 0.83 0.98 0.97
Event 0.91 0.95 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.97
Artifact 0.92 1 1 0.78 0.96 0.88 0.99 0.96
Location 0.85 0.76 1 0.92 0.92 0.83 0.99 0.97
Table 8.14: Test set evaluation
Overall, the performance of the NBM is very high and encouraging and the
disambiguation model seems to perform well not only on queries collected in
a controlled experimental setting but also on queries submitted to real search
systems.
Distribution Trends: Attribute Position
The third research question of our study was about the distribution of attributes
inside the queries. We aimed to highlight possible trends of attributes that re-
cur during the formulation process and that reflect, it is argued, the strategies
used by users to organize their information need. To this purpose, we focused
on the distribution of attributes in terms of position. If we represent a query
Q as a vector of attribute types, a = a1, a2, ..., an, the position of an attribute
type corresponds to the position of the corresponding element in the vector.
The aim was to explore whether there is a preferential order followed by sub-
jects when they organize the attributes within the query so that an attribute
type is more likely used in a specific position in the query. For example, is
the name of the target entity always the first attribute specified? In this case
18The 125 queries constituting our test set were not part of the sample which was used to
run the learning phase.
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the position of the attribute becomes extremely informative to understand the
entity search process and should be included in an integrated model of attribute
relevance. Consider, for example, the following two queries: Q1=”Silvio Berlus-
coni Mediaset” and Q2=”Mediaset Silvio Berlusconi”. The two queries contain
exactly the same terms and consequently the same attributes types, Q1= “first
name, surname, organization name” and Q2= “organization name, first name,
surname”, respectively. The only difference between Q1 and Q2 is the order of
their terms. For example, in Q1 the attribute “first name” is in first position,
whereas in Q2 the same attribute is in second position, and so on. But do the
two queries refer to the same entity target? or, reformulating the question in
terms of entity types, is the entity type of Q1 the same than the entity type
of Q2? If we submit the two queries to one of the most popular search engine,
i.e. Google, and we look to the first results returned by the system we find that
the two queries produce exactly the same results (see Figure 8.5 and 8.6). Our
research question deals with exploring whether the two queries are equivalent
from a cognitive point of view. This means to investigate if the order used to
organize the terms (and therefore the attribute types) within a query conveys
some information about the intended meaning (i.e. the target entity) underlying
the query.
Figure 8.5: First five Google results for the query Q1=Silvio Berlusconi Medi-
aset.
The Bayesian Model described in 8.2.2 does not make any assumption about
the order of attribute types within the query, that is the probability of an entity
type ek, given an attribute type as, is the same independently from the position
of as within the query. In our example, if A1 is the vector of attribute types
of Q1 and A2 is the vector of attribute types of Q2, the model predicts that
p(E = ek|A1) = p(E = ek|A2) for each entity type ek. For instance, the model
predicts that the probability that Q1 is about a person is the same than the
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Figure 8.6: First five Google results for the query Q2=Mediaset Silvio Berlus-
coni.
probability that Q2 is also about a person.
In order to investigate whether the attribute type position provides useful
information about the intended target of a query, we analyzed the probability
distribution of attributes by position within the query. To this purpose, for each
attribute type as and entity type ek, we calculated the probability of observing
as in a given position j, as follows:
Posj =
Nposj
N
(8.13)
where Nposj is the number of queries of type ek in which the attribute
as occurs in position j and N is the number of queries of type ek in which
the attribute as occurs, regardless of the position in the query. The analysis
was conducted only on the queries about the five high-level entity types. A
graphical representation of the results for the Person and Organization entity
types is shown in Figure 8.7 and 8.8, respectively (see Appendix C.2.3 for the
same analysis on the other entity types).
As shown in Figures the results of the position analysis give support to
the initial hypothesis. Different attribute types present a preferential position
within the query and at least the first two positions are significantly dominated
by one attribute. For instance, we note that “first name” and “organization
name” are the attributes with the highest probability in first position, respec-
tively for Person and Organization. Instead, “surname” and “middle name” (for
Person) and “organization type” and “activity” (for Organization) are the pre-
ferred attributes in second position. The analysis provides an interesting insight
about the problem of the presumptive “cognitive equivalence” of the two queries,
Q1=“Silvio Berlusconi Mediaset” and Q2=“Mediaset Silvio Berlusconi”, sug-
191
Pos1 Pos2 Pos3 Pos4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Position
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
first name
surname
middle name
organization
occupation
area of interest/activity
location
Person
Figure 8.7: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Person.
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Figure 8.8: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Organization.
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gesting that the two queries are indeed more likely about to different entity
types. The analysis of the position distribution shows that queries about per-
sons are more likely to present “first name” and “surname” in first and second
positions respectively. If “organization name” is specified, this attribute type
is more likely to occupy the third position. This order distribution match that
of Q1. On the contrary, queries about organizations are more likely to present
the name of the organization in first position, as we find in Q2. The position
results suggest that Q1 is more likely to be a query about a person, whereas Q2
is more likely to refer to an organization.
Based on these results, we propose to extend the Bayesian model of attribute
relevance presented in section 8.2.2 to incorporate position dependencies. We
call this model Extended Bayesian Model (EBM). The Naive Bayes Model as-
sumes the positional independence for attribute types: the conditional proba-
bility of an attribute type given an entity type is independent from the position
of the attribute in the query. To incorporate position dependencies, we suggest
to weight the probability p(E = ek|A = as) by the position term Posj defined
in Equation 8.13, as follows:
p(E = ek|A = as, posj) =
p(ek) ∗ p(as|ek)∑m
i=1 p(ei) ∗ p(as|ei)
∗ Posj (8.14)
where Posj is the probability of observing the attribute as in position j
19. To
compare the performance of the NBM with that of the EBM we tested the two
models on the same sample of 125 queries randomly extracted from the queries
collected in the entity search experiment. The results in terms of Precision,
Recall and F-measure are reported in Table 8.15 and 8.16.
Measures Person Organization Event Artifact Location
Precision 0.72 0.87 1 1 0.85
Recall 1 0.91 0.91 0.66 0.96
F-measure 0.84 0.89 0.95 0.80 0.90
Overall Precision Overall Recall Overall F-measure
0.86 0.89 0.88
Table 8.15: Test-set Evaluation of the NBM.
Measures Person Organization Event Artifact Location
Precision 0.85 0.89 1 1 0.96
Recall 1 0.91 0.92 0.72 0.95
F-measure 0.92 0.90 0.95 0.84 0.96
Overall Precision Overall Recall Overall F-measure
0.93 0.90 0.91
Table 8.16: Test-set Evaluation of the EBM
The results show that the extended model may sensibly improve the disam-
19When an attribute type is not observed in a given position, the relevance of it is multiplied
by a small constant term to avoid the nullification of the relevance value.
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biguation process compared with the original model, supporting the hypothesis
that the the order of terms within a query conveys semantic meaning that can
be exploited for the disambiguation process.
Entity type disambiguation in Web Search
In the Section 8.2.3 we have provided empirical evidence that the NBM (or
its extended version, i.e. EBM) yields good disambiguation performance on
our test sets. In this section we investigate the beneficial impact of the en-
tity type disambiguation approach for an entity-centric search system. To
perform this analysis we used an entity-id lookup system (available at http:
//api.okkam.org/search/) provided by the Okkam project and we compared
the performance of the system in three different search conditions (respectively
with correct disambiguation, with wrong disambiguation and without disam-
biguation).
To this purpose, we used a set of fifty queries randomly selected from our
experimental dataset. In the first condition, i.e. correct disambiguation, we
submitted the queries to the system specifying for each query the correct entity
type20. In the second condition, i.e. wrong disambiguation, we submitted the
queries using the same search functionality used in the previous condition, but
specifying a wrong entity type randomly chosen between those provided by the
system. In the last condition, i.e. default condition, the queries have been
executed without filtering the results by entity type. The number of correct
results in the first 20 returned results and the ranked position of the first correct
match have been used to calculate a measure of the performance of the system.
In order to test the impact of the disambiguation on entity-centric search we
tried to answer the following questions:
• What is the impact of using Entity Type Disambiguation versus not using
it?
• What the impact of errors in Entity Type Disambiguation on the search
results?
In order to be able to differentiate performance we used three different mea-
sures:
• The precision P of results, measured as the number of entities related to
the query to the full set of entities returned by the search engine. The
search results returned are 20 at maximum. If |C| is the number of correct
20We used the search functionality of the system that allows to filter the results by entity
type.
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Disambiguation
Performance Measure Default Correct Wrong
Precision P 12.13% 18.69% 12.24%
Ranking effectiveness R 13.00 12.78 28.98
Overall Performance F 11.92% 18.54% 1.14%
Table 8.17: Performance Measures. Best result in bold.
or plausible answers and |A| the number of all results returned then the
following formula calculates P.
P =
|C|
|A|
• The ranking effectiveness R, measured as the rank of the most appropriate
entity for the query. If there is not plausible answer entity in the results
we apply the dummy value of rank 30 as the ranking effectiveness. Thus,
higher is worse in the ranking effectiveness.
• The overall performance for a given query. The overall performance is
calculated by the formula in the following equation.
F =
31− R
30
× P
This equation weights the precision by a function of the rank of the most
plausible answer in the answer set. A perfect query answer will have only
plausible entities returned, i.e., P = 1 and the rank of the most plausible
will be R = 1. In this perfect case F = 1 and F diminishes in every other
case, reaching zero when no plausible result has been returned (P = 0).
In Tables 8.17 we report the performance of the system related to precision
P, ranking effectiveness R and overall performance F. We found that the correct
disambiguation produced an improvement on all the measures of performance.
To test if the difference in overall performance was significant between the con-
ditions we conducted a comparison between pairwise conditions. In Tables 8.18
we report the results of the analysis which shows the beneficial impact of correct
disambiguation, compared to default and wrong disambiguation and the cost of
wrong disambiguation compared to default and correct disambiguation.
To conclude these results support our initial hypothesis that the effective-
ness of entity type disambiguation can significantly improve the quality of the
search results of an entity-centric system. On the other hand, the impact of
wrong disambiguation can be very high. Thus, only if a highly effective dis-
ambiguation is used, disambiguation can be beneficial. Promisingly, the results
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Relative Performance
Comparison Correct>Default Default>Wrong Correct>Wrong
p-value X (0.01) X (0.02) X (0.001)
Table 8.18: Relative performance. In parentheses the p-value of the one-sided,
paired t-test. X:Performance inequality statistically supported,
reported in 8.2.3 show that a highly effective disambiguation is possible and,
more interestingly for the purposes of this work, this can be obtained making
explicit the semantics underlying search queries.
8.2.4 Discussion
The entity search experiment gave us the opportunity to investigate one of the
main issues of the present work, i.e. how a cognitive study on identification
can contribute to inspire possible solutions to some of the most crucial prob-
lems about entity identification in systems which manage information about
individual entities.
We focused, here, on a specific problem, which we named Entity Disam-
biguation Problem, which is the problem to identify the target entity of a query
and assign to it the correct entity type.
To this purpose, we have proposed a probabilistic model for Entity Type
Disambiguation that infers an entity type from the type of attributes a user
specifies in a search query. We have also showed how the disambiguation per-
formance can be improved including aspects related to how people organize the
attributes within the query (i.e. order of attributes). And finally we have pro-
vided evidence of the impact that entity type disambiguation may have for an
entity-centric search system.
However, our approach does not address the issue of how to perform auto-
matically the assignment of attributes to their corresponding attribute types.
However, the attribute type disambiguation is not a simple task. For same at-
tributes the disambiguation process can be performed applying thesaurus-based
disambiguation methods (an example is the use of a thesaurus of first names or
location names), but for other attributes the disambiguation is more challenging.
This is mainly due to the lack of contextual information in Web search queries
- i.e. queries are typically composed by two or three terms - which makes the
application of many Natural Language Processing Techniques, such as methods
for Named Entity Recognition21, difficult to apply in this specific context.
For these reasons, in the last chapter of this work we propose a solution for
21Named entity recognition (NER) is a subtask of information extraction that seeks to locate
and classify atomic elements in text into predefined categories such as the names of persons,
organizations, locations, expressions of times, quantities, monetary values, percentages, etc.
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automatic disambiguation of attribute types and we present a Web application
for Entity Type Disambiguation which uses this solution.
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Chapter 9
Tracing the Identity of
Individual Entities
Because individuals can change some of their properties while persisting as the
same individuals, the singular cognition system needs a function of tracking a
changing entity across time. This means that the system has to maintain the
referential link between an entity in the world and its cognitive representation
across time and change in order to make the identification process effective. In
this part of our work we focus on the problem of how people judge the identity
of entities over time and change (e.g. how people decide that an entity at one
time t0 or context c is the same entity at another time, t1 or context, c
′).
This cognitive ability is crucial to daily life. We need to correctly identify
our unique individual car, dog or spouse relevant to our own existence and
successfully track those individuals across time and change.
There are at least two distinct representational systems underlying this fun-
damental aspect of human cognition.
The first is perceptual and has been largely studied in the context of visual
perception and infant cognition, exploring the principles by which the visual
system segments the visual input in discrete objects and bind individual views
of objects into dynamic representations which persist across time, motion, fea-
tural change, and interruptions (see for example [187, 121, 211, 41, 230, 8]).
When I’m watching a dog playing in a park, my perceptual system is able to
preserve the unity of this entity although neither its retinal size or its shape
remain constant. The perceptual system is also capable restoring continuity
that has been temporarily broken in the stream of sensory inputs. The dog
that reappears after running behind a tree will normally be treated as the same
individual which was seen to disappear, provided that the disappearance was
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short and that the parameters of motion remain more or less constant. In this
case, it is not necessary to know the identity of the entity in place (i.e. to acti-
vate the singular representation of the entity and recognize it) to guarantee the
experienced continuity of that entity. In this sense, the process is not depen-
dent on high level conceptual representations, but it is ensured by temporary
pre-conceptual representations (see 3.1 for a discussion on the models which
addressed this issue).
The second system is fully conceptual and deals with conceptual informa-
tion that comes into play when the object continuity can not be ensured by the
correspondence process which attempts to match a low-level temporary repre-
sentation (e.g. an object file in the Kahneman’s model [121]) to a particular
object perceived in the immediately preceding moments. Saying that the system
is fully conceptual does not mean that perceptual information is not involved
in the object identity tracking. It means, instead, that a high level conceptual
representation of the object is activated. Perceptual information can be part
of this representation and can be the most important information which medi-
ates the identification process in some situations. When I recognize a friend of
mine at a party, perceptual details can be the first elements of the conceptual
representation of him which ensure the individual continuity. However there
are situations in which perceptual information is insufficient (or completely ab-
sent) to trace the identity of an object. Consider the following situation. While
reading a news item about a traffic accident, I start to suspect that the person
involved in the accident is a classmate whom I lost touch with a long time ago.
I have to decide about the identity of this individual using only the information
reported in the article. I know that part of this information may reflect changes
that the person has undergone, and I have to use this knowledge to decide if
the description in the article is compatible with what I remember about that
person.
Sometimes identity judgments also entail the ability to choose between alter-
native descriptions. If you are searching for a friend on Facebook and you find
two or more alternative profiles registered under the same name, you have to de-
cide which profile refers to the person you have in mind, in spite of information
that might not match what you remember about that person.
In these cases, perceptual information can not help to trace the history of
the entity involved and higher level information about identity must come into
play.
The focus of this study is on the conceptual system which mediate identity
judgments.
In 3.3 we have described two alternative approaches which have addressed
the problem of object identity in terms of a conceptual system. The first ap-
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proach, i.e sortalism, claims that certain concepts (i.e. sortals) may determine
rules for individuating and identifying their category members. The concept
of table, for example, may consist in part of rules for differentiating individual
tables in a mass of tables and other objects and identifying each table over time.
A sortal specifies which properties of an individual category member can change
over time (and in what way) and which properties are fixed. From this perspec-
tive, knowledge of categories dictates identification rules for their exemplars.
An alternative approach has been recently proposed by Rips et al. [192].
According to this approach the ultimate basis for identity is not rooted in high
level representations of categories (i.e. general concepts), but depends on causal
forces that determine the continuity of objects through time. Causal laws govern
the life course of individual objects and people make use of causal information
to identify objects across time and change.
In a series of evocative studies, the authors examined the role of causality
in identity judgments and have proposed a new model of object identity named
Causal Continuer Theory. We have already described the model in 3.3.2. Here,
we summarize the most important aspects of the model for the purposes of our
research and we discuss how we used the model as general framework to study
the functioning dynamics of singular concepts in two experiments.
The model attempts to describe the cognitive processes people go through
when they have to decide whether an individual object, x0, existing at one time
is identical to one of a set of candidate objects, x1, x2 . . . ,xn, existing at a later
time.
The model derives from a philosophical theory, i.e. the Closest Continuer
Theory, proposed by Robert Nozick [174] as a theory of personal identity. The
Nozick’s theory suggests that the identical object to the original x0 is the one
that is, in some ways, the closest to it. In the Rips et al.’s model this closeness
is explained in terms of causal dynamics and therefore the model has been
referred to as Causal Continuer Theory. The intuition is that “the continuer of
the original object must be a causal outgrowth of that original” (p. 7). Causal
continuity captures the intuition that people think of causes as central to object
persistence and suggests that what makes two entities identical with each other
is not based on superficial similarity or sortal membership, but rather on a deep
causal connectedness.
While the first element of the model deals with causality, the second element
deals with closeness. As we noted above, the model assumes that in determining
a continuer, people do not select something that is arbitrary far from the origi-
nal. If there are two or more objects at a later time that are close enough to the
original, the theory specifies that only the closest of these objects is identical
to the original. However, if none of these potential continuers is significantly
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closer to the original than the others, the model predicts that indecision can be
generated due to the competition between the candidates. Another aspect re-
lated to the closeness is that in determining a continuer, people can not to select
something that is arbitrary far from the original. If the candidates are causally
too far from the original there may be no object that qualifies as identical to
the original.
In the causal continuer framework, the authors proposed a two-step decision
process on identity judgments. 1) The first step deals with considering as po-
tential candidates only those objects that are close enough to the original; 2)
the second step consists of selecting, within the range of candidates, the closest
object as the one identical to the original.
But how can a cognitive agent decide which are the possible candidates of
the original and then determine which is the closest to it? Our intuition is
that these processes can be performed by means of singular concepts. In our
framework, singular concepts are organized structures of semantic features or
attributes which store our information about the individuals they are about. In
chapter 8 we argued that these features are of different importance in concept
representation and that the most important features in a singular concept are
those which absolve better the identity function, i.e. those that are more useful
to discriminate an individual from other similar individuals (attributes with
high dominance and high distinctiveness).
Since individuals change across time, an important aspect of the identity
function deals with the mutability of features. An individual object, such as
a person or a car, can undergo a variety of changes in its properties, whereas
other property changes are not compatible with identity. Total disassembly and
reassembly may be possible for a watch but not for a person. This distinction
between possible and impossible changes for an individual then determines, at
least in part, the identity of that individual.
Within a causal framework, we argue that a change in a property is con-
sidered compatible with the identity of an individual, only if there is a causal
explanation which can justifies the change. Singular concepts would mediate this
evaluation. Our hypothesis is that the identity judgment requires a matching
process involving the original representation of an individual and one (or more)
representations of possible candidates (continuers). Representations of possible
candidates are selected considering the causal distance with the original repre-
sentation. A match is found and the identity is assigned, if a causal path is
traced from the initial representation to one of the alternative representations.
The causal path is given by a causal explanation which justify the transition
from one representation to another, i.e. a causal explanation for a change in one
or more features. Since more than one path can be found, the contender with
202
the strongest causal path is selected as the one identical to the original. In other
words people decide that a singular representation about a target individual x0
at one time t0 belongs to the same object as a representation of it at another
time t1, if there is a causal link which explains the transition of the representa-
tion at t0 into the representation at t1 and this link is the strongest compared
to other links which connect the original representation with representations of
other contenders.
The goal of the present study is to test how well the model explains people’s
identity judgments. To this purpose we performed two experiments in which we
used descriptions of individual entities (e.g., people or organizations) and asked
participants to make judgments about the identity of the entities across changes
in the descriptions.
In a first experiment (experiment 1) we collected “mutability ratings”, i.e.
ratings of whether an individual could still be the same individual given a change
in one of its features and “causality” ratings of how easy it is to imagine a cause
for such a change. The goal of this experiment was to collect quantitative
measures of causal distance which could be used to test the causal model in
the second experiment. By collecting the judgments of causality and mutability
from separate groups of participants we aimed to test whether these judgments
were independent. This was an important requirement for the use of causality
ratings in the second experiment, as we will discuss later.
As we have just noticed, in the causal model, identity judgments involve a
double comparison process: the identical object must be causally close enough to
be the original and must be closer than other close enough alternatives. There-
fore, to test the model, we needed a situation in which at least two contenders
were available and participants were asked to make a choice between potential
continuers which differed by causal distance from the original. In our experi-
ment we included a situation of this sort, asking participants to make identity
judgments between alternative descriptions which were simplified versions of de-
cisions that people have to make in many real-world situations (e.g. select the
correct profile of a friend on Facebook). Our aim was to predict participants’
judgments of whether an individual is the same as one, both, or neither of two
alternatives, where the alternatives differ from the original in the change of a
feature. For example, given a person who is 5 feet 10 inches and is a lawyer,
which of the following individuals is the same as the original: a) one who is 6
feet 1 inch and is a lawyer, b) one who is 5 feet 10 inches and is an accountant,
c) both, or d) neither.
Since our hypothesis assumes that the distance between two representations
depends on how it easy to find a causal explanation which connects the two
representations, the measures of causal distance collected in the experiment 1
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were used to create the tasks of this second experiment. In this way we could
use causal distance as predictor of the results in the experiment 2 and test the
performance of the model.
The causal continuer model assumes that the identity decisions are context
sensitive, i.e. an item that is closest in one situation may not be closest in an-
other if the second situation contains an even closer object. Context sensitivity
in identity has been largely criticized in philosophy [171] because it is seem im-
plausible that the question of whether an object x0 is identical to x1 can depend
on the presence of an individual x2 that may also exist at the same time as x1.
Of course, if we conceive identity as an intrinsic matter of an object, there is
no room for contextual dependencies. However, we agree with the authors of
the causal continuer theory that considering alternatives is an inevitable part of
judging the identity of entities. This is especially true in information contexts
where the identity decisions are usually performed in an information space rich
of alternatives and people have to decide if a piece of information is about an
entity target. Moreover the idea that an item in one situation may not be clos-
est in another if the second situation contains an even closer object, is coherent
with the identification process in an information system, since in this context
the problem is to find the better candidate given a certain information context.
Since our focus is on cognitive processes which are used in daily-life identity
decisions with particular attention for situation which involve interactions with
computer-based systems, we aimed to explore the cognitive plausibility of the
contextual sensitivity assumption in identity judgments. To this purpose, the
second goal of the study was to compare the performance of the causal continuer
model with that of a simpler model, i.e. Naive Causal Model, which assumes
that identity judgments are contextual-independent.
9.1 Experiment 1: Mutability and Causal Dis-
tance Norms Production
The aim of this experiment was to collectmutability ratings and causality ratings
for features of individual entities and to test the correlation between the two
measures.
The idea that features differ in their mutability has been first proposed by
Love et al. [141, 225] to explain the centrality of a feature for a general concept.
According to this view, the centrality of a feature represents the degree to
which the feature is integral to the mental representation of a category, the
degree to which it lends conceptual coherence. The authors have proposed an
explanation of the feature centrality for general concepts based on the notion
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of mutability. The idea is that the mutability of a feature in a concept is
a measure of feature centrality, reflecting people’s willingness to transform the
feature in a representation of an object while retaining the belief that the object
is represented by the concept. Therefore the degree of centrality associated with
a feature can be measured by asking people how easily they can transform their
mental representation of an object by eliminating the feature or by replacing
the feature with a different value, without changing other aspects of the object’s
representation. For instance, when one thinks about robins, one envisions a
creature that eats, builds nests, flies, has wings, a red breast, feathers, and so
on. Nevertheless, one can successfully perform conceptual transformations in
which one can imagine a robin that does not build nests but is still a robin. It
could be more difficult to imagine a robin which lacked bones and still count
as a robin. Features that are central to a representation, like “has bones” are
referred as immutable, while those that are more easily transformed, like “builds
nests” are referred to as mutable.
We argue that the notion of mutability can be used to quantify the relevance
of a change in a feature for identity judgments. In this perspective, a feature is
mutable of an entity to the extent that the feature can change without altering
the object’s identity. The idea is that features of individual objects can be
ordered according to their mutability using a task which requires to evaluate
the probability that a change in one attribute occurs without changing the
identity of the object.
The first goal of this experiment was to collect mutability ratings for features
of individual entities using a measure which is a variation of one of the measures
of mutability proposed by Sloman et al. [225] for general concepts, i.e. the easy-
of-imaging measure.
In a typical easy-of-imaging task, subjects are asked how easily they could
imagine an actual instance of a category without a specific feature. For example,
how easily they could imagine “a real apple that does not grow on trees”.
Since we were focused on concepts of unique individuals, we adapted this
task to the purposes of our study. First, we provided a brief description of an
individual, presenting a profile composed by five attribute-value pairs. Then,
we asked people to judge how easily could this individual still be the same if it
were in all ways like that in the description except that one of the feature was
changed in its value.
In this experiment we also collected a second type of ratings which we refer
to as causality ratings. Since in our causal framework we assume that identity
decisions are function of causal distance between singular representations, we
were interested to quantify the degree of causal distance which divide two rep-
resentations when these representations differ for the value of one attribute. In
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other words, our aim was to quantify how easy is to imagine a causal explana-
tion for a change of a representation on a specific attribute. To collect causality
ratings we used the same method used for mutability ratings. We presented an
attribute-value profile describing an individual and then we asked participants
to judge how easy is to imagine a cause that can determine the change on a
specific attribute of the description.
Mutability and causality ratings were collected from two different groups
of participants, in order to ensure that the two measures (i.e. mutability and
causality distance) were independent. This is because in the second experiment
we aimed to use the causal distance as predictor of identity judgments and was
important to exclude that causal judgments from which we derived the ratings
involved a form of identity judgment.
On the contrary a type of identity judgment was involved in the mutability
task. Since the mutability ratings asked how easily a feature could change
while preserving identity, they already involve a type of identity judgment quite
similar to that participants will be asked to make in the second experiment.
Therefore, if the comparison between the two measures provided evidence for
the independence of the two dimensions we could use the causality distance as
a predictor for the identity judgments in the second experiment.
9.1.1 Method
Participants
The participants were 32 Northwestern University students who took part in
order to fulfill a course requirement in introductory psychology. Of the partici-
pants, 16 were randomly assigned to the mutability ratings group, the other 16
were assigned to the causality rating group.
Stimuli
In order to collect mutability and causality ratings we used descriptions of indi-
viduals by means of attribute-value profiles. Individuals were selected from the
five categories (Person, Organization, Event, Artifact, Location) used in the pre-
vious studies on feature relevance. Five exemplars for each category were used
resulting in 25 profiles. Each profile was composed by five attributes which were
selected using the feature norms described in chapter 8. Since proper names are
different from the other attributes of a singular concept - because of their nature
of rigid devices of direct reference and unique markers of mental individuality -
we decided to not include the names of the entities among the attributes tested
for mutability and causality ratings. We collected ratings for each attribute of
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the profile. Therefore, the experiment consisted of 125 trials resulting from five
profiles for each category and five attributes for each profile. For example, a
person profile used in the experiment was the following:
NAME: Madison Smith
AGE: 45
HOBBIES: tennis
OCCUPATION: reporter
PHONE: 202.287.3305
HEIGHT: 5’8”
The complete list of profiles used in the experiment is reported in Appendix
D.1.
Procedure
To collect the mutability ratings, participants were told they were presented with
a series of descriptions of objects and that each object was described by a list of
attributes. For each description they were asked to evaluate the probability that
a change in one attribute occurs without changing the identity of the object.
All the questions were of the following format: “How easily could X still be X
if it had all the attributes of X except P?” where X is the specific object and
it is changed in some manner with respect to the attribute P. To make these
judgments, participants were asked to choose a number between 1 and 9, where
1 represented “very easy” and 9 represented “very difficult”.
For example, given the description above (which we refer as description A)
a possible question was: “How easily could this individual still be the same if it
were in all ways like that in the description A except that its OCCUPATION
is changed? In other words, if you were presented with another description B
that is in all ways like the description A except that the occupation is changed,
how easily could these two descriptions refer to the same individual?”
Causality ratings were collected saying participants they were presented with
a series of descriptions of objects composed by a list of attributes. For each
description they were asked to imagine a possible cause that explains the change
in one attribute. All the questions were of the following format: “How easy is
to imagine a cause that changes the attribute A?”.
Mutability and causality ratings were obtained from two separate groups of
subjects. Each subject provided ratings for all the trials of the corresponding
condition. All trials were completely randomized between participants with the
exception that the same profile could not appear in two consecutive trials.
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At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to answer two ques-
tions about the strategies they used to provide their ratings.
The first question aimed to investigate whether participants took into ac-
count only the attribute type (e.g., “occupation”), without considering the spe-
cific value on this attribute (e.g., “reporter”) in order to provide their judgments,
or whether they took into account both the attribute type and the specific value
on this attribute. For example, to rate how easily the attribute “occupation”
could change (or to imagine a cause that changes the occupation of the person)
we wanted to know if they provided their judgments regardless of the fact that
she was a reporter or they took in consideration the fact that she was a reporter.
The second question investigated whether participants took into account
only the change in the specific attribute without considering possible interac-
tions with other attributes, or whether they took into account both the change
in the specific attribute and possible interactions with other attributes to make
their judgments. For example, to rate the change in the attribute “occupa-
tion”, we were interested whether they judged how likely the person changes
her occupation (or they imagined a possible cause that changes the occupation
of the person) regardless of her “age”, or whether they considered also the age
in making their judgments.
The motivation underlying these two questions was to verify the influence
that the specific description we provided could have on the final ratings. Of
course our goal was to minimize this influence and the instructions of the ex-
periment were created to this purpose. In particular the main concern was
about the interaction between attributes because we wanted to obtain context-
independent ratings to be used in the second experiment.
9.1.2 Results
For each attribute the mean ratings across participants were calculated for each
condition (i.e. mutability and causality). The complete list of attributes with
the corresponding mutability and causality mean ratings is reported in D.2.
Correlation across all the attributes were 0.66. The two measures of mutability
and causal centrality correlates with each others. However, even though the
correlation is quite high there is room for assuming that the two measure reflect,
at least partially, independent constructs. For this reason we decided to use
the causal distance measure as predictor for identity judgments in the second
experiment.
The analysis of the questions about the strategies used by participants
showed the efficacy of the instructions in reducing the influence of specific com-
binations of attributes and specific values on these attributes on the partici-
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pants’judgments. The majority of participants reported that they took into
account only the attribute type instead of the attribute-type combination to
formulate their judgments, both in the mutability group (11 out of 16, p = 0.13)
and in the causality group (14 out of 16, p < 0.003). In figure 9.1 we show the
response frequencies in the two groups of participants.
We obtained a very similar pattern of results also for the second question
about the response strategy used by participants. In particular, 12 out of 16
participants (p < 0.05) in the mutability group and 13 out of 16 (p < 0.02)
participants in the causality group reported that they did not consider the
interaction between different attribute types in the profile to formulate their
judgments. Figure 9.2 shows the distribution of the response frequencies.
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Figure 9.1: Response frequencies of the response strategies used by participants
(question 1) in the two experimental groups.
9.2 Experiment 2: Identity Decisions across Change
The first goal of the second experiment was to test the predictions of the Causal
Continuer Model using the causality ratings collected in the experiment 1 to
estimate the causal distance of features in an identity decision task.
The second goal was to compare the performance of the causal continuer
model with a simpler model, i.e Naive Causal Model, based on the assumption
of contextual independence of identity decisions.
As we have noticed above, in the Causal Continuer Model, identity judg-
ments involve a double comparison process: the identical object must be causally
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Figure 9.2: Response frequencies of the response strategies used by participants
(question 2) in the two experimental groups.
close enough to be the original and must be closer than other close enough alter-
natives. To test how well the causal continuer model predicts people’s identity
judgments, we needed a situation in which at least two contenders were available
and the contenders differed for causal distance with the original.
To this purpose, we designed an experimental task that gave participants a
choice between two alternative descriptions (i.e. continuers) which differed in
terms of causal distance from an initial description of an entity (i.e. original).
Then, we asked participants to judge whether the individual described in the
original profile was the same as one, both, or neither of the two alternatives,
where each of the alternative descriptions differed from the original in the change
on a feature.
The goal of the study was to determine whether the causal continuer model
could predict participants’ decisions about which description in each pair (or
both or neither) was about the same individual as the initial one. We assume
these decisions will reflect the model’s two-part structure: the participants’
notion of whether either alternative is causally close enough to be the original
and also whether one alternative is causally closer than the other.
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9.2.1 Method
Subjects
45 undergraduate or postgraduate students of the Northwestern University of
Chicago (USA) participated in the experiment in exchange for either course
credit or a small payment.
Procedure
To find out how well the causal continuer theory handles people’s identity judg-
ments, we designed an experimental task that gave participants a choice between
two potential continuers and varied the causal distance between the continuers
and the original object. Participants were presented with the profile of an indi-
vidual (i.e. a description containing two attribute-value pairs) and two alterna-
tive profiles (i.e. continuer 1 and continuer 2) that differed from the original by
just the value of one attribute, but were identical to the original by the value of
the other attribute. One continuer differed from the original on one attribute,
the other continuer differed on the other attribute.
The participants’ task was to decide which of the alternative descriptions
referred to the same individual as the original description. For each trial par-
ticipants were asked to chose one of the following answers: “Only the continuer
c1 refers to the same individual described in the original profile”, “Only the
continuer c2 refers to the same individual”, “Both refer to the same individual”
or “Neither c1 nor c2 refer to the same individual”.
For example, given the description of a person who lives in Germany and is
5 feet 6 inches, the question was to decide which of the following descriptions
referred to the same individual as the original: a) one who lives in Ireland and
is 5 feet 6 inches (continuer 1), b) one who lives in Germany and is 5 feet 3
inches (continuer 2), c) both, or d) neither.
Since we wanted to manipulate the causal distance between the continuers
and the original description and study how well the model predicts the response
distributions of participants, it was important to test different combinations of
causal distance along the range of possible distances, varying from 1 (minimum
distance) to 9 (maximum distance).
To this purpose, we divided the attributes of the categories used in experi-
ment 1 in 5 quantiles on the basis of the mean causal distances. In this way, we
created 5 sets of attributes for each category (i.e. Person, Organization, Event,
Artifact and Location) ordered from the minimum to the maximum causal dis-
tance. Then, for each category we combined pairs of attributes which could be
randomly extracted from the same set resulting in five pairs (i.e. the first pair
from the first set, the second from the second set and so on), or from different
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sets resulting in ten pairs, one for each combination of sets (i.e. the first with
the second, the first with the third and so on). As a result we obtained 15
tasks for each category resulting in 75 tasks which were used in a within subject
design. The procedure used to select the tasks ensured a good distribution in
terms of causal distance which was reflected in an homogeneous distribution
of the differences of the causal distances between the continuers. A graphical
representation of this distribution for the Person category is reported in Figure
9.3.
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Figure 9.3: Distribution of the causal distance differences between the continuers
in the person tasks used in experiment 2.
We note that we decided to use descriptions containing only two attributes
in order to minimize possible interactions between attributes. For instance, a
change on the attribute “occupation” can depend in some way from the at-
tribute “age”(e.g. the fact that a 50 years old person is less likely to change her
occupation compared to a 30 years old person). However, since the selection pro-
cedure selected randomly the combination of attributes from the quantile sets,
possible dependencies between attributes within the same pair were evaluated
separately from 4 judges who analyzed the tasks after they were automatically
generated. In case a dependency was observed, the extraction procedure was
repeated until obtaining an acceptable combination of attributes. The complete
list of the profiles used in the experiment is reported in D.3.
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9.2.2 Results
According to the Causal Continuer Theory, participants’ responses on a partic-
ular trial should depend on a two-phase decision process. First, they need to
determine whether either alternative description is close enough to the original
to qualify it as referring to the same individual. Second, they need to determine
whether one of the description is causally closer than the other.
Our assumption in this experiment is that the causal closeness between the
original and a continuer is quantifiable by how easy is to find a causal expla-
nation which may explain the transition from the original description to the
continuer’s description. The more easy is to explain the change, the less is the
causal distance.
We assume that this process corresponds to an equivalent process in semantic
memory which involves a comparison between singular concepts. The singular
concept of the original is compared with the singular concepts of the continuers
and the first step of the process establishes whether a causal explanation can
be found to link the original representation with that of the continuers. Subse-
quently, it is established whether one of the singular concepts of the continuers
is more strongly connected to the singular concept of the original.
If a causal link is found for one or both of the continuers and the second
step of the identity process reveals that there is a strongest link between the
original and one of the continuer, participants should respond that only the
closer continuer is identical. On the contrary, if both representations of the
continuers can be linked to the original, but it is not possible to decide which is
the strongest connection, participants should respond that both continuers are
identical to the original. In all the other cases they should answer that neither
of the continuers can be considered identical to the original.
Since our assumption is that the causal closeness between the original and
a continuer depends on how easy is to find a causal connection between the
corresponding representations, we used the causal distance ratings collected in
the experiment 1 to estimate 1) the likelihood that one or the other continuer
(c1 or c2) is causally close enough to be identical to the original and 2) the
likelihood that one of them is closer to the original. The quantitative model is
expressed by the following equations.
P (c1 or c2 close enough) = 1−(1−P (c1 close enough))∗(1−P (c2 close enough))
(9.1)
In the equation 9.1 the probability that c1 or c2 are close enough to the
original to be considered identical to it is calculated as the probability of two
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disjunctive events, i.e. c1 is close enough or c2 is close enough. Disjunctive
events are events which will be considered successful if at least one event is a
success, therefore the probability that c1 or c2 are close enough is calculated as
1 - (the probability of both the two events NOT occurring). To estimate the
probability P(c1 close enough) and P(c2 close enough) we used the causality
ratings collected in the experiment 1 as follows:
P (c1 close enough) =
(9 −mean causal distance of c1)
8
P (c2 close enough) =
(9 −mean causal distance of c2)
8
We note that the causality ratings were provided on a 9-point rating scale
(1=very easy; 9=very difficult). Therefore, the formula transforms the ratings
into probability values ranging from 0 (when the causal distance is equal to 9)
to 1 (when the causal distance is equal to 1).
The second step of the decision process is to establish whether the causal
distance between the continuers is enough to consider one of them closer to the
original. The assumption here is that only the continuer with the lower causal
distance is the potential candidate to be the only one continuer closer to the
original. If c2 is the continuer with the higher distance, the model predicts
that c2 can never be closer than c1 and participants will never say that only c2
represents the original object.
Therefore if, for instance, c1 is the continuer with the lower causal distance,
the probability that c1 is the closest continuer can be calculated as follows:
P (c1 closer) =
P (c1 close enough) - P(c2 close enough)
1− P (c2 close enough)
(9.2)
The equation 9.2 indicates that more the causal distances of the continuers
are close, less likely c1 is considered the only closer continuer. Combining the
equations 9.1 and 9.2 gives us the predictions for the identity judgments in
experiment 2.
For example, assuming that c1 is the continuer with the lower causal distance
the model predictions are:
P (c1 identical) = P (c1 closer) ∗ P (c1 or c2 close enough) (9.3)
where P(c1 identical) is the predicted probability that participants should
identify only c1 as identical to the original.
P (both identical) = (1− P (c1 closer)) ∗ (P (c1 or c2 close enough)) (9.4)
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where P(both identical) is the probability of a “both” response.
P (neither identical) = 1− P (c1 identical)− P (both identical) (9.5)
where P(neither identical) is the probability of a “neither” response. As we
have mentioned before, according to the model P(c2 closer) is 0 in this case,
because c2 can not be the only continuer chosen given that c1 is at a lower
causal distance than c2.
To evaluate the model, we fit the model predictions to the percentage of re-
sponses of the experiment 2, using least squares approximation. Since we found
a certain variability between the categories of entities (i.e. Person, Organiza-
tion, Event, Artifact and Location) used in the experiment, we performed the
analysis separately for the different categories. In Figure 9.4 and 9.5 we reported
the percentage of responses obtained in the experiment 2 for the 15 trials of the
person category. Lines with circle points represent the observed responses that
the continuer c1, the continuer c2, both continuers or neither continuers refer to
the same entity as the original description. Red lines with square points denote
the model predictions (i.e. predicted percentage of responses). The graphs for
the other categories are reported in Appendix D.4.1. Table 9.1 shows the overall
fit of the model for each category.
Category Model Fit (R2) Residual Standard Errors gdl
Person 0.82 8.97 58
Organization 0.68 10.62 58
Event 0.32 13.19 58
Artifact 0.69 11.13 58
Location 0.77 10.19 58
Table 9.1: Causal Continuer Model Fit
The overall fit of the model is quite good for four out of five categories (i.e.
Person, Organization, Artifact and Location), as we can observe from the R2
values1.
However, the model performs significantly worse for the category Event
(R2 = 0.32). This result opens interesting questions about the ontological
nature of events and the strategies used by people to trace the identity of events
across time and change. We will discuss this aspect in section 9.2.3.
A second goal of the analysis was to compare the performance of the Causal
Continuer Model with that of a simpler model which we refer to as Naive Causal
1R2 is a statistic that quantifies the goodness of fit of a model. It is a measure ranging
between 0 and 1, and has no units. Higher values indicate that the model fits the data better.
R2 = 1 indicates that the model fits perfectly the observed data.
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Model. This model assumes that participants make their decisions on the basis
of their separate judgments of whether the continuer c1 or the continuer c2 refer
to the same entity as the original description. This assumption differs from
the causal continuer idea in that there is no explicit comparison for closeness
between the continuers as expressed in the Equation 9.2. Under this assumption,
the Naive Causal Model makes the identity decisions context insensitive, in the
sense that the judgment on one continuer is not dependent on the presence of
other continuers which can be more or less closer to the original. This means
that, if we represent the probability that c1 is close enough to the original as
P(c1 close enough) and the probability that the c2 is close enough as P(c2
close enough) as in the previous model, the Naive Causal Model computes the
probability that c1 is identical to the original, c2 is identical, both are identical
or neither are identical as follows. Assuming independence between decisions:
P (c1 identical) = P (c1 close enough) ∗ P (1− c2 close enough) (9.6)
P (c2 identical) = P (c2 close enough) ∗ P (1− c1 close enough) (9.7)
P (both identical) = P (c1 close enough) ∗ P (c2 close enough) (9.8)
P (neither identical) = 1− P (c1 identical)− P (c2 identical)− P (c3 identical)
(9.9)
Estimating the component probabilities from the mean causality ratings,
as we did earlier, allows us to fit the Naive Causal Model to the data. The
goodness of the model fit for the five categories used in the experiment can
be observed in Table 9.2. The Naive Causal Model performs less well than the
Causal Continuer Model in four of the five categories (i.e. Person, Organization,
Artifact and Location), as we can observe comparing the R2 values of the two
models. However, the opposite pattern of results was found for the category
Event, where the Naive Causal Model does considerably better than the Causal
Continuer Model. This seems confirm that people use different strategies to
evaluate the identity of events compared to other categories of entities.
In Appendix D.4.2 we reported a graphical representation of the Naive
Causal Model fitting for all the categories of the experiment.
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Figure 9.4: Person tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure 9.5: Person tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Category Model Fit (R2) Residual Standard Errors gdl
Person 0.74 10.47 58
Organization 0.43 13.41 58
Event 0.65 9.50 58
Artifact 0.43 16.08 58
Location 0.38 15.85 58
Table 9.2: Naive Causal Model Fit
9.2.3 Discussion
In this experiment we have explored how people make identity decisions between
alternatives across change.
Our goal was to test the hypothesis that people believe that causal forces
come into play to determine the changes which objects can undergo. To decide
if an individual x0 at one time and situation is the same individual x1 (changed
on a certain aspect) at another time and situation, people would use causal
explanations to evaluate the plausibility of the change. In other words, people
use their knowledge about the probability that a certain cause may explain the
change to evaluate the identity of objects across time or situations.
We know for example that a person can change hair style while still remaining
the same person, but it is hard to believe that a dog can change its breed while
remaining the same dog. This is because in the first case we can easily imagine
a cause which explains that the person has changed hair style (e.g. she went to
the hairdresser). On the contrary, it is difficult to find a causal reason which
can explain that a dog changes its breed, at least in the real world.
The easy with which a causal explanation can be found for a certain change
determines the causal distance of an individual x1 from the original individual
x0. Our hypothesis is that this causal distance is a general metric used by peo-
ple to make identity judgments about objects of different categories. Since we
believe that identity judgments are promoted by conceptual representations of
individuals (i.e. singular concepts), we argue that causal distance is ultimately
the metric for singular concepts. When a person has to decide, given a certain
amount of knowledge about a target individual x0 at one time and situation,
whether this individual continues to exist at another time and situation, she has
to fix the referent of two singular concepts. More precisely, she has two singular
representations in memory and she has to decide whether the two representa-
tions belong to the same object as a representation of it at two different times
or situations. In order to perform such a process, the causal distance between
the two representations is used. Since in many situations identity judgments
also entail the ability to choose between alternatives, we argue that causal dis-
tance is also the metric used to discriminate between them. In particular we
219
hypothesize that the dynamics of functioning of singular concepts in promoting
identity judgments between alternatives can be modeled by a Causal Continuer
Model which assumes that these judgments involves a two-step process: the
participants’ notion of whether either alternative is causally close enough to be
the original and also whether one alternative is causally closer than the other.
To test our hypothesis, we asked participants to make identity decisions be-
tween alternatives, using short descriptions of entities. The idea was reproduce
simplified versions of decisions that people have to make in many real-world
situations. In each task we presented a description of an individual entity (e.g.,
a person, an organization, an event and so on). This entity was described by a
small set of attributes that represented all the information that the participant
knew about the entity at the time of the decision. We conceived the descrip-
tion as a sort of explicit representation of the content of the singular concept of
that entity. Two alternative descriptions were also presented together with the
original, corresponding, in terms of mental representation, to other two singular
concepts. Each of these descriptions differed from the original by the value of
one attribute and this change corresponded to a certain causal distance, esti-
mated using the causal ratings collected in the experiment 1. The task of the
participants was to decide which (if either) of the two alternative descriptions
was likely to refer to the same individual described in the original description.
In terms of the functioning dynamics of singular concepts the task required to
find a match (if any) between the singular concept of the original and those of
the alternatives.
Using the mean causality ratings collected in the experiment 1 as predic-
tors for the identity judgments in the experiment 2 we tested the performance
of a quantitative version of the Causal Continuer Model. The results of the
experiment showed that the model fit was quite good for the majority of cate-
gories used in the experiment, indicating that the model can predict the identity
judgments between alternatives and, in our perspective, it can reproduce the
dynamics of functioning of the underlying singular concepts. This results is
also confirmed by the evaluation of an alternative model, which we called Naive
Causal Model, which showed lower performance on the same categories. In
particular, since the main difference between the two models is related to the
contextual dependency of the identity decisions (assumed by the Causal Con-
tinuer Model but denied by the Naive Causal Model), the better performance
of the Causal Continuer Model produces an evidence in favor of the idea that
considering alternatives is an inevitable part of judging or inferring the identity
of objects.
However, there is a considerable exception in this scene that is represented
by the category Event. From our analysis the model is not able to reproduce
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the identity decisions for entities belonging to this category. This is also the
only category in which the Naive Causal Model performs better (R2 = 0.65)
than the Causal Continuer Model (R2 = 0.32).
In chapter 8 we have discussed the ontological nature of the five categories
of entities that we have used in this experiment, i.e. Person, Organization,
Event, Artifact and Location. An important ontological distinction that can
help to understand the difference between events and other categories of enti-
ties is between endurants (also called continuants) and perdurants (also called
occurrents). Endurants are entities that are “in time”, they are “wholly” present
(all their proper parts are present) at any time of their existence. On the con-
trary, perdurants are entities that “happen in time”, they extend in time by
accumulating different “temporal parts”, so that, at any time t at which they
exist, only their temporal parts at t are present. Events are perdurant entities,
whereas all the other entities that we have considered in the experiment are
endurants. Endurants and perdurants can be characterized by whether or not
they can exhibit change in time. Endurants can “genuinely” change in time,
in the sense that the very same endurant as a whole can change a property at
different times; perdurants cannot change in this sense, since none of their parts
keeps its identity in time. Suppose for example that a person has the property
of “being a student” at a time t and the different property of “being a lawyer”
at a time t1. In both cases we refer to the whole object, without picking up
any particular part of it. On the other hand, when we say that a perdurant like
“the football game” has a property at t like “was boring”(at the beginning) and
an another property at t1 like “was exciting” (say toward the end of the game)
there are always two different parts exhibiting the two properties.
In this sense an event can not change in time as a whole. The different
ontological nature of events could explain a different strategy used by partic-
ipants in the experiment. Since events happen in time and are composed by
temporal parts which are different across time, it is difficult to compare the
continuers to establish if one is more close than the other to the original. This
is because the changes can affect different temporal parts. This could explain
the better performance of the Naive Causal Model in fitting the data, because
this model does not assume the comparison between the continuers, but predict
that participants make their decisions on the basis of their separate judgments
of whether one or the other continuer is identical to the original.
Despite these differences, the main contribution of this study is to show that
causal reasoning is of central importance to judgments of individual persistence.
Moreover, from the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that has at-
tempted to explicitly quantify the causal distance between alternatives and use
this measure as the predictor of a causal model to infer the identity judgments.
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This aspect is important to confer validity on the theoretical model. Indeed,
one of the main criticisms that was made to the authors of the Causal Con-
tinuer Model was that to be able to make the claim that causal continuity is
the factor that accounts for participants’ identity judgments, they would have
had to provide, minimally, some measure of causal distance [190]. On the con-
trary, according to this criticism, they offered post hoc descriptions, in each of
their experiment, of how the observed results could have been due to causal rea-
soning. In one of their experiments, for example, Rips et al. [192] used stories
about hypothetical transformations, similar to those adopted in some philosoph-
ical discussions of identity, describing a machine that could copy and transfer
objects from place to place on a particle-by-particle basis. Participants read sto-
ries depicting a lion named Fred, whose copied particles were combined in some
proportion with particles from another lion or a tiger to create a new creature.
Participants were asked to decide whether the resulting creature was or was not
Fred. The assumption was that causal closeness in this experiment depended
on the percentage of the copy’s particles that derived from the original. In the
stories, the copying machine was the causal mechanism that produced closeness
by copying particles and transmitting them. However, it was argued by [190],
we cannot exclude that in this experiment people used other strategies to infer
the identity of the object, like for example a similarity criterion (more particles
from the original is equivalent to more similarity).
In our experiment we have manipulated measures of causal distance collected
from a different group of subjects in a previous experiment, and we have shown
that the participants’ identity judgments can be predicted from a causal model
which use these measures to infer the percentages of responses. This seems a
direct way to provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that causal continuity
is the factor that accounts for participants’ identity judgments.
Several experiments on object identity used fiction scenarios to explore the
cognitive processes involved in identity judgments (see for example [137, 23,
192]). The use of this scenarios was criticized by some authors [190], arguing
that in fictional contexts people are willing to accept kinds of transformations
(no matter how extreme they are) which would not be acceptable in real world
situations. This was considered another reason to cast a doubt on the effective-
ness of transformation studies to explore how people make identity judgments
in real-world situations.
Therefore, another contribution of our research is to have applied the Causal
Continuer Model to a decisional context that reproduces simplified versions of
decisions that people have to make in many real-world situations. There are
many contexts in which identity judgments entail the ability to choose between
alternative descriptions and this is particularly prominent in informational con-
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text like the Web. For example, if you are searching for a friend on Facebook
and you find two or more alternative profiles registered under the same name,
you have to decide which profile refers to the person you have in mind, in spite
of information that might not match what you remember about that person.
When you use a search engine, like Google, you have to decide which link (or
links) returned by the system refers to the entity you are looking for and you
have to base this decision on a limited amount of information contained in the
small fragment of the Web page, named snippet, which summarize its content.
In all these situations the identity decisions are based on a limited amount of
information and involve a decision between alternatives. We believe that our
study provides an important contribution to explain how people perform iden-
tity judgments in situations like those described above and provides a plausible
account within a theoretical framework that can be used in different contexts.
For example, understanding how people make identity decisions between al-
ternatives can provide interesting insights for the development of systems which
have to perform these decisions automatically or which involve the interaction
with real users.
In 5.3 we have described an example of one of these systems (i.e. an En-
tity Name System) and we have noted a parallelism between the functioning
dynamics of singular concepts and those involved in the maintenance of entity
profiles in the system. We have observed that one of the main requirement
for the system is the life-cycle management of the entity profiles across time
and change. We envision the possibility to adopt the notion of causal distance
for the development of algorithms which decide about the identity of entities
through time. For example, one of the function which must be performed by
these algorithms is entity merging. We have noted that since new profiles of
entities are continuously added to the system and entity representation change
incrementally as a consequence of the updating process, the system is supposed
to revisit its identity decisions, i.e. it has to check if given the current status
of information in the repository, entity matching would still support the same
entity identity decisions. As a result of such a process it might be detected that
two entity representations (with separate identifiers) actually refer to the same
real world entity, requiring corrective actions which produce a unified represen-
tation from the two initially separated profiles. This process is named entity
merging.
In order to decide whether two profiles refer to the same entity, a measure
of causal distance can be adopted and a two-phase process like that suggested
by the Causal Continuer Model can be performed. A first step would select
possible candidates (i.e. those that are close enough to a given profile), while
a second step would establish whether one of these candidates is sufficiently
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closer compared to the contenders to be considered identical to the original and
consequently merged with it. The causal distance could be quantified in an
indirect way. Since in this specific case the causal distance measures how easily
causal forces may change an aspect of an entity represented by the value of an
attribute without altering its identity, the causal distance can be estimated by
the degree of mutability of the same attribute in the profiles of all the other
entities of the same type in the repository. The idea is that if it is unlikely that
causal forces may change the feature (e.g. gender) represented in the system as
the value of an attribute, we should expect that the degree of mutability of this
attribute is low for the majority of entities of the same type. This means that
the attribute changes rarely in their profiles. Estimating the causal distances
from the histories of the entities in the repository, these measures can be directly
applied in the merging decision process.
This is just an example of how understanding the cognitive processes involved
in human identity decisions can be exploited in technological contexts, showing
the potential for a profitable dialog between the two research fields.
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Chapter 10
An Application for Entity
Type Disambiguation in
Queries using RDF Triples
as Knowledge-Base
One of the objectives of this thesis is to provide evidence of how a cognitive
study on the problem of individual identification can provide contributions for
the development of technological applications.
In chapter 8 we individuated a possible ground where we found the oppor-
tunity to address this issue, i.e. the Entity Type Disambiguation Problem in
Web search queries. The general question was how to determine from a set of
keywords the entity a user is after, and the type of this entity, in order to limit
the search to information about this precise entity. This issue is relevant for
the information retrieval community since entity type disambiguation can be
used to fix a number of failure cases in the relevance based search engines, but
is also particularly meaningful for searching in Semantic Web content, where
“aboutness” is a central aspect of information modeling. Finally the issue has a
particular resonance for entity-centric approaches to information and knowledge
management in distributed systems like the Web.
Knowing about what we want to know something can help us limit the search
space significantly and improve the quality of search results.
As a first step of the research, we investigated in a user study which kinds of
attributes humans actually consider relevant to identify different types of entities
during the search process. The first contribution of the study was to identify
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patterns of attributes that reproduce recurrent strategies in entity searching.
For example, a query that is of the form “first name surname city” is indicative
of a person search.
Based on these results, we investigated the assumption that an entity type
can be inferred from the attributes a user specifies in a query and we proposed a
Bayesian model for Entity Type Disambiguation that explores this assumption.
We found that the performance of the model was very good and encouraging and
we provided evidence for the beneficial impact of the Entity Type Disambigua-
tion approach on the performance of an entity-centric search engine. However,
the approach does not address the issue of how to perform automatically the
assignment of attributes to their corresponding attribute types. Of course if we
aim to implement the model in a real application, this is not a trivial task.
In this chapter we propose a possible solution to the automation problem
and we show how an approach derived from a cognitive study can inspire tech-
nological solutions.
Since the previous analysis on the queries collected in the entity search exper-
iment showed that the majority of attributes in a query contain named entities,
we propose here a simplified approach to the problem of Entity Type Disam-
biguation. This approach is based on the assumption that the entity type of a
query can be inferred by disambiguating the types of the named entities in the
query.
To investigate our assumption we propose a new method that automatically
extracts and classifies the named entities in a query and then infer the entity
type of the target of the query (i.e. the entity the user is looking for).
As far as we know, there are very few studies that have addressed the prob-
lem of named entity disambiguation in queries. Named Entity Disambiguation
in query addresses for queries the same problem which traditionally has been ad-
dressed by Named Entity Recognition (NER) in natural language texts. NER is
the task of processing a text and identifying certain occurrences of words or ex-
pressions as belonging to particular categories of Named Entities (NE), such as
the names of persons, organizations, locations, expressions of times, quantities
and others. Several approaches have been proposed in literature (e.g. rule-
based, supervised, unsupervised machine learning approaches) and a number of
cues are utilized to identify named entities in textual documents. These may
include local cues such as affixes, orthographic cues (e.g. capitalization), part-
of-speech (POS) tags (i.e. linguistic categories of words) and phrasal chunks (i.e.
simple syntactic structures) or external cues such as external lookup lists of fa-
miliar names (i.e. gazetteers) or training corpora (typically used for machine
learning approaches).
However, direct application of exiting NER methods to queries would not
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perform well. This is because queries are usually very short and, therefore,
contextual information (i.e. words surrounding a word), which usually helps
the disambiguation process in texts, is very limited. Moreover, very often terms
in queries are not in standard form (e.g., all letters are in lower case), and thus
many features are not sufficient for performing accurate disambiguation.
For these reasons, we propose a new approach for entity type disambiguation
which mine semantic annotated data to provide knowledge for disambiguating
queries. The approach exploits a large data set of semantic metadata (RDF
triples) - extracted from (Semantic Web) documents - as a repository of entity-
related semantic knowledge which is used to extract named entities in queries
and classify them in possible types.
The general idea is that the disambiguation process can be tackled exploiting
the subject-predicate-object structure of RDF statements (or triples) used to
describe resources1 in the Semantic Web. In the RDF data model, the subject
denotes the resource, and the predicate denotes traits or aspects of the resource
and expresses a relationship between the subject and the object. Our approach
focuses only on a subclass of RDF metadata namely RDF statements whose
objects are literals (plain text strings, such as, for example, “Rome”, “Barack
Obama” or “June 1th 2009”). In these statements the predicate, establishing
the relation between the subject and the object, makes explicit the type of in-
formation specified by the literal object. For example, in a statement describing
that there is a person whose name is Barack Obama, the predicate would spec-
ify that “Barack Obama” is the “person name” of the entity identified by the
subject. To restate in other words, “Barack Obama” can be seen as the value
of the attribute “person name”. From that we can infer that “Barack Obama”
is a named entity whose type is Person.
The idea is that many terms that compose an entity query match literals (or
part of them) of RDF statements. Therefore the predicates of these statements
can be indexed (using a large data set of metadata) and mapped into a set of
possible candidate entity types for disambiguation. For instance, in the previous
example, the predicate “person name” would map to the entity type Person.
In this way, any keyword or combination of keywords inside of a query can
be searched in the index to get the most likely entity type. Once the set of
candidate entity types have been returned for all the entities in the query, the
most likely entity type for the whole query is selected.
Even though we tested the effectiveness of the approach on a subset of types
of named entities (person, organization and location), the method is general
1in the Semantic Web, the term resource encompasses every thing or entity that can be
identified, named, addressed or handled, in any way whatsoever, in the Web at large, or in
any networked information system.
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enough to be extended to more types of named entities (e.g. event or arti-
fact) and to other attributes which do not contain named entities but other
kinds of information (e.g. the profession of a person, the type of activity of an
organization, the topic of an event and so on).
Finally, since with the rise of the Semantic Web more and more RDF data
becomes available on the Web, we believe that the approach can be improved
progressively enlarging and updating the RDF triple store from which the en-
tity types are extracted, according to the new information represented on the
Web. If a new named entity is semantically tagged within a RDF triple, this
information is potentially available for the disambiguation process. Therefore,
the proposed approach is less static than other NER methods based on ex-
tensive gazetteers - including lists of names of people, organizations, locations,
and other named entities - or on manually annotated training corpora used in
data-driven statistical approaches.
10.1 Related Works
The performance of search engines depends on their ability to capture the mean-
ing of a query most likely intended by the user. The intended meaning has been
viewed so far as either a “topic” [105] or an “intent” [30]. In our approach we
propose a third aspect of the intended meaning of a query based on the un-
derlying “entity” that acts as the core of the information need (i.e. the target
entity). This view is in line with a recent entity-centric vision of information
and knowledge management on the Web.
The entity-centric aspect of the Web has been described and supported both
conceptually [27] and in terms of implementation [57, 43]. We study the problem
of Entity Type Disambiguation in the query terms, based on an already existing
context of entity-centric search on Web data.
Users submit queries that usually contain a small number of keywords, i.e.
the queries provide very limited information related to the intended information
need. Query processing has been used as a way to infer the information need
from the query. Several features additional to the query themselves have been
used in the literature to describe a query related to the web, e.g., query log
information, search context information [39] and anchor text [133]. Among the
efforts of understanding the meaning of a query, we can distinguish between two
main kinds of processing that have been applied on queries: query segmentation
and query classification.
Query Segmentation aims to identify “meaningful” segments inside of a
query, usually referring to word collocations (sets of words found to be neighbors
more often than expected by chance, within a text corpus). This approach
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essentially addresses a syntactic issue, because it does not identify the type of
concepts and does not assign concept labels to segments. Two main approaches
have been proposed in literature for query segmentation.
The first is based on mutual information (MI) between pairs of query words
[194]. Risvick et al. [194] used data mining in query logs and document corpora
to produce segment candidates and compute “connexity” measures. The general
idea is to apply this database of segments and connexities to a query, for splitting
it into segments according to a segmentation procedure. The procedure matches
all possible subsequences of the given query in the segments database and assigns
connexity value to each matched segment. Finally, it computes a segmentation
score for each segmentation and return the most likely segmentation.
The second approach uses, supervised or unsupervised, machine learning
techniques. Bergsma and Wang [18] proposed a data-driven, supervised ap-
proach to query segmentation. In this approach at each word position, a binary
decision is made whether to create a segment boundary or not and the decision
parameters are learned discriminatively from gold standard data. Tan and Peng
[237] proposed an unsupervised method that uses a generative model (unigram
model) to recover a query’s underlying concepts that compose its original seg-
mented form. The model’s parameters are estimated automatically from a text
corpus using an expectation-maximization algorithm.
The main difference between query segmentation and our approach for query
disambiguation is that query segmentation separates a query into a number of
units, but it does not identify named entities from units and also does not classify
them into classes or types. However, we can consider the process of detecting
named entities inside of a query as a specialized form of query segmentation and
a prerequisite of entity disambiguation. As we will explain later, our approach
for entity detection is similar to that of Risvick et al. [194] in that it uses an
iterative segmentation procedure which matches all possible subsequences of a
query to find the segment with the higher probability for a given type. In our
approach, however, segmentation is not separate from classification but is an
integral part of it.
A second kind of processing applied on queries is query classification.
Query classification is the task of assigning classes to whole queries, in
order to improve the retrieval performance of search engines.
Query classification falls into two groups: 1) classification according to search
intent, such as classification of queries into three general intent classes: infor-
mational, navigational or transactional intents [33, 201, 122]; 2) classification
according to semantics of query, such as classification of user queries into a
ranked list of predefined content categories [221, 15, 39]. Topical, i.e. topic-
based, web search classification has been studied intensely, especially within the
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KDD Cup 2005 competition 2. The best performing system of the KDD Cup
used an ensemble of classifiers using rich information from different sources (e.g.,
query, search engine related documents) to perform the classification [220].
Beitzel et al. [14], on the other hand, indicate that pre-retrieval (vs. post-
retrieval) classification can be very effective, when the query category in the
training set is assigned manually — and not determined through a bridging
process that uses search engine-suggested categories as was done by [220].
In this work, we focus on entity-type classification and not topical classifica-
tion. Furthermore, in query classification the whole query is classified and there
is no further analysis on the internal structure of query. Instead, our aim is to
reveal the internal semantic structure of query by classifying the entities inside
of a query into types and inferring from these types the type of the whole query.
In this respect, our approach is more close to Named Entity Recognition
(NER).
Named Entity Recognition is the task of identifying named entities in
a written text and classifying them into appropriate entity types. Named enti-
ties are information units like names (such as person, organization and location
names), temporal expressions (dates and times) and certain types of numeric
expressions (monetary values and percentages). In the expression “Named En-
tity”, the word “Named” aims to restrict the task to only those entities for
which one or many rigid designators, as defined by S. Kripke [128], stands for
the referent. Since the most important rigid designators are proper names, early
work formulates the NER problem as recognizing “proper names” in general.
Overall, the most studied types are three specializations of proper names: names
of persons, locations and organizations, collectively known as “enamex”. In this
work we focus on these three main types of named entities.
Many approaches have been proposed for NER. While early systems were
making use of handcrafted rule-based algorithms [76], modern systems most of-
ten resort to machine learning techniques, including supervised machine learning
[22, 25, 5], semisupervised learning [32, 178] and unsupervised learning [51, 2].
Named Entity Recognition is usually performed on text documents and very
few studies have addressed the problem of NER in queries. This is due the fact
that queries are usually short and are often not well formed. Therefore, NLP
techniques are difficult to apply in queries for high accuracy.
A first study that have recognized the importance of named entities in Web
Search was conducted by Marius Pas¸ca [177]. The author introduced a weakly
supervised method for mining Web search queries in order to explicitly extract
named entities, using templates. The main contribution of the study was to
capitalize query data, instead of document collections, in order to explicitly
2Check http://www.sigkdd.org/kdd2005/kddcup.html for more information.
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extract named entities that are expected to be relevant and suitable for later
use (for example, to improve the quality of named entity recognizers to be
used in Web documents). However, the intent was to extract named entities
pertaining to various classes of interest to Web search users, rather than to
classify individual entities inside of a specific query, as we envision in our study.
More related to our approach is a recent work by Guo et al. [97]. The authors
proposed a probabilistic approach to the NER task in queries using query log
data and a weakly supervised learning method referred to as WS-LDA (Weakly
Supervised Latent Dirichlet Allocation). The approach exploits topic models
(i.e. probabilistic models for uncovering the underlying semantic structure of a
document collection) in a new application which considers contexts of a named
entity as words of a document, and classes of the named entity as topics. The
aim is to detect the named entities within query and find the most likely entity
class given the context.
Our approach aims to address a very similar goal. However, there are im-
portant differences between the two approaches.
First of all the Guo’s method focuses on single named-entity queries (i.e.
queries with contain only one named entity). A single named-entity query is
represented as a triple including a named entity, a context and a class. The goal
is to find the triple for a given query which has the largest joint probability.
Our approach is more general in that it can handle more complicated queries
with multiple named entities, inferring the type of the whole query from the
combination of the all entity types within the query.
Secondly, the approach by Guo et al. employs weakly supervised learning
using partially labeled seed entities and query log as external knowledge in
an oﬄine learning phase. The query log is used to provide patterns of entities,
classes and contexts whose joint probabilities can be learned by the NER system.
On the contrary, our approach does not employ machine learning techniques.
The proposed Entity Disambiguation method uses a data set of RDF triples as
external knowledge that contain entity-related information. However this data
set is not employed for the training process but is used to create an index that
can be searched to find the most likely entity type given a certain keyword or
combination of keywords. In this respect, the external knowledge derived from
the RDF triple store is used as a lookup of terms and types rather than as a
training corpora.
In a recent study Du et al. [59] proposed a method to overcome the lack
of context information in queries. They proposed to utilize the search session
information before a query as its context to address this limitation and improve
two classical NER solutions which are known as Conditional Random Field
231
(CRF) based solution and Topic Model based solution, respectively3. The idea
is to use the relationship between current focused query and previous queries
in the same session to extract novel context aware features which are used to
assign the most likely entity class to named entities. In the use of external
knowledge and in the machine learning models adopted, this approach is more
similar to that proposed by Guo et al.’s than that presented in the present work
which aims to create a system that can recognize named-entities in a given query
without prior training.
Named Entity Recognition is also at the core of a more specific line of re-
search: personal name classification in Web queries. The task underlying per-
sonal name classification in queries is to decide whether a query is a personal
name or not. Shen et al. [222] proposed an approach based on the construction
of probabilistic name-term dictionaries and personal name grammars, which are
used to predict the probability of a query to be a personal name.
An effort has been also made to identify and categorize queries that include
geographical entities. Rocio Guille´n [96] have proposed a method that combines
information extraction (i.e. gazetteers) and patterns.
Compared to these approaches which focus on named entities of a specific
type, the main contribution of our work is to propose a more general approach
that can be potentially extended to disambiguate all the named entities in a
query.
10.2 The Entity Type Disambiguation Problem
In this section we present again the formalization of the Entity Type Disam-
biguation Problem, as it was introduced in 8.2.2. We first describe the problem
at a very general level. Then, we propose a simplification of the problem based
on the idea of Named Entity Recognition in Query.
Without loss of generality, we can represent a query Q as a set of unknown
terms T = (t1, t2, ..., tn), each of which can be a single word or a combina-
tion of words. We assume that each term t specifies the value of an attribute
a. For example, in the query “Barack Obama”, “Barack” is the value of the
attribute “first name”, “Obama” is the value of “surname”. Assume that
A = (a1, a2, ..., an) is a set of predefined attribute types. We map every term
t into one appropriate type in A. After this mapping is established, Q can be
represented by a vector a (an assignment of attribute types a1, a2, ...as to the
3A conditional random field (CRF) is a type of discriminative probabilistic model most
often used for labeling and segmenting structured data, such as natural language texts or
biological sequences.
A topic model is a type of statistical model for discovering the abstract “topics” that occur
in a collection of documents.
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terms in T ). Finally, suppose that E = (e1, e2, ..., em) is a small number of
entity types.
The goal of Entity Type Disambiguation is to assign the most likely entity
type e∗ to a given query Q described by its attribute vector.
In 8.2.2 we have proposed a Bayesian Model for solving the Entity Type
Disambiguation Problem. The model can be described by a classifier that is
the function disambiguate (f : a → (E)) that takes as argument a vector a of
attributes and returns the most likely entity type e∗. This function is defined
as follows:
disambigaute(a) = arg max
ek∈E
p(ek) ∗ p(a|ek)∑m
i=1 p(ei) ∗ p(a|ei)
(10.1)
The model assumes that if the attribute types are correctly assigned to
the query terms, the target entity type can be inferred from the combination
of attribute types. However, no methods have been proposed to automatically
extract terms and assign attribute types to them. Moreover, the attribute types
and their granularity have been decided a priory.
The main goal of the present study is to provide a possible solution to this
problem. The proposed approach is general enough to address the Entity Type
Disambiguation problem as formulated above. However, here we propose a
simplified formalization of the Entity Type Disambiguation problem which con-
siders only a subset of attribute types that is attribute types that contain named
entities.
10.2.1 A simplified version of The Entity Type Disam-
biguation Problem
Restating the problem of Entity Type Disambiguation, the general idea is that
the identification and classification of terms in a query can lead to the detection
of the target entity type (i.e. the type of entity the user is looking for) by
inferring the entity type from the coexistence of different term types in the
query.
The analysis reported in 8.2 on real-world queries, provided by a large sample
of participants in an experiment performing an entity search task, showed that
about 90% of the queries about person, location and organization contained the
name of the entity target, along with possible other information. This means,
for instance, that if a user is looking for information about the President of USA,
it is more likely that he formulates the query using the proper name “Barack
Obama”, eventually specifying additional information (e.g. President of USA),
than using a definite description such as “The actual President of USA”.
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Therefore, since the final goal of Entity Type Disambiguation is to under-
stand the type of entity the user is looking for (i.e. the target entity), the
problem can be reformulated in terms of detecting the target entity within a
query and assigning to it the corresponding entity type. If a query contains
a single named entity the problem is reduced to detect the only named entity
in the query and assign the most likely type to that entity. For instance, in
the query “Barack Obama President” there is a single named entity “Barack
Obama”. In this case the disambiguation problem consists in detecting “Barack
Obama” as a named entity and assigning the correct entity type to it (i.e. Per-
son). Therefore, for the majority of single-named-entity queries, the Entity
Type Disambiguation problem can be reduced to a Named Entity Recognition
problem (see for example [97])4.
However, many queries contain more than one entity and the Entity Type
Disambiguation problem can not be entirely reduced to a problem of named
entity recognition in this case. Once the named entities are detected and classi-
fied, the disambiguation needs to discriminate between the target entity and the
context entity/ies and assign the whole query to the entity type of the target.
Consider for example the query “Barack Obama USA”. In this case the query
contains two named entities corresponding respectively to Person and Location
types. From that, it comes out that even when the disambiguation process is
reduced to the disambiguation of the only named entities, a further inferential
step is necessary to detect the target entity among the named entities within the
query. From this premises, we can reformulate the Entity Type Disambiguation
as follows.
A named entity query Q can be represented as a set of unknown terms
T = (t1, t2, ..., tn), each of which can be a single word or a combination of
words. Some of these terms corresponds to named entities, while others specify
other kind of information.
The goal of Entity Type Disambiguation is to assign the most likely entity
type e∗t to all the named entities in Q and then infer the most likely entity type
e∗q of the whole query from the combination of the entity types in Q.
The Entity Type Disambiguation process consists in three phases:
1. Entity Detection
2. Entity Disambiguation
3. Query Disambiguation
4Of course this is a simplification of the original problem and in 8.2 we have already
discussed potential failures of this approach. See for example 8.2.3 for a discussion on some
remarkable examples. However, the cost of automation in this specific context forced to accept
some degree of inaccuracy.
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The first phase of the disambiguation process consists of detecting the terms
in Q which refer to named entities. We name this process Entity Detection.
The next phase, named Entity Disambiguation, consists of assigning the most
likely entity type to each named entity in Q. Finally, the last phase consists of
inferring the entity type of the whole query (i.e. the type of the entity the user
is searching information about). We name this phase Query Disambiguation to
differentiate it from the phase 2. Of course in case of single-named-entity queries,
phase 3 coincides with phase 2. At the core of the Entity Type Disambiguation
Problem as formulated above there is the task of detection and classification
of named entities in query. In the next section we propose a new approach to
address this task in an automatic way. The approach has been implemented in
a prototype application for entity type disambiguation.
10.3 A new approach for Entity Type Disam-
biguation
The core of our approach is based on the idea that the disambiguation process
can be tackled exploiting peculiar characteristics of the RDF metadata used to
describe resources in the Semantic Web.
The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a language for representing
information about resources in the World Wide Web which is based upon the
idea of making statements about resources (in particular Web resources) in
the form of subject-predicate-object expressions named RDF triples or RDF
statements.
The meaning of an RDF statement is that some relationship - defined by
the RDF predicate - exists between the RDF subject and the RDF object. This
relationship can be visualized as a node and arc diagram (i.e. graph) whose
nodes are the subject and the object, while the arc represents the relationship
between them.
RDF is based on the idea of identifying resources using Web identifiers (called
Uniform Resource Identifiers, or URIs). The subject of an RDF statement can
be either a URI or a blank node, both of which denote resources. Resources
indicated by blank nodes are called anonymous and are not directly identifiable
by a URI. The predicate of a triple is a URI which also indicates a resource,
representing the relationship between a subject and an object. Finally, the
object of a triple may be a URI, a blank node or a literal (a plain text string,
such as, for example, “Rome”, “Barack Obama” or “June 1th 2010”). We note
that a literal may be the object of an RDF statement, but not the subject or
the predicate. Unlike a subject or object, a predicate must always be a Uniform
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Resource Identifier. A RDF graph representing a triple with a literal object is
shown in Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1: Graphical representation of an RDF statement.
A huge amount of RDF metadata are today available and a substantial part
of these data are RDF statements whose objects are literals.
Our approach is based on the idea that many terms used in queries about
specific entities could match literals (or part of them) of RDF statements. Since
the predicate is the part of the statement that makes the object value a charac-
teristic of the subject, the predicate conveys semantic meaning which identifies
the type of information specified by the object. Of course, there’s no way for a
computer or a human to figure out what a specific predicate (i.e. URI) means,
or how it should be used. This is where vocabularies and ontologies come in,
describing explicitly the meaning and the relationships of predicates, as well as
their domain of application. Consider, for example, the following RDF state-
ment.
<foaf:Person rdf:about=“http://disi.unitn.it/ bouquet/”>
<foaf:familyName>Bouquet</foaf:familyName>
</foaf:Person>
In the triple, <foaf:Person rdf:about=“http://disi.unitn.it/ bouquet/”> is
the subject, <foaf:familyName> is the predicate, Bouquet is the object. The
intuitive meaning of the statement is that there is a person (subject) whose
surname (predicate) is Bouquet (object). However, the explicit meaning of
the predicate (i.e. foaf:familyName) and its use is specified in the vocabulary
of the corresponding ontology that is the FOAF ontology5 in this case. The
FOAF vocabulary specifies that “the familyName property is provided (along-
side givenName) for use when describing parts of people’s names” 6. From the
definition of the predicate meaning and its entity type domain (i.e. Person), we
5FOAF is an ontology that has been designed to describe and integrate information about
persons, their activities and their relations to other people and objects.
6Check http://xmlns.com/foaf/spec/\#term_familyName for more details.
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can infer that a term labeled with the predicate “foaf:familyName” is referring
to a named entity of type Person.
Therefore, using the specifications of RDF vocabularies, that make explicit
the domain of application of predicates and their use, it is possible to map RDF
predicates into a predefined set of attribute types or named entity classes.
From these premises derives the idea that a large data set of RDF metadata
can be exploit to create an index of RDF predicates extracted from triples which
contain literal objects. The index can be searched and used to extract possible
candidate entity types (or attribute types) given a certain term of a query.
Since there is no restriction in the definition of predicates, different ontologies
may use different predicates to specify the same relationship. For example,
“http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#given-name” can be considered equivalent
to “http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/givenname”. Moreover, also the same ontology
may have more than one predicate which specifies the same relationship (e.g.
foaf:givenName and foaf:firstName). Furthermore, for the purpose of our study,
several predicates, even with a different semantic meaning, can be considered
equivalent to disambiguate the general type of the object. A predicate that
identifies the name of an author is considered equivalent to a predicate that
identifies the name of a person, since authors are persons.
For these reasons, all the equivalent predicates returned by the index can
be further mapped into a small number of attributes type or entity types to
improve the efficacy of the disambiguation process.
The mapping of predicates into entity types used in our approach is reported
in Appendix E.1.
We note that our approach is strongly dependent from at least three aspects:
1) the quality of the metadata used to create the index, 2) the availability of
vocabularies that make explicit the use of predicates and 3) the discriminative
power of the predicates, as specified in the RDF vocabularies. If the domain of
application of an RDF predicate is too general, being used to specify a property
that can be applied to more than a single type of entity, the predicate is not use-
ful for disambiguation purposes. For this reason, we based the disambiguation
process on a limited subset of the predicates extracted from the original data
set that are the predicates which unambiguously refer to the entity types we are
focused on, i.e. Person, Organization and Location. We remark that we started
from these entity types mainly for practical reasons concerning the kinds, the
amount and the quality of metadata today available on the Web along with the
availability of ontologies and vocabularies underlying the use of named proper-
ties. However, we argue, the approach is general enough to be extended to other
entity types in future, as the data set will be improved with new predicates and
new mapping constraints.
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10.4 PropLit: an application based on a index
of RDF predicates
As we have introduced in the previous section, at the core of our approach lies
an index of RDF predicates which is used to extract the candidate entity types.
To build the index, we used a data set composed of a billion of RDF triples7
crawled during February-March 2009 based on datasets provided by Seman-
tic Web search engines such as Falcon-S8, Sindice 9, Swoogle10, SWSE11, and
Watson12.
From the original data set we took in consideration only triples with a literal
as object and we extracted only predicate-literal couples out of the data set. The
result of this filtering operation produced 246 702 400 predicate-literal couples.
The couples have been stored in an inverted index using Lucene13.
The index was build as a full-text inverted index. An inverted index is a
mapping of words to their location in a set of documents. Most modern search
engines utilize some form of an inverted index to process user-submitted queries.
The goal of a search engine implementation is to optimize the speed of the
query: find the most relevant documents where the keywords of the query occur.
Once a forword index is developed, which stores lists of words per document,
the index is inverted to create an inverted index. Querying the forward index
would be highly consuming, in terms of memory, processing resources and time
because it would require sequential iteration through each document and to
each word to verify a matching document. Instead of listing the words per
document in the forward index, the inverted index data structure is developed
which lists the documents per word. In this way, the query can be resolved
by directly accessing to the documents pointed by the corresponding words in
the inverted index. Having determined which subset of documents or pages
matches the query terms, a similarity (or ranking) score is computed between
the query and each document/page based on the scoring algorithm used by the
system. A largely used scoring algorithm is based on the tf/idf measure (term
frequency-inverse document frequency) that evaluates how important a word is
to a document in a collection or corpus, combining the number of times a given
7The RDF data set was provided for the Billion Triple Challenge 2009, an annual event
for presenting new applications based on the Semantic Web vision. For more details see
http://challenge.semanticweb.org/
8http://ws.nju.edu.cn/ontosearch/
9http://sindice.com/
10http://swoogle.umbc.edu/
11http://swse.deri.org/
12http://kmi-web05.open.ac.uk/WatsonWUI/
13Apache Lucene is a free, open source information retrieval software library used for full-
text indexing and searching in Java. See http://lucene.apache.org/java/docs/index.html
for more details.
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word appears in that document (tf ) with the inverse of the frequency of the
word in the corpus (idf ). The relevance increases proportionally to the number
of times a word appears in the document but is offset by the frequency of the
word over the entire document corpus.
To build our index we used the same approach (an inverted index and a
tf/idf measure of similarity), by mapping words to predicates, instead of words
to documents. More precisely, our inverted index lists the predicates per word,
including the position of the word within the literal. Namely, we treated the
literals as texts of documents and the predicates as documents. Before creating
the index, we used a filter which dropped out any stop words, words like articles,
conjunctions, prepositions (a, an, the, and, of etc.) that occur so commonly in
language that they might as well be noise for searching purposes. Just to make
an example, given the literals L0=Barack Obama, L1=USA, L2=Washington
USA, we have the following full inverted index:
“Barack”: {(0,0)}
“Obama”: {(0,1)}
“USA”: {(1,0), (2,1)}
“Washington” : {(2,0)}
where, for instance, “Obama”: {(0,1)} means that “Obama” is in the literal L0
and it is the second word in the literal (position 1).
To measure the relevance of a given term for a specific predicate, we adapted
the tf/idf measure to our context. We defined the term frequency of a term ti
for a predicate pj as follows:
tfi,j =
ni,j∑
k nk,j
where ni,j is the number of occurrences of the considered term ti (i.e. word
or combination of words) in predicate pj and the denominator is the sum of
number of occurrences of all terms in predicate pj . We note that we have many
occurrences of the same predicate in our data set. Therefore, ni,j is the number
of times a given term ti appears in all the occurrences of the predicate pj .
We defined the inverse predicate frequency of a term ti, as follows:
ipfi = log
|P |
|{p : ti ∈ p}|
where P is the total number of predicates in the data set and |{p : ti ∈ p}|
is the number of predicates where the term ti appears.
From the combination of the two measures we obtain the tf/ipf measure as
follows:
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(tf − ipf)ij = tfi,j ∗ ipfi
A high weight in tf-ipf is reached by a high term frequency (for a given
predicate) and a low predicate frequency of the term in the whole collection of
predicates.
The index is the core module of an application for entity type disambigua-
tion, which we named PropLit. PropLit provides two search functionalities: 1)
Basic (without mapping) and 2) Advanced (with mapping).
The basic functionality of the index returns a list of ranked predicates for
each search term. A search term can be composed by a single word (e.g. Barack)
or a combination of words (e.g. San Salvador). When the search term contains
a combination of words, the index returns the ranked predicates which contain
the combination of words as if they were enclosed in quotation marks (i.e. in
the exact order entered). A snapshot of the ranked list of predicates (first five
results) for the terms “Barack” and “San Salvador”, respectively is shown in
Figure 10.2 and in Figure 10.3
As we can note from the outputs reported in the figures, many predicates can
be clustered since they convey the same semantic meaning (e.g. foaf:name and
foaf:given-name) and a subset of them (those whose meaning is specific enough
in the corresponding vocabulary) can be used to create a further mapping to
a predefined set of entity types: person, location and organization14. There-
fore, using the mapping reported in Appendix E.1, the index has been used
to implement an advanced search functionality which maps the list of ranked
predicates given a certain words (or combination of words) into a ranked list
of entity types. The output of the advanced search for the term “Barack” is
shown in Figure 10.4 and indicates that the term “Barack” is always object of
predicates that map to the entity type Person. The numbers which accompany
the entity type indicate the tf/ipf measure and its percentage value, compared
to the other entity types.
Consider now the case of a query which contains two or more terms, like
for example “Freddy Mercury” or “Paolo Bouquet Trento”. We have noted
that in the basic search module described above, the index is searched using
the combination of words typed in the search field, preserving the word order
(e.g. “Freddy Mercury”). This approach presents, of course, a limit for the
disambiguation process because it is dependent on the presence of the exact
combination of words among the RDF objects of the data set. If I’m search-
ing for “Carlo Bonatti” and no triples contain “Carlo Bonatti” as object, the
14The actual version of the index has been implemented to map into only three entity types
because of the characteristics of the data set and the predicates available.
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Figure 10.2: Snapshot of the list of ranked predicates returned by the basic
search of the PropLit Index for the term “Barack”.
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Figure 10.3: Snapshot of the list of ranked predicates returned by the basic
search of the PropLit Index for the term “San Salvador”.
Figure 10.4: Snapshot of the output returned by the advanced search of the
PropLit Index for the term “Barack”.
242
index does not return any result. Moreover, the approach can not be used to
disambiguate more than a single search term. To overcame this problem, in
the advanced module a different search algorithm has been used. The query
processing in the advanced module has 4 main steps.
1. Tokenization
2. Stop word removal
3. Query representation
4. Query term weighting
5. Entity type mapping
1) As soon as a user inputs a query, the search module tokenizes the query
stream, i.e., break it down into single terms (tokenization). A single term is
an alpha-numeric string that occurs between white space and/or punctuation.
In the query “Chicago USA”, for instance, the single terms are “Chicago” and
“USA”.
2) The second step (stop word removal) removes all the stop words among
the single terms obtained in the previous step15. If the tokenization process of
the query “The Eiffel Tower” produces the following tokens “The”, “Eiffel” and
“Tower”, the stop word removal eliminates “The” from the search terms.
3) The third step (query representation) creates a representation of the query
containing single terms and sequences of terms which are used to search the In-
dex. The goal of this step is to identify the meaningful units within the query16.
These units not always coincide with single terms. Consider for example the
query “New York USA”. The query contains three single terms “New”, “York”
and “USA”, but in this case there are only two meaningful units “New York”
and “USA”. To identify the meaningful units within a query, each single term
is individually submitted to the Index, as well as each possible sequence com-
posed by a single term and the terms that follow it within the query. For
example, if we have a query Q of 3 single terms and we represent this query
as a vector Q = (t1, t2, t3), we generate the following sequences: s1 = (t1, t2),
s2 = (t1, t2, t3), s3 = (t2, t3). As we can understand from the example, these
sequences do not correspond to all the possible combinations of words which
compose the query (i.e. the sequence s = (t1, t3) is not included) because we
adopted the restriction that a sequence must be composed by contiguous words.
15A stop word list typically consists of those word classes known to convey little substantive
meaning, such as articles (a, the), conjunctions (and, but), interjections (oh, but), prepositions
(in, over), pronouns (he, it), and forms of the “to be” verb (is, are). Stop words are removed
based on this list.
16A meaningful unit in our approach is a unit that contains a named entity.
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In the previous example, the terms and sequences of terms submitted to the
index are the following: “New”, “York”, “USA”, “New York”, “York USA”
and “New York USA”. The assumption is that some terms (e.g. USA) or term
sequences (e.g. “New York”) should be more represented among the RDF ob-
jects of the data set compared to others (e.g. “York USA”) and receive higher
ranking scores in the next step. However, when a given meaningful sequence of
terms, such as the first name and surname of a person (e.g. “Carlo Bonatti”)
is not present among the objects of the data set (i.e. there are no RDF triples
about that specific person), the disambiguation can be performed anyway com-
bining the disambiguation of single terms. In the example, it is likely that there
are many triples which are about persons named “Carlo” and in the same way
it could be that there are triples about persons with the surname “Bonatti”.
Hence, even though there are no triples about the specific person which we are
looking for, we can disambiguate the two single terms as referring to a person.
The example is shown in Figure 10.5.
4) In the fourth step (query term weighting), terms and sequences of terms
are submitted to the index using the basic search module and the corresponding
lists of ranked predicates, according to the tf/ipf measures, are obtained.
5) Finally, using a mapping function which maps predicates to entity types
according to the mapping schema reported in Appendix E.1, a ranked list of en-
tity types for each term and sequence of terms is returned (entity type mapping).
Having assigned the ranking scores , the terms and/or the term sequences with
the highest scores provide the term disambiguation returned by the Index. In
Figure 10.6 is shown the output of the advanced search module for the query
“New York USA”. We circled in red the suggested disambiguation according to
the highest ranking scores. We can note that the system correctly identifies the
meaningful units “USA” and “New York” and assigns the correct entity type to
these units.
10.5 Index Evaluation
When we have introduced the Entity Type Disambiguation Problem, we noted
that the problem can be reduced to an entity recognition problem in case of
queries which contain a single named entity. Therefore, as a first evaluation
of the application we conducted an analysis on a sample of queries containing
a single named entity, such as “Barack Obama”, “New York” or “IBM”. The
queries were randomly extracted from those collected in the entity search exper-
iment described in 8.2 and the evaluation was performed manually. We tested
the index on sixty queries for each entity types (i.e. person, organization and
location). Each query was submitted to the advanced search module. For eval-
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(a) basic
(b) advanced
Figure 10.5: Output of the basic (a) and advanced (b) modules for the query
“Carlo Bonatti”
uation purposes, when multiple results were returned by the index for a given
query, we considered the answer with the highest tf/ipf value. However, when a
disambiguation was returned for a sequence of terms, we took in consideration
the corresponding outcome for the evaluation, instead of considering the sin-
gle terms (see Table 10.1 for an example), even though single terms presented
higher tf/ipf. This is because we assume that a match with a sequence of terms
is more relevant for disambiguation purposes than a match with single terms.
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Figure 10.6: Output of the advanced search module for the query “New York
USA”
Consider, for example, a query like “George Washington”. Since “Washington”
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can be the surname of a person or the name of a city, we expect that the dis-
ambiguation of the sequence “George Washington” is more relevant than the
disambiguation of the single terms separately, even though the absolute value
of tf/ipf may be lower compared to that of single terms17.
tf/ipf
Term Person Location Organization
Hillary 7710.14 139.32 0
Clinton 4391.77 3862.97 0
Hillary Clinton 345.19 0 0
Table 10.1: Entity Type Disambiguation example. In bold the answer which we
considered for the evaluation.
In Figure 10.7 we report the correct disambiguation frequencies (i.e. true
positives) for each entity type, while the results in terms of Precision, Recall
and F-measure18 are reported in Table 10.2.
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Figure 10.7: Percentage of correct disambiguations (true positives) on single
term queries.
The results show that the system performs quite well in disambiguating
17This is because the ni,j of a single term in the tfi,j formula is ≥ than ni,j of a sequence
which contains that term.
18
Precision is the ratio of the number of queries correctly assigned to the entity type (true
positive) to the total number of queries correctly (true positive) and incorrectly (false positive)
assigned to that type. Recall is the ratio of the number of queries correctly assigned to the
entity type (true positive) to the total number of queries that should have been assigned to
that type (true positive+false negatives). F-measure is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall.
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Measures Person Organization Location
Precision 0.55 1 0.81
Recall 0.95 0.22 0.70
F-measure 0.70 0.36 0.75
Table 10.2: Performance of the advanced search module on single term queries.
entities of Person and Location types, while it performs more poorly in disam-
biguating queries about organizations. We argue that one of the main reasons
which can explain this significant difference concerns the characteristics of the
data set we used to create the index. In Appendix E.2 we reported the list of
the first 50 RDF predicates and the corresponding frequencies calculated on the
original data set of RDF triples used to create the index, before filtering the
data set (i.e. before extracting the triples with literal objects). This frequency
distribution shows the most represented predicates in the data set and the on-
tologies to which they refer. We can note that the majority of these predicates
refer to ontologies specialized to code information about persons (e.g. FOAF
ontology) or about locations (e.g. Geonames). This may explain the significant
better performance of our application in disambiguating queries about persons
and locations than queries about organizations. The lower precision for the en-
tity type Person is due to the fact that many terms which refer to organizations
are mapped into Person type (false positives), because often rdf triples about
persons contain the affiliation of the person along with the proper name. This
aspect represents an element of noise in the data set due to an improper use of
the semantics of the predicates. We believe that this element of noise should be
overcome increasing the amount of rdf triples in the dataset uniquely referring
to organizations. The imbalance in the predicate distribution in favor of Person
and Location types , also explains the high precision for the Organization type
which contrasts with the low recall.
Given the poor performance of the system in disambiguating named entities
referring to organizations, we decided to limit the second phase of the evaluation
to queries about Person and Location.
In the second phase of the evaluation we tested the system using queries con-
taining multiple named entities and we evaluated two aspects of the performance
of the application:
1. Entity Detection: the detection of the named entities within the query.
2. Entity Disambiguation: the assignment of the correct entity type to each
named entity of the query.
In order to be able to differentiate performance on these two aspects we used
the following two measures:
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1. The Detection Effectiveness Z, measured as the sum of the number of
entities correctly detected in each query of the test set, divided by the
number of entities that should have been detected/disambiguated in the
query. The Detection Effectiveness has been calculated using the following
formula:
Z =
∑
i
Ndti
Ni
where Ndti is the number of entities correctly detected in the query Qi
and Ni is the number of entities that should have been detected in the
query Qi.
2. The Disambiguation Effectiveness L, measured as the sum of the number
of entities correctly disambiguated in each query of the test set, divided
by the number of entities that should have been detected/disambiguated
in the query. The Disambiguation Effectiveness has been calculated using
the following formula:
L =
∑
i
Ndsi
Ni
where Ndsi is the number of entities correctly disambiguated in the query
Qi and Ni is the number of entities that should have been disambiguated
in the query Qi.
Both measures range from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the maximum effective-
ness. The analysis was performed on a test set of 128 queries (64 for each entity
type) extracted from those collected in the entity search experiment. In Tables
10.3 we report the performance of the system related to Detection Effectiveness
Z and Disambiguation Effectiveness L.
Performance Measure Person Location
Detection Effectiveness Z 0.83 0.63
Disambiguation Effectiveness L 0.68 0.66
N 64 64
Table 10.3: Detection and Disambiguation Effectiveness of PropLit on queries
with multiple named entities. N = number of queries.
The Disambiguation Effectiveness for queries about persons is not signifi-
cantly different from that of queries about locations (p = 0.79), but the De-
tection Effectiveness is significantly (p < 0.01) higher for queries about persons
than for queries about locations. From our analysis it comes out that one of
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the reasons that can explain this difference is due to the way in which semantic
information about locations is coded in RDF triples. We found that very often
two or more locations are included in the same predicate (e.g. Trento, Italy).
This aspect may have reduced the effectiveness of the system in detecting the
named entities within the queries favoring the detection of co-occurrences of
entities.
In Section 10.2.1 we have proposed a simplified version of the Entity Dis-
ambiguation Problem and we have identified three main phases of it: 1) Entity
Detection, 2) Entity Disambiguation and 3) Query Disambiguation. We noted
that for single-named-entity queries, phase 2 and phase 3 coincide, that is dis-
ambiguating the type of the unique named entity in the query coincides with
disambiguating the type of the whole query. Instead, for queries with multiple
named entities when the entities within the query have been disambiguated,
the type of the target entity must be inferred from the combination of the types
of entities identified in phase 2. This phase is not directly implemented in the
actual version of our system and represents an open field of future research. We
believe that the investigation described in 8.2 may suggest useful insights into
the implementation of this module as well as into the improvement of the entity
disambiguation itself (phase 2). In order to define a baseline from which the
impact of future solutions can be measured, we performed a final evaluation of
the performance of the system, using a simple heuristic decision procedure that
is to assign to a given query the entity type of the first entity of the query. For
example, if we have a query Q like “John Lennon Beatles” and the entity dis-
ambiguation returns “John Lennon → Person” and “Beatles → Organization”,
the heuristic procedure assigns the entity type Person to the whole query. In
Table 10.4 we report the baseline performance of the system on the 128 queries
used for the previous analysis.
Performance Measure Person Location
Precision 0.75 0.78
Recall 0.92 0.77
F-measure 0.76 0.84
Table 10.4: Baseline performance of Proplit on multiple-named-entity queries
The analysis shows that the heuristic procedure provides quite good results,
indicating that for a substantial amount of queries the first entity is indeed the
entity target. However, we have already discussed that this “rule of thumb”
approach has the advantage of reducing the complexity of the disambiguation
process, but has an important side effect. The success of the approach depends
exclusively on the ability of disambiguating a unique piece of information within
the query. If the process fails, the system will return a wrong disambiguation.
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On the contrary, an approach such as that we have proposed in 8.2 which is
based on the disambiguation of attribute types, instead of entity types, is less
vulnerable to mistakes in disambiguating single attributes, because a certain
pattern of attributes may still suggest the correct disambiguation despite the
presence of a mistake. This is particularly true for the extended approach (i.e.
extended version of the Bayesian Model) that takes into consideration the order
of the attribute types within the query . We can illustrate the problem with an
example. Consider the query Q=“Paris Hilton Hotel”. If we submit the query to
the advanced search module of our system we find that the best disambiguation
returned by the system is “Paris Hilton → Person (tf/ipf =346.50)”. For a
human is quite simple to understand that in this case the correct entity detection
should be “Paris” and “Hilton Hotel” and that the type of the entity target
should be Location rather than Person. This interpretation is suggested by
the presence of the word “Hotel” that suggests that Hilton is the name of an
hotel rather than the surname of a person. From this interpretation follows
that Paris is more likely to be the name of a city than the name of a person.
The example shows that the approach of disambiguating the first entity of the
query may be not effective in cases like this and the main reason of the failure
is that the processes of entity detection and disambiguation do not consider the
dependencies between the sequences of terms.
We believe that the results of the entity search experiment can be used
to overcome this problem. One of the main results of the investigation about
the entity search experiment described in 8.2 showed that the disambiguation
performance of the Naive Bayes Model can be improved extending the model
to incorporate the position of the attribute types within the query. We argue
that the same insight can be extended to the proposed simplified version of
the Entity Disambiguation Problem. Going back to the previous example, the
results of our experiment show that a pattern of attributes like “location name
(Paris), location name (Hilton Hotel)” is more likely than the alternative pattern
“first name (Paris), surname (Hilton) and location type (Hotel)”. We argue that
position measures should also used to weight the possible combinations of terms
in the system to determine the more likely disambiguation. Alternatively, a rule-
based approach, with hand crafted rules extracted from experimental evidences,
could be combined with the current approach used in the system.
10.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a simplified approach to the Entity Type
Disambiguation Problem based on named entity recognition in queries and we
have presented an application which automatically extracts and classifies the
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named entities in a query.
Named entity recognition in queries is a challenging task because many ap-
proaches proposed to address the same problem in textual documents are not
effective in queries. This is because the lack of context information in short
queries makes some classical named entity recognition algorithms fail. Moreover,
many queries do not satisfy the natural language grammar, and orthographic
and syntactic cues are often not available for disambiguation purposes.
Since local cues are scarce in queries, a reasonable approach seems to use
external information to support the disambiguation process.
Traditionally, this issue has been addressed using extensive gazetteers - lists
of names of people, organizations, locations, and other named entities. Indeed,
the compilation of such gazetteers is sometimes mentioned as a bottleneck in
the design of Named Entity recognition systems. Cucchiarelli et al. [52] report,
for example, that one of the limitations in designing NE recognition systems is
the limited availability of large gazetteers, particularly gazetteers for different
languages. Indeed gazetteers are difficult to develop and domain sensitive. The
lists need to be huge to have suitable coverage. It is estimated, for example, that
there are 1.5 million unique surnames just in the USA. A gazetteer which would
list all the surnames in the world should be enormous. There is a similar prob-
lem with company names. A list of all current organizations worldwide would
be huge, if at all available, and would immediately be out of date since new or-
ganizations are formed all the time. In addition, organization names can occur
in variations: a list of organization names might contain, for example, “Digital
Enterprise Research Institute”, but that institute might also be referred to as
“DERI”. The same is true for events. Consider, for example, names of con-
ferences that usually have an extended form and an acronym. To surmount
these obstacles, application of machine learning approaches (e.g. Maximum en-
tropy, Hidden Markov Models, Memory-based Based learning) to NER became
a research subject. Nevertheless all these machine learning algorithms rely on
previously hand-labeled training data. Obtaining such data is labor-intensive,
time consuming and usually is restricted to a specific domain.
Since our goal was to develop an application for NER in queries we needed an
approach which allowed (at least potentially) to address the high heterogeneity
and variability that the Web introduces. To broad coverage entity recognition
we adopted a scalable approach which exploits the vast amount of RDF triples
available on the Web as lists of named entities (and additional information)
which have semantic annotations and extracts from these annotations attribute
types and entity types. The advantages of using these annotated data are many.
First of all a vast amount of RDF metadata are today available on the Web and
new RDF metadata are continuously produced, facilitating the “on-line” updat-
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ing and expansion of the external knowledge at the core of the disambiguation
process. If a new organization is annotated, for instance, it is potentially avail-
able to be indexed in our system. Second, with the expansion of the Semantic
Web, multi-language metadata will be available, allowing to address another
drawback of traditional monolingual gazetteers approaches.
Another advantage of our approach compared to other approaches based
on gazetteers is that while gazetteers are built as look-up lists of unique terms
(useful only for perfect matches), our approach indexes terms and combinations
of terms, extracted from RDF literals, which provide a sort of contextual infor-
mation to be used for performing the disambiguation process. This approach
can overcome another limit of the methods based on look-up lists: even if it was
possible to list all possible organizations locations, people etc., there would still
be the problem of overlaps between the lists. Names such as Paris, Emerson
or Washington could be names of people as well as places; Philip Morris could
be a person or an organization. Our approach partially resolves this problem
looking at possible combinations of terms with contiguous terms which can re-
solve the ambiguity. For instance, when “Washington” is preceded by the term
“George” our system suggests a Person instead of a Location. However, we have
already noted that for other ambiguities it is needed to implement more sophis-
ticated strategies that take into consideration the context given by other terms
or attribute types within the query. In the case of “Philip Morris”, the simple
co-occurrence of the two terms is not enough to eliminate the ambiguity and
therefore other attribute types or entities in the query should be considered to
improve the disambiguation. It is at this level that we plan to integrate experi-
mental evidences and insights derived from our user study with the technological
solution here described.
Finally, compared to the few previous studies that have tried to recognize
named entities in queries [97, 59], our approach addresses scalability issues since
it is based on a data structure (i.e. inverted index) which is created expressly
to support the same issues in search engines. This solution has been chosen to
guarantee that the system is able to handle growing amount of RDF metadata
that is an essential requirement to ensure a suitable coverage of the system.
A preliminary evaluation of the system on a limited number of entity types
shows that the proposed approach can accurately perform the entity disam-
biguation at least for two (Person and Location) out of the three types of entities
which we considered. We argue that this is due to the specific composition of
the data set we used to build the index, which was strongly unbalanced in favor
of these two categories of entities. Nonetheless, we believe that the results show
the promising potential of this approach as soon as the quality of the data set
can be improved and more and more entity specific metadata will be available.
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There are several issues which we plan to address in the future. Up to now
we have verified the effectiveness of our method in queries in which there are
only a small number of entity types. We remark that this choice was motivated
by the characteristics of the data set, as well as by the availability of vocabular-
ies from which to extract a mapping schema. We plan to extend our approach
to other entity types and design a more general schema mapping to handle
these types. Another topic for future work is to develop a query disambigua-
tion algorithm which infers the type of the entity target by integrating all the
information available within the query, not only the named entities but also ad-
ditional information (i.e. other attribute types) that can aid the disambiguation
process. The advantage of using this information has been demonstrated in our
entity search experiment, as well as the impact of making the disambiguation
process sensitive to the position of the information within the query. We want
to implement these insights in the future evolution of our approach.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future
Work
Humans construe their environment as composed of unique individuals - people,
special places, pets, artworks, events - that largely represent what it is valuable
and important to their own existence. We are able to identify these individuals
as members of various categories (e.g. x is a politician, y is a city, z is a dog)
but we are also able to uniquely identify these individuals distinguishing them
from all the other members of the same category (e.g. x is Barack Obama, y
is Rome and z is Fido). Every aspect of our interactions with the unique indi-
viduals relevant to our life strongly depends on our ability to correctly identify
and successfully track these entities over time, change and situations. These
issues seem to be a foundational component of how we perceive not only our
environment but ourselves as well, by anchoring our existence to the background
of our affective continuity. When these abilities go awry, the consequences can
be devastating - and revealing. Consider, for example, neurological disorders
such as prosopoagnosia, the inability to recognize familiar faces, or the Capgras
syndrome in which individuals believe that significant people in their lives have
been replaced with strangers who are perceptually identical imposters.
We name singular cognition the complex of cognitive processes which allow
a cognitive agent to identify a known entity, through perceptual or epistemic
access to its memorial representation, and trace it as the same unique entity
over time and change.
To perform singular cognition a cognitive agent is confronted with a unique-
ness problem, i.e. the problem to identify and trace an individual as the same
continuing individual, distinguishing that specific individual from all the other
members of the same kind. A fundamental challenge is thus to determine how
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people solve the uniqueness problem for identification and tracking of unique
individuals.
Many studies have addressed the uniqueness problem in the context of visual
perception (e.g. adult object-based attention) and infant cognition (e.g. object
persistence and numerical identity), exploring the principles by which the visual
system segments the visual input in discrete objects and bind individual views
of objects into dynamic representations which persist across time, motion, feat-
ural change, and interruptions. In section 3.1 we have discussed models of vision
and attention which propose direct mechanisms of individuation and reference
to explain how a perceiver can perform the perceptual individuation or identifi-
cation of an object as the same unique object perceived at successive moments
in time (i.e. perceptual identity). All the models that we have reviewed share
a non-conceptualist approach to the uniqueness problem in singular perception
since they are based on the idea that sensory-motor capacities or perceptual
contents make possible for a perceiver to latch on to, or to track a target x as
being the same target without the help of complex conceptual or descriptive
capacities. Such perceptual capacities must be able to perform anchoring of the
perceiver onto the object x and provide perceptual reference to x, regardless of
the fact that the object is fully identified as a unique individual (e.g. the object
x is my dog Fido) or as a member of a category (e.g. the object x is a dog).
In this work we addressed the uniqueness problem from a different perspec-
tive, studying the conceptual system that comes into play when an object is
fully identified as an instance of a conceptual representation in memory. This
system comes into play when an object is identified as a known individual both
in presence and in absence of perceptual information ensuring what we refer
to as conceptual identity. Only assuming the existence of such a system we
can explain how we recognize and track individual objects over long-term inter-
ruptions or changes in perceptual properties or even in absence of perceptual
inputs, when the identification is based on purely descriptive information.
At the core of singular cognition we identified a system of conceptual rep-
resentations, i.e. singular concepts, that are the cognitive devices specialized
to uniquely identify and track individuals in different situations. Differently
from singular mechanisms of reference assumed by models of visual attention
(e.g. object files, FINSTs), singular concepts are conceived as long-term mem-
ory representations that allow long-term identification and entity tracking across
lapses of attention, sleep, and other perceptual interruptions, as well as changes.
As we have already noted in the course of this work, the representation of ex-
emplars has to include conceptual, as well as purely perceptual, information in
order to explain the way we trace identity in all the situations in which we have
to track individuals on the basis of non-perceptual facts. In this sense, singu-
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lar concepts represent the core of the identification process both in perceptual
contexts and in contexts in which perceptual information is scarce or not avail-
able at all. Through singular concepts we are able to unite discrete glimpses or
descriptions of an object into glimpses or descriptions of the same individual.
We use singular concepts to keep track of properties (perceptual and concep-
tual) that are constant from one phase of an object to another. Identification
depends, indeed, on a variety of cognitive means for information acquisition,
such as perception, reasoning, communication and so on. The acknowledgment
of this variety of means requires distinguishing two ways to access singular con-
cepts: perceptual or bottom-up and epistemic or top-down. A singular concept
can be accessed via a bottom-up way by a perceptual stimulus. In this case the
individual is present in a sensory field of the agent’s perceptual systems and the
perceptual input activates the corresponding mental representation, through a
direct match with the perceptual information stored in the concept. Alterna-
tively, a singular concept can be accessed via a top-down way in cases in which
the target individual cannot be perceived, but can be identified on the basis
of indirect information gathered by such sources as memory, reasoning or com-
munication. For instance, every time we talk about an absent individual, we
refer linguistically to that individual by means of expressions such as singular
terms or descriptions used to activate the corresponding singular concept in our
interlocutor. When we think of an individual we access top-down to the men-
tal representation (singular concept) that possesses the relevant structure of a
mental device for which there is a singular content. This representation refers
to, is about a single individual and it is available for purported re-identification
of that individual.
In the course of the present work we have investigated different aspects of the
nature and the functioning dynamics of singular concepts and we have collected
the elements to sketch a model of singular cognition that has the notion of singu-
lar concept at its core. This issue has been poorly investigated in the literature
on concepts in cognitive psychology that centers mainly on general concepts,
such as dogs and buildings, rather than on concepts of individuals, such as a
specific dog or a specific building. Moreover, studies that have addressed pro-
cesses involved in singular cognition, like individual object recognition, mainly
focused on a specific class of individual objects, i.e. faces - often considered a
special class of individual entities - and very few studies have extended the inves-
tigation to other categories of unique individuals, such as buildings, artworks,
products, organizations and events. Therefore, the first motivation of this work
was to fill this gap, by proposing a model of singular cognition based on a sys-
tem of mental unique representations which ensure the agent’s individuation of
unique objects through different contexts, time and change.
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Beside the aim of better understanding some poorly investigated aspects
of high-level cognition and suggesting new research directions in cognitive psy-
chology, the present work is also motivated by a more practical need. In their
interactions with information-rich spaces, such as the Web, people are more
and more faced with searching and identifying individual entities in informa-
tion contexts. They use search engines to find information abut people, events,
places, products and other entities. They access to social networks to find old
friends and keep up with people with whom they contact rarely. They interact
with domain information systems which store information about unique entities
such as databases and digital libraries. They identify and tag people and other
objects on digital pictures and so on. In all these activities people perform acts
of singular cognition but they also interact with computer-based systems that
face with the problem of managing entity-centric information which is in play in
the course of these interactions. In this context, new approaches for addressing
entity identification issues have been proposed and the idea that entities are at
the core of user-information systems interactions, in particular in the case of
distributed networked-based systems, has become a new frontier of investiga-
tion, being, for instance, one of the main pillar of the Semantic Web and other
innovative entity-centric approaches (e.g. the Entity Named System described
in Chapter 5). Therefore, the study of how people represent individual enti-
ties and how they use these representations to perform acts of identification in
their interaction with information systems (e.g. to formulate keyword queries to
look for specific entities) has a potential application in a technological context
to improve the development of systems which are more and more designed to
understand the real needs and requests of their users.
The first step of our investigation of the processes underpinning singular cog-
nition concerned the bottom-up access to singular concepts. We explored how a
perceptual (visual) stimulus makes contact with the corresponding individual-
specific knowledge stored in semantic memory, that is how a perceptual stimulus
makes contact with its corresponding singular concept. Traditional models of
knowledge representation both in cognitive science and in computer and infor-
mation sciences (see for example [3, 73]) assume a hierarchical representation of
knowledge whose lower part concerns with knowledge about individuals, while
the upper part concerns with knowledge about general concepts. The question
we investigated was about the level where the perceptual stimulus of a unique
individual first makes contact with this hierarchy (entry point). This level cor-
responds to the level of abstraction at which the stimulus is first identified. In
other words, we explored whether the perceptual stimulus of an individual di-
rectly activates its corresponding individual representation in memory - being
first recognized as a unique individual - or it first activates higher level nodes
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in the hierarchy - being first recognized as a member of a category - and only
after that it activates the corresponding singular concept. This issue is rele-
vant since many studies [160, 198] have shown that although all things can be
identified at different levels of abstraction, there seems to be one level, the ba-
sic level, that has a special status serving as the typical entry point in object
recognition. However other studies [240] showed that individual differences in
domain-specific knowledge could also influence the entry point. For example,
the entry point of recognition of experts, in contrast to novices, may shift to a
level that is subordinate to the basic-level. Finally, for a special kind of objects,
i.e. human faces, there are evidences [241] that the entry point can be shifted to
the unique level of abstraction which corresponds to the level of singular concept
in our framework.
In three experiments, described in Chapter 6, we investigated the hypothesis
that the entry point of unique individuals is at the level of unique identity also
for other kinds of unique objects (artworks, buildings and products), indicating
that this downward shift of the entry point is not a peculiarity of face stimuli
but it is the common way that the cognitive system adopts to process individual
entities for which the system has a singular representation in memory. Having a
singular concept of an individual entity creates a preferential and direct access
to that individual’s specific knowledge in memory. The individual is identified
as a unique individual before than being identified as a member of a basic-level
category. Given that the perceptual demands increase with category specificity
[119], the greatest amount of visual processing is required to identify individ-
uals at the most specific level of unique identity. This means that in order to
differentiate one familiar individual from other individuals of the same category,
the recognition system must be sensitive to fine-grained differences in percep-
tual input. Despite these formidable constraints, our results show that the most
specific category level of unique identity is the level at which individuals are first
recognized when the recognition system has the cognitive devices (i.e. singular
concepts) specialized to efficiently perform these kind of processing and differ-
entiations. The entry point of individual objects which usually coincides with
the basic level of classification shifts to the most subordinate level of unique
identity when the perceivers become especially sensitive to subtle differences of
an object compared to the other objects of the same class. We argue that this
discrimination is possible thanks of the fact that a singular concept is available
in memory about that specific object. Since we claim that singular concepts are
initiated for those individuals we need to mark as “unique” in semantic mem-
ory, it should be more convenient for the cognitive system to identify a “unique”
individual as that specific individual instead of a member of a general category.
This allows, indeed, a cognitive agent to perform suitable and fast interactions
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with that individual, such as performing actions or having reactions accurately
directed to that specific individual.
Therefore, the first element of our model of singular cognition concerns the
direct perceptual bottom-up access (i.e. non-mediated by higher level concepts)
to singular concepts in semantic memory that means that the first recognition
of individual entities occurs at the level of unique identity. We note that this
is an assumption underlying the most important models of face recognition
in literature (see for example [34, 37]) but it has remained untested for other
individual objects.
As assumed by theoretical accounts of the processes underlying face recogni-
tion, we argue that the bottom-up access to the knowledge stored in the singular
concept involves a match between the products of structural encoding processes
of the visual stimulus and previously stored structural codes describing the ap-
pearance of familiar individuals which are part of the information stored in their
corresponding singular concepts. When the match is found the corresponding
singular concept is activated and the direct referential link between the mental
representation and the individual in the world is established. In this way, the
system has at its disposal all the information it needs to perform a suitable
interaction with that specific individual.
The first phase of our investigation about the access mechanisms to singular
concepts provided evidence for a direct access to unique representations in mem-
ory which is not mediated through general concepts. However, it is still open
the question whether general concepts structure the semantic knowledge stored
in singular concepts determining how singular concepts are interconnected each
others, or whether other organization principles come into play to inter-link sin-
gular concepts. To investigate this issue we probed the semantic system using
a priming experiment, described in Chapter 7.
In particular we investigated two different ways in which representations of
individual entities can be related in memory. One is based on vertical relation-
ships which connect individual instances to categories, the other is mediated
by horizontal relationships between individual instances within or across cate-
gories. We name “categorical” the relationships of the first type, “associative”
the relationships of the second type.
In the first case, abstracted superordinate categories are used to create a
connection between individual items which belong to the same category. Two
instances of the same category are connected to the representation of the cat-
egory which they belong to and the category creates an indirect link between
the two instances. This means that once an instance of a category is presented
and recognized, activation spreads to the other instances of the same category.
If semantic representations of individual entities are inter-linked by categorical
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structures, we should register priming effects when prime and target entities
has no other connection than the category membership. This kind of spread-
ing activation is assumed for example by the Burton et al. [38] model of face
recognition to explain how the activation of the person identity node of an indi-
vidual (PIN) can activate PINs of other persons which share the same semantic
categories.
The second way by which semantic representations of individual entities can
be structured and connected in memory is by means of direct associative links.
These links are not mediated by shared category memberships but reflect mean-
ingful co-occurrence relationships between singular entities (which non neces-
sarily belong to the same category). Category membership can be part of the
information shared by associated singular concepts but is not the semantic con-
nection that interlinks them. If associative links structure the representations
of individual entities in memory, this means that once an entity is presented
and recognized, activation spreads from the singular concept of the entity to its
associated singular concepts. In terms of priming, we should obtain a priming
effect when prime and target entities are associatively related even when they
do not share category membership.
The results of our experiment provides support to the latter semantic orga-
nization structure of singular concepts. Once an individual which can be recog-
nized at the level of unique identity, such as famous person, artwork, building
or product, is presented and recognized, activation spreads to other individu-
als associatively connected to it, which produces the associative priming effects.
The results of the experiment show clearly that there was no reliable categorical
priming of individuals, in the sense that there was no significant benefit from
primes corresponding to the proper names of members of the same category
(e.g. another person from the same occupational category or another painting)
but not associated. Since we found that associative links between prime and
target from different categories produced facilitation effects and for the cate-
gory person we found similar priming effects when associated pairs were from
the same or from different categories, it appears that activation within the se-
mantic system spreads to the representations of associates by connecting paths
other than those provided by general concepts. We argue that these paths are
associative in nature and may connect singular concepts of individuals from
different categories, contrary to what assumed in models of face recognition.
These findings provided a second element to our model of singular cognition
suggesting that semantic representations of individuals (i.e. singular concepts)
are preferentially inter-connected by networks of horizontal associative links
rather than by vertical categorical relations. An individual marked as “unique”
in the semantic system is more strongly connected with other unique individu-
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als associatively related to that individual than with other unique individuals of
the same category. This suggest that the information about the category mem-
bership, such as for example the fact that Paul Newman is an actor or Mona
Lisa is a portrait, may be part of the information stored in the singular concept,
but it is not generally used to organize or inter-connect the network of singular
representations of individuals that share the same category membership (e.g. to
connect the representation of Paul Newman with that of Johnny Depp). The
categorical association between unique entities may be created temporarily, as
suggested by Barsalou [11] for ad hoc or goal directed categories such as “Amer-
ican actors”, but our results show that the representations of these entities in
memory are not permanently organized by these abstracted superordinated cat-
egories.
For the specific case of person recognition, our results are in accordance with
those of other studies [271, 9] which reported non-significant categorical priming
in face recognition, compared with larger and statistically significant associative
priming. We note that the failure to consistently observe categorical priming of
person recognition challenges the Burton et al. [37] model of organization of per-
son knowledge which assumes that the only semantic connection between person
identity nodes (PINs) is through shared semantic units (SIUs) which organize
biographical knowledge of people in memory creating an indirect link between
PINs connected to the same SIUs. The evidence for associative priming effects
suggests that associative relationship is a kind of semantic relationship that
should be account by a model of person recognition. We argue that this can be
done assuming some form of direct link between the identity nodes (i.e. singular
concepts in our framework) of associated individuals which is reinforced when
these individuals frequently co-occur. Since we found that the same associative
connections can be established between persons and individual entities from dif-
ferent categories (e.g. between a person and an artwork), our results challenge
the model proposed by Barry et al. [9] which suggest that representations of
known persons are connected to each other individually by links representing
specific inter-personal relatedness. We propose, instead, that significant binary
properties between entities of whatever category can be transformed into an
associative link if the relationship is reinforced by co-occurrence.
In conclusion, these findings show a fundamental aspect of the functioning
dynamics of singular concepts and confirm what we found in the first step of
our investigation: singular concepts of entities from different categories share
common mechanisms of access and organization in semantic memory. Some
of these mechanisms have been previously investigated in studies about person
recognition. One of the main contribution of our work is to have extended
these results to other kinds of individuals entities supporting the hypothesis
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of the existence of a system of singular concepts in memory which is partially
independent from the system of general concepts. In this sense singular concepts
are not mere instances of general concepts, as assumed by many models of
knowledge representations, but they are complex conceptual representations
with they own functioning and organization mechanisms.
The first two phases of our work investigated how singular concepts are
bottom-up accessed by perceptual (visual) stimuli and how they are intercon-
nected each others in semantic memory. The third aspect we explored about
the functioning dynamics of singular concepts deals with the organization of the
information within a singular concept and the top-down access to this informa-
tion in order to perform a specific identification task (e.g. search for information
about specific entities by keyword queries). In our model of singular cognition,
singular concepts are represented as organized structures of semantic features
(or attributes) which store our knowledge about the individuals they are about.
These features are of different importance in concept representations, being the
most important features those that better absolve the identification function,
that it the function to decide, by accessing to the system of singular concepts,
if an encountered entity corresponds to an entity previously encountered and
marked in memory as “unique” by means of a unique representation. In a first
study we used a feature listing task paradigm to collect feature norms for individ-
ual entities from a small set of categories (person, organization, event, artifact
and location) and subcategories (e.g. politician, manager, sport person, actor,
professor for the category Person). The basic premise of the method was that
participant’s conscious intuitions about the most important features to identify
individual entities actually reflect the underlying organization of the correspond-
ing mental representations (i.e. singular concepts) in terms of feature relevance.
By collecting data from a large sample of participants, our aims was to identify
patterns of attribute types that people judge more relevant to uniquely iden-
tify entities from the above mentioned categories. To this purpose we adopted
a model of identification relevance, based on the model of semantic relevance
proposed by Sartori and Lombardi [207] for general concepts, which computes
the contribution of a feature to identify an individual of a category. The results
of this analysis gave us non only an interesting overview about the distribu-
tion of attributes in terms of measures such as dominance, distinctiveness and
relevance for the different categories of entities, but provided in particular an
important set of data to address the second goal of the present work concerning
possible contributions that a cognitive study on the identification processes in
humans can provide for the development of identification algorithms in auto-
matic systems. To this purpose, we focused on the specific case of the Entity
Name System (ENS), described in 5, which provided a useful ground to explore
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this issue. In particular, the results of our study have been used to address two
issues concerning the functioning of the ENS: entity representation and entity
matching. In the first case, we proposed to directly apply our findings to the
way entities are represented in the system, suggesting a default schema for entity
description to be implemented in the module of the system which manages en-
tity entering. The second application area that we have investigated was entity
matching, i.e. the process that attempts to return the single one entity that a
user was (most probably) looking for when searching the ENS. We investigated
two ways of how the research findings can be applied to this problem: in a
straight-forward manner, to rank the results of the matching process according
to the relevance of the corresponding attributes, and a “backward” manner, by
making inferences about the desired type of entity from a given search term.
This latter aspect was better investigated in a second study in which we
explored more specifically the search strategies used by people to formulate
search queries about individual entities. On the one hand, this study gave as
the opportunity to study an interesting case in which singular concepts are
top-down accessed to extract a small amount of information which is used to
uniquely identify an entity in the interaction with a search system. The idea of
a goal-directed activation of the knowledge stored in a singular concept enriched
our model of singular cognition with a new element. In particular, the results
of the study integrated those obtained in the previous investigation showing
which attributes people consider more relevant to identify individual entities in
a specific task and the strategies they used to organize these attributes within
a query.
On the other hand, the analysis of the attributes used in keyword search
queries provided evidence for the beneficial impact that a cognitive study on
the identification strategies used by people in entity searching may have in
improving the performance of computer-based search systems. In particular,
we showed how our results could contribute to address one of the most critical
problem in information retrieval that is the problem to capture the meaning of a
query most likely intended by the user. Our assumption was that an important
first step of performing such a task is to understand what type of entity the user
is looking for. We call this process Entity Type Disambiguation. To address
this problem we proposed and tested a Bayesian Model based on the assumption
that an entity type can be inferred from the attributes a user specifies in a search
query. The beneficial impact of the entity type disambiguation approach on a
search system was proved on the effect of the disambiguation on the performance
of a real system. The proposed approach led finally to the development of a
technological application for automatic entity type disambiguation of queries
which represents a concrete example of how a cognitive investigation on the
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problem of entity identification can inspire the development of technological
solutions.
A further step toward the understanding of the functioning dynamics of sin-
gular concepts at the service of singular cognition concerns their role in track-
ing the identity of individuals in identity judgments. Because individuals can
change some of their properties while persisting as the same individuals, an
important aspect of singular cognition deals with the persistence of individual
identity across time and change. To address this issue, singular cognition needs
a function that connects different (temporal) descriptions of an individual into
a unique singular description of the same individual, ensuring a unique refer-
ential link between the mental representation in the cognitive system and the
corresponding referent in the world over time.
In chapter 9 we examined this fundamental aspect of singular cognition
studying how people perform identity judgments among alternatives over change
and we provided evidence in favor of a causal model of individual identity, i.e.
Causal Continuer Model, that has the notion of causal closeness at its core.
According to this model, causal continuity captures the intuition that people
think of causes as central to object persistence and they uses causal explanations
to explain the persistence of individuals across changes. The model assumes that
to decide if an individual x0 at one time t0 can be considered identical to one
of a set of possible individuals x1, x2, ..., xn at another time t1, people perform
a two-step decision process. First they select a subset of candidates which
are individuals that are causally close enough to be considered identical to the
original and then they choose as identical the closest individual to the original
among the selected candidates. In order to perform such a process we argue that
the cognitive system performs a comparison between the mental representation
of the original individual x0 and the representations of the possible candidates.
The degree of causal closeness between the original description of x0 and the
description of a candidate xi is established evaluating how easy is to find a
causal explanation that may explain the differences between the representation
of x0 compared to that of xi. In other words people decide that a singular
representation about a target individual x0 at one time t0 belongs to the same
object as a representation of it at another time t1, if there is a causal link which
explains the transition of the representation at t0 into the representation at t1
and this link is the strongest compared to other links which connect the original
representation with representations of other possible continuers.
To test the model predictions we performed an experiment in which par-
ticipants had to make identity decisions between alternative descriptions which
varied in causal distance, as measured in a previous experiment, from an orig-
inal description. The results of the experiment showed that the predictions of
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the Causal Continuer Model fitted well the experimental results with the only
exception of identity judgments about events whose ontological nature seems to
determine different ways of processing.
These findings have added another “brick” to the model of singular cogni-
tion, showing that causal forces come into play in governing the mechanisms of
tracking identity across time and change mediated by singular concepts. The
fact that analogous results have been found for objects from different categories
suggests that causal closeness is a general metric used to trace the identity of
objects of different types by uniting discrete descriptions of an object into a
unique singular concept of the same individual. As we have noted above, these
results support the idea that system of singular concepts is subjected to com-
mon mechanisms of functioning that are not restricted to or peculiar of specific
categories of objects and do not depend on the concepts or categories to which
these objects belong. In this sense our work promotes a sort of revenge of sin-
gular concepts on general concepts whose predominant role in identity tracking
was claimed for example by sortalist approaches to the problem of object iden-
tity. Of course, we are not deny that objects of different types can vary in their
behavior in ways that are important for identity and persistence. Dropping a
crystal glass from 50 cm can break it. Dropping a ball from the same height
won’t. But what distinguishes the causal approach with sortalist views is the
explanation for such differences. While sortalist view assumes that the source
of such differences is the meaning of the sortal terms that describe the objects,
the causal model that we are proposing here accounts for the difference in terms
of the kinds of causes responsible for maintaining the integrity of the object in
question. People use their knowledge about the causal mechanisms in different
domains to judge whether a certain event will cause certain consequences or not
and use these knowledge to predict the compatibility of a given change in an
object’s description with the identity of that object.
There are a lot of other questions about singular concepts and identity that
we aim to investigate in future work. We conclude this thesis by sketching
possible future research directions inspired by the work reported here.
One of the most reliable findings in the literature on person identification
is that semantic categorization of a face occurs more quickly than naming a
face. Response latencies are slower in a name classification task (e.g. is the
person’s first name Paul or not?) than a semantic classification task (e.g. is the
person a politician or not?). Participants are quicker to determine whether two
simultaneously presented faces are those of people sharing a semantic property,
for example, occupation [273] and nationality and dead/alive decisions than
those of people sharing the same first name. Several explanations have been
proposed for the difficulties with name retrieval relative to other biographical
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information. In the Bruce and Young model [34], name retrieval takes place in
a separate processing stage that follows, and is contingent upon, the retrieval
of semantic information about the person. Therefore, the relative difficulty of
name retrieval is the consequence of a serial architecture. In contrast, Burton
and Bruce [37] proposed that names and semantic information can be accessed
in parallel. The difficulty of name retrieval is a consequence of name uniqueness;
whereas most semantic properties like occupation or nationality are shared by
many people, names are unique to one person and therefore they take longer to
be activated. The serial/parallel debate remains unresolved even though recent
studies have presented evidence supporting parallel rather than serial access
models [214].
To the best of our knowledge there are no mental chronometry studies that
have addressed the same issue for other kinds of unique entities. Therefore,
a first line of research could investigate semantic categorization compared to
naming for other types of unique entity, such as buildings, artworks or prod-
ucts. This would be a further step to explore the parallelism in the functioning
dynamics of singular concepts about people and those about unique objects
from other categories.
Most published studies about person recognition and naming involve celebri-
ties and people known through media and also the studies presented in this work
used famous entities as stimuli. However, as far as recall of information (e.g.
names and other semantic information) about unique individuals is concerned,
the importance of frequency and recency of use may also be relevant to explain
the behavioural evidence and should be considered before proposing general the-
oretical accounts. Frequency of exposure to names could determine the ease of
name retrieval compared to recall of other information. To test this hypothesis
future studies could compare semantic categorization and naming of person-
ally known entities, such as highly familiar persons or buildings with which
participants interact regularly. The results could be confronted with those ob-
tained from famous entities of the same categories. Differences between the two
conditions would support parallel access to names and semantic information
in singular concepts and would show that frequency of name use could be an
important determinant of data patterns in entity naming.
The experiment that we have presented in Chapter 9 investigated how peo-
ple trace the identity of objects across change evaluating which changes are
compatible with the identity of an individual and which are not. However, our
concept of an individual object can sometimes undergo fission or fusion, even
when the object itself is unchanged. As a real-life example, imagine, for exam-
ple, that you never met the sister of a friend. Nonetheless, you have a singular
representation about her based on what you know from him. One day you met a
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girl at a party and a new singular concept is initiated about her in your memory.
At a certain point during the conversation you understand that the person you
have just met is in fact the sister of your friend. This means that now you have
two singular representations about the same individual. In this case the two
singular concepts need to be merged to create a unique representation which
combine all the information stored in two original representations. The opposite
process, conceptual fission, sometimes also occurs in revising our knowledge of
people. For instance, going back to the previous example, if you think that your
friend has only one sister, every time that he tells you about his sister you store
the information into a unique mental representation. But if you discover that
in fact he has two sisters, you need to revise your memorial representations and
eventually distribute different pieces of information into two different concepts.
An interesting research question deals with the reorganization processes of
singular concepts during these processes. In the fusion process the issue is to
understand how the information initially stored in two singular representations
is reorganized into a unique representation which creates a unique referential
link with its referent. Anderson [3] suggests that which concept is retained and
which is abandoned depends on the amount of information connected to the
two. People first encode via a proposition that the two representations turned
out to have the same referent. Then they choose to maintain the “stronger”
representation, the one with more information. They begin a process of copying
information from the abandoned representation to the other, the links to the
abandoned representation are weakened through disuse and finally the access to
it is lost. We argue that other mechanisms may come into play to explain which
singular concept is retained and which is abandoned. In particular, the results
presented in Chapter 9 suggest the hypothesis that a dimension such as the
causal distance of the information contained in the two original representations
may influence the revision process. In fusion cases, we might prefer to keep the
concept that we can most easily “explain” becoming the merged individual who
could more readily acquire the properties of the other. The idea is that the
representation whose attribute changes are difficult to explain is maintained,
while the other is abandoned. To test this hypothesis, we could use the An-
derson’s technique1 to see whether causally stable traits dominate less stable
ones in conceptual fusion or fission. We could use the causal distance measures
collected in the first experiment described in Chapter 9 to create the tasks and
1The procedure used by Anderson concerned with the speed with which subjects can re-
trieve facts and make inferences from them. Participants were taught with facts about different
individuals and then they learned that pairs of these individuals were indeed the same indi-
vidual. The latencies in making inferences from facts about these individuals were used to
explain how the corresponding representations are re-organized in memory after the fusion
process.
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predict which of two descriptions should be retained and which should be aban-
doned and test the predictions on experimental data. We note that fission and
fusion of singular concepts can also happen for effect of the fact that an entity,
sometimes, splits into two or more entities or two entities merge in a unique
entity. As a real world example, consider an organization that acquires another
or two organizations that merge to form a new entity. In the context of an
ENS these decisions have a big impact, since they may guide the decisions to
purge entities from the repository or populate it with new entities. Therefore,
understanding how these processes are managed by a cognitive system could
provide interesting insights to develop algorithms to manage fusion and fission
in entity-centric systems.
In summary, the contribution of this work is twofold. On one hand, we
provided new evidence on the nature of high-level cognitive mechanisms involved
in entity representation and identification, suggesting new research issues on
a field scarcely investigated in cognitive psychology. On the other hand, we
provided concrete examples of how a better understanding of these processes at
a cognitive level can improve the development of entity identification approaches
in information systems, suggesting a middle ground where cognitive models and
technological solutions can find the opportunity for integration, in particular
in information-rich spaces, like the Web, where users and machines constantly
interact to satisfy entity-centric information needs.
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Appendix A
Experimental Materials
used in the Entry Point
Experiments
A.1 Entry Point Experiment 2
In Table A.1 we reported stimuli and category words used in the category-
verification tasks of the Experiment 2. Each stimulus was presented six times,
three times in the true condition (one for each level of abstraction of the true
category word) and three times in the false condition (one for each level of
abstraction of the false category word).
Category Word
Stimulus Level True Condition False Condition
Mona Lisa Superordinate artwork building
Basic painting sculpture
Subordinate Mona Lisa The Scream
Sunflowers Superordinate artwork product
Basic painting sculpture
Subordinate Sunflowers The Last Supper
David Superordinate artwork furnishing
Basic sculpture painting
Subordinate David Discobolous
Statue of Liberty Superordinate artwork product
Basic sculpture painting
Subordinate Statue of Liberty The Pieta`
Eiffel Tower Superordinate building utensil
Basic tower skyscraper
Subordinate Eiffel Tower Leaning Tower of Pisa
Empire State Building Superordinate building product
Basic skyscraper church
Subordinate Empire State Building Twin Towers
Golden Bridge Superordinate building musical instrument
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Basic bridge tower
Subordinate Golden Bridge Rialto Bridge
St. Peter’s Basilica Superordinate building product
Basic church bridge
Subordinate St. Peter’s Basilica Milan Cathedral
Fiat 500 Superordinate product building
Basic car audio player
Subordinate Fiat 500 Mini Cooper
Fiat Panda Superordinate product artwork
Basic car phone
Subordinate Fiat Panda Beetle
Iphone Superordinate product artwork
Basic phone car
Subordinate Iphone Black Barry
Ipod nano Superordinate product furnishing
Basic audio player car
Subordinate Ipod nano Walkman
rocking chair Superordinate furnishing artwork
Basic chair table
Subordinate rocking chair folding chair
desk lamp Superordinate furnishing musical instrument
Basic lamp table
Subordinate desk lamp floor lamp
tea table Superordinate furnishing utensil
Basic table lamp
Subordinate tea table dinning table
four poster bed Superordinate furnishing musical instrument
Basic bed chair
Subordinate four poster bed cot
wooden spoon Superordinate utensil musical instrument
Basic spoon pan
Subordinate wooden spoon teaspoon
bread knife Superordinate utensil artwork
Basic knife spoon
Subordinate bread knife flick knife
fry pan Superordinate utensil building
Basic pan knife
Subordinate fry pan saucepan
nail scissors Superordinate utensil furnishing
Basic scissors pan
Subordinate nail scissors garden scissors
grand piano Superordinate musical instrument utensil
Basic piano trumpet
Subordinate grand piano upright piano
bongo drum Superordinate musical instrument furnishing
Basic drum guitar
Subordinate bongo drum bass drum
trombone Superordinate musical instrument utensil
Basic trumpet piano
Subordinate trombone clarinet
electric guitar Superordinate musical instrument building
Basic guitar drum
Subordinate electric guitar acoustic guitar
Table A.1: Stimuli and categories words used in experiment 2
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A.2 Entry Point Experiment 3
In Table A.2 we reported stimuli and word primes used in the identity-matching
tasks of the Experiment 3. In the experiment, a word prime was followed by two
pictures. In the same condition two identical pictures were presented. In the
different condition the stimulus picture was paired with a picture of a different
object. In the Table A.2 we reported the list of the stimuli pictures for the
same and different conditions and the prime words used for the three levels of
abstractions (i.e. basic, subordinate and neutral).
Stimulus Level Category Word Paired with
(prime) (different condition)
The Scream Basic Level painting Sunflowers
Subordinate Level The Scream Mona Lisa
Neutral blank The Kiss
The Last Supper Basic Level painting The luncheon of
the boating party
Subordinate Level The Last Supper Starry Night
Neutral blank The Birth of Venus
Discobolous Basic Level sculpture Statue of Liberty
Subordinate Level Discobolous David
Neutral blank Venus de Milo
The Pieta` Basic Level sculpture Riace Bronzes
Subordinate Level The Pieta` The Thinker
Neutral blank The Kiss
The Leaning Tower Basic Level tower Eiffel Tower
of Pisa Subordinate Level The Leaning Tower Big Ban
of Pisa
Neutral blank Asinelli Tower
Twin Towers Basic Level skyscraper Empire State Building
Subordinate Level Twin Towers Taipei 101
Neutral blank Sears Tower
Rialto Bridge Basic Level bridge Golden Gate Bridge
Subordinate Level Rialto Bridge Old Bridge
Neutral blank Tower Bridge
Milan Cathedral Basic Level church Cathedral of Notre-Dame
Subordinate Level Milan Cathedral St. Peter’s Basilica
Neutral blank Canterbury Cathedral
Mini Basic Level car Lancia Y
Subordinate Level Mini Cooper Fiat 500
Neutral blank Smart
Beetle Basic Level car Golf
Subordinate Level Beetle Fiat Panda
Neutral blank Peugeot 206
Black Barry Basic Level phone Iphone
Subordinate Level Black Barry Nokia E71
Neutral blank Samsung I8000
Walkman Basic Level audio player Ipod Nano
Subordinate Level Walkman Ipod shuﬄe
Neutral blank Ipod classic
folding chair Basic Level chair rocking chair
Subordinate Level folding chair office chair
Neutral blank armchair
floor lamp Basic Level lamp desk lamp
Subordinate Level floor lamp night table lamp
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Neutral blank table lamp
dinning table Basic Level table tea table
Subordinate Level dinning table picnic table
Neutral blank billiards table
cot Basic Level bed four poster bed
Subordinate Level cot cradle
Neutral blank iron bed
tea spoon Basic Level spoon wooden spoon
Subordinate Level tea spoon Chinese spoon
Neutral blank honey dipper
flick knife Basic Level knife cheese knife
Subordinate Level flick knife bread knife
Neutral blank kitchen knife
saucepan Basic Level pan fry pan
Subordinate Level saucepan pasta pan
Neutral blank pressure cooker
garden scissors Basic Level scissors nail scissors
Subordinate Level garden scissors chicken scissors
Neutral blank barber scissors
upright piano Basic Level piano grand piano
Subordinate Level upright piano spinet
Neutral blank keyboard
bass drum Basic Level drum bongo drum
Subordinate Level bass drum tambourine
Neutral blank congas
transverse flute Basic Level flute recorder
Subordinate Level transverse flute piccolo
Neutral blank penny whistle
acoustic guitar Basic Level guitar electric guitar
Subordinate Level acoustic guitar bass guitar
Neutral blank resonator guitar
Table A.2: Stimuli and categories words used in experiment 3
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Appendix B
Experimental Materials
used in the Entity
Recognition Experiment
B.1 Entity Recognition Experiment
The table B.1 shows target stimuli and word primes used in the entity recogni-
tion experiment. Numbers in the first column show the degree of association,
measured as the proportions of participants (n=15), who gave the name as the
“first that springs to mind” when presented with the target name in the pilot
study.
Person: across
Associate prime Categorical prime Unrelated prime Target
Set A
USA (0.80) Nicolas Sarkozy Florence Barack Obama
Pretty Woman (0.60) Monica Bellucci Nokia Julia Roberts
Beatles (0.80) Freddy Mercury Pantheon John Lennon
Ferrari (0.93) Ayrton Senna Poland Michael Schumacher
Set B
Mediaset (0.60) Angela Merkel Taiwan Silvio Berlusconi
Mission Robert De Niro Chinese Wall Tom Cruise
Impossible (0.60)
Argentina (1) David Beckham Times Square Diego A. Maradona
Albachiara (0.46) Tiziano Ferro Chicago Vasco Rossi
Set C
Saturday Night Leonardo Di Caprio Egypt John Travolta
Fever (0.47)
England (0.66) Princess Grace Panasonic Lady Diana
Thriller (0.53) Madonna Trevi Fountain Micheal Jackson
Yamaha (0.60) Marco Melandri Broadway Valentino Rossi
Person: whitin
Set A
Angelina Jolie (0.86) Johnny Depp Luciana Litizzetto Brad Pitt
Romina Power (0.93) Andrea Bocelli Hugh Grant Albano Carrisi
Sandra Mondaini (0.93) Pippo Baudo Bob Marley Raimondo Vianello
Ilary Blasi (0.60) Rino Gattuso Kelly Minogue Francesco Totti
Set B
Katia Ricciarelli (0.53) Paolo Bonolis Penelope Cruz Pippo Baudo
Enzo Iacchetti (0.60) Claudio Bisio Joaquin Cortez Ezio Greggio
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John F. Kennedy (0.60) Audrey Hepburn Winston Churchill Marilin Monroe
Fidel Castro (0.33) Nelson Mandela Kevin Costner Ernesto Che Guevara
Set C
Gino Paoli (0.66) Gianna Nannini Cary Grant Ornella Vanoni
Monica Lewinsky (0.60) Tony Blair Sean Connery Bill Clinton
Claudio Bisio (0.56) Daria Bignardi Lucio Dalla Vanessa Encontrada
Carlo Conti (0.46) Elizabeth Taylor Dino Zof Sophia Loren
Artwork
Set A
Louvre (1) Guernica Vladimir Putin Mona Lisa
Van Gogh (0.86) The School of Athens Cuba The Sunflowers
Munch (0.80) The Three Graces Sanghai The Scream
Greece (0.33) The Venus de Milo Cindy Lauper Riace Bronzes
Set B
Michelangelo (0.86) Discobolus Elvis Presley La Pieta`
Leonardo Da Vinci (0.86) Water-Lilies Barilla Last Supper
Sistine Chapel (0.40) Dead Christ Bombay The Creation of Adam
Gustav Klimt (0.33) Luncheon Of Australia The Kiss
The Boating Party
Set C
USA (0.80) Christ Redeemer Switzerland Statue of Liberty
Botticelli (0.66) The Tree of Life Los Angeles The Birth of Venus
Van Gogh (0.46) Girl with a Nikon Starry Night
Pearl Earring
Florence (0.73) The Thinker Red Square David
Building
Set A
Paris (0.93) Leaning Tower of Pisa Moscow Eiffel Tower
Rome (0.93) Triumphal Arc Ibiza Colosseum
Barcelona (0.73) Santa Maria Novella Ariston Sagrada Familia
Washington (0.80) Villa of Arcore Luigi Pirandello White House
Set B
Bin Laden (0.86) Tower of London Napoleone Bonaparte Twin Towers
Queen Elisabeth (0.86) Palace of Versailles Turin Buckingham Palace
Rome (0.93) Notre Dame Japan Basilica of Saint Peter
New York (0.86) Golden Gate Bridge The Great Brooklyn Bridge
Pyramid of Giza
Set C
London (1) Asinelli Tower Spain Big Ben
Berlin (0.66) The Arch of Constantine Toronto Brandenburg Door
New York (0.73) Taipei Michelle Hunziker Empire
Financial Center State Building
Paris (0.93) The Uffizi Gallery Microsoft Louvre
Product
Set A
Apple (0.86) Black Barry Martin Scorsese Iphone
Fiat (1) Micra Dublin Panda
Ferrero (0.60) Kit Kat Prague Nutella
Volkswagen (0.73) Peugeot 205 Nivea Golf
Set B
Apple (0.73) Walkman Portugal Ipod
Fiat (0.86) Ypsilon Vienna 500
Algida (0.80) Maxi Bon Acer Cornetto
Piaggio (0.60) Monster Trafalgar Square Vespa
Set C
Sony (0.60) Xbox Vatican Museums Play Station
Volkswagen (0.73) Megane Kensington Gardens Beetle
Ford (0.80) Punto Munich Fiesta
Piaggio (0.53) Scarabeo Albert Einstein Ciao
Table B.1: Prime words and Stimuli used in the entity recognition experiment
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Appendix C
Relevance Measures
C.1 Feature Norms for Individual Entities
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Category Attributes (it) F f Attributes (eng) F f
Politician age 17 0.56 party 24 0.76
name 14 0.46 name 19 0.63
political view 14 0.46 age 13 0.43
party 13 0.43 country 10 0.33
surname 11 0.43 gender 10 0.26
type 11 0.36 role 8 0.26
role 10 0.36 nationality 5 0.13
education 9 0.30 surname 5 0.13
experiences 7 0.30
curriculum 5 0.23
N=30 N=30
Manager name 13 0.46 name 0.71 16
surname 11 0.39 age 0.28 7
company 8 0.28 department 0.23 5
age 7 0.25 experience 0.20 5
role 7 0.21
type 6 0.21
education 6 0.21
N=28 N=21
Professor name 13 0.52 name 0.87 21
specialization 16 0.64 university 0.41 10
age 9 0.36 department 0.33 8
surname 8 0.32 education 0.29 7
educational institution 6 0.24 publication 0.29 7
publications 5 0.20 age 0.20 5
type 5 0.20 email 0.20 5
research area 0.20 5
surname 0.20 5
N=25 N=24
Sportsperson type of sport 20 0.66 name 0.63 19
age 14 0.46 type of sport 0.5 18
name 14 0.46 age 0.33 10
surname 9 0.23 gender 0.26 9
type 7 0.23 birth-date 0.23 7
birth date 6 0.20 nationality 0.16 5
level 6 0.20 team 0.16 5
N=30 N=26
Actor/actress age 16 0.51 name 0.88 16
type 16 0.51 birth date 0.38 7
name 15 0.48 movies 0.38 7
experiences 14 0.45 gender 0.33 6
nationality 11 0.35 country 0.27 5
surname 10 0.32 age 0.22 4
movies 10 0.32
birth date 7 0.22
N=31 N=18
Person name 20 0.74 name 0.73 19
neutral category surname 17 0.62 gender 0.46 14
birth-date 10 0.37 birth-date 0.42 11
age 10 0.37 age 0.38 10
birth-place 8 0.37 education 0.23 6
tax code 8 0.29 height 0.23 6
occupation 7 0.29 nationality 0.23 6
height 7 0.25 occupation 0.23 6
place of residence 7 0.25 surname 0.23 6
type 7 0.25 birth-place 0.19 5
character 6 0.22 email 0.19 5
weight 6 0.22 marital status 0.15 4
N=27 N=26
Table C.1: Features and production frequencies for Person
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Category Attributes (all) F f
Politician party 37 0.61
name 33 0.55
age 30 0.50
role 23 0.38
experiences - career 19 0.31
political view 17 0.28
surname 17 0.28
education 13 0.21
country 11 0.18
type 11 0.18
gender 10 0.16
N=60
Manager name 29 0.59
age 14 0.28
role 12 0.24
company 11 0.22
experiences 10 0.20
education 9 0.18
competence 9 0.18
N=49
Professor name 34 0.69
specialization 20 0.40
age 14 0.28
surname 13 0.26
publications 12 0.24
university/ies 11 0.22
department 10 0.20
N=49
Sportsperson type of sport - specialty 38 0.63
name 33 0.55
age 24 0.40
birth date 13 0.21
gender 9 0.15
surname 9 0.15
N=60
Actor/actress name 31 0.63
age 20 0.40
type 18 0.36
movies 17 0.34
birth date 14 0.28
experiences 14 0.28
nationality 13 0.26
education 8 0.16
N=49
Person name 39 0.73
neutral category surname 23 0.43
birth date 21 0.39
age 20 0.37
birth place 15 0.28
gender 14 0.26
occupation 14 0.26
height 13 0.24
nationality 11 0.20
eyes color 8 0.15
N=53
Table C.2: Features and production frequencies for Person: aggregated data
(i.e. English and Italian).
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Subcategory Attributes (it) F f Attributes (eng) F f
Company name 22 0.68 name 15 0.83
location 11 0.31 address 7 0.38
type 10 0.31 location 7 038
num. of employees 9 0.28 country 6 0.33
turnover 6 0.18 business type 4 0.22
sector 5 0.15 num. of employees 4 0.22
web site url 4 0.22
N=32 N=18
Association name 17 0.60 name 13 0.52
objective/s 16 0.57 objective/s 10 0.40
type 11 0.39 location 8 0.32
members 8 0.28 type 6 0.24
sector 6 0.21 website url 6 0.24
location 5 0.17 activity 5 0.20
headquarters 5 0.17 address 5 0.20
date of foundation 5 0.20
members 5 0.20
N=28 N=25
University location 15 0.48 name 16 0.61
name 14 0.45 location 12 0.46
faculties 9 0.25 address 8 0.30
courses 7 0.22 city 7 0.26
city 6 0.19 number of students 7 0.26
num. of students 5 0.16 country 6 0.23
courses 5 0.19
faculties 5 0.19
state 5 0.19
N=31 N=26
Government political orientation 8 0.34 country 15 0.55
nation 7 0.30 name 7 0.25
type 6 0.26
country 4 0.17
N=23 N=27
Agency name 16 0.65 name 13 0.65
type 13 0.54 address 7 0.35
location 7 0.29 num. of employees 5 0.25
address 6 0.25 type 5 0.25
objective/s 6 0.25
num. of employees 5 0.20
sector 4 0.16
N=24 N=20
Organization name 17 0.56 name 13 0.61
neutral category objective/s 17 0.56 location 6 0.28
type 10 0.33 type 6 0.28
sector 8 0.26
location 7 0.20
head office 6 0.20
members 5 0.16
N=30 N=21
Table C.3: Features and production frequencies for Organization
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Subcategory Attributes (all) F f
Company name 37 0.74
location 18 0.36
number of employees 13 0.26
business type 12 0.24
address 10 0.20
turnover 9 0.18
country 8 0.16
N=50
Association name 30 0.56
objective/s 26 0.49
type 17 0.32
location 13 0.24
activity 9 0.17
N=53
University name 30 0.52
location 27 0.47
faculties 14 0.24
city 13 0.23
number of students 12 0.21
courses 12 0.21
address 11 0.19
N=57
Government country 26 0.52
type 9 0.18
political view 8 0.16
N=50
Agency name 29 0.65
type 18 0.40
address 13 0.29
number of employee 10 0.23
location 10 0.23
N=44
Organization name 30 0.58
neutral category type 16 0.31
location 13 0.25
sector 8 0.15
N=51
Table C.4: Features and production frequencies for Organization: aggregated
data (i.e. English and Italian)
281
Subcategory Attributes (it) F f Attributes (eng) F f
Conference location 18 0.9 location 22 0.84
topic/s 14 0.7 name 15 0.57
participants 10 0.5 date 10 0.34
date/s 9 0.45 organizer/s 7 0.26
duration 6 0.30 participants 5 0.19
speaker/s 6 0.30 topic/s 5 0.19
title 5 0.25 year 5 0.19
organizers 4 0.20
objective/s 4 0.20
time 4 0.20
N=20 N=26
Meeting location 16 0.84 location 22 0.88
time 12 0.63 time 20 0.80
topic/s 11 0.57 date 16 0.64
participants 10 0.52 participants 13 0.52
date 9 0.21 topic/s 9 0.35
type 4 0.21 type 6 0.24
name 5 0.20
N=19 N=25
Exhibition location 16 0.72 location 12 0.75
topic/s 12 0.54 name 8 0.5
title 10 0.45 time 6 0.37
date 7 0.31 date 6 0.37
duration 7 0.31 end date 3 0.18
type 6 0.27 start date 3 0.18
artists 4 0.18
N=22 N=16
Show type 28 0.75 name/title 11 0.64
location 27 0.73 location 9 0.52
date 16 0.43 actors 5 0.30
duration 11 0.29 time 5 0.30
time 11 0.29 type 4 0.23
price/s 10 0.27 date 4 0.23
title 9 0.24
actors 8 0.21
participants 6 0.16
N=37 N=17
Sport event location 16 0.76 location 17 1
neutral category date 11 0.52 type of sport 11 0.64
sport specialty 10 0.47 date 10 0.58
name 8 0.38 time 5 0.29
type 6 0.28 duration 4 0.23
time 4 0.19 name 4 0.23
participants 4 0.19 participants 4 0.23
N=21 N=17
Event date 15 0.71 location 21 0.91
neutral category location 15 0.71 date 13 0.56
type 14 0.66 time 12 0.52
participants 8 0.38 participants 8 0.34
name 7 0.33 name 7 0.30
duration 5 0.23 type 6 0.26
organizer/s 5 0.23 purpose/s 5 0.21
time 5 0.23
N=21 N=23
Table C.5: Features and production frequencies for Event
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Subcategory Attributes (all) F
Conference location 40 0.86
title/name 20 0.43
topic/s 19 0.41
date/s 19 0.41
participants 15 0.33
organizers 11 0.24
objective/s 8 0.17
duration 8 0.17
N=46
Meeting location 38 0.86
time 32 0.72
date 25 0.56
participants 23 0.52
topic/s 20 0.45
type 10 0.22
N=19
Exhibition location 28 0.73
name 18 0.47
date 13 0.34
time 9 0.23
duration 9 0.23
type 7 0.18
N=38
Show location 36 0.66
type 32 0.59
title/name 20
date 20 0.37
time 16 0.29
actor/s 13
duration 12 0.22
price 11 0.20
participants 9 0.16
N=54
Sport event location 33 0.86
date 21 0.55
sport specialty 21 0.55
name 12 0.31
time 9 0.23
type 9 0.23
participants 8 0.21
duration 6 0.16
N=38
Event location 36 0.81
neutral category date 28 0.63
type 20 0.45
time 17 0.38
participants 16
name 14 0.31
duration 8 0.18
organizers 8 0.18
purpose/s 7 0.16
N=44
Table C.6: Features and production frequencies for Event: aggregated data
(i.e. English and Italian)
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Subcategory Attributes (it) F f Attributes (eng) F f
Product price/s 15 0.6 price/s 23 0.52
name 11 0.44 name 9 0.39
use 11 0.44 color 5 0.21
type 10 0.40 description 5 0.21
color/s 9 0.32 size 4 0.17
dimension/s 7 0.28 use 4 0.17
features 5 0.20
weight 5 0.20
N=25 N=23
Artwork artist/s 27 0.9 creation date 14 0.73
title/name 11 0.36 artist/s 13 0.68
date 13 0.43 title/s 13 0.68
location 12 0.40 material 6 0.31
type 10 0.33 style 6 0.31
material 9 0.30 type 5 0.26
style 8 0.26 date 4 0.21
color/s 6 0.20
subject 6 0.20
creation date 5 0.16
size 5 0.16
N=30 N=19
Building location 16 0.53 address 15 0.65
height 11 0.36 location 13 0.56
number of floors 11 0.36 height 11 0.36
color/s 10 0.33 name 8 0.47
dimension/s 10 0.33 architect 6 0.34
type 10 0.33 color 5 0.26
address 7 0.30 number of floors 5 0.21
recipients 6 0.20 owner 5 0.21
area mq 6 0.20 type 0.21
use 6 0.20 country 0.17
N=30 N=23
Book author/s 27 0.90 author/s 20 0.8
title 22 0.73 title 19 0.76
publisher 18 0.6 ISBN 13 0.52
number of pages 16 0.53 publisher 13 0.52
year of publication 12 0.40 year of publication 13 0.52
type 9 0.30 number of pages 7 0.28
ISBN 7 0.23 year 5 0.20
topic 6 0.20 language/s 4 0.16
edition 6 0.20 topic 4 0.16
N=30 N=25
Article of clothing color/s 27 0.83 color 18 0.72
size/s 21 0.68 size 13 0.52
type 19 0.61 type 11 0.44
brand name 15 0.48 material 9 0.36
price/s 12 0.38 gender 7 0.28
fabric 8 0.25 price/s 7 0.28
material 5 0.16 style 7 0.28
model 5 0.16 brand name 5 0.20
N=31 N=25
Object color/s 20 0.91 size 16 0.64
function/use 20 0.91 color 14 0.56
material 14 0.63 shape 10 0.40
shape 14 0.63 function 10 0.40
size 14 0.63 name 6 0.24
weight 10 0.45 dimensions 4 0.16
name 9 0.40 material 4 0.16
weight 4 0.16
N=22 N=25
Table C.7: Features and production frequencies for Artifact
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Subcategory Attributes (all) F f
Product price/s 27 0.56
name 20 0.41
color 14 0.29
type 13 0.27
manufacturer 11 0.23
size 11 0.23
description 8 0.16
use/function 7 0.15
features 7 0.15
brand 7 0.15
N=48
Artwork artist/s 40 0.82
title/name 27 0.49
creation date 23 0.47
material 15 0.30
type 15 0.30
style 14 0.29
location 0.29
size 9 0.18
color 8 0.16
N=49
Building location 29 0.54
address 22 0.41
height 22 0.41
number of floors 16 0.30
color 15 0.28
type 15 0.28
size 13 0.24
architect 9 0.17
name 8 0.15
use 6 0.20
N=53
Book author/s 47 0.85
title 41 0.74
publisher 31 0.56
year of publication 25 0.45
number of pages 23 0.42
ISBN 20 0.36
type 11 0.20
topic 10 0.18
edition 9 0.18
N=55
Article of clothing color 45 0.80
size 34 0.61
type 30 0.53
brand name 20 0.36
price 19 0.34
material 14 0.25
fabric 12 0.21
style 11 0.19
gender intended for 9 0l.16
N=56
Object color/s 34 0.72
neutral category size 30 0.63
function 30 0.63
shape 24 0.51
material 18 0.38
name 15 0.31
weight 14 0.29
use 6 0.27
N=47
Table C.8: Features and production frequencies for Artifact: aggregated data
(i.e. English and Italian)
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Subcategory Attributes (it) F f Attributes (eng) F f
Tourist Location location 14 0.58 name 11 0.57
attractions 8 0.33 country 8 0.42
name 7 0.29 geo. position 7 0.37
type 7 0.29 city 5 0.26
population 4 0.16 attractions 5 0.21
geo. position 4 0.16 location 4 0.21
services 4 0.16 price/s 4 0.21
N=24 N= 19
City number of citizens 24 0.8 country 13 0.52
country 18 0.60 name 13 0.52
geo. position 18 0.60 population 11 0.44
name 12 0.40 location 10 0.40
region 10 0.33 geo. position 7 0.28
climate 6 0.20 language/s 5 0.20
num. of citizens 4 0.16
N=30 N= 25
Shop location 20 0.55 location 0.38
name 19 0.52 name 0.38
type 14 0.33 height 0.47
address 12 0.33 address 0.33
timetable 11 0.30
number of employee 7 0.19
dimensions 6 0.16
N=36 N=21
Hotel location 18 0.66 name 20 0.83
name 15 0.55 address 12 0.5
services 11 0.40 location 9 0.37
number of rooms 10 0.37 country 7 0.29
number of stars 10 0.37 city 7 0.29
category 8 0.29 number of rooms 4 0.16
address 6 0.22 rating 4 0.16
price/s 5 0.18 state 4 0.16
N=27 N=24
Restaurant type 21 0.7 name 21 0.75
location 17 0.56 address 20 0.71
name 13 0.43 type of cuisine 19 0.67
price/s 10 0.33 location 13 0.46
address 9 0.30 price/s 11 0.39
timetable 7 0.23 city 8 0.28
category 5 0.16 country 6 0.21
chef 5 0.17
type 5 0.17
N=30 N=28
Place geo. position 16 0.72 geo. position 26 0.92
name 7 0.32 country 14 0.5
location 6 0.27 name 13 0.46
altitude 4 0.18 city 10 0.36
region 4 0.18 address 5 0.17
type 4 0.18 state 5 0.17
N=22 N=28
Table C.9: Features and production frequencies for Location
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Subcategory Attributes (all) F f
Tourist Location name 18 0.42
location 18 0.42
geographical position 14 0.33
attractions 12 0.27
country 4 0.25
type 9 0.20
city 7 0.16
price/s 7 0.16
N=43
City country 31 0.56
name 25 0.45
geographical position 25 0.45
population 15 0.27
location 13 0.24
N=55
Shop location 29 0.51
name 27 0.47
type 24 0.33
address 19 0.33
type of products 18
timetable 11 0.19
N=57
Hotel name 35 0.68
location 27 0.53
address 18 0.35
number of rooms 14 0.27
services 13 0.25
number of stars 13 0.26
city 11 0.22
category 9 0.17
country 8 0.15
price/s 8 0.15
N=51
Restaurant name 34 0.58
location 30 0.52
address 29 0.5
type 26 0.44
price/s 21 0.36
type of cuisine 19 0.32
timetable 9 0.16
N=58
Place geographical position 42 0.84
neutral category country 20 0.40
name 20 0.40
city 11 0.22
location 9 0.18
N=50
Table C.10: Features and production frequencies for Location: aggregated
data (i.e. English and Italian)
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PERSON
Category Attributes (eng) k Attributes (it) k
Politician party 65.78 party 35.63
name 31.20 political view 28.67
gender 16.42 name 22.99
position/s 14.60 age 21.02
age 11.30 surname 18.06
Manager name 26.27 company 21.93
experiences 11.68 name 21.34
role/s 10.30 surname 18.06
department/s 9.12 experiences 9.12
occupation 7.01 education 9.85
Professor university 37.77 specialization 54.94
name 34.48 name 21.34
publications 19.19 institution 20.60
research area 17.17 publications 17.17
department 14.60 surname 13.14
Sportsperson type of sport 49.34 type of sport 54.82
name 31.20 name 22.99
team 17.17 age 17.31
birth-date 11.50 surname 11.50
gender 14.78 birth-date 9.85
Actor name 26.27 movies 34.34
movies 19.19 name 24.63
birth-date 11.50 experiences 25.54
gender 9.85 age 19.79
awards 6.14 surname 16.42
Person name 31.20 name 32.84
gender 22.99 surname 27.92
birth-date 18.06 birth-place 18.25
occupation 14.01 occupation 18.68
religion 13.74 birth-date 16.42
Table C.11: Relevance Measure for Person
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ORGANIZATION
Category Attributes (eng) k Attributes (it) k
Company name 24.63 name 36.12
ceo name 8.22 number of employees 14.78
business type 8.19 turnover 12.29
profits 7.01 share capital 10.96
revenue 6.87 activity 10.30
Association name 21.34 name 27.91
objective/s 16.42 members 27.47
members 11.68 objective/s 11.61
activity 11.68 number of members 7.01
date of foundation 9.12 functions 6.87
University name 26.27 faculties 30.91
number of students 19.19 name 22.99
faculty/ies 16.35 number of students 17.17
courses 13.70 courses 16.35
department/s 9.12 professors 13.74
Government name 11.49 political view 16.38
head 9.34 duration 13.74
members 9.34 party/s 10.96
party 8.22 ministries 10.30
leaders 8.22 ministers 10.30
Agency name 21.34 name 26.27
number of employees 7.44 number of employees 8.21
president 6.87 clients 6.87
specialization 4.67 sector 4.53
profit/s 4.67 objective/s 4.36
Organization name 21.34 name 27.91
business type 6.14 objective/s 12.34
objective/s 4.93 members 11.68
character/s 4.67 sector 9.05
head 4.67 date of foundation 8.21
Table C.12: Relevance for Organization
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EVENT
Category Attributes (eng) k Attributes (it) k
Conference name 22.32 topic 25.54
organizers 12.77 speakers 16.45
date 12.37 participants 16.42
chair/s 10.30 date 11.13
sessions 10.30 needs 10.30
Meeting time 29.76 topic 20.07
date 19.79 time 17.86
topic/s 18.43 participants 16.42
participants 16.08 date 11.13
agenda 13.74 location 7.01
Exhibition name 11.90 topic 21.89
time 8.93 duration 11.50
date 7.42 artists 10.96
start date 7.01 exhibitors 10.30
end date 4.93 title 9.85
Show actors 17.17 date 19.79
name 13.39 actors 18.68
producer/s 10.30 duration 18.06
time 7.44 time 16.37
director/s 7.01 title 14.78
Sports event type of sport 30.15 type of sport 27.41
stadium 10.30 name 14.59
date 12.37 date 13.60
time 7.44 location 7.01
winners 6.87 time 5.95
Event time 17.86 date 18.55
date 17.31 participants 13.14
name 10.41 name 12.77
participants 9.89 duration 8.21
repetition 6.87 time 7.44
Table C.13: Relevance for Event
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ARTIFACT
Category Attributes (eng) k Attributes (it) k
Product manufacturer 21.02 function/use 22.52
price 14.84 name 18.06
name 14.78 price 14.24
use 14.33 color 11.13
warranty 10.30 brand 9.34
Artwork artist/s 30.91 author 37.77
creation date 18.43 location 24.57
style 14.01 style 18.68
material 10.95 creation date 17.17
author 7.01 technique 17.17
Building architect 20.60 number of floors 37.77
number of floors 17.17 location 32.76
height 14.90 ara (smq) 20.60
name 13.13 height 16.37
architectural style 10.30 date of creation 13.74
Book author/s 46.71 publisher 61.81
publisher 44.64 number of pages 54.94
ISBN 35.63 author 44.34
year of publication 27.47 title 36.13
number of pages 24.04 year of publication 30.91
Article of
clothing
gender intended for 24.04 size/s 72.11
color 17.08 brand 35.03
material 16.42 color 33.39
style 16.35 fabric 27.47
fabric 13.74 model 17.17
Object shape 16.42 color 24.74
color 13.29 material 22.99
weight 11.68 shape 22.99
value 10.30 function/use 21.02
name 9.85 weight 18.25
Table C.14: Relevance for Artifact
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LOCATION
Category Attributes (eng) k Attributes (it) k
Tourist Loca-
tion
name 18.06 attractions 21.93
attractions 13.74 name 11.49
geographical position 11.50 services 10.96
price/s 4.95 population 9.34
area 4.67 geographical position 9.34
City population 25.69 population 56.05
name 21.34 geographical position 23.72
geographical position 11.50 name 19.70
region 9.34 region 18.25
language/s 9.12 climate 14.01
Shop products sold 13.74 products sold 48.08
name 13.13 name 31.20
quality 5.48 timetable 30.15
owner/s 5.42 number of employees 11.50
price/s 4.95 location 8.77
Hotel name 32.84 number of rooms 27.41
number of rooms 13.74 number of stars 27.41
rating 10.96 name 24.63
services 10.30 services 12.45
number of stars 10.30 category 10.84
Restaurant type of cuisine 52.08 name 21.34
name 34.48 timetable 19.19
chef 17.17 specialty 13.74
specialty 13.74 type of cuisine 10.30
price/s 13.60 price/s 9.49
Place geographical position 42.70 geographical position 29.19
name 21.34 address 16.82
continent 13.74 name 11.49
altitude 10.30 altitude 10.96
distance from the sea 8.22 continent 8.22
Table C.15: Relevance for Location
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C.2 Entity Search Experiment
C.2.1 Attribute frequencies for the entity types of the en-
tity search experiment
Category Attributes F f
Politician surname 53 1
first name 43 0.81
role 18 0.40
location: country 14 0.26
party 13 0.25
middle name 5 0.09
related event 4 0.07
affiliation 4 0.07
occupation 4 0.07
title 2 0.04
location: city 2 0.04
N=53
Manager surname 38 0.76
affiliation 30 0.60
first name 29 0.58
occupation 20 0.40
role 13 0.26
location: country 3 0.26
location: city 3 0.06
area of interest/activity 3 0.06
middle name 2
N=50
Professor surname 57 0.97
first name 48 0.81
affiliation: university 29 0.49
area of interest/activity 14 0.24
location: city 13 0.22
occupation 11 0.18
affiliation: faculty 7 0.12
title 6 0.10
affiliation: institute 4 0.06
affiliation: department 3 0.05
N=59
Sportsperson surname 48 0.98
first name 41 0.84
type of sport 37 0.76
affiliation: team 18 0.38
related event 7 0.14
location: country 4 0.08
N=49
Actor/actress first name 49 0.96
surname 48 0.94
movie/s-series 14 0.27
nationality 6 0.12
genre 5 0.09
N=51
Person surname 250 0.96
first name 233 0.90
occupation 24 0.09
affiliation 23 0.08
location: city 15 0.06
location: country 14 0.05
area of interest/activity 10 0.04
middle name 10 0.04
position/role 6 0.02
pseudonym 3 0.01
related event 2 0.01
famous for 2 0.01
N=260
Table C.16: Attribute frequencies in Person queries.
293
Subcategory Attributes F f
Company name 52 0.74
type of business 31 0.58
location: city 12 0.23
location: country 9 0.17
N=53
Association name 54 1
location: city 14 0.26
type of activity 14 0.26
location: country 5 0.05
N=54
University name 61 1
location: city 17 0.28
location: country 8 0.13
faculties 6 0.09
N=61
Government location: country 48 0.90
administrative body 11 0.20
premier 8 0.15
N=53
Agency name 48 0.98
type/activity 34 0.70
location: city 13 0.40
location: country 10 0.16
location: province 3 0.06
N=49
Organization name 265 0.95
neutral category type 30 0.11
activity 27 0.10
location: city 21 0.08
location: country 14 0.05
N=272
Table C.17: Attribute frequencies in Organization queries.
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Subcategory Attributes F f
Conference name 39 0.97
location: city 16 0.40
subject 10 0.25
date: month 5 0.13
date: year 3 0.07
N=40
Meeting type 27 0.61
place: city 24 0.54
name 15 0.34
date: month 13 0.29
date: year 10 0.23
organizers 7 0.16
subject 5 0.12
N=44
Exhibition location: city 34 0.81
location: building 13 0.31
name 13 0.31
date: year 12 0.28
subject 9 0.21
location: country 7 0.17
date: month 7 0.16
type 6 0.14
artist name 6 0.14
N=42
Show type 31 0.70
name 28 0.63
location: city 50
artist name 12 0.27
date: year 9 0.20
location: building 8 0.18
date: month 4 0.09
N=44
Sport event name 30 0.61
type of sport 21 0.37
location: city 21 0.37
type 12 0.31
participants 9 0.16
date: year 9 0.16
place: country 8 0.14
date: month 5 0.10
N=49
Event name 159 0.59
type 125 0.46
location: city 92 0.33
artist name 46 0.17
date: year 24 0..08
date: month 17 0.06
location: country 13 0.05
subjects 10 0.04
date:day 9 0.03
location: building 8 0.03
organizers 5 0.02
N=271
Table C.18: Attribute frequencies in Event queries.
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Subcategory Attributes F f
Product type 35 0.65
model name 28 0.52
brand 25 0.46
feature 23 0.42
use 4 0.07
N=54
Artwork title 48 0.92
creator 22 0.42
type 15 0.28
location: museum 14 0.27
location: city 10 0.19
style 5 0.09
N=52
Building location: city 44 0.76
name 42 0.72
use 16 0.28
place: country 9 0.16
type 8 0.14
N=58
Book title 45 0.92
author 34 0.69
publisher 6 0.12
subject 4 0.08
N=49
Article of clothing type 49 0.96
brand 23 0.45
material 12 0.24
features 11 0.21
sector 9 0.18
gender intended for 8 0.15
ways of purchase 5 0.09
N=51
Object type 169 0.63
name 64 0.24
model name 49 0.18
brand 45 0.17
feature 16 0.06
creator 14 0.05
N=269
Table C.19: Attribute frequencies in Artifact queries.
296
Subcategory Attributes F f
Tourist Location name 51 0.98
location: city 14 0.27
place: country 11 0.21
sector 7 0.13
location type 6 0.11
location: region 6 0.07
N=52
City name 51 0.96
location: country 25 0.34
attractions 8 0.15
administrative role 6 0.11
location:region 4 0.07
N=53
Shop location: city 35 0.58
business type 31 0.52
shop name 31 0.52
brand 19 0.30
place: country 5 0.12
N=60
Hotel name 48 0.94
location: city 42 0.82
location: country 11 0.21
location: area 5 0.09
type 4 0.08
N=51
Restaurant location: city 45 0.86
name 36 0.69
type of cuisine 27 0.52
address 5 0.09
services 5 0.09
N=52
Place name 255 0.94
location: city 53 0.19
location: country 41 0.15
type 25 0.09
location: region 13 0.05
N=271
Table C.20: Attribute frequencies in Location queries.
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C.2.2 Bayesian relevance measures for low-level entity types
Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Politician party 0.77
location: country 0.56
role 0.37
related event 0.30
nationality 0.28
title 0.24
surname 0.21
first name 0.20
Manager occupation 0.55
affiliation 0.33
role 0.29
location: country 0.16
location: city 0.19
surname 0.16
first name 0.15
Professor location: city 0.57
title 0.40
affiliation 0.40
occupation 0.27
area of interest/activity 0.21
surname 0.21
first name 0.20
Sportsperson area of interest/activity 0.62
related event 0.51
location: country 0.20
surname 0.21
first name 0.20
nationality 0.15
Actor movies/series 0.79
role 0.30
nationality 0.29
first name 0.24
surname 0.21
Table C.21: Bayesian Relevance: Person
Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Company type 0.40
activity 0.37
location: region 0.34
name 0.24
location: country 0.21
location. city 0.17
Association members 0.42
location: region 0.33
type 0.30
name 0.25
location: city 0.20
University faculties 0.60
name 0.24
location: city 0.21
location: country 0.17
Government administrative body 0.75
premier 0.69
location: country 0.23
location: city 0.19
Agency activity 0.43
location: country 0.25
location: city 0.20
Table C.22: Bayesian Relevance: Organization
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Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Conference subject 0.39
name 0.39
location: country 0.22
organizers 0.21
date: month 0.18
Meeting organizers 0.56
date: month 0.42
type 0.39
name 0.25
date: year 0.28
location: city 0.22
Exhibition location: country 0.57
location: building 0.55
date: day 0.43
subject 0.36
location: city 0.34
date: year 0.33
artist name 0.31
date: month 0.21
Show artist name 0.59
type 0.44
location: building 0.35
date: day 0.32
name 0.28
location: city 0.22
Sport event type of sport 0.81
location: country 0.35
date: day 0.23
name 0.22
date: year 0.18
Table C.23: Bayesian Relevance: Event
Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Product model 0.89
brand 0.72
feature 0.71
type 0.45
use 0.20
Artwork location: building 0.82
style 0.62
nationality 0.55
creator 0.37
title/name 0.35
type 0.20
Building location: city 0.71
use 0.70
location: country 0.55
name 0.30
Book publisher 0.68
subject 0.60
creator 0.56
title/name 0.33
Article of Clothing sector 0.42
gender intended for 0.39
material 0.38
brand 0.20
Table C.24: Bayesian Relevance: Artifact
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Entity Type (e) Attribute type (a) p(e|a)
Tourist location location name 0.74
location type 0.28
organization name 0.18
City administrative role 0.68
building name 0.68
state name 0.48
municipality 0.48
country name 0.46
city name 0.30
Shop shop name 0.91
product type 0.90
brand 0.85
shop type 0.79
address:street 0.33
Hotel hotel name 0.93
hotel type 0.61
number of stars 0.48
price range 0.42
Restaurant restaurant name 0.92
type of cuisine 0.90
restaurant type 0.61
services 0.47
location: neighbourhood 0.43
Table C.25: Bayesian Relevance: Location
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C.2.3 Position Distribution of Attribute Types
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Figure C.1: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Person.
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Figure C.2: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Organization.
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Figure C.3: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Event.
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Figure C.4: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Artifact.
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Figure C.5: Probability distribution of attribute types for the first four positions
in queries about Location.
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Appendix D
Mutability and Causality
Ratings: Stimuli and
Measures
D.1 Entity profiles used to collect mutability
and causality ratings
The following profiles were used to collect mutability and causality ratings.
1) PERSON DESCRIPTIONS
NAME: Madison Smith
AGE: 45
HOBBIES: tennis
OCCUPATION: reporter
PHONE: 202.287.3305
HEIGHT: 5’8”
NAME: Michael Abrams
BIRTH DATE: July 15, 1969
EXPERIENCES AND QUALIFICATIONS: master in business administration, Stanford Advanced
Project Management certificate
WEIGHT: 170 pounds
CITY OF RESIDENCE: London
EMAIL: abrams@gmail.com
NAME: Benjamin Green
RELIGION: catholic
BIRTH PLACE: Los Angeles
EYE COLOR: blue
EDUCATION: master degree in law
ADDRESS: 4300 Hudson Ave.
NAME: Nathan McConnell
NATIONALITY: Ireland
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MARITAL STATUS: single
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 595-12-5274
AFFILIATION: Porter Airlines
HAIR COLOR: blonde
NAME: Nicholas Patton
CHARACTER: sociable
MOTHER’S NAME: Julia Anderson
ROLE: editor in chief
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE: Germany
GENDER: male
2) ORGANIZATION DESCRIPTIONS
International Organization
NAME: Asian Commission for Environmental Cooperation
MEMBER STATES: China, India, Japan, Australia, Nepal, Mongolia
HEADQUARTERS (location): Bangkok
LEGAL STATUS: non governmental
DATE OF FOUNDATION: 1988
WEB SITE URL: http://www.acec.com
Company
NAME: Cyber
COUNTRY: USA
BUSINESS TYPE: computer hardware and software
CEO: John Anderson
OWNER: Michael Thomson
ANNUAL TURNOVER: 2 million dollars
Association
NAME: APAP
CITY: Los Angeles
MAIN OBJECTIVE: prevention and health promotion
PRESIDENT: Carol Walton
ASSOCIATES: Robert Burton, Alexander Luan
EMAIL: apap@gmail.com
Agency
NAME: Job Finder
PRESIDENT: John Langton
ADDRESS: 1345 Polaris Ave
TYPE: employment agency
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: 50
PHONE NUMBER: 345 678956
University
NAME: Cajal University
CITY: Madrid
FACULTIES: History, International Business, Philosophy
DEPARTMENTS: Departments of Business Administration and Economics . . .Department of Hu-
man Sciences
NUMBER OF STUDENTS: 11000
COURSES: Introduction to American Studies . . .Modern Philosophy
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3) EVENT DESCRIPTIONS
Conference
NAME: ACS
LOCATION: 14750 Conference Center Drive
DATES: October 25-29
YEAR: 2009
ORGANIZERS: Lisa Zhang, Mike Dean
SPONSORS: BBN Technology, ManTech
Show
NAME: Rainbow
CITY: New York
TYPE: musical
DATE: September 4-6
LEAD ACTOR: David Alvarez
DIRECTOR: Stephen Daldry
Sport event
NAME: Beach World Cup
COUNTRY: Dubai
YEAR: 2009
TIME: 13 p.m.
TYPE OF SPORT: Soccer
PARTICIPANTS: Mexico, Italy; Germany, France
Meeting
NAME: AIB (Academy of International Business)
TIME: 9 a.m. - 4 p.m.
DATE: October 25
YEAR: 2009
LOCATION: College of Business Administration, San Diego State University
TOPIC: business strategies during the depression
Exhibition
NAME: The Unusual Object
SUBJECT: surrealism and the power of the imagination to transform the everyday
LOCATION: The Museum of Modern Art, 11 West 53 Street
DATES: June 24, 2009-January 4, 2010
PRICE: $20
MAIN ARTISTS: Salvador Dal´ı and Meret Oppenheim
4) ARTIFACT DESCRIPTIONS
Product
NAME: Wing
PRICE: $449
MODEL: gd900
COLOR: black
SIZE: 13”
MANUFACTURER: Sony
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Book
TITLE: Mind Shadow
AUTHOR: Richard Cabot
PUBLISHER: Dell Publishing
NUMBER OF PAGES: 192
ISBN: 9780440204886
EDITION: 1989
Artwork
TITLE: Still Life
AUTHOR: Patricia Waddell
DISPLAY LOCATION: San Francisco Museum of Modern Art
STYLE: contemporary art
CREATION DATE: 1990
MATERIAL: oil on canvas
Building
NAME: Green Hall
ADDRESS: 3131 McClintock Ave
HEIGHT: 50m
USE: residence hall
COLOR: white
ARCHITECT: Jackie Craven
Software
NAME: Photo Power
TYPE: freeware
VERSION: 3.3
FEATURES/FUNCTIONS: photo editing, screen capturing, raw converter
MANUFACTURER: MOOII TECH
CREATOR: Paul Griffin
5) LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS
City
NAME: Eastport
POPULATION: 1000
GEO COORDINATES: 44◦54’49”N 67◦0’14”W
STATE/REGION: Washington County, Maine
AREA: 13 sq mi
MAIN LANGUAGE: English
Shop
NAME: Calibre
ADDRESS (street): 139 Elizabeth St.
SHOP TYPE: retail store
PRODUCTS SOLD: sport clothes
OPENING HOURS: 9 a.m.- 6 p.m.
AREA: 150 mq
Restaurant
NAME: Khaosan
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COUSINE TYPE: Thai Restaurant
CITY: London
PRICE RANGE: $20-50
CHEF: Win Liaowarin
RATING: medium
Tourist location
NAME: Fun Spot
ADDRESS: 5551 Del Verde Way, Orlando
TYPE: amusement park
PRICE: $35
HOURS: 10:00 - midnight
ATTRACTION/S: Ferris wheel
Hotel
NAME: Plaza
ADDRESS (street): 1345 Richmond Street
NUMBER OF ROOMS: 300
NUMBER OF STARS: 4
SERVICES: Concierge, High-speed Internet access
OWNER: Terry Tailor
D.2 Mutability and Causality Ratings
Entity Type Attributes Mutability Ratings Causality Ratings
Mean SD Mean SD
Person 1 age 4.93 3.17 5.5 3.7
hobbies 4.81 2.04 3.7 2.54
occupation 4.98 2.17 3.8 2.31
phone number 1.81 2.07 2.75 2.32
height 4.15 2.29 6.68 2.08
Person 2 birth date 6.44 2.78 8.68 0.70
qualifications 5.75 2.17 4.81 2.78
weight 2.31 1.40 2.56 2.44
city of residence 3.43 2.22 3.12 2.27
email 1.25 0.57 3.06 2.88
Person 3 religion 5.68 2.70 5.25 2.46
birth place 5.12 2.60 8.62 0.80
eye color 4.12 2.39 5.18 3.20
education 6.12 1.92 3.37 2.27
address 2.0 0.96 2.56 2.12
Person 4 nationality 7.06 2.20 6.81 2.83
marital status 4.25 2.88 2.06 1.91
social security number 4.31 3.64 8.18 1.04
affiliation 3.0 1.89 3.0 2.06
hair color 2.31 1.53 2.43 2.52
Person 5 character 6.43 2.06 4.25 2.93
mother’s name 4.93 3.08 5.81 3.35
role 4.31 2.15 3.12 2.47
country of residence 4.12 2.33 3.18 2.10
gender 8.06 1.94 6.25 2.56
Int. Organization member states 6.06 2.04 6.93 2.69
headquarters 3.93 2.37 3.93 2.29
legal status 6.06 1.98 4.75 2.51
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date of foundation 4.93 2.64 8.25 1.69
web site url 2.25 2.11 4.25 2.86
Company Country 5.06 2.79 4.75 2.67
business type 8.0 0.89 6.06 2.23
ceo 5.19 2.34 2.75 2.01
owner 4.81 2.13 2.87 2.06
annual turnover 4.50 2.22 3.18 1.93
Association city 4.37 2.18 5.06 2.23
main objective 8.12 1.31 5.75 2.35
president 4.25 2.11 2.12 1.85
associates 4.75 1.69 3.18 2.63
email 1.37 0.61 5.75 1.98
Agency president 3.75 2.20 2.12 1.85
address 2.93 1.56 3.18 2.63
type 8.00 1.15 5.75 1.98
number of employees 3.56 1.96 2.37 1.82
phone number 1.31 0.60 3.37 2.47
University city 6.62 1.58 7.5 1.71
faculties 6.31 2.24 6.18 2.31
departments 6.25 1.87 6.75 2.65
number of students 2.68 1.81 2.75 2.62
courses 4.87 2.33 6.93 2.14
Conference location 3.87 2.27 3.25 2.20
dates 2.50 1.82 3.5 1.93
year 5.18 2.16 4.93 2.32
organizers 5.75 1.57 6.37 2.39
sponsors 3.62 2.06 5.43 2.55
Show city 4.43 2.18 3.31 2.18
type 7.81 1.47 6.25 2.23
date 2.68 1.70 3.37 2.02
lead actor 6.25 2.48 3.93 1.94
director 6.0 2.09 3.87 2.36
Sport Event country 5.5 2.03 4.06 2.56
year 5.12 2.82 6.68 2.05
time 2.62 2.12 2.50 1.09
type of sport 8.50 1.03 7.00 2.44
participants 4.93 2.64 5.56 2.82
Meeting time 2.50 1.71 3.18 2.63
date 2.62 1.66 3.56 2.50
year 5.06 2.26 6.00 2.55
location 2.81 1.90 3.56 2.50
topic 7.37 1.85 4.68 2.30
Exhibition subject 7.81 0.98 5.37 2.36
location 4.37 1.85 3.00 1.54
dates 2.68 2.08 3.37 2.24
price 3.06 1.80 2.37 1.20
main artists 7.75 1.0 6.06 2.51
Product price 3.37 2.50 1.93 0.92
model 6.31 2.02 4.37 2.98
color 3.31 2.05 2.81 2.37
size 6.12 1.54 4.43 2.94
manufacturer 4.87 2.15 4.68 2.82
Book author 8.50 0.81 8.43 0.96
publisher 4.25 2.79 6.12 2.70
number of pages 4.25 2.67 4.81 3.20
ISBN 4.56 3.59 5.62 2.77
edition 3.93 2.51 5.06 3.45
Artwork author 8.31 1.01 8.43 0.81
display location 3.25 2.40 2.43 1.78
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style 8.00 0.96 7.37 1.82
creation date 4.93 2.88 8.00 1.82
material 7.81 1.32 7.75 2.08
Building address 4.93 2.67 5.12 2.91
height 5.5 1.93 4.43 2.65
use 4.93 2.93 4.00 1.96
color 2.75 1.77 2.62 2.30
architect 6.87 2.06 7.37 2.33
Software type 5.87 2.15 4.93 2.93
version 4.81 1.90 3.93 2.83
functions 8.43 0.89 6.93 2.29
manufacturer 3.87 1.82 5.56 2.03
creator 7.0 1.63 7.81 1.97
City population 4.81 2.71 2.06 1.18
geo coordinates 7.06 1.91 8.25 1.80
state 8.31 1.35 7.81 2.19
area 4.56 2.25 5.81 2.50
main language 6.93 1.98 7.56 2.52
Shop address 3.56 1.82 3.06 2.46
shop type 7.25 2.26 4.93 1.28
product sold 7.68 1.4 4.81 2.19
opening hours 2.68 1.81 2.12 1.31
area 4.81 2.07 2.81 2.25
Restaurant cuisine type 7.62 1.58 5.87 2.39
city 5.31 1.85 4.93 2.56
price range 4.5 1.89 3.00 1.26
chef 5.31 2.67 3.43 2.47
rating 5.25 2.48 2.93 1.65
address 5.37 2.06 4.68 2.07
Tourist Location type 8.0 1.82 5.5 2.36
price 3.43 2.12 2.62 1.62
hours 2.68 1.95 3.25 2.74
main attractions 6.37 2.24 4.62 2.30
Hotel address 3.93 2.04 4.87 2.52
number of rooms 4.75 2.56 4.25 2.26
number of stars 5.31 2.54 3.00 1.71
services 5.43 2.33 6.37 2.52
owner 4.31 2.24 3.31 2.54
Table D.1: Mean (and SD= standard deviation) Mutability and Causality Ratings
D.3 Entity Profiles used in Experiment 2
ORIGINAL CONTINUER 1 CONTINUER 2
NAME: Carol Green Carol Green Carol Green
Address: 506 South Grand Ave 701 Pennsylvania Ave 506 South Grand Ave
Weight: 126lb 126lb 136lb
NAME: Robert Smith Robert Smith Robert Smith
Hair color : brown red brown
City of residence: New York New York Chicago
NAME: Stephen Young Stephen Young Stephen Young
Phone number : 312-263-1737 847-125-1007 312-263-1737
Occupation: professor professor financial counselor
NAME: Nathan McConnell Nathan McConnell Nathan McConnell
Weight: 160 lb 150 lb 160 lb
Religion: Catholic Catholic Buddhism
NAME: Rachel James Rachel James Rachel James
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Marital status: single married single
Birth date: 29 September 1966 29 September 1966 31 August 1972
NAME: Bob James Bob James Bob James
City of residence: New York Toronto New York
Affiliation: IMSI IMSI Visio
NAME: Mary Scott Mary Scott Mary Scott
Email: mary@gmail.com chubby@yahoo.com mary@gmail.com
Hobbies: gardening gardening stamp collecting
NAME: Michael Abrams Michael Abrams Michael Abrams
Role: Business Administrator Human resource manager Business Administrator
Age: 46 46 41
NAME: Sarah Randolph Sarah Randolph Sarah Randolph
Country of residence: Germany Ireland Germany
Height: 5’6” 5’6” 5’3”
NAME: Carl Larson Carl Larson Carl Larson
Hobbies: tennis kayaking tennis
Character : sociable sociable antisocial
NAME: Anna Jones Anna Jones Anna Jones
Qualifications: public adm. certificate business adm. certificate public adm. certificate
Eye color : brown brown green
NAME: Virginia Tylor Virginia Tylor Virginia Tylor
Occupation: hairdresser shop assistant hairdresser
Birth date: 1 January 1968 1 January 1968 25 May 1971
NAME: Madison William Madison William Madison William
Gender : male female male
Mother’s name: Alyssa Thomson Alyssa Thomson Emma Paxton
NAME: David Smith David Smith David Smith
Religion: Catholic Jewish Catholic
Social security num: 431-45-9876 431-45-9876 123-46-6789
NAME: Alexandra Brown Alexandra Brown Alexandra Brown
Height: 5’40” 5’ 50” 5’40”
Birth place: Miami Miami Santa Barbara
Table D.2: Person Profiles used in the experiment2
ORIGINAL CONTINUER 1 CONTINUER 2
NAME: Cyber Cyber Cyber
Owner : Michael Thomson Robert Lewis Michael Thomson
Ceo: John Anderson John Anderson Anthony Moore
NAME: Horizon Horizon Horizon
Address: 1345 Boston Ave 1915 Polaris Ave 1345 Boston Ave
President: Carol Walton Carol Walton Emma Johnson
NAME: Biotech Biotech Biotech
Owner : Addison Foster Robert Lewis Addison Foster
Country: United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany
NAME: Cajal University Cajal University Cajal University
N. students: 10000 13000 10000
Departments: Economics Economics, Physics
Anthropology, Chemistry Anthropology, Chemistry Sociology, Philosophy
NAME: Pauling University Pauling University Pauling University
N. students: 15000 13000 15000
City: Berlin Berlin Frankfurt
NAME: Friendship Charity Ass. Friendship Charity Ass. Friendship Charity Ass.
President: Meredith Baxter Carol Lee Meredith Baxter
Email: info@fshipcharity.org info@fshipcharity.org contact@fca.org
NAME: Youth Football Ass. Youth Football Ass. Youth Football Ass.
Email: info@yfa.org arniex@virgin.net info@yfa.org
City: San Francisco San Francisco San Diego
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NAME: SCA SCA SCA
President: Carol Walton Larry Christiansen Carol Walton
Associates: Brett Kleist, Brett Kleist, Stuart Finney,
A. Tang, M. Esseman A. Tang, M. Esseman M. Phelps, A. Wang
NAME: Third eye Third eye Third eye
Phone number : 212-509-7200 212-777-7534 212-509-7200
Type: advertising agency advertising agency employment agency
NAME: For the Right to Food For the Right to Food For the Right to Food
Headquarters: Paris Amsterdam Paris
Legal status: non governmental non governmental intergovernmental
NAME: COA COA COA
City: Columbus Pittsburgh Columbus
Main objective: obesity obesity promote and coordinate
prevention prevention chess activities
NAME: Commission on Commission on Commission on
Climate Change Climate Change Climate Change
Headquarters: Shanghai Tokyo Shanghai
Member states: China, China, Nepal,
India, Japan India, Japan Australia, Vietnam
NAME: IAOP IAOP IAOP
Objective: ent. older people sup. autistic peo. ent. older peo.
Associates: Robert O’Neill, Robert O’Neill, Alan Scott,
Mary Lynch, Linda King Mary Lynch, Linda King Barbara Hogan, Marc Reid
NAME: Fermi University Fermi University Fermi University
Departments: Biology, Anthropology, Art and Sciences,
Economics, Engineering Chemistry, Physics Economics, Engineering
City: Rome Rome Venice
NAME: IFA IFA IFA
Member states: Texas, Florida, Texas,
Maine, Georgia Virginia, Ohio Arkansas, Georgia
Date of foundation: 25-10-1980 25-10-1980 2-11-1995
Table D.3: Organization Profiles used in the experiment2
ORIGINAL CONTINUER 1 CONTINUER 2
NAME: The Unusual Object The Unusual Object The Unusual Object
Location: Museum of Modern Art Axia Modern Art Museum of Modern Art
Price: $20 $20 $15
NAME: Asian Semantic Web Conf. Asian SW Conference Asian SW Conference
Location: Pierre Baudis Center Sir Alexander Fleming build. Pierre Baudis Center
Dates: November 25-28 November 25-28 September 12-17
NAME: Breeders’ Cup NAME: Breeders’ Cup NAME: Breeders’ Cup
Time: 9 a.m - 4 p.m. 11 a.m - 6 p.m. 9 a.m - 4 p.m.
Country: Canada Canada USA
NAME: Business Forum Business Forum Business Forum
Time: 9 a.m - 13 p.m. 14p.m - 17 p.m. 9 a.m - 13 p.m
Year : 2009 2009 2010
NAME: Currie Cup Currie Cup Currie Cup
Time: 9 a.m - 18 p.m. 15 a.m - 21 p.m. 9 a.m - 18 p.m.
Type of sport: rugby rugby bowling
NAME: Mary Poppins Mary Poppins Mary Poppins
City: New York Amsterdam New York
Date: October 25-29 October 25-29 December 25-29
NAME: The First Dream The First Dream The First Dream
City: Chicago Washington Chicago
Lead actor : Steven Robman Steven Robman Henry Condell
NAME: NanoThech NanoThech NanoThech
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Dates: June 23-26 July 1-4 June 23-26
Sponsors: NSTI, NSTI, NanoInk,
CTSI, Platinum CTSI, Platinum Merck, BASF
NAME: Infringe the Obvious Infringe the Obvious Infringe the Obvious
Dates: June 24, 2009 - October 12, 2009 - June 24, 2009 -
January 4, 2010 February 2, 2010 January 4, 2010
Main artists: C. Lim, B. Puah C. Lim, B. Puah J. Hiah, F. West
NAME: The Misanthrope The Misanthrope The Misanthrope
Lead actor : Melanie Klein Kelly Price Melanie Klein
Director : Thea Sharrock Thea Sharrock Tom Morris
NAME: ABS ABS ABS
Topic: business strategy safety business strategy
Year : 2009 2009 2010
NAME: Rip Curl Pro Rip Curl Pro Rip Curl Pro
Country: Australia New Zealand Australia
Type of sport: surf surf horse race
NAME: GECCO GECCO GECCO
Year : 2008 2009 2008
Sponsors: Toyota, Philips NSTI, Nvidia,
CTSI, Platinum Icosystem Corporation
NAME: Beach Soccer Festival Beach Soccer Festival Beach Soccer Festival
Participants: Italy, Germany Italy,
Japan, Senegal , Australia, China Japan, Senegal
Year : 2007 2007 2008
NAME: Anaconda Anaconda Anaconda
Year : 2009 2010 2009
Type of sport: surf surf triathlon
Table D.4: Event Profiles used in the experiment2
ORIGINAL CONTINUER 1 CONTINUER 2
NAME: Viparis Viparis Viparis
Use: convention center shopping center convention center
Color : grey grey white
NAME: Wing NAME: Wing NAME: Wing
Price: $200 $250 $200
Model: gd900 gd900 gd1100
NAME: Margot Guest House Margot Guest House Margot Guest House
Color : yellow green yellow
Address: 1678 Lexington Ave 1678 Lexington Ave 317 West 14th Street
NAME: Remembrance Remembrance Remembrance
Display location: High Museum of Art Museum of Fine Arts High Museum of Art
Style: expressionism expressionism cubism
NAME: Embrace Embrace Embrace
Display location: National Museum of Art Institute National Museum of
Modern Art Modern Art
Artist: Michelle Ward Michelle Ward Megan Faye
NAME: XEL XEL XEL
Model: KDL-46X3500 RG-250 KDL-46X3500
Size: 32” 32” 46”
NAME: Left Back Left Back Left Back
Number of pages: 250 270 250
Edition: 2th 2th 4th
NAME: Amulet Amulet Amulet
Version: 1.1 1.5 1.1
Function: photo editing photo editing file sharing
NAME: Codec Codec Codec
Version: 2.1.2 1.1.4 2.1.2
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Creator : Andrew Johnson Andrew Johnson Ian Darragh
NAME: Akismet Akismet Akismet
Type: freeware commercial software freeware
Manufacturer : Zone Labs Zone Labs TackTech
NAME: The Soul’s Darkness The Soul’s Darkness The Soul’s Darkness
Edition: 1th 2th 1th
Publisher : Picador Picador Henry Holt and Co.
NAME: Mid Town Tower Mid Town Tower Mid Town Tower
Address: 1678 Zola Ave 1915 Sherman Way 1678 Zola Ave
Architect: David Fisher David Fisher Helmut Jahn
NAME: Last Moon Last Moon Last Moon
Publisher : Little, Brown & Company Samhain Publishing Little, Brown & Company
ISBN : 978-0316166317 978-0316166317 978-1599982595
NAME: Bridgit Bridit Bridit
Functions: audio conferencing video conferencing audio conferencing
Creator : Paul Barlow Paul Barlow Nicholas Chapman
NAME: Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Santa Cruz
Author : Paul Bloomer Michelle Ward Paul Bloomer
Creation date: April 1980 April 1980 August 1992
Table D.5: Artifact Profiles used in the experiment2
ORIGINAL CONTINUER 1 CONTINUER 2
NAME: Khnumhotep’s Tomb Khnumhotep’s Tomb Khnumhotep’s Tomb
Price: $20 $25 $20
Hours: 10:00 am - 5:00 pm 10:00 am - 5:00 pm 2:00 pm - 5:00 pm
NAME: Petal Petal Petal
Area: 80smq 130sqm 80smq
Address: 1661 York Ave 1661 York Ave 1345 Madison Ave
NAME: Old Town Old Town Old Town
Price: $30 $20 $30
Address: 834 Surf Ave 834 Surf Ave 11131 Malibu Dr
NAME: Antigone Antigone Antigone
Opening hours: 10:00 am - 9:00 pm 11:00 am - 7:00 pm 10:00 am - 9:00 pm
Shop type: outlet outlet department store
NAME: Grafton Grafton Grafton
Population: 56,257 35,000 56,257
Geo coordinates: 29◦41’S 152◦56’E 29◦41’S 152◦56’E 33◦51’S 151◦12’E
NAME: Grace Hotel Grace Hotel Grace Hotel
Number of stars: 3 5 3
Owner : Cherie Ditcham Cherie Ditcham Alex Scott
7. NAME: The Pavilion The Pavilion The Pavilion
Price range: $40-70 $80-120 $40-70
Chef : Alex Di Maggio Alex Di Maggio Antonio Tettamanzi
NAME: Carmelita Carmelita Carmelita
Rating: 4.5 3.8 4.5
Cuisine type: Mexican Mexican Seafood
NAME: Capital Hotel Capital Hotel Capital Hotel
Number of stars: 5 4 5
Services: Wi-Fi access in public areas Wi-Fi access in public areas In room Wi-Fi
NAME: Heritage Park Heritage Park Heritage Park
Address: 861 SE Main Street 2470 Heritage Park Row 861 SE Main Street
Main attraction: Neptune Fountain Neptune Fountain Steam Locomotive
NAME: Euro Queen Hotel Euro Queen Hotel Euro Queen Hotel
Number of rooms: 196 150 196
Address: 122 Church Road 122 Church Road 110 Peckham Road
NAME: Griffin House Griffin House Griffin House
Number of rooms: 25 50 25
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Services: 24-hour front desk 24-hour front desk daytime front desk
NAME: Sitar Sitar Sitar
Cuisine type: Indian Japanese Indian
City: Boston Boston Milwaukee
NAME: Fantasy Fantasy Fantasy
Address: 1101 Van Ness Ave 122 Church Road 1101 Van Ness Ave
Services: free parking free parking valet parking
NAME: Queensburg Queensburg Queensburg
Area: 157 Km2 165 Km2 157 Km2
Main language: English English French
Table D.6: Location Profiles used in the experiment2
D.4 Response Distribution in Experiment 2
D.4.1 Causal Continuer Model Fit
Graphical representations of the Causal Continuer Model fitting for the 15 trials
of the five categories used in experiment 2.
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Figure D.1: Person tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.2: Person tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.3: Organization tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.4: Organization tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.5: Event tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.6: Event tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.7: Artifact tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.8: Artifact tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.9: Location tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.10: Location tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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D.4.2 Naive Causal Model Fit
Graphical representations of the Naive Causal Model fitting for the 15 trials of
the five categories used in experiment 2.
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Figure D.11: Person tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.12: Person tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.13: Organization tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.14: Organization tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the con-
tinuer 1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same
entity as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from
the causal continuer model.
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Figure D.15: Event tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.16: Event tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer 1,
continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.17: Artifact tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.18: Artifact tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.19: Location tasks 1-8. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Figure D.20: Location tasks 9-15. Percentage of responses that the continuer
1, continuer 2, both continuers, or neither continuers refers to the same entity
as the original description. Lines with square points are predictions from the
causal continuer model.
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Appendix E
PropLit Index
E.1 Predicate-Entity Type Mapping used in the
RDF index
In the following table we reported the mapping schema used in the advanced
search module of the PropLit Index.
Predicate Mapped in
http://www.aktors.org/ontology/portal#full-name person
http://www.aktors.org/ontology/portal#given-name person
http://www.aktors.org/ontology/portal#family-name person
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name person
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/member name person
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/givenname person
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/surname person
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/nick person
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/accountName person
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#given-name person
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#fn person
http://purl.oclc.org/NET/nknouf/ns/bibtex#hasAuthor person
http://rdfs.org/sioc/ns#name person
http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/creator person
http://www.kisti.re.kr/isrl/ResearchRefOntology#engNameOfPerson person
http://purl.uniprot.org/core/author person
http://dbpedia.org/property/artist person
http://dbpedia.org/property/playername person
http://www.aktors.org/ontology/portal#has-appellation person
http://www.rdfabout.com/rdf/schema/ussec/officerTitle person
http://purl.uniprot.org/core/author person
http://dbpedia.org/ontology/leaderTitle person
http://www.geonames.org/ontology#name location
http://www.geonames.org/ontology#alternateName location
http://www.geonames.org/ontology/#locationMap location
http://dbpedia.org/property/country location
http://dbpedia.org/property/county location
http://dbpedia.org/property/counties location
http://dbpedia.org/property/birthPlace location
http://dbpedia.org/property/deathPlace location
http://dbpedia.org/property/region location
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http://dbpedia.org/property/location location
http://dbpedia.org/property/state location
http://dbpedia.org/property/city location
http://dbpedia.org/property/place location
http://dbpedia.org/property/hqCity location
http://dbpedia.org/property/province location
http://dbpedia.org/property/region location
http://dbpedia.org/property/frazioni location
http://dbpedia.org/property/capital location
http://dbpedia.org/property/citta location
http://dbpedia.org/property/deathPlace location
http://dbpedia.org/property/adresse location
http://rdf.geospecies.org/ont/gsontology#stateprov name location
http://tap.xmlns.com/data/representsPlace location
http://dbpedia.org/property/hometown location
http://www.ontoknowledge.org/oil/case-studies/Waterways location
http://swat.cse.lehigh.edu/resources/onto/university.owl#city location
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#locality location
http://www.w3.org/2001/vcard-rdf/3.0#Locality location
http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/based near location
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#country-name location
http://data.linkedct.org/resource/linkedct/facility address country location
http://data.linkedct.org/resource/linkedct/facility address city location
http://www.w3.org/2002/12/cal/icaltzd#location location
http://dbpedia.org/property/regierungsbezirk location
http://purl.oclc.org/NET/nknouf/ns/bibtex#hasAddress location
http://swrc.ontoware.org/ontology#address location
http://www.isi.edu/webscripter/bibtex.o.daml#address location
http://www.kisti.re.kr/isrl/ResearchRefOntology#engNameOfLocation location
http://www.kisti.re.kr/isrl/ResearchRefOntology#engNameOfLocation location
http://annotation.semanticweb.org/iswc/iswc.daml#location location
http://www.isi.edu/webscripter/bibtex.o.daml#address location
http://www.daml.org/2002/02/telephone/1/areacodes-ont#rc location
http://www.radarnetworks.com/shazam#location location
http://wikicompany.org/wiki/Special:URIResolver/Property-3AAddress location
http://wikicompany.org/wiki/Special:URIResolver/Property-3ARegion location
http://www.daml.ri.cmu.edu/ont/USCity.daml#name location
http://demo.openlinksw.com/schemas/northwind#provinceName location
http://www.cs.cas.cz/semweb#publisher address location
http://dbpedia.org/property/state location
http://www.daml.org/2001/01/gedcom/gedcom#place location
http://demo.openlinksw.com/schemas/northwind#shipAddress location
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#street-address location
http://e-tourism.deri.at/ont/e-tourism.owl#hasStreet location
http://www.snee.com/ns/flights#flightFromCityName location
http://www.snee.com/ns/flights#flightToCityName location
http://dbpedia.org/property/cityStateProperty location
http://rdf.geospecies.org/ont/gsontology#timezone location
http://www.w3.org/2001/vcard-rdf/3.0#Country location
http://www4.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/factbook/ns#countryname localshortform location
http://www4.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/factbook/ns#countryname locallongform location
http://www.ontoknowledge.org/oil/case-studies/Country name location
http://www.ontoknowledge.org/oil/case-studies/National capital location
http://wikicompany.org/wiki/Special:URIResolver/Property-3ARegion location
http://data.semanticweb.org/ns/swc/ontology#affiliation organization
http://www.okkam.org/prefix/affiliation organization
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#organization-name organization
http://ramonantonio.net/doac/0.1/#organization organization
http://purl.oclc.org/NET/nknouf/ns/bibtex#hasInstitution organization
336
http://dbpedia.org/ontology/keyPersonPosition organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/airline organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/manufacturer organization
http://data.semanticweb.org/ns/swc/ontology#affiliation organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/secondTeam organization
http://www.kisti.re.kr/isrl/ResearchRefOntology#engNameOfInstitution organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/firstTeam organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/fastTeam organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/thirdTeam organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/companyName organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/clubname organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/acronyms organization
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#organization-unit organization
http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#organization-name organization
http://dev.livingreviews.org/epubtk/terms#affiliation organization
http://ramonantonio.net/doac/0.1/#organization organization
http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/publisher organization
http://dbpedia.org/property/employer organization
http://www.aktors.org/ontology/portal#has-goals organization
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/ml/riddle#publisher organization
Table E.1: Predicate-Entity Type mapping schema
E.2 Top-50 RDF Predicates and their frequency
In the following table we reported the list of the top-50 RDF predicates and the
corresponding frequencies in the original data set of RDF triples, before filtering
the data set to extract predicate-literal couples. The Table gives an idea of the
distribution of triples between the main ontologies today available.
Predicate Frequency
http://dbpedia.org/property/wikilink 156,434,900
rdf:type 143,479,200
rdfs:seeAlso 53,852,300
foaf:knows 35,786,400
foaf:nick 32,979,500
foaf:weblog 23,239,200
dc:title 22,356,700
akt:has-author 19,541,900
sioc:links to 19,228,400
skos:subject 18,280,600
foaf:interest 16,786,400
foaf:member name 14,799,800
rss:link 14,357,800
foaf:holdsAccount 14,038,900
foaf:image 13,871,800
rss:title 13,524,600
rdfs:label 13,515,900
foaf:name 13,179,000
geonames:nearbyFeatures 13,128,700
dc:date 12,519,700
foaf:accountName 12,133,000
foaf:accountServiceHomepage 12,068,600
geonames:parentFeature 11,466,300
foaf:tagLine 10,677,500
rss:description 9,844,700
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content:encoded 9,794,800
foaf:accountProfilePage 9,483,700
sioc:has container 9,171,900
rdfs:comment 9,109,600
akt:cites-publication-reference 8,944,600
geonames:name 7,600,800
geo:lat 7,399,900
geo:long 7,341,000
http://dbpedia.org/property/wikiPageUsesTemplate 7,102,100
akt:full-name 7,100,700
dc:creator 6,987,900
geonames:featureClass 6,962,200
geonames:inCountry 6,827,100
geonames:locationMap 6,822,700
geonames:featureCode 6,822,300
owl:sameAs 6,539,300
http://dbpedia.org/property/redirect 6,451,500
foaf:homepage 6,427,100
http://dbpedia.org/property/abstract 5,750,400
foaf:img 5,562,800
http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/rss091#pubDate 4,814,700
foaf:page 4,653,200
dc:description 4,651,700
akt:has-title 4,310,500
akt:has-date 3,923,200
Table E.2: Top-50 RDF Predicates and their frequency in the 1 billion triple store.
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